

THE
DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

OF THE
MARQUESS WELLESLEY, K. G.

DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION IN

INDIA:

EDITED BY
MONTGOMERY MARTIN.

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INTRODUCTION

THE present Volume contains the chronological series of the Despatches and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley relative to his Lordship's administration of the Supreme Government of India, from January 1804 to August 1805, when his Lordship embarked for Europe.

It embraces an examination of the treaties of peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; an explanation of the events which occurred subsequent to the ratification of those treaties; and of the contests with Jeswunt Rao Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpore.

The endowments for the Mogul Emperor and his family are specified. The advantages resulting from the foundation of the College of Fort William are demonstrated.

The designs of the French Government on India are fully exemplified by the statements at page 131, and by the highly important French document in the Appendix; the treaties ratified by the Governor-General in 1804 and 1805 with the Peishwa, Nizam, Guikowar, &c. are given in the Appendix; as are also the plans of the Governor-General for the internal improvement of British India; and his Lordship's reply to the Address of the inhabitants of Calcutta when voting the erection of a marble statue in commemoration of his administration, which closes the Appendix.

It has not been deemed requisite to offer any comment on the transactions narrated in the present and preceding Volumes; they are materials for history; and they furnish examples for the instruction, guidance and encouragement of political and military functionaries entrusted with the management of important affairs in this distant part of the Empire.

Several documents and despatches illustrative of the events narrated in the four volumes will be given in a Supplemental Volume, now in preparation.

The Editor cannot close the Work without renewing the tender of his grateful thanks to the several noblemen and gentlemen mentioned in the preceding Volumes. To the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, he feels however more particularly indebted, not only for many important documents, but for the high testimony borne to the value of the publication by their despatch to the Governor-General in Council of the 21st September, 1836, and their circular letter of the 24th May, 1837, which will be published in the next Volume.

To the principal officers of the Board of Control, Colonial Office, and Horse Guards, he is obliged for the use of several papers.

He would also again record his deep sense of obligation to N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. who has unweariedly bestowed a large portion of his valuable time to the careful correction of the sheets as they passed through the press, and freely afforded his estimable advice and friendly aid towards the more perfect completion of the Work.

It becomes not the Editor to express here his feelings for the confidence reposed in him by the Nobleman whose wise, humane and patriotic government, it has been his anxious desire to place in a full and clear light before the public. To have contributed in any manner, however humbly, towards the accomplishment of such a truly national object will ever be to him a source of grateful remembrance and happiness.

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ERRATA.

p. 648, line 16 from the bottom, *read* la péninsule *for* le péninsule.

— 1. 5 from bottom, *read* la contraction *for* le contraction.

— 1. 3 from bottom, *read* rivalité *for* rivalite.

p. 649, l. 2 from top, *read* fonde *for* fondé.

— 1. 8 from top, *read* Européenes *for* Européens.

— 1. 33 from top, *read* beaucoup de points *for* beaucoup des points.

— 1. 35 from top, *read* qui a *for* que a.

— 1. 48 from top, *read* encouragée *for* encouragés.

* * A translation of the French document, in which the foregoing errata require to be made, will be given in the next volume, as will also the continuation of the despatch to the Secret Committee, dated March 24, 1805, of which a part is given in the present volume.

Explanation of the Plan of the Battle of Deig fought on the 13th of November 1804, in which the whole of the Regular Infantry and Artillery of Jeswunt Rao Holkar under the Command of his Principal Officer (Hernaul Dada) was totally defeated by a Division of His Excellency General Lake's Army, under the immediate Command of M. Gen. Fraser.—(See page 233.)

- A.—British encampment on the 12th November 1804.
- B.—Camp of the Enemy.
- C.—Bazar of the Enemy.
- D.—High Ground, from whence the Enemy cannonaded the British Camp on the 12th.
- E.—The 1st and 2d Brig. of Inf. consisting of H. M. 76th Rt. 1st Bat. 4th N. I.—1st Bat. 2d N. I.—Honble. Co's Eu. Rt. and 15th Rt. of N. I. with the 2d and 3d Rts. of N. C. and a Pack of Light Field Pieces in Column of march to attack the Enemy's Camp B. on the morning of the 13th, leaving the 3d Brig. consisting of two Bats. of N. I. and two Troops of N. C. from the above two Corps for the protection of the Camp, and to bring up the Baggage.
- F.—A Piquet of the Enemy's Horse driven off to G.
- H.—The Position taken up by the Infantry and Artillery of the Enemy, on the approach of the British Troops, on the morning of the 13th having struck their Camp B. and sent it to their Bazar C.
- I.—Their Cavalry.
- K.—Formation of the British Infantry, in two Lines.
- L.—Disposition of the British Cavalry, to cover the Formation of the Infantry.
- M.—Fields of Dry Grain which facilitated the approach and Formation of the British Troops.
- N.—Ough a Village of Masonry on high ground occupied by a body of the Enemy's Troops, which was carried by Assault, here General Fraser was wounded.
- O.—Route of the British Troops to attack the Enemy's Batteries after having carried the Village of Ough.
- P.—Batteries of the Enemy extending from the Village of Ough to the Fort of Deig.
- Q.—The direction of the Enemy's Horse retired on the advance of the British Cavalry.
- R.—Movement of the British Cavalry in support of the Infantry after the enemy's Cavalry had withdrawn from the Field.
- S.—The Enemy's Left Wing which maintained its ground until the return of the Troops from the Capture of the Batteries under the Walls of Deig.
- T.—Guns under Lt. Col. Horsford which kept the Enemy's Left Wing in check, and contributed to the success of the day.
- U.—The direction in which the Enemy's Left attempted to retire across the Morass on the approach of the British Troops, but having missed the Ford were compelled to abandon their Guns and were driven into the Morass with great slaughter.
- V.—British Encampment after the action.
- W.—Infantry Piquet.
- X.—Cavalry do. within range of the Fort but protected by a Bank.
- Z.—Advanced Post of a Battalion of Native Infantry very near the Fort but covered by a high mound of earth.

DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

§c. §c. §c.

I N D I A.

No. I.

Lieutenant-General Stuart to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Head Quarters, Choultry Plain, January 9th, 1804.

Major-General Campbell, on the 27th of December, received information that a large body of plunderers, amounting to ten thousand horsemen and peons, had crossed the Kistna at the Dharoor Ghaut, and were proceeding towards the Toombudra and the Company's frontier. This body of plunderers was conducted by a Moossulman who assumed the character of a Faquir, and the name of the late Dhoondia Waugh. The depredations already committed by these plunderers, their manifest intention of passing the Toombudra, and the extensive and serious evils which they were calculated to occasion in the countries of the Company and its allies, rendered it indispensable to attack and disperse them with every possible degree of promptitude; and Major-General Campbell commenced his march in pursuit of them on the 28th of December, with the cavalry and the flank companies of the infantry of his division. After a forced march of considerable length, Major-General Campbell had the good fortune to get up with the plunderers on the morning of the 31st of December. He attacked them immediately, and dispersed them, after killing and wounding upwards of three thousand of their number.

I have the honour of forwarding to your Excellency a copy of Major-General Campbell's report of that affair, which re-

flects considerable credit on the exertions of that officer and the troops under his command. No doubt can exist of his early success having relieved the Company's northern provinces, and the Doab, from depredations similar to those which were committed by the late Dhoondia Waugh.

I have the honour to be;
with the highest respect, my Lord,
your Excellency's most faithful, most obedient,
and devoted humble Servant,
J. STUART.

(Enclosure.)

Major-General Campbell to Lieutenant-General Stuart, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

Camp at Chillagherry, near Hanampsagur,
December 30, 1803.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit to you the following account of the operations of this division of the army since my letter of the 27th instant, on the evening of which day I received positive information, that a party of Mahratta plunderers, amounting to about 10,000 horse, and pindarries on foot, had passed the Kistna at the Dharoor Ghaut, and was proceeding towards Moodianoor, in the tract of our Brinjarries.

I marched on the 28th from Woodapoory with the cavalry and flank companies, lightly equipped, leaving Col. Vigors to follow me by easy stages, and next morning reached Jallyhall, where a party of marauding horse, sent to watch our motions, was surprised by the cavalry camp colourmen accompanying Major Strachan to mark out the ground of our encampment; and their chief, Coureg Gawran, a notorious plunderer, with several officers, were brought in prisoners.

At Jallyhall, Hurkaras came in with intelligence that the Mahratta freebooter who assumed the name of Dhoondia Waugh, had pitched his encampment between Doodyhall and Moodianoor, with the intention of intercepting our convoys, and carrying his depredations beyond the Toombudra.

To arrest his progress, I marched on the 29th at seven o'clock, P. M. towards Moodianoor, and on reaching Hanampsagur this morning, about four A. M., had accounts brought me that I was within six miles of the enemy, who was entirely ignorant of my approach. As the day dawned I came up with them, and finding the whole in confusion, I pushed with the cavalry into the centre of their camp, meeting with but little opposition.

In less than an hour the affair was at issue. Two thousand of the enemy were killed on the spot, and upwards of one thousand were wounded, or taken prisoners; the remainder, throwing down their arms, dispersed in all directions.

I have only to regret that three thousand of their horse, under Jittim Kakar, a well known marauder, had moved the day previous to my arrival, on a plundering excursion towards Gajinder Ghur.

The leader of the party Mahomed Beg Khan, who assumed the name of Dhoondia, is wounded and prisoner; the whole of their baggage, bazars, and upwards of twenty thousand Brinjarry bullocks have fallen into our hands. Our loss, I am happy to say, is trifling; a report of it is transmitted with this; the horses missing, will, I have no doubt, be mostly recovered, as the enemy was nearly annihilated, and the Nizam's peons are now in pursuit of the few that fled unarmed.

Four Frenchmen accompanied this party; one of them was killed, and bore the appearance and dress of a person above the common rank; the others escaped on good horses by early flight.

I have every reason to applaud the conduct of the troops, cavalry, artillery, infantry, and pioneers on this occasion. The fatigues they have lately undergone have been great, but their zeal for the public service is without bounds. The flank companies, under Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott, of his Majesty's 33d regiment, after marching thirty miles, were up with the cavalry, and had their full share in the destruction of this formidable band of plunderers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DUGALD CAMPBELL, M. G.

No. II.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieutenant-General Lake.

(Secret.)

SIR,

Fort William, 17th January, 1804.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatches under date the 19th, 28th, and 29th December 1803* and I entirely approve your Excellency's conduct towards Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and the letters which you have addressed to that chieftain.

2. The letters of which Jeswunt Rao Holkar has transmitted copies to your Excellency must have been forwarded to Holkar by Major-General Wellesley in his own name. I have

* The letter of the 19th December 1803, alludes to the "arrogant and improper style" in which Holkar addressed General Lake, with a view to create an opinion of his power: the "hostile expressions of Holkar General Lake hopes to overcome by firmness and dignity."

That of the 28th December, states the "extraordinary conduct of Holkar," of his "levying contributions, and otherwise distressing the country," and of his having "lately put to death the English officers in his service, Captains Vickars, Todd, and Ryan."

That of the 29th December, encloses General Lake's letter to Holkar of the 28th December, in which he expresses his intention of "doing no one act contrary to the rules of friendship."

The letters are voluminous, and would occupy much space.—[Ed.]

not addressed any letter to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, but Major-General Wellesley was authorized by my instructions of the 26th June, to open an amicable negotiation with that chieftain.

3. It is now expedient to decide the course to be pursued with respect to Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

4. The great distance of the honourable Major-General Wellesley's position from the camp of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, must render the intercourse difficult from that quarter; and as your Excellency's situation is more likely to be convenient for that purpose, it is my intention that your Excellency should immediately open a negotiation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

5. A copy of this despatch will be immediately transmitted to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, with a view to enable that officer to promote the objects of these instructions, if circumstances should bring the army of Major-General Wellesley within a convenient distance of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's camp.

6. The authority exercised by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in the name of Khundeh Rao, over the possessions of the Holkar family, is manifestly an usurpation of the rights of Cashi Rao Holkar, the legitimate heir and successor of Tuckojee Holkar. Consistently therefore with the principles of justice, no arrangement can be proposed between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, involving a sanction of the exclusion of Cashi Rao Holkar from his hereditary dominions.

7. Under the sanction of his Highness the Peishwa's authority, the British Government would be justified in adopting measures for the limitation of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power, and for the restoration of Cashi Rao Holkar's rights, either by force or compromise; and the spirit of our engagements with his Highness the Peishwa might be considered to impose on the British Government an obligation to comply with a requisition on the part of His Highness for that purpose under the public protection of the British Government. The Peishwa may not now be anxious for the reduction of Holkar's power, or for the restoration of Cashi Rao Holkar to his hereditary rights. But it may be expected that his Highness would readily concur in a proposition for the restoration of Cashi Rao, and for the punishment of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

8. Although the British Government is precluded by con-

siderations of justice from the adoption of any arrangement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, involving a formal confirmation of his usurped authority, or that of Khundeh Rao, over the possessions of the Holkar family, we are not required without the express solicitation of the Peishwa to employ our influence or arms for the restoration of Cashi Rao Holkar to his hereditary dominions.

9. The British Government, therefore, may be considered to be at liberty to adopt either of the alternatives stated in the following propositions:

1st. To restore to Cashi Rao Holkar the possession of his hereditary rights, securing at the same time a provision for Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and for Khundeh Rao. This proposition would necessarily involve the reduction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power either by force or by compromise.

2nd. To consider Jeswunt Rao Holkar as a power absolutely neutral, and to limit our proceedings with respect to him to the protection of our territories, and of our allies, against his encroachments and exactions.

10. The enterprizing spirit, military character, and ambitious views of Jeswunt Rao Holkar render the reduction of his power a desirable object with reference to the complete establishment of tranquillity in India. The restoration of Cashi Rao Holkar to his hereditary rights by the aid, and under the protection of the British power, would be highly creditable to the justice and honour of the British Government, and advantageous to its interests. It might be expected that Cashi Rao would readily acquiesce in any arrangement which might be deemed advisable for the security of our interests as the condition of his restoration. Indebted to our power for the recovery of his rights, and depending on our support for their preservation, his interest would be permanently consolidated with that of the British Government. His restoration would obtain the concurrence and applause of every state in India, and would afford to the Peishwa an additional proof of our sincere disposition to respect the rights of the Mahratta feudatories, and to fulfil the obligations of our public faith.

11. I should not hesitate therefore in determining to effect the restoration of Cashi Rao Holkar to his hereditary dominions, if the measures necessary for the accomplishment of that object had not involved difficulties and embarrassments

which would not be compensated by the probable benefits of the proposed arrangement.

12. Adverting to the personal character, and to the actual power and resources of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, it cannot be expected that he will acquiesce in such an arrangement without a contest.

13. Admitting, however, that the terror of our arms might induce Jeswunt Rao Holkar to acquiesce in the restoration of Cashi Rao Holkar to his hereditary rights, the adjustment of the details of such an arrangement would probably occasion a protracted and embarrassing investigation of the rights and pretensions of the several branches of the Holkar family, and we could not prudently withdraw our armies until that arrangement should have been accomplished, since Holkar might not ultimately consent to the terms prescribed to him; and it would then be necessary to enforce our determination by arms. If peace should not have been previously concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, Dowlut Rao Scindiah might acquire in the power and resources of Jeswunt Rao Holkar additional means of protracting the war.

14. On the other hand, it is proper to consider the degree of danger to be apprehended from leaving Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the possession of his present military power and territorial resources.

15. The vicinity of the territory actually under Holkar's authority to the province of Guzerat, would afford him an opportunity of fomenting and supporting the turbulence and disaffection of the enemies of our interest in that quarter of India. The contiguity of his possessions to those which Scindiah will probably retain at the conclusion of peace, and to the territory guaranteed to Rajah Ambajee, might facilitate an union of interests between Holkar and those chieftains. An additional danger may also be apprehended in the existence of a military independent power in the hands of an enterprising and ambitious chieftain, who must be supposed to be interested in the reduction of our influence and ascendancy in India, and who may therefore be expected to avail himself of any favourable opportunity to combine the employment of his power and resources with any eventual attempts on the part of France to disturb the tranquillity of the British empire.

16. To these speculative dangers are to be opposed the

accession of political, territorial, and military strength, which we must acquire at the conclusion of the present war, and the effect of that augmented strength, and of our recent alliances in precluding the successful application of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power and resources to purposes injurious to the interests and security of the British empire.

17. If a subsidiary British force be established in the dominion retained by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, any dangerous connection between that chieftain and Jeswunt Rao Holkar will be effectually prevented, and the existence of a British force in the vicinity of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's possessions will essentially tend to check any hostile projects on the part of that Chieftain. The vigilance of our Resident at Scindiah's Court may also be expected to impose a restraint on the designs of Holkar.

18. No state of circumstances can be reasonably supposed which would induce Ambajee to connect himself with Jeswunt Rao Holkar for purposes hostile to the British Government.

19. Any intrigues between Holkar and the disaffected chiefs in Guzerat would probably be effectually checked by the vicinity of our troops, or by the vigilance of the public officers of Government; but hostile combinations of so limited a nature cannot be considered dangerous to the stability of the British power. Our recent conquests and alliances afford us the means of advancing our troops to the frontier of Holkar's possessions, without difficulty or interruption, from the south west and from the north east, and will enable us to employ the military power of the Rajpoots and of Ambajee in offensive operations against the dominions of that chieftain. The territory of the Holkar family will be surrounded by states either in alliance with us, and interested in maintaining that alliance, or not sufficiently powerful to contribute any important aid to his designs. His proceedings will be subject to the vigilant observation of the British authorities, and his country accessible on all sides to British armies and British allies.

20. It may be further observed, that in proportion to the defect of Holkar's title, it would be his interest to abstain from any measures calculated to excite the resentment of the British Government.

21. These circumstances would tend in an equal degree to preclude any combination between Jeswunt Rao Holkar and the emissaries, or the forces of France. With a circumscribed territory and with a confined field of action, Jeswunt Rao Holkar's military power would probably decay. He has been enabled to maintain his present extensive armies almost exclusively by exactions from foreign states, and by the acquisition and the hope of plunder. An army maintained exclusively by the resources of the territory which Jeswunt Rao Holkar occupies, could neither be numerous nor effective.

22. An immediate attempt, therefore, to restore Cashi Rao Holkar to his hereditary rights, would involve more positive and certain difficulty and danger than could be justly apprehended from the continuance of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the possession of the territories actually under his authority. A pacific conduct towards Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the present moment, will not preclude the future restoration of Cashi Rao Holkar to the possession of his hereditary rights. The previous adjustment of our differences with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the final settlement of our new political relations, together with the restoration of general tranquillity in India, may be expected to afford additional facilities to the settlement of our relations with the Holkar family, if such a settlement should ultimately be deemed advisable.

23. It will be necessary, however, to regulate our proceedings with respect to Jeswunt Rao Holkar in such a manner as to avoid any acknowledgement or confirmation of the legitimacy of his dominion, or of that of Khundeh Rao Holkar.

24. The considerations detailed in the preceding part of this despatch have determined me not to make any immediate attempt to restore Cashi Rao Holkar to the possession of his hereditary dominions, and I am also disposed to leave Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the exercise of his present authority, without any further interposition of the British power than that which may be required for the security of the chiefs and states in Hindostan, with whom we have contracted defensive alliances. Those chiefs and states must be protected against any exactions on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, founded in the pretended claims of the Holkar family. We are pledged by the spirit of our engagements to secure those allies against such exactions.

25. My sentiments on the subject of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's supposed claims upon those chiefs and states, are detailed in the despatch from the Governor-General in Council to your Excellency, under date the 13th instant. A copy of that despatch has been transmitted to the honourable Major-General Wellesley.

26. It may be expected that Jeswunt Rao Holkar will acquiesce in this moderate proposition on the part of the British Government. His refusal will preclude all expectation of his concurrence in any other arrangement consistent with the obligations of justice and of public faith, and will require a reduction of his power by force.

27. For the accomplishment of the proposed arrangement, it will merely be necessary that your Excellency should signify to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, either by letter or through the channel of vakeels, whom he may be invited to despatch either to your Excellency's camp, or to that of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, as may be most convenient for the purpose of negotiation, that the British Government entertains the most amicable disposition towards him, and harbours no intention of prosecuting hostilities against him unless compelled to that extremity by acts of aggression on his part against the British Government, or any of its allies: that the British Government is pledged by the obligation of its engagements with various chiefs and states in Hindostan, to guarantee them against all exactions and demands unfounded in justice, that we do not admit his claim to tribute of any denomination upon those chiefs or states, founded upon the pretensions of the Holkar family, and that we shall therefore be compelled to resist any such demands on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar: that with the consent of his Highness the Peishwa, the British Government will be disposed to arbitrate the differences subsisting between Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Cashi Rao Holkar, and to adjust the claims of the several branches of the family on the principles of equity and justice: that we are desirous of preserving peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that we will abstain from any unsolicited interference in his concerns, beyond the limits required for the protection and security of the rights and territories of our allies, and that we merely require that he should manifest a similar conduct by abstaining from all measures and opera-

tions of a contrary tendency, by withdrawing his troops from any position which they may at present occupy of a menacing aspect to the British Government, or to our allies, and by withholding all demands on the states or chieftains with which the British Government is in alliance. Adding, that if Jeswunt Rao Holkar should advance any claims on those states in his individual capacity, the British Government will be disposed to arbitrate all such claims on principles of equity and justice, and generally to arbitrate all claims on any of our allies by similar rules of moderation and good faith.

28. On the basis of the proposed arrangement, your Excellency is authorized to enter into a negotiation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, exercising your discretion with regard to the degree of security which we may possess under Jeswunt Rao Holkar's acquiescence in the terms of any such arrangement.

29. If Holkar's views should appear to be evidently hostile, your Excellency will judge how far it might be expedient to move against his forces. My wish is, to avoid such an extremity, and if peace with Scindiah should be obtained on terms of adequate security, I should desire that the army under your Excellency's command, should speedily be formed in such a manner as might effectually expedite the security and settlement of our valuable conquests and powerful alliances.

30. The solidity and strength of our dominion in Hindostan, under the system of treaties and alliances already happily accomplished by your Excellency, will be confirmed by a peace with Scindiah under circumstances of glory and power, which must oppose an impregnable barrier to the assaults of any native state. The British empire in India, at the close of the war with the confederate chiefs, will assume an aspect of such splendour as must daunt the most adventurous spirit of any chief or state excluded from the benefits of our protection. I am, therefore, satisfied that after the conclusion of peace with Scindiah, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, instead of attempting to encounter the British arms, will anxiously solicit the countenance and favour of our government. The alternative of peace or war with Scindiah is probably decided, as I am convinced that Major-General Wellesley has not renewed the armistice with Scindiah after the 27th ultimo. If the war with Scindiah should be protracted, the motions of

Holkar must be checked without delay; and in such an event your Excellency will be pleased to consider the expediency of advancing that part of your force which (previously to the peace of Deogaum) was destined for Berar, in such a direction as to operate against Holkar, and ultimately to second Major-General Wellesley's movements against Scindiah. In such an extremity Major-General Wellesley would probably move towards Oojyn.

31. My wish and expectation are, however, that a peace has actually been signed with Scindiah, and if my hopes should be confirmed, I trust that the fame of the British power will deter Holkar and every adventurer in Asia for many years to come, from the perils of a rash contest with the British arms.

32. The intelligence which your Excellency has received of the cruelty exercised by Jeswunt Rao Holkar towards his English officers in the murder of Messrs. Vickars, Todd, and Ryan, has occasioned great concern in my mind. The particulars of this atrocious transaction, however, must be fully ascertained before it can become the subject of discussion with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. I therefore am anxious to learn further details on the subject, previously to the despatch of any instructions to your Excellency founded on the perpetration of such a crime.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. III.

N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., to T. Brooke, Esq., Acting Agent to the Governor-General, Benares.

SIR,

Fort William, Jan. 24, 1804.

1. I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letters under dates the 5th, 19th, and 24th of November 1803, on the subject of Rajah Run Bahauder.*

* The Rajah of Nipaul, who abdicated the government in 1801, and took up his residence at Benares.

2. His Excellency in Council has deemed it expedient to postpone his instructions to you on the subject of the measures to be pursued with respect to Rajah Run Bahauder until his Excellency in Council should have formed a determination with regard to the continuance or dissolution of the alliance concluded with the ruling authority in Nipaul in October 1801.

3. The arrival of Captain Knox at Calcutta having enabled the Governor-General to obtain the information necessary for the regulation of his Excellency's judgments on that fundamental question, his Excellency in Council has finally determined to withdraw from that alliance, and to consider the treaty concluded with the state of Nipaul in October 1801, to be null and void.

4. His Excellency in Council has taken into his consideration the remarks contained in your letter of the 5th of November, and your suggestion on the subject of concluding a secret treaty of alliance with Rajah Run Bahauder.

5. Adverting to the character of Rajah Run Bahauder, and to the situation of affairs in Nipaul, the Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion that any engagement concluded with that Prince will be nugatory, unless enforced by a degree of control on our part over the government of Nipaul, which his Excellency in Council deems highly inexpedient and objectionable.

6. His Excellency in Council, however, considers that measure to be utterly repugnant to the justice and dignity of the British Government.

7. The legitimate government of Nipaul is that which was established by the voluntary abdication of Rajah Run Bahauder in the person of his son, and with that government the treaty of October 1801, was concluded. Its legitimacy is not invalidated by the abuses and misconduct of the administration, although the British Government has been absolved from the obligations of the alliance by the violation of the treaty of 1801, on the part of the reigning government of Nipaul.

8. If by another revolution in the state Rajah Run Bahauder should be restored to authority, the British Government would be at liberty to conclude engagements with that Prince as the acknowledged sovereign of the country, but considera-

tions of political expediency having reference either to the interests of the state of Nipaul or to our own, would not justify the interference of the British power for the accomplishment of such a revolution. It would be incompatible with every principle of justice and consistency to afford the aid of the British power for the restoration of Rajah Run Bahauder to that authority which he has formally renounced, or for the subversion of that government, which we have acknowledged as the legitimate government of the state, and with which we have concluded a treaty of alliance.

9. The same observation is applicable to the transfer of that alliance to Rajah Run Bahauder previously to his actual restoration to the government of Nipaul : we could not justify nor sanction by a formal treaty, the prosecution of a measure, to the accomplishment of which we are precluded by considerations of justice and of consistency with a previous act of our government, from affording the aid of the British power.

10. It would be inconsistent with the dignity of the British Government to form an alliance by a clandestine negotiation with the abdicated Rajah in the hope of obtaining, through the re-establishment of his authority, those benefits which our connection with the reigning government of Nipaul has failed to produce ; adverting also to the known cruelty and violence of the Rajah's disposition, it would be inconsistent with the dignity and justice of the British Government to support him in the sanguinary exercise of his authority in Nipaul by the presence of a British representative, or by the conclusion of an alliance which would impose upon us the obligation either to acknowledge that authority, to whatever purposes of violence and oppression it might be directed, or to exercise a degree of control over the government of that country which on distinct grounds of policy his Excellency in Council considers to be inadmissible.

11. For these reasons his Excellency in Council has determined to abstain from the conclusion of any engagements whatever with Rajah Run Bahauder.

12. During the existence of the alliance concluded with the actual government of Nipaul, we should be justified in imposing on Rajah Run Bahauder any degree of restraint which might be necessary for the security of the arrangements established by that alliance. But under the dissolution

of the treaty of October 1801, the British Government is no longer at liberty to oppose the Rajah's departure to Nipaul, or to any other quarter without the Company's provinces. His Excellency in Council, however, deems it proper that Rajah Run Bahauder's departure should be postponed until the government of Nipaul can be informed of his Excellency in Council's resolution to consider the obligations of the treaty of 1801 to be null and void, and of the consequent permission of Rajah Run Bahauder to retire from the Company's provinces.

13. The Governor-General has addressed a letter to the reigning Rajah of Nipaul, communicating that resolution. That letter may be expected to reach Catmandu within a month from the date of this despatch, you are therefore directed to signify to Rajah Run Bahauder, that after the expiration of that period of time, he will be at liberty to proceed to Nipaul, or to whatever quarter he may desire to proceed, without the limits of the Company's authority.

14. The Governor-General in Council expects that the Rajah will be contented to remain at Benares until the expiration of that period of time. But if the Rajah should manifest a resolution to anticipate the prescribed period of his departure, you must prevent his departure, as it would not be consistent with our public faith to permit him to depart without sufficient notice to the reigning government of Nipaul.

15. Enclosed you will receive a letter from the Governor-General to Rajah Run Bahauder,* which you will be pleased to deliver to him, a copy in English and Persian accompanies for your information.

16. In conformity to the preceding instructions you will reject any propositions on the part of the Rajah for the conclusion of engagements with the British Government: his Excellency in Council, however, deems it proper that you should signify to the Rajah Run Bahauder his Excellency's expectation that in the event of his restoration to the government of Nipaul, he should refrain from any acts of violence against those persons who have manifested a disposition to secure the due execution of the treaty of October 1801, inti-

* See p. 16.

mating to him that the knowledge of any such acts of injustice will in future preclude all amicable intercourse between the British Government and the state of Nipaul.

17. His Excellency in Council deems it advisable that measures of precaution should be adopted to prevent Rajah Run Bahauder in his journey through the Company's provinces from raising troops, or collecting any considerable number of adherents of any description, or purchasing arms, or military stores within the British territories: his Excellency further deems it proper that the Rajah should be prevented from stopping or establishing himself for any considerable period of time, on the frontier of the British territories adjacent to the frontier of Nipaul, for the purpose of exciting commotions in Nipaul, or of inviting people to join him from that country while he is within the limits of the British territories, and consequently under the protection of the British Government.

18. You are accordingly directed to signify to Rajah Run Bahauder previously to his departure from Benares, the Governor-General's expectation that he will refrain from any acts of the nature above described, and with a view to restrain the Rajah from the adoption of any of those objectionable measures, his Excellency in Council deems it advisable that you should appoint a confidential agent to accompany Rajah Run Bahauder to the frontier of the British territories, instructing such agent to remonstrate against any measures of that nature which the Rajah may attempt to accomplish, and to communicate such proceedings not only to you, but also to the chief civil officer in the district through which the Rajah may at that time be passing, with a view to enable that officer to counteract such improper proceedings. You will be pleased to apprise the chief civil officers of the districts through which Rajah Run Bahauder will have occasion to pass, of the orders which you have received on this subject.

19. If Rajah Run Bahauder should express a desire to receive the arrears of his stipend, you are authorized to pay him the amount which may have accumulated up to the prescribed period of his departure from Benares.

I have the honour to be, &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Govt.

[Enclosure.]

The Marquess Wellesley to Rajah Run Bahauder.

Written January 24, 1804.

I have been favoured with your two letters (recapitulate those received 2d December 1803, and 18th January,) the first of them expressing a desire to proceed on a pilgrimage, and the second soliciting permission to return to Nipaul.

It is satisfactory to me to know that you entertain a just sense of the protection and regard which you have experienced on the part of the British Government during your residence within the Company's provinces.

In the arrangements concluded with the ruling authorities in Nipaul, after your abdication of the government, it was equally my object to provide for your permanent comfort and accommodation, in the secluded situation which you had voluntarily chosen, and to promote the real interests and welfare of the state of Nipaul, by improving the relations of amity and alliance, which had so long subsisted between the two governments. The misconduct of the officers, on whom the administration of affairs in Nipaul has devolved in consequence of your abdication, has however precluded the accomplishment of the objects of the arrangement, and has compelled me to withdraw from all connection with that state. The British Government, therefore, can no longer continue responsible for the permanency of the provision assigned by those engagements for your support.

Under these circumstances, it is not my intention to oppose your departure to whatever quarter you may think proper to proceed, after the government of Nipaul shall have been apprized of my resolution to withdraw from an alliance, of which the state of Nipaul has never fulfilled the conditions.

I have accordingly directed Mr. Brooke to suggest to you the propriety of continuing at Benares during the space of a month; after the expiration of which time you will be at liberty to proceed agreeably to your request to Nipaul or to any other quarter without the Company's provinces.

WELLESLEY.

No. IV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

SIR,

Fort William, Jan. 24th, 1804.

1. Having received information of the refusal of the Commandant of Gwalior to surrender that fortress to the British Government, in direct violation of the treaty lately concluded with Rajah Ambajee, I have deemed it advisable to transmit

instructions directly to Mr. Mercer for the regulation of his conduct on this occasion.

2. Your Excellency will be apprized of my sentiments, and intentions with respect to Rajah Ambajee, by the copy of those instructions which has been transmitted to your Excellency by my direction.

3. Although the alliance actually concluded with Rajah Ambajee should be dissolved by the operation of my present orders, I still deem it desirable that an arrangement should be ultimately concluded with Ambajee, by which that chieftain may be guaranteed in the independent possession of a part of the territory under his authority, and I accordingly authorize your Excellency if necessary, to renew the negotiation with Ambajee for that purpose, unless your Excellency should have reason to be satisfied, that the conduct of the Commandant of Gwalior has been clandestinely instigated by Ambajee. Such a proof of treachery would preclude all confidence in any arrangement with Ambajee.

4. In the event of the dissolution of the engagements lately contracted with Ambajee, the British Government will be justified in proposing to his acceptance terms less favourable than those which formed the basis of the late arrangement, and in concluding any new engagements with Rajah Ambajee, the indemnification described in the 6th paragraph of my instructions to Mr. Mercer may be justly demanded. Such indemnification may be obtained by securing, under any future arrangement with Ambajee, advantages of a pecuniary, territorial, or political nature.

5. In concluding the terms of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I am desirous of leaving in the possession of that chieftain as great an extent of territory as may be consistent with the future security of the British Government and its allies, and admitting the justice and expediency of the arrangement lately concluded by your Excellency with Ambajee, under the circumstances which existed at the period of your Excellency's negotiation with that chieftain, it is probable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah might complain of that arrangement.

6. On the grounds of justice and expediency, as connected with the satisfaction of our claim to indemnity for the injury and expence occasioned by a breach of faith on the part of

Ambajee it appears to be proper, that in the event of the renewal of a negotiation with Ambajee for the establishment of his independence, the limit of the territory to be guaranteed to that chieftain should not extend further to the southward than Raghoo-ghur. By this arrangement the districts of Seronge, and Saugur will be excluded from the dominions of Ambajee.

7. I avail myself of this occasion to state to your Excellency my sentiments on the conduct to be observed towards the Commandant of Gwalior in the event of our being compelled to occupy that fortress by force of arms.

8. If the Commandant of Gwalior in refusing to admit the British troops should have acted in opposition to the orders of his immediate superior, he must be considered as a rebel, and must be rendered personally responsible for all the consequences of his disobedience. Justice and the necessity of a public example require, that an act of disobedience, and rebellion involving injuries, calamities and bloodshed, such as must attend the occupation of Gwalior by force of arms, should be punished in the person of the author of those evils. If therefore the Commandant of Gwalior should be taken prisoner upon the capture of that fortress by the British troops, without any previous convention or engagement importing security to his person, he must be publicly executed for the purpose of deterring native Commanders from similar acts of wanton obstinacy, involving the violation of public faith, the protraction of war after the solemn conclusion of peace, and the effusion of human blood, without any justifiable cause, either of public security or honour. On the other hand, if the Commandant in refusing to surrender the fortress of Gwalior should have acted in obedience to the orders of Ambajee, the responsibility must rest exclusively with Ambajee.

9. I accordingly authorize and direct your Excellency, in the event supposed, to make an example of the Commandant of Gwalior by a public execution; but if it should appear, that Ambajee has been the author of this atrocious treachery, your Excellency will reject all negotiation or treaty with him.

10. If it should appear that the Commandant of Gwalior has been compelled by his officers or troops to violate the

treaty with Ambajee, your Excellency will necessarily consider the Commandant to be innocent of the violation of the treaty, and you will report to the Governor-General in Council, the circumstances of this violent infraction of the law of nations, together with the names of those who may have been guilty of the blood which has been shed after the conclusion of a treaty of peace. When I shall have received your Excellency's report on this case, I will furnish you with full instructions respecting the exemplary punishment of those infatuated persons who have attempted to frustrate that humane and conciliatory system of policy which has distinguished your Excellency's conduct, not less than the splendour and glory of your achievements in the field.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. V.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

Beaza, February 4th, 1804.

MY LORD,

[Received February 15th, 1804.]

I shall endeavour to avoid hostilities with Ambajee, if possible, as it appears to me if we commence a war with him and Holkar, should he choose to be inimical to us it might bring on a war with many other powers, and lead us into a very long and perhaps a general war, which of course shall if possible be avoided; at the same time I much fear till Ambajee and Holkar are annihilated that permanent peace cannot be expected.

I am exceedingly sorry to find you have been indisposed, but most sincerely hope you are now quite recovered and that matters will soon be so settled as to set your mind at ease, and make you feel the good effects of all your measures so excellently well adapted for the security of our territories and the aggrandizement of the British Government.

That you may live long to enjoy every blessing this world can afford, with the applause and gratitude of your country, is the sincere prayer of

My dear Lord,
your affectionate and devoted,

G. LAKE.

No. VI.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Camp, Surrouh, Feb. 11th, 1804.

I have moved on thus far on my road to take up a position near Dowsa, which will cover the passes on this side into Hindostan, the only one in this quarter by which Holkar could pass should he be hostilely inclined; at the same time it gives spirit and confidence in our protection to the Rajah of Jeypoor of which he was most desirous. I have received no answer to my last letter to Holkar, I hear he talks of attacking the English, but I cannot believe he will. The news in one paper this day is that he intends returning to his own territories and detaching a body of horse towards Delhi; this he cannot, as I have troops at Cacour and in all that country which must prevent him, nor can he afford to detach a force as he has not a large one with him, and I believe his distress for more is very great.

Be assured, my dear Lord, I will avoid hostilities if possible, as I am quite clear the sooner a general peace is concluded the better; I think Holkar must retire and when he knows, which I durst say he does, how inimical Scindiah is towards him, he will be afraid to trust himself between two fires. I have one great advantage in moving into the Jeypoor country, that I have plenty of forage which I have been in great want of lately, and I should have been much distressed for it had I remained in our own country as we had been so long in it. I mean green forage for the cattle; we are in no want for supplies of any kind, we have a most excellent bazaar upon a most fair and liberal scale, owing to the excellent management of Captain Morrison.

I once more beg you will be assured that every effort shall be made to prevent hostilities with Holkar and to persuade him to come into the terms you propose.

And I hope a few days will tell you that he is come to reason and all is peace and tranquillity.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

affectionately and truly yours

G. LAKE.

I forgot to say that the Rajah of Jeypoor has assembled a force of upwards of fifteen thousand men.

No. VII.

The Governor-General in Council to Lieut.-General Lake.

SIR,

Fort William, 13th Feb. 1804.

The Governor-General in Council has the honour to apprise your Excellency that the quadruplicate of a despatch from the honourable Major-General Wellesley, dated the 30th December, 1803, enclosing a copy of the treaty of peace lately concluded by that officer with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, has this day been received from Mr. Mercer. A copy of that despatch and of the treaty of peace are enclosed for your Excellency's information.

2. In consequence of some unaccountable irregularity in the conveyance of letters from the camp of Major-General Wellesley to Hydrabad, neither the original, duplicate nor triplicate of that despatch has hitherto been received.

3. The terms of the peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, appearing to his Excellency in Council to be conformable to the general principles of the Governor-General's instructions to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, and to be in every respect highly advantageous and honourable to the British Government and its allies, that treaty has been formally ratified by the Governor-General in Council. A copy of the Governor-General in Council's despatch to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, announcing his Excellency in Council's entire approbation and ratification of the treaty is enclosed for your Excellency's information.

4. The tenor of the 9th article of the treaty, renders it necessary that your Excellency should be immediately apprized of the sentiments of the Governor-General in Council, with regard to the operation of that article in the actual state of your Excellency's arrangements in Hindostan.

5. That article provides for the confirmation of all treaties and engagements which your Excellency may have concluded with any states or chieftains in Hindostan. Although the literal construction of that article would limit its operation to the treaties and engagements actually concluded by your Excellency at the date of the treaty of peace, the true intent and meaning, and the just construction of that

article must be considered to be, to provide for the confirmation of all treaties and engagements concluded by your Excellency to the period of your Excellency's receipt of official information of the termination of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, excepting such as are expressly excluded under the terms of the article in question, by the local position of the territories of those chieftains with whom such treaties and engagements may have been contracted.

6. The question which appears to require immediate decision, is whether under the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, the British Government is justified in occupying the territories ceded to its disposal by the terms of the treaty concluded with Ambajee on the 16th of December.

7. Previously to the discussion of this question it is necessary to state as a fundamental principle, that by the confirmation of the treaties and engagements above described, Dowlut Rao Scindiah is not placed in the condition of a guarantee to such engagements; he is merely required to recognize and confirm the rights which we derive from the conclusion of them. If by the conclusion of such engagements Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been deprived of any rights or territories which he previously possessed, such rights or territories cannot be considered to revert to him by the violation of those engagements on the part of the chieftain with whom they were contracted.

8. It follows from this principle that whatever rights we acquired under the treaty with Ambajee, must be confirmed by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, excepting only in the event of their being affected by that clause in the 9th article, which secures to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the possession of such part of his former territories as is situated to the southward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Jodepoor, and of the Rana of Gohud.

9. It remains therefore to consider what are these rights and in what manner they are affected by that clause in the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

10. If Rajah Ambajee had faithfully fulfilled the obligations of his engagements, the ratification of the treaty of peace in its present form would have prevented us from executing our part of those engagements and would consequently have

deprived us of the right to benefit by them. It would then become a question whether we should be justified in depriving Dowlut Rao Scindiah of those territories formerly in the possession of the Rana of Gohud, which we have guaranteed to that chieftain by the treaty concluded with him by your Excellency on the 29th of January, and in occupying the fortress of Gwalior as a cession made to us by the Rana of Gohud.

11. It is manifest, however, that Ambajee has violated the engagements concluded with him by your Excellency.

12. By those engagements we acquired a right to dispose of certain territories situated to the northward of the line of demarcation described in the 9th article of the treaty of peace, and we determined for political purposes to assign those territories to the Rana of Gohud, the ancient possessor of them. Confiding in Ambajee's adherence to the obligation of his public faith, your Excellency negotiated a treaty with the Rana of Gohud, by which those territories were to be guaranteed to him by the British Government.

13. The right thus established, could only be invalidated by the mutual consent of the contracting parties to dissolve the engagements by which it was acquired. If by Ambajee's violation of his public faith, those territories were to be considered to have reverted to that chieftain in opposition to every principle of justice and of public law, that chieftain would benefit by the effects of his own treachery, and the British Government would lose the advantage of a beneficial political arrangement, and would be deprived of the means of fulfilling engagements concluded with another chieftain on the credit of Ambajee's faith.

14. The Governor-General in Council therefore, is decidedly of opinion, that the right of disposing of the territories ceded to the British Government by the treaty concluded with Ambajee, is not in any degree invalidated by that chieftain's violation of his engagements.

15. This state of facts existed before the conclusion of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, and the country ceded by Ambajee and since guaranteed to the Rana of Gohud, is not comprehended in that description of territory which is excluded from the operation of the general provisions of the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

16. According to the principle therefore stated in the 7th preceding paragraph, the right of disposing of the districts ceded by Ambajee in the manner prescribed by the treaty with the Rana of Gohud, must be considered to be acknowledged and confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

17. But independently of any right to the disposal of those territories founded on our engagements with Ambajee, the Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion that the treaty concluded with the Rana of Gohud, is comprehended in that description of engagements for the confirmation of which the 9th article of the treaty of peace provides.

18. The Rana of Gohud is universally admitted to possess an hereditary right to those territories which have now been guaranteed to him, and to the fortress of Gwalior; his loss of those possessions by conquest and usurpation, cannot be considered to preclude his right to negotiate for his restoration, with the power at war with that state which had unjustly deprived him of his dominion.

19. Under every view of the subject therefore, his Excellency in Council considers that the British Government retains the right to dispose of the territories ceded to the Company by the treaty with Ambajee, and the Governor-General in Council accordingly authorizes and directs your Excellency to proceed in the occupation of those territories for the purpose of transferring them to the possession of the Rana of Gohud, in conformity to the treaty concluded with that chieftain on the 29th of January. Under these instructions your Excellency will also continue to prosecute the measures in progress for obtaining possession of the fortress of Gwalior for the British Government.

20. Although Rajah Ambajee by the violation of his engagements might be considered to have placed himself in the condition of a public enemy to the British Government, the Governor-General in Council is desirous of avoiding hostilities with that chieftain, and accordingly desires that your Excellency will abstain from the prosecution of any hostile operations against Ambajee, unless that measure should be rendered unavoidably necessary by acts of direct hostility on the part of that chieftain.

21. Your Excellency will hereafter receive further instruc-

tions on points arising out of the treaty of peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

We have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

J. UDNY.

No. VIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieutenant-General Lake.

SIR,

Fort William, Feb. 20th, 1804.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch, dated the *5th instant.

2. The instructions of the Governor-General in Council, addressed to your Excellency under date the 13th instant, are calculated to remove your Excellency's apprehensions with regard to the construction of the 2d and 9th articles of the treaty of peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to explain my intentions respecting the fortress of Gwalior and the territories guaranteed to the Rana of Gohud by the treaty which your Excellency concluded with that chieftain on the 29th of January.

3. With reference, however, to the observations contained in the 2d paragraph of your Excellency's letter of the 5th instant, I deem it advisable to state to your Excellency the precise construction of the 2d and 9th articles of the treaty of peace with Scindiah.

4. By the terms of the 2d article, Dowlut Rao Scindiah cedes to the British Government and its allies, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests, in the countries situated to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Jodepoor, and the Rana of Gohud. By the same article it is stipulated that the countries formerly in the possession of Dowlut Rao Scindia, situated between Jeypoor and Jodepoor, and to the southward of the former shall belong to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

* General Lake expresses his doubts as to the construction which he should put on the treaty with Scindiah, and asks the Governor-General's opinion thereon.—[ED.]

5. In forming a judgment of the true construction of that article unconnected with the tenor of the 9th article, a question might arise, whether the fortress of Gwalior and the territories of the Rana of Gohud, situated to the southward of the latitude of the southern frontier of Jeypoor, are included within the line of territory which is to belong to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but the separate and distinct reference to the territories of the Rana of Gohud in that article manifestly implies that those territories were not considered to form a part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's possessions, although previously to the war the dominions of Gohud were actually under the usurped authority of Scindiah. The country of Gohud cannot, therefore, be considered to be absolutely ceded to Scindiah by the terms of the 2d article.

6. Under the operation of that article, if your Excellency had not concluded engagements with Rajah Ambagee, or with the Rana of Gohud, by the terms of which, those territories were to be separated from the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, those territories would have reverted to the situation in which they were placed with respect to the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah before the war.

7. The construction of the 2d article of the treaty of peace is, however, clearly ascertained by the tenor of the 9th article. By the 9th article, those territories only which are situated to the southward of the territories of Jeypoor, Jodepoor, and the Rana of Gohud, are declared to form a part of Scindiah's future possessions, and to be exempted from the operation of any treaties which your Excellency may have concluded with the states and chieftains of Hindostan.

8. Copies of the treaties, which your Excellency has concluded with the Rajahs of Bhurtoor, Matchery, Jeypoor, Jyenagur, Rajah Ambagee, and the Rana of Gohud, have already been transmitted to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, but your Excellency may possibly have concluded engagements with other chieftains, such as the Rana of Oudepore, and the Rajahs of Kotah and Boondi, whose territories, although situated to the southward of Jyenagur, Jodepore, or the country of the Rana of Gohud, and probably tributary to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, cannot be considered to be included in the description of territory which is to be exempted from the operation of any treaties which

your Excellency may have concluded with the chieftains to whom those territories belong.

9. With a view, therefore, to fulfil the obligation of that part of the 9th article of the treaty of peace which prescribes that a list of the persons with whom your Excellency may have contracted engagements shall be delivered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I request that your Excellency will transmit to Major Malcolm, who has been appointed to act in the capacity of Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, a complete list, and copies of those engagements.

10. With reference to the application contained in Major-General Wellesley's letter to your Excellency on the subject of the restitution to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the guns and military stores in the forts of Kanoun, Kishenghur, Haunsee, Gowelghur, Metagurh, and Sehaurunpoor, under the supposition that those forts have not been captured by the troops under your Excellency's immediate command, your Excellency observes that all the forts specified have been occupied by the British troops, excepting the fort Sehaurunpoor.

11. In my judgment, it is by no means advisable that any of the guns or military stores captured in the forts formerly belonging to Scindiah should be restored.

12. Although the fort of Sehaurunpoor has not actually been occupied by the British troops, that fort must be considered to have been placed under the authority of the British Government by the conquest of the Doab.

13. The promise of Major-General Wellesley to recommend to your Excellency the restitution of the guns and military stores of such forts as may not have been captured by the British troops, but are ceded to the British Government by the terms of the treaty of peace, can only be considered to refer to such forts as may not yet have been placed under the British authority. I, therefore, consider the fort of Sehaurunpoor to be excluded equally with the other forts specified by Major-General Wellesley from the operation of that officer's conditional promise to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

14. Your Excellency will accordingly be pleased to retain possession of all the guns and military stores in all the forts either captured by the British troops under your Excellency's immediate command, or placed under the British authority by the effect of your Excellency's conquests in the north of Hindostan, and in the Doab of the Jumna and the Ganges.

15. A copy of this despatch will be transmitted to the hon. Major-General Wellesley and to Major Malcolm, by the way of Hyderabad; and I request that your Excellency will also transmit a copy of it to those officers respectively by the route of Hindostan.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. IX.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Most Secret.)

London, Sept. 9th, 1803.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received overland, Feb. 29th, 1804.]

It was fully my intention to have written to you by the last overland express, with respect to your further continuance in the government of India, conceiving that there were many circumstances on which you might naturally desire and expect to receive information from me, previous to the period when you would be called upon to take a decision on this important question.

As the end of January is now not quite six months distant, I feel that I have not a day to lose in writing to you without reserve upon this subject; and I am additionally alive to the pressing necessity of doing so, in consequence of a conversation which I yesterday had with your brother, in which he expressed doubts whether, under the late despatch of the Court, coupled with Sir G. H. Barlow's subsequent appointment, you would feel yourself altogether free to decide this question according to the deliberate view you might at the moment entertain of what was due to the public service.

Mr. Wellesley's doubts, I perceive, hinged on the desire therein expressed by the Court being limited in terms *to your continuance for another year*, and to their having since sent out an absolute, instead of a provisional appointment of a successor. With respect to the first point, the terms were altogether, as I conceive, the result of your own offer being strictly limited to that period of time. What influence the limitation of the period which you assigned for your stay might have had on the minds of some of the Court, under

feelings which do them so little credit, in disposing them to concur in that despatch, I will not take upon me to determine; but I should have considered that they were conveying the very reverse of what they professed to do to your Lordship, had I understood the despatch to carry with it any thing in the shape of a recal at the end of the year. The only mode in which the question of time entered ostensibly into the discussion, was with regard to Mr. Yorke. His decision was to be taken with reference to the Supreme Government, and it was under the sanction of your letter to Mr. Addington that the question was proposed for his consideration, in contemplation of his succession being definite in point of time. But Mr. Yorke having determined to remain in Europe, the same considerations did in no degree apply to Sir G. Barlow. His appointment was made entirely at the suggestion of Government, partly from an impression that he would be more competent to the trust, whenever it might devolve on him, under a conclusive than a provisional appointment, and partly from the expediency of deciding finally what related to the Supreme Government before the arrangement for that of Fort St. George was brought forward. I have been thus particular, that your Lordship might clearly understand the spirit in which these transactions took place, as far as I had any share in them; and I can have no hesitation in stating that I conceive (Mr. Yorke being out of the question) the point is as open to your Lordship's decision as if the expressions in the despatch had been altogether general, and as if no supplementary commission had been sent out to Sir George Barlow.

With respect to other considerations which may influence your judgment, there are two points which I trust I shall be entitled at once to assume as not admitting of the smallest doubt; first, that there is but one feeling and opinion in his Majesty's councils, that the Government of India can in no hands be so advantageously placed as in your Lordship's; and secondly, that there prevails in all their minds the most anxious disposition to give your Government a cordial and honourable support. Persuaded that your Lordship cannot for a moment entertain a doubt upon either of these facts, I am very sorry I cannot perceive a corresponding disposition in the Court of Directors. Very early after your

brother's arrival in England, I thought it right to apprise him of the disappointment with which I observed a revival of feelings which I had flattered myself were buried in oblivion, and subsequent observations have satisfied me, that it would be only exposing your Lordship's name, at least to most unmerited coldness, were I to call upon the Court to concur with the King's Government in *urging you* to continue in the Government of India.

The legal authority of our Board certainly enables us to mitigate, if not to disarm much of the disposition I have alluded to, and, I trust, with the exception of Mr. Strettell's supercession,* in which case we had only the power of remonstrance, that nothing has occurred at home, during the last year, to disturb the efficiency of your Government, whilst much has been done in financial arrangements to support its credit, and to enable you to give effect to that pecuniary prosperity, which is the fair and legitimate result of your political measures, and which it was due to your Lordship should be realized in your own hands; but although we can do much to diminish the evil, your Lordship must feel how difficult, if not impossible it is, to give a totally different complexion to all the details which originate with others, and which must necessarily receive and disclose the stamp and character of the mind which prevails in Leadenhall Street.

Under these circumstances, and with the experience of an existing disappointment, Mr. Addington and I were of opinion, that we could not in justice to your Lordship *claim* at your hands so great a sacrifice as that of continuing to administer so arduous a trust, not being able to assure you of a cordial support from those who have the means of embarrassment largely in their hands, and that we should best discharge our duty by you and by the public, in stating to you fully and fairly the real state of facts, leaving it to your Lordship's unbiassed judgment to decide, on the spot, what, under all the circumstances, may best reconcile your own feelings with what you deem to be due to the public interest.

In examining the question in this point of view, we have no

* In the office of Advocate-General, Mr. Strettell having been appointed to that office by the local government, on the return of Mr. Burroughs to England.

doubt you will take into your consideration all the circumstances, either as arising from the war in Europe, or the complexion the local politics of India may have assumed, that can bear upon this question, and being better able than any one to estimate the powers of the individual upon whom the government is to devolve, and the effects to be apprehended from such a charge passing into new hands at any particular juncture (however generally competent those hands may be) that you will upon the whole take the determination which appears to you most becoming, and most consistent with the security of India.

I am satisfied, however strongly your private feelings may impel you to relinquish the Government, without the delay of a day beyond what you before looked to, that no impulse of that nature will induce you to transfer it even into Sir G. Barlow's hands, unless you can satisfy your own mind that it may at the moment be safely done without prejudice to any essential interest.

It is, I trust, unnecessary for me to assure your Lordship, from Mr. Addington and myself, that your decision on this delicate and important question will entirely command our confidence and concurrence, and still less so to add, that in every event, whether abroad or at home, it is not less our duty than it is the sincere and cordial impulse of our own feelings, to give your administration the most hearty support.

I have sent to the India House for the Oude correspondence, which I find composes not less than nine volumes folio. It is my intention to carry it with me into Suffolk, where I am going for a fortnight, and I hope on my return to be enabled to convey to your Lordship our approbation of that important transaction. I shall take occasion in that despatch to notice your brother's official conduct in the manner which I consider to be due to him, and it will afford me great personal satisfaction when that despatch, together with his concluding report on the winding up of his government is laid before the Court, to find them disposed to confer upon him some substantial reward for services which have been not less honourable to him than advantageous to the Company.

I am happy to acquaint your Lordship, that in addition to

the supply of £1,730,000 in silver, which has been actually shipped for India and China in the course of the present season, we have procured a further supply of above £200,000 in dollars, which will be received on board a King's and a Company's ship, now under despatch for North America, and thence carried direct to Bengal, so your Lordship may reckon upon receiving it very early in the next year. The interruption of our communication with Hamburgh has given a temporary check to the Company's sales, and so far threatens to cripple the treasury at home, on the state of which our purchases of silver must necessarily depend; but I feel the importance of continuing this supply to be so much augmented by the war, that there is no effort which I shall leave untried to continue it upon a liberal scale.

The Company's stock has fallen since the recommencement of hostilities from 215 to 160. This makes it a great object, if possible, to postpone raising the additional capital till the *principal* is more productive, if by any operation, affecting only the interest, funds can be in the meantime procured to meet our demands. As far as £1,000,000 I hope this may be done, by enabling the Company to issue bonds at a higher rate of interest, at least as high as the exchequer bills of the day bear in the market. This will keep a larger amount in circulation, and so relieve the issues. I do not despair also of some arrangement, if it should be found requisite, being made with Government, by which the money might be raised on public securities in the market, to be repaid whenever the treasury should think fit to direct the Company to add to their capital. As the depreciation connected with the war bears much more than proportionably on the Company's funds, somewhat of the loss may be thus avoided. I only throw out these hints, to show your Lordship, that although we have provided nearly £2,000,000 for India in the present year, we shall not be satisfied till we enable you to meet and to conquer all your financial difficulties.

As the state of the army at home bears not a little on that portion of the Indian force to be supplied from Europe, I think it may not be unacceptable to your Lordship to understand what our prospects are under this head.

The militia and supplementary militia, amounting in Great Britain to 72,000 rank and file, are now raised nearly to their standard, and I understand from the Duke of York, who is just returned from an extensive inspection of the army, that in point of men, and even of discipline, though they have been under arms only four months, the militia is at this moment superior to what it was at the end of the war.

When the measure of the army of reserve was before Parliament, our calculation was, that the earliest enrolment could not take place before the 15th of August. Much to the honour of the country, not less than 12,000 men were actually assembled at the depots on that day, and the return of the 1st of September amounted, for Great Britain, to 23,300. The 10,000 men for Ireland are in progress, and the levy proceeds favourably; I cannot give your Lordship a more interesting and satisfactory proof of the spirit of the country than is contained in the above statement. So great an effort, made in the midst of harvest, without an expression of dissatisfaction from any quarter, notwithstanding the heavy bounties at which these men have been raised, is an unexampled proof that the public mind is upon a level with the circumstances in which we are placed. With the exception of the recruits raised in the neighbourhood of the Metropolis, who are prone to desert, the men are of the best description, and it is expected that the old regiments for general service will speedily be completed by volunteers from this force.

The army of reserve itself is formed upon thirteen old regiments, which are to have two battalions of 1000 each, to be officered by persons still in the King's regular service. The remainder are to be thrown into as many battalions of reserve, to be officered by persons, who either are or have been in the King's service, either in the line or fencibles. The Irish levy is to be apportioned, in like manner, to the four weakest regiments upon that establishment.

I have no doubt this levy will be completed and rendered in a great measure efficient, in the course of the next two months. We shall then have about 150,000 men in Great Britain, and 50,000 men in Ireland, exclusive of above 300,000 volunteers, including sea fencibles, in the former, and about

80,000 in the latter. This will place us in a state of security at home, and at the same time furnish a disposable force for offensive purposes.

With reference to India, I should state, that a considerable body of recruits, belonging to the regular regiments now there, were ready to proceed in the month of May last to join their corps. These men, amounting to about 1200, were detained under the pressing demand for force which then prevailed, and were, as a temporary resource, thrown into either two or three distinct battalions. They have since been doing duty in Jersey and Guernsey. They are now perfectly disciplined, and will be prepared to proceed with the first ships of the season. I shall, as the time of their departure approaches, call the Duke of York's attention to the state of the Indian army generally, and I trust his Royal Highness will by that time feel himself enabled to take measures for rendering the establishment perfectly complete.

I shall send a duplicate of this despatch by the Euphrates, the end of next week, and shall avail myself of that conveyance, should any thing further occur, which may appear to me worthy of notice.

I have the honour to be,
My dear Lord, very sincerely yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

No. X.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Hirdwar, March 5, 1804.

I have this day received a letter from Major Shawe enclosing copies of letters from your Excellency to his Majesty, the Prince of Wales, Duke of York, Lords Grenville and Hobart, the Right Hon. Henry Addington and Court of Directors, filled with such gratifying expressions and recommendations of me, that I really am totally unequal to say what I feel upon the occasion.

Believe me my dear Lord, I did not require this fresh instance of your friendship, affection and attachment, to be convinced of your zealous wishes and endeavours to secure

for me the approbation of the King, the Prince of Wales, all those distinguished characters and that of the country at large to which you have held me forth in such a conspicuous, flattering and honourable point of view.

I have only to assure you, that whatever reward I may receive, my greatest pride and satisfaction will arise from thinking that I have merited your applause and esteem by carrying your wise and well concerted plans into effect, and that your name will be handed down to posterity as the first statesman and most able politician England ever produced

That you may receive every testimony of esteem and regard for your brilliant services, with every honour and mark of distinction that a grateful and admiring nation can bestow, is the sincere wish, my dear Lord,

Of your affectionate and devoted servant,

G. LAKE.

No. XI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

SIR,

Fort William, March 12, 1804.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch under date the 26th of February.

2. It appears to me to be probable that Rajah Ambajee will be the person appointed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to receive charge from your Excellency of the Pergunnahs of Dholepore, Baree, and Rajah Kurrah which in conformity to the 7th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, are to be restored to Scindiah under certain stipulations excluding the introduction of troops. Adverting however to the treachery and insolence of Ambajee's conduct towards the British Government, and particularly towards your Excellency, I am determined to refuse to hold any intercourse whatever with Ambajee, and with all persons appointed by him, or dependent upon him. This determination is supported by considerations of obvious policy. It would be manifestly imprudent to admit the introduction of Ambajee's authority into the districts of Dholepore, Baree and Rajah Kurrah, which command the line of communication between Agra, Gwalior, and the territory of Gohud.

3. Your Excellency is therefore authorized and directed to refuse the surrender of those Pergunnahs into the hands of Ambajee, or of any person appointed by that chieftain to take charge of them, or of any person dependent on Ambajee. I deem it proper that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be immediately apprized of this determination, and of the grounds on which it is founded. Instructions have accordingly been issued to the Acting Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, directing that officer to state to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the nature of Ambajee's misconduct, to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the resolution of government to withhold all intercourse with Ambajee, and to require Dowlut Rao Scindiah to notice in proper terms the insult offered to your Excellency and to the British Government, in the language of Ambajee's letter to his vakeel.

4. Having maturely considered your Excellency's suggestion on the subject of maintaining a post garrisoned by British troops near the Passes into the territory of Gohud, situated within the Pergunnahs to be ceded to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I am of opinion that the prohibition against the introduction of the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah into those Pergunnahs, does not imply an authority to station British troops within them, and that no British garrison can be stationed in those districts without the consent of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; I am satisfied however of the importance of maintaining military posts near the passes of communication between Agra and the territory of Gohud, the Acting Resident has therefore been directed to endeavour to obtain Dowlut Rao Scindiah's consent to the adoption of that arrangement. The attention of the Acting Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah has also been directed to the desirable object of obtaining from Scindiah the retrocession of those Pergunnahs for an equivalent in territory or in money.

5. In the meanwhile your Excellency is authorized to maintain a garrison in those districts, until Scindiah shall have sent proper officers to take charge of them. In the event of the transfer of the Pergunnahs in question, to the authority of a person duly empowered to receive charge of them, previously to your Excellency's being informed of the result of the proposed reference to Dowlut Rao Scindiah,

your Excellency will be pleased to withdraw the garrison of Alli-Gholes* at present stationed in the Fort of Dholepore.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, March 14th, 1804.

1. In my letter of the 30th of December, 1803, I had the honour to submit to your Honourable Court a respectful notification of my intention to await in India the issue of those transactions in the Mahratta empire, which originated during my administration in the course of the year 1802, and of my confident expectation of being enabled to derive considerable advantage to your interests by conducting the depending negotiations for peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, to a favourable issue.

2. The treaties of peace concluded with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, of which copies are transmitted to your honourable Court, and to your Secret Committee by this despatch, will I trust, satisfy your honourable Court that the expectation expressed in my letter of the 30th of December 1803, has not been disappointed by the terms of the general pacification.

3. The copies of the treaties together with the documents transmitted to the Secret Committee of your honourable Court by this conveyance, are sufficient to afford a general view of the advantages acquired by the treaties of peace, and of the principles on which the several stipulations are founded.

4. In addition to a considerable augmentation of the territories and resources of the honourable Company in India, your honourable Court will observe with satisfaction, that the peace is founded upon principles of exemplary faith and equity towards our allies, of moderation and lenity towards our vanquished enemies, and of just regard for the general prosperity of this quarter of the globe.

5. It will require a more particular consideration of the voluminous documents connected with the various negotiations and arrangements which have originated in the success

* A class of Mahomedan troops so called.

of the war, and in the terms of the peace, to enable your honourable Court to appreciate all the benefits of this salutary and honourable settlement.

6. The detailed statements requisite to illustrate every article of the pacification, will be submitted to your honourable Court or to your Secret Committee, as soon as it shall be found practicable to prepare them for your consideration.

7. In examining the documents now transmitted, your honourable Court will remark, that various, extensive and complicated arrangements are dependent upon the peace, and are necessary to secure and to consolidate its beneficial operation.

8. I trust that I shall be enabled to conclude every important settlement connected with the general pacification of India at the close of the present year, and in that expectation I have the honour respectfully to notify to your honourable Court, my intention of embarking for Europe at that period of time.

9. It is probable that the settlement of affairs in Hindostan may require me to proceed to the north-western provinces, and I have accordingly made the necessary preparations for proceeding by water to Agra, in the month of June, if circumstances should appear to demand my presence in that quarter. In that event I expect however, to be enabled to return to Fort William in the month of December.

10. Notwithstanding the notification submitted to your honourable Court in this letter, I request you to rely with confidence on the unabated exertion of my zeal, for the interests and honour of the Company, and of the nation in India, if any event should occur to demand the further continuance of my services in this arduous government during the existence of war with France, or during any crisis which may arise among the native powers of Asia.

11. I entertain a firm hope that my presence in India will not be necessary to the security of the public interests in this quarter of the globe, under any probable circumstances after the close of the present year; but while I shall retain the power of discharging the duties of my station, your honourable Court may be assured that I will not attempt to abandon it in any exigency of difficulty or danger.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XIII.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Most Secret.)

London, 25th August, 1803.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 17th March, 1804.]

The *Georgiana* and *Admiral Aplin*, being ready to proceed on their voyage, I am unwilling to detain them for the sole purpose of completing the series of papers relative to the college. What remains, together with a private letter from myself, shall be sent by an overland express. Duplicates will also go by the *Euphrates*, which proceeds in about three weeks direct for Bengal, being the last ship of the season.

The fatiguing length of this controversy, and the daily hope of bringing it to an issue, will explain why your Lordship has been kept so long in suspense upon this point. My private letter will have sufficiently prepared you for the suspension of the former orders, and nothing but the vexatious resistance of the Court of Directors, as well on the point of authority as on that of business, could have retarded the communication. I trust however, it will yet reach India in time to relieve you from the embarrassment of taking any proceedings upon an imperfect authority.

The despatch itself will be forwarded overland, as the Board's approbation cannot be signified so as to admit of its going by the present conveyance. I enclose however a copy of the draft, which will enable your Lordship to take the necessary measures, in case the orders should not reach you in time through the regular channel.

You will perceive after various endeavours to evade or disappoint the wishes of the Board, that the Court have at last reluctantly executed the proposition originally made to them. There has been enough of discussion on the detail of the question to point your Lordship's observation to those parts of the subject upon which most doubts are entertained at home; and to these I wish to call your particular attention, as I should be desirous, when this topic again comes under consideration, that the arrangement on which you would propose to rest the system of education for the Company's servants,

should as far as possible obviate those objections, which are most strongly felt in Europe, to the present establishment.

That an adequate system of instruction in the native languages should be provided, combining academic discipline with the means of study, seems conceded on all hands. The practical question then resolves itself, into the extent and nature of the establishment, and the further question whether one or more colleges shall be kept up.

With a view to the decision of this point, I should be glad your Lordship would form a plan and estimate of a single establishment for the entire service, in as much detail as possible; also plans and estimates of separate establishments for each Presidency, that the question of comparative expence may be fairly brought into view—that you would, further, look at the quantum of allowance to be given to the young men whilst at college, not only in the view of general economy, but as bearing materially in principle upon the measure of joint or separate establishments; and, lastly, that your Lordship would furnish me with the most accurate information you can in respect to the comparative facility of acquiring the particular languages which are most in use in the peninsula, by studying them at Fort St. George and Bombay, rather than at Fort William. Several authorities in this country, whose opinions are calculated to have much weight on a question, which rests altogether on practical grounds, to be judged of by observation and experience, rely very strongly on this consideration, and it is a point upon which I find myself much more incompetent to form an opinion, than on those arguments of a more general nature which enter into this part of the subject.

Your Lordship will perceive that, if those in charge of the governments abroad have occasionally to complain of mortifications and embarrassments from the proceedings of the Court of Directors, the superintending authority at home is not exempt from its share of difficulty, and that we are all called upon in our turn to endure that, which is equally repugnant to our understandings and to our feelings.

I cannot close this letter without expressing the satisfaction and advantage I have derived from conversing unreservedly with Mr. Henry Wellesley on a variety of subjects connected with your Lordship's government, on all of which he is so well

informed. The result of his administration in Oude, so ably detailed in his concluding report, afforded me the utmost satisfaction, and I beg to offer to your Lordship my sincere congratulations upon the issue of an appointment, in the success of which, your private and public feelings were equally interested.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord,
with great truth and regard,
yours most sincerely,
CASTLEREAGH.

No. XIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, March 21, 1804.

1. I have received on this day advices from the Lieut.-Governor of Prince of Wales's Island, and from Captain Dance, of the safety of the honourable Company's valuable homeward-bound China fleet, and at the same time I received a despatch from Mr. Lance, containing the same intelligence and enclosing a sealed despatch for your honourable Committee.

2. I sincerely congratulate your honourable Committee and the honourable Court on the safety of this important fleet, and I am convinced that the circumstances which have effected the protection of the Company's commercial interests on this occasion will be deemed highly honourable to the British character and to our national fame.

3. My public duty required me to open Mr. Lance's sealed despatch addressed to your honourable Committee, for the purpose of taking copies of that despatch, and of transmitting them by separate conveyances; it appeared to me that the importance of the occasion also required an express despatch overland.

4. The conduct of Captain Dance and of the officers and seamen of the honourable Company's service in repelling and defeating a powerful squadron of French ships destined expressly to intercept your China trade, will receive your high approbation.

5. The superiority of the British naval power never appeared with greater splendour, and I cannot suppress the satisfaction which I feel in announcing to your honourable Committee that the French fleet appointed to disturb the trade of the East India Company, has been put to flight by the British merchantmen, which were the objects of its cruise, and that the valour and skill of your commanders and of your seamen have not only protected your valuable cargoes against the ships of war of the enemy, but would have captured the enemy's squadron if the contest had not been terminated by the precipitate retreat of the French ships of war.

6. Your honourable Committee will approve the judgment manifested by Lord William Bentinck in suggesting to the commanders of his Majesty's ships the *Albion* and *Sceptre*, the expediency of proceeding to Prince of Wales's Island on the first receipt at Madras of the intelligence of Admiral Linois's appearance at Bencoolen.

7. His Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier will of course inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the measures adopted by his Excellency for observing the movements of Admiral Linois' squadron from the time of its arrival at Pondicherry, in the month of July 1803, until its appearance at Bencoolen.

8. I think it necessary to apprise your honourable Committee that I entertain no intention of occupying Macao, or of providing for the security of your China trade in any other manner than that recommended by the Supra Cargoes at Canton. The plan of the Supra Cargoes requires the co-operation of his Majesty's ships in these seas; I must, therefore, depend on the opinion of the officer commanding in these seas for its execution. It is unquestionably the most prudent arrangement which can be attempted with reference to the characteristic jealousy of the Chinese government.

9. I avail myself of this opportunity to inform your honourable Committee that I received last night from Major Malcolm the important intelligence that Scindiah had signed a treaty of defensive alliance and of subsidy with the honourable Company, conformably to the 15th article of the peace of Surjeeanjungaum, and on principles similar to the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein.

10. I expect to receive a copy of the treaty in a few days,

and I shall not fail to transmit it by the earliest opportunity to your honourable Committee, in the meanwhile I have the honour to congratulate your honourable Committee and the honourable Court on an event which completes the establishment of the British interests in the Mahratta empire, secures the exclusion of the French, and consolidates every advantage obtained by the late war and by the general pacification of India.

11. The power of Holkar affords no ground of alarm in any event, but I entertain a confident expectation that he will be effectually restrained from disturbing the peace of Asia.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect,
your most obedient and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. XV.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRs,

Fort William, March 22, 1804.

1. I have the honour to enclose for the information of your honourable Court copies of the Gazette published last night at Fort William, containing the important and satisfactory intelligence of the success of the honourable Company's homeward-bound China fleet, in defeating a squadron of French ships of war, under the command of Admiral Linois, on the 14th of February, at the entrance of the straits of Malacca.

2. With the most cordial satisfaction I have the honour to offer to your honourable Court my sincere congratulations on this signal display of the gallantry and skill of your commanders, and of the bravery and discipline of your seamen.

3. It is highly creditable to the service of the honourable East India Company, that your commercial ships should have afforded this decisive proof of the superiority of the British naval power. The squadron under the command of Admiral Linois consisted of the *Marengo*, a ship of eighty guns, of two large frigates, of a corvette of thirty guns, and a Dutch

brig of eighteen guns. This force was expressly destined to capture your homeward-bound China fleet, and having very judiciously occupied a proper station for that purpose, under every circumstance of advantage and of favourable fortune, succeeded in intercepting the honourable Company's ships laden with valuable cargoes. But in the moment of apparent success the French Admiral was repulsed and put to flight by the British merchantmen, which were the express objects of his cruize; an event more honourable to the naval and commercial character of our country has not occurred in any period of our history; and I sincerely rejoice that the service of the honourable Company should have furnished an example so salutary to the British trade, and so well calculated to check the predatory and rapacious spirit of the enemy.

4. The conduct of Captain Dance, of the honourable Company's ship *Earl Camden*, will receive the highest approbation of your honourable Court, and will entitle him to public respect and honour: by his gallantry and skill, a disposition of your fleet was made, which not only saved your valuable cargoes and those of the country trade from the enemy, but reduced a French squadron, bearing an Admiral's flag, to the necessity of a precipitate retreat.

5. The commanders of the *Royal George* and *Ganges* also merit your distinguished notice for the gallant manner in which they commenced and sustained the action; and the spirit manifested by all the officers and seamen of your ships cannot fail to obtain your public approbation.

6. Although it is possible that this despatch may not reach your honourable Court previously to the arrival in England of the homeward-bound China fleet, I deemed it to be my duty to convey the intelligence contained in this letter to your honourable Court by the earliest opportunity which offers by land and sea.

I have the honour to be,
honourable Sirs, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

(Secret.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, March 24, 1804.

1. Since the despatch of my letter to your Lordship marked "Secret, No. 8," I have received a despatch from his Excellency General Lake, under date the 12th of March, stating that two vakeels from Jeswunt Rao Holkar had arrived at Jypore, and were to reach General Lake's camp on the 16th of this month. The vakeels are represented to be entirely in the confidence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

2. A communication had taken place directly with Jeswunt Rao Holkar through the channel of a native agent employed with the sanction of the Commander-in-chief. The native agent represents Jeswunt Rao Holkar to be extremely solicitous to maintain friendship with the British Government, and to avoid every measure which may tend to disturb the tranquillity of the British territories or of those of our allies.

3. My attention will now be directed to the completion of the military arrangements which it may become necessary to adopt in consequence of the peace, and of the accession of territory and power which has been acquired by the successes of the late war. I trust that the period of time is at length arrived when our military establishments in India can be formed on permanent principles, and the great augmentation of our resources in consequence of our recent success, will amply defray any expense which may be incurred by the adoption of any arrangement which may be required by the actual state of our political relations and subsidiary engagements; a considerable surplus of revenue arising from subsidies, cessions and conquests will remain after defraying all civil and military charges.

4. I shall avail myself of an early opportunity of writing to your Lordship on this subject as soon as I shall have received the information which is necessary for that purpose.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and regard,
my dear Lord,
yours most faithfully,

WELLESLEY.

No. XVII.

Lieutenant-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Camp Ballaher, March 22th, 1804.

I do not think it will be possible for me to leave the upper provinces till after the next cold season, as I apprehend that the upper part of the Dooab will require much watching, arrangement, and management, to bring Sumroo's Begum, and many others, into a proper state of subjection. Indeed I believe it will require the utmost attention on my part, as well as on that of every judge and collector, aided by the military, to bring our new subjects to conform to the rules and regulations of our government. That part of our territories are certainly at present by no means in the state I could wish them, nor will they, I fear, be much better so long as Holkar's army is in existence, as many chieftains, and very particularly so the Rohillas, are ready to join him if he could break into our possessions. It will be necessary when we break up the camp that they should be so posted as to prevent the possibility of any incursions being made into our provinces, they should be so situated that a large force could be assembled at the shortest notice; at the same time so disposed of, as to assist the civil servants of government, to enforce obedience to our laws throughout the different districts. When I consider what a length of time it will take to bring the high-minded natives into order and regularity, I cannot think it will be possible for me to quit this part of the country before the rains of next year, 1805. I forgot to mention that there are several tribes of people living in the upper part of the Dooab that must be subdued, as the depredations they are eternally committing are productive of every mischief and destruction to our subjects. Several of them live just upon the borders of our possessions, and are eternally making encroachments, and must be corrected.

You will perceive by this, my dear Lord, that there is much to be done in settling our own affairs; besides which I cannot divest myself of the idea, that if Holkar is not destroyed, he will, as soon as the rains are over be extremely troublesome. I never was so plagued as I am with this

devil; he just, nay hardly, keeps within the letter of the law, by which means our army is remaining in the field at an enormous expense; and if we retire he will instantly come on to Jeypoor, where he will at least get a crore of rupees (besides immense plunder), which will enable him to pay his army, and become more formidable than he has ever yet been—That he is decidedly inimical to the English there cannot be a doubt. I feel myself in a most awkward situation respecting the robber; for if he does not come on to me, which I do not suppose he will, I cannot move on towards him, as the moment I advance and leave an opening for him, he will give me the slip, get into our territories with his horse, burn and destroy every thing he comes near. How far it would be politic to let Scindiah attack him from his side of the country I am not competent to judge, but sure I am that the only mode of meeting this reptile would be some decisive measure on the part of Scindiah. He is certainly the aggressor against Scindiah, as he is endeavouring to get Ajmeer, which place, by the late treaty of peace, belongs to that chieftain. Don't, my dear Lord, from this language imagine that I shall commence hostilities with Holkar, and lead you into another war unless he comes, or till I hear from you. Forage for our cattle is getting scarce, with every other necessary of life, we are better and cheaper supplied than ever army was, I believe. Of course, this comfort is attended with a heavy expense to Government.

I trust you will see the propriety of my remaining in the upper provinces for at least a very great part of the next cold season, which must of course prevent my meeting you at Calcutta till very late in this year, or beginning of next, should you deem it absolutely necessary for me to come there. I much fear that if I express a wish that you should proceed to the upper provinces that you will think me selfish and troublesome; believe me, I should feel the greatest satisfaction and pleasure in seeing you, not only for the enjoyment of your society, which I most sincerely wish for, but in a public point of view, I think it would be absolutely necessary we should meet, as there are many circumstances I have to relate that would be much better talked over than committed to paper.

I rejoice to find you so highly satisfied with the peace, and have no doubt but all the trivial difficulties you allude to will

be easily surmounted. I hope Scindiah will exchange Dolpoor, &c. for some other lands or taking money in lieu of them. In all times that has been looked upon as a pass of the utmost consequence. In the time of the Emperor, when in profound peace, a large army was always kept to protect it as one of the principal passes into the Hindostan.

I agree with your Lordship in thinking Colonel Scott the ablest ambassador you could have sent to Delhi. He is a man of strict honour and great firmness of mind; I am upon the very best of terms with him, and shall be happy to act with him upon all occasions, and I am well convinced he feels the same sentiments towards me. I have received the most uniform assistance and information from him since I began this campaign, and found him of most essential service in every thing he has said and done.

I wish to assure your Lordship that Colonel Ochterlony has acted during his stay at Delhi in the most upright and exemplary manner possible; his situation has been trying, and he has acquitted himself entirely to my satisfaction.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

with the truest attachment and gratitude,
your faithful and devoted

G. LAKE.

Let me recommend to your Lordship's notice Major M'Leod, a more gallant officer never stepped, and a more honourable man never lived. I have seen him, and know his worth.

No. XVIII.

Lieut.-General Lake to his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council.

MY LORD,

Camp near Balahere, 4th April 1804.

1. I have the honour to transmit for the information of your Excellency in Council the enclosed copies and translations of a letter addressed to me by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of my answer.

2. Copies and translations of the several letters referred to in my answer to Jeswunt Rao Holkar are also enclosed.*

* The intercepted correspondence is very voluminous. Holkar, in his letters to the different Hindoo chiefs, speaks of the English as "infidel

3. The conduct which Jeswunt Rao Holkar continues to pursue is so evidently hostile to the British interests, and the demands preferred by his vakeels, and since repeated by his confidential servant, Bowannee Shunker, are in their nature so inadmissible, and indeed insulting, considered only as propositions from Holkar to a government whose pre-eminent rank and consequence in the empire of Hindostan, is now fully acknowledged by the other established powers, that I am fully impressed with the belief that no modified arrangement which could be formed, nor sacrifice which could be made, consistent with the honour and dignity of the British Government, would satisfy the ambition of that chieftain, nor contribute to ensure to the several states of Hindostan that permanent peace and safety which it has formed a principal object of your Excellency's administration to secure to them. His resources, depending solely upon rapine and plunder, can only be supported at the expence of the neighbouring states, whilst the numerous predatory bands at present collected in his service, and composed of the restless and disaffected from all quarters of India, will be ready to encourage and support seditions and disturbances in other governments.

4. Your Excellency will have perceived that the forbearance hitherto observed towards Jeswunt Rao Holkar by the British Government, has had no effect in inducing a more friendly disposition on his part towards us, nor in altering his conduct towards our allies. As a proof of his ambitious views and the little regard paid by him to the usual forms observed by the other states of India towards the King of Delhi, it may be proper to remark to your Excellency, that on the seal of the letter addressed to me, instead of the usual style of "servant to Shah Alum," he styles himself servant of Mahomood Shah, the late King of Cabul, with which state I have every reason to believe he has lately kept up a correspondence

Christians;" the "enemies of the Hindoo faith;" "seditious men, whom they should be prepared to do distinguished services against." He calls on them to aid his "victorious army in taking vengeance on the ungrateful multitude" (the English). To the Moossulman chiefs he declares, that "it is the object of the religion, and the rule of Moossulmans, that the whole body of the faithful having assembled together, be employed, heart and soul, in extirpating the profligate infidels."—[Ed.]

for the purpose of inviting their arms into Hindostan. The confidence which he appears to entertain of a successful commencement of hostilities with this government, principally arises, I am inclined to believe, from the support he expects from the power and influence of several of the subjects of government, with whom his intrigues have been successful, and from the hope of being enabled by their assistance and junction in the Dooab to create disturbances, and to distress us by the diminution of our resources and supplies.

5. To frustrate any design of this nature on his part, which might certainly be attended with many distressing consequences if attempted during the remainder of the dry season, I shall be obliged to retain this army in such a position as may cover the valuable possessions of the Company in this quarter.

6. The advance of the army, under present circumstances, to force Holkar from his position in the frontier of Jeypore, and in the country of Ajmeer, whilst it might enable him to pursue the supposed measure of entering the Company's dominions, would be liable also to be frustrated in its ultimate object by his retiring into the extensive country of Mewar, from whence he could easily resume his position, or recommence his hostilities against the Jeypoor Rajah upon the army retiring towards our own provinces.

7. The co-operation of a British force from the southward, when joined with the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, would not only effectually prevent his protracting the war by his evading any decisive engagement with this army, but would be the immediate means of withdrawing from him the troops and countenance of the Rajahs in that quarter, and even the numerous bodies of Patans, whose views of plunder would be annihilated by the evident necessity which would then exist for Holkar's risking the continuance of his power and ability to retain them in his service in the event of an engagement.

8. With this view I shall immediately proceed to consult with Major-General Wellesley the mode in which this co-operation may be most advantageously effected, that I may be prepared to act accordingly when I am put in possession of the final resolution of your Excellency in Council, in re-

gard to the expediency of the measure, of immediately prosecuting active hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

I have the honour to be,
my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,
G. LAKE.

1st Enclosure.

Translation of a Letter from Jeswunt Rao Holkar to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; dated the 14th of Zehege, 27th March 1804.

Nouroz Ali Khan and Sheik Sultaun Buxhs have delivered to me your friendly letter, in which you express your wish that a confidential person, duly authorized on my part, should be sent to establish the relation of friendship, and to enter into binding engagements, with which I was much pleased. I also fully understood all its contents; it is certain that the bond of friendship does not depend upon the interchange of letters, or the observance of complimentary customs. It is proper that you should first acquaint me with the means which, after due deliberation of the consequence, you propose should be used for settling all disputes, for ensuring the welfare of the people, and establishing friendship, that I may then send to you a confidential person who shall be agreeable to both parties; considering in every respect your attachment, I have no improper views against the Company or its connections; you will, as the means of increasing our friendship, continue to favour me with your friendly correspondence.

A true Translation.

GRÆME MERCER,
Agent Governor-General.

A true Copy.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Government.

2d Enclosure.

Translation of a Letter to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, 4th April 1804.

Your letter of the 14th Zehij has been received, and its contents understood. You write that it is necessary, before you send to me a confidential person who shall be agreeable to both parties, that I should acquaint you with the means which I propose should be used for settling disputes and giving peace to the country; you will have been fully informed by the contents of my former letter, sent by Nawroz Ali Khan and Sheik Sultaun Bucksh, that those means are entirely in your own power, and depend solely on yourself. The British Government requires nothing further on your part, than you should retire to your own country, and cease to molest the allies of the government, whom they are bound to protect, whilst they will on their part observe the same line of conduct towards you, by avoiding all interference with your country and concerns. To

this equitable and friendly proposition you make no reference in your letter, and instead of acting in conformity to it, and to the promise contained in your letter of the 21st of Gicaud, of returning to your own country after performing the religious ceremonies at Ajmeer; you still remain in that quarter, whilst a part of your army is employed in plundering the country of the Jeypore Rajah, the friend and ally of the Government. From these circumstances, and from the letters which you have lately written to several of the allies and servants of the British Government, declaratory of your hostile intentions, it appears that your professions of friendship are illusory. If the circumstances stated in the letter from Bawany Shunker to Mr. Gardiner, now received, are written in conformity to your own sentiments, it will be still more evident that a wish for the friendship of the British Government has never entered into your heart.

From the contents of this letter it appears that you consider as an indispensable preliminary to the establishment of friendship an admission on the part of the government of unfounded claims which you must be sensible have never been submitted to by the British Government, in their political relations with any state of Hindostan, or the Deccan, and which it would be derogatory to their power and dignity to listen to.

I still hope that your judgment and foresight will induce you to view these circumstances in a proper light, and that you will take advantage of the favourable opportunity which still offers for continuing and strengthening the friendship between yourself and the British Government.

A true Translation.
GRÆME MERCER,
Agent Governor-General.

A true Copy.
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Government.

No. XIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable F. North.

MY DEAR NORTH,

Fort William, 6th April, 1804.

I have received information from an authentic quarter that the detachment of native Bengal volunteers, now doing duty on Ceylon, has been required and compelled to attend the performance of Divine Service with the European troops at Columbo. It is impossible for me to express to you the surprise and regret which this intelligence has excited in my mind. It has always been one of the principal objects of my government to refrain from every kind of interference with the religious customs and prejudices of our native subjects, particularly of our sepoys, who are extremely jealous of their reli-

gious rights, and who have constantly experienced the most marked protection in the exercise of their religious ceremonies from the British Government in every quarter of India. Any deviation from the attention which is due to the religious prejudices of the native troops of India is not only calculated to produce the most serious evils in all our military establishments, but to excite apprehensions in the minds of the native troops, which may be attended with the most fatal consequences with regard to their attachment and fidelity. The interests of your government must also suffer from imposing on the native troops belonging to the different Presidencies in India, now serving on Ceylon, the performance of duties which are not only contrary to their habits and prejudices, but which, according to their opinion, entails certain disgrace and infamy.

Your experience and knowledge of the interests of the Empire, render it unnecessary for me to point out to you the various dangers to which the public service must be exposed by any interference with the religious customs of the native troops of India. It will be impossible for the government of India to induce native troops to volunteer to serve in distant quarters of the British Empire, unless they can ensure to the native troops the observance of a due respect for their religious prejudices, nor will it be in your power in Ceylon to obtain recruits from any quarter of India, if the native troops from India serving in Ceylon be compelled to attend Divine service together with European troops, or to perform any duties incompatible with the customs and doctrines of the Hindoo and Mussulman faith. My public duty would require me to exert on this occasion the extensive powers which are vested in me by the Crown, as Captain-General of the land forces serving in the East Indies; I am, however, disposed to believe that the arrangements requiring the attendance at Colombo, of the native troops of India at the performance of Divine service, have been adopted ignorantly or inadvertently, without considering the serious consequences which must be apprehended from any interference with the religious customs of their country, and I have therefore adopted this mode of communicating to you my sentiments on this delicate and important subject. If, however, it should be the determination of the officer commanding the forces on the Island

of Ceylon to require the attendance of the native troops of India at the performance of Divine service, I must recal every native of the continent of India belonging to any of the Company's establishments, and now serving in Ceylon; and it is accordingly my desire that they should all be embarked as soon as possible after the receipt of this letter, and sent to their respective Presidencies on the continent of India, unless you are prepared to afford to me the most satisfactory assurances, that the native troops of every description from India, now serving on Ceylon, shall receive the most ample protection in the exercise of the duties of their religion, and shall experience the same attention to their religious prejudices, and to all their customs and habits, which is manifested towards them on every occasion by the government of India.

You must be aware, that if any difficulty should occur in conforming to the tenor of these suggestions, I shall be compelled to forbid, on the continent of India, the recruiting for your lascars, and for all other native corps in your service.

My dear North,
believe me ever yours most faithfully,
WELLESLEY.

No. XX.

N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. to Sir William Clarke, Envoy at Goa.

SIR,

Fort William, April 11, 1804.

1. I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 21st February, and to communicate to you the following instructions for the regulation of your conduct in the event of the death of the Vice Roy of Goa, during the present uncertainty with regard to the state of the relations between his Majesty and the Court of Lisbon.

2. His Excellency the Governor-General is decidedly of opinion that upon principles of self-defence, the British Government would be justified under any circumstances whatever, in precluding the establishment of the authority of the French at Goa. While the state of Portugal continues at peace with Great Britain, whether as an ally against France or as a neutral

power, we have a right to expect that the local authority at Goa should be prepared to the utmost extent of the power and resources of that settlement, to resist any attempt on the part of the French to obtain possession of it, and that the Governor of Goa should receive the aid of the British troops for the defence of that settlement, if its local power and resources should be inadequate to that purpose. This question must necessarily be determined with reference to the danger to which our interests would be exposed in the event of the occupation of Goa, or any other of the Portuguese settlements in India by the troops of France, during the existence of war between Great Britain and France. No state of circumstances can be supposed which would preclude our right to avert that danger either by an amicable arrangement with the local government, or if necessary by the forcible occupation of that place with the British troops. If the state of Portugal be considered as an ally of Great Britain against France, any measures or omissions on the part of the local Government of Goa intended to favour the admission of the authority of France, would constitute acts of treachery to the cause of the allies. If the state of Portugal be considered neutral in the war, such measures or omissions on the part of the subordinate government would constitute a violation of its neutrality.

3. If the Government of Goa should be disposed to favour the views of France, our right to guard by timely precautions against the probable effects of such a disposition with reference to the interests and security of the British Government cannot be disputed, and if the military strength and resources of that settlement are inadequate to its defence, the British Government is unquestionably justified on the same principle in supplying that deficiency by the aid of its power. These are the general principles on which were founded the instructions of his Excellency the Governor-General of the 11th December, 1801, and 6th and 17th of January, 1802, for the eventual occupation of Goa by force of arms. For the reasons above stated, his Excellency is determined to adopt measures for the purpose of precluding the danger to be apprehended to the interests of the British Government at Goa, in the event of the government of that

settlement passing into the hands of persons of the character and principles of those who are stated in your letter of the 21st of February to the honourable the Governor of Bombay, to compose the commission for eventually executing the functions of the Government of Goa. With this view, the Governor-General is extremely desirous that in the event of the decease of the Vice Roy, the settlement of Goa should be taken under the complete protection of the British Government, by an arrangement similar to that effected by you with the Vice Roy at the commencement of the year 1802.

4. For this purpose, you will immediately after the death of the Vice Roy, at such period as you may deem advisable for the security of the British interests at Goa, commence a negotiation with the existing government of that settlement for placing it in the same state of dependence on the British Government, in which it stood from the commencement of 1802, to the period when the British troops were withdrawn from Goa.

5. His Excellency would prefer such a settlement under the present circumstances to any other which can be made, and is therefore extremely solicitous for its speedy and pacific accomplishment in the event of the decease of the Vice Roy.

6. Should all your exertions to secure this desirable object be ineffectual, it will be necessary to adopt more decisive measures for the prevention of the evils to be apprehended from the expected change of Government. His Excellency therefore directs, that in the event of the entire failure of the negotiations above directed, you will proceed to assume in the name of his Majesty the civil and military Government of Goa. His Excellency directs me to observe to you, that the instructions contained in my letter to your address under date the 17th June, 1802, appear to apply equally to the state of affairs under which you may now be required to act, and to furnish a sufficient rule for your guidance on the present occasion, and accordingly desires that you will conform to the spirit of those instructions in the event of its becoming necessary to assume by force the Government of Goa. His Excellency leaves it to your discretion to deviate

from those instructions in any point, which may render them inapplicable to the particular circumstances of the present crisis.

I have the honour to be, &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

Secretary to Government.

No. XXI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

(Secret.)

SIR,

Barrackpore, April 16, 1804.

1. Having fully considered your Excellency's despatches to a date as late as that of your Excellency's letter, of the 4th instant,* which reached me yesterday, I think it necessary to apprize your Excellency without delay, of my determination to commence hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, at the earliest practicable period of time.

2. Your Excellency will hereafter receive my detailed instructions on this subject, and in the meanwhile I deem it to be expedient to authorize and direct your Excellency to adopt such measures, as may be necessary to enable your Excellency to undertake active operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in the manner which may appear to your Excellency to be most advisable, and without waiting for further orders from me for that purpose.

3. A copy of this letter is transmitted to the honourable Major-General Wellesley on this day, together with my orders, directing him to co-operate with your Excellency from the Deccan, against the resources and power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

4. I also forward on this day similar orders to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, directing him to prepare Scindiah to act in concert with the British forces in Hindostan and the Deccan.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your Excellency's most faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

* See p. 48.

No. XXII.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Camp Jonga, April 29, 1804.

Your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, which I received yesterday, conveying your instructions for commencing hostilities with Jeswunt Roa Holkar, relieved my mind from the greatest anxiety, as I was much alarmed at the idea of entering into a war without your sanction, and was very fearful from the conduct of Holkar, that it would not be possible for me to avoid it; however I have been fortunate enough to desist from action, and at the same time to alarm him sufficiently from doing any mischief.

General Wellesley will, I make no doubt, soon have all his forts and country. If I can by any means get at him, you may depend upon my not letting any opportunity slip that may offer. He is extremely abusive whenever the British name is mentioned, and descends to the lowest vulgarity on these occasions in the most public manner. For these three days his camp has been in a constant state of alarm, and the horses have been saddled from evening until he has reached his ground on the following day. The above account comes from Captain Gardener, who, as my despatches will have informed you, has been employed with a few irregular horse to hover round his camp, and gain intelligence, in which undertaking he has succeeded most perfectly to my satisfaction. He has hitherto been directed upon no account to do anything that could appear hostile.

I am not without hopes we may be able to disperse or destroy the army of Holkar on this side; his brigades and artillery are in Malva, and ought to be kept there if not taken by Scindiah's army.

That success may attend you throughout this business with the robber Holkar, and every undertaking through life, is the fervent prayer of your affectionate and devoted

G. LAKE.

No. XXIII.

Major Merrick Shawe to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

(Private.)

SIR,

Barrackpore, 30th April, 1804.

I am commanded by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General to transmit to you herewith a short note, containing his Excellency's observations upon Major Malcolm's public and private despatches and letters from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to a date as late as the 10th of the present month.

You will receive the Governor-General's detailed instructions upon the subject of those despatches at an early period of time, but in the present state of the negotiations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, his Excellency deems it to be of importance that you should receive the earliest practicable intimation of his Excellency's sentiments which are stated in the enclosed note relative to the objects of those negotiations.

The observations contained in that note were originally designed for Major Malcolm's consideration and guidance; but adverting to the state of Major Malcolm's health, to the importance of the crisis, and to the period of Mr. Webbe's expected arrival at Burhanpore, his Excellency thinks it nearly certain that Major Malcolm will have delivered over charge of the residency to Mr. Webbe before this despatch can reach Burhanpore. In that event, Mr. Webbe is desired to consider the Governor-General's note to be addressed to his particular attention.

I have the honour to be,

M. SHAWE.

[Enclosure.]

Remarks on the undermentioned Paragraphs of Major Malcolm's Official Despatches, Nos. 26 and 27 of the 3d and 10th of April, 1804.

ABSTRACT.

No. 26, 3d April, 1804.

Par. 2.—Scindiah's ministers declare that the loss of Gwalior and Gohud by Scindiah under the treaty of peace, had not been considered to be possible by them. They could hold no other language to their master without confessing that they had betrayed their trust.—*Major Malcolm.*

REMARK.

This argument ought to have been resisted in the most positive and determined manner. The ministers wished the British Resident to acknowledge a violation of the treaty, in order to countenance their deceit, because they wilfully deceived Dowlut Rao Scindiah they wish to make us confess that if we do not cover their falsehood we shall violate our public faith.

We are therefore to sacrifice our public faith, our interests, rights, and security, for the mere purpose of countenancing the deceptions of Scindiah's ministers.—Wellesley.

Par. 11.—The personal interests of Scindiah's ministers are deeply involved in maintaining his pretensions to Gwalior and Gohud. The Resident attributes their obstinacy on this point entirely to motives of private interest.—*Major Malcolm.*

If this be the case, Major Malcolm should have demanded an audience of Scindiah, and personally explained the whole question, and exposed the deceit of his ministers instead of suffering the question to be agitated through the channel of persons interested in deceiving Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and in misrepresenting the conduct of the British Government.—Wellesley.

Par. 14.—Bappoo Wittell is supposed to be well disposed towards the British Government, but if Scindiah loses Gohud, Bappoo Wittell can only retain his situation by impressing Scindiah with sentiments injurious to the British Government.—*Major Malcolm.*

A further reason for coming to a clear understanding with Scindiah himself, regarding the question of Gohud and Gwalior.—Wellesley.

No. 27, 10th April, 1804.

Par. 2.—The Resident has shown to Moonshee Kavel Nyn the list of chiefs with whom the British Government had concluded treaties. The Resident states his expectation that Scindiah shall recognize the independence of the persons named in the list.—*Major Malcolm.*

Major Malcolm has not been directed to make this requisition. The claims of Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon those persons are annulled by the engagements between them and us, confirmed by the 9th article. This requisition appears to render Dowlut Rao Scindiah's consent necessary to their independence, and to be an additional obstacle to a final adjustment of the question, and opens a new ground of discussion equally unnecessary and objectionable.—Wellesley.

Par. 2.—Moonshee Kavel Nyn states an apprehension that the recognition of the title of the Rana would alienate the territory of Gohud and fortress of Gwalior from Scindiah.—*Major Malcolm.*

Undoubtedly.—This most extraordinary and even insolent declaration, appears to have been received without any particular remark or expression of surprise and disapprobation.—Wellesley.

Par. 4.—Kavel Nyn repeats the objections frequently made to the name of the Rana of Gohud by Scindiah's ministers.—*Major Malcolm.*

The question of the existence of a Rana had been repeatedly brought forward and answered in a manner unanswerable.—Wellesley.

The Resident states his reason for not replying to Moonshee Kavel Nyn's observation respecting the Rajah of Jodepore.—*Major Malcolm.*

It is a question whether Jycpoor and Jodepoor might not at any time have concluded defensive treaties with us without reference to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on whom they were no further dependent than as he possessed and exercised the power of exacting tribute from them in the name of the king.—Wellesley.

Par. 8.—The Resident entertains no doubt that Scindiah will recognize the treaties with the chiefs named in the list, and believes the delay which had taken place had been solely caused by the apprehension of the effect such recognition might have on the claims of Scindiah to Gohud and Gwalior.—*Major Malcolm.*

Does Major Malcolm suppose that such recognition would not have that effect?—Wellesley.

Major Malcolm's belief of the justice, or rather the necessity of maintaining our engagements with the Rana of Gohud, appears to have been shaken by the arguments of the ministers. He expressly states in a letter to Mr. Mercer of the 30th March, that he considers the question to be doubtful, and in a private letter to the secretary, which encloses the former, he states that his official proceedings are not founded on his real sentiments. Major Malcolm evidently thinks that we are at liberty to dissolve our engagements with the Rana of Gohud, and expects that the reports which he has made of the solicitude of Scindiah to possess Gohud and Gwalior, will induce the Governor-General to cede them.

This may perhaps account for Major Malcolm's not resisting the arguments of the ministers with due decision, indeed it can hardly be expected that any person will successfully defend a cause, of the justice of which, *he* himself entertains a doubt.

Major Malcolm has probably been led into the error of requiring Scindiah's acknowledgments of the independence of the Rana of Gohud, &c., and his renunciation of all claims upon them (in other words, requiring Scindiah's ratification of our treaties with those persons) by the terms of the instructions for the peace, in which those requisitions are stated as forming part of the plan of pacification, but those instructions were issued without having in contemplation the accomplishment of the object of those requisitions by means of treaties with the persons concerned.

To bring forward those requisitions now, is exciting a question which has been completely adjusted by the article of the treaty providing for the confirmation of all treaties with chieftains of Hindostan, and consequently of treaties which stipulated for the independence of the Rana of Gohud, and others who are the subject of debate.

That Major Malcolm should entertain any doubt of the obligation of the engagements with the Rana of Gohud on the faith of the British Government, appears very extraordinary, since not only the Governor-General has in his instructions distinctly acknowledged that obligation, but

Major Malcolm himself has on several occasions adduced arguments which are conclusive, and which Major Malcolm must have thought to be conclusive on the question. It can only be supposed as stated above, that his judgment has been influenced by the arguments of the ministers, yet Major Malcolm seems to be aware that the ministers have now a personal interest in disputing the validity of our engagements with the Rana, and in misrepresenting the arguments by which their validity is supported, since they cannot admit the latter without an acknowledgment that they have wilfully deceived their master. Either, therefore, Scindiah must be convinced that the British Government has violated its faith, or his ministers must lose their master's confidence. The latter, Major Malcolm considers to be injurious to our interests, and he therefore apprehends injury to our interests, whether Scindiah be or be not convinced of the justice of our proceedings with respect to Gohud, and hence Major Malcolm's solicitude for the restitution of Gohud and Gwalior to Scindiah.

But if Major Malcolm were satisfied that our public faith is pledged to maintain our engagements with the Rana of Gohud, it is to be supposed that he would adopt the obvious mode of adjusting this question by explaining personally to Scindiah the nature of the case, instead of negotiating through the channel of men who are interested in mistating the question to their master, and in impressing him with a belief that we have violated our faith to clear their own characters, and to maintain their stations.

To that cause, therefore, may principally be ascribed Major Malcolm's errors. In that event the instructions of the 8th of April are calculated to set him right.

Major Malcolm's errors cannot have proceeded from want of information. All the information which the public documents of Government afford, respecting the condition of the person called the Rana of Gohud, could not have enabled Major Malcolm to combat with more success than he did the assumption of the ministers that no Rana of Gohud exists. It appears on the face of Major Malcolm's despatches, that he was apprized of the actual conclusion of a treaty with the Rana of Gohud, by the operation of which, the territory of Gohud and Gwalior must be alienated from Scindiah's dominion. The circumstances which pledge the faith of Government to the permanency of that treaty, are entirely unconnected with the contents of the treaty. Major Malcolm was apprized also of the nature of the engagements concluded with Ambajee—of the treachery of that chieftain, of the consequences of it, and of the rights we acquired by it. Major Malcolm appears to have had every information in any degree necessary to the cause which he had to support, and indeed Major Malcolm has occasionally shown his perfect knowledge of the subject. His error seems to be in suffering his judgment to be perverted by the sophistry of the ministers.

It may be useful to add to these notes, that the delay in the restitution of Asseerghur, of which Scindiah's ministers complain, has been created solely by Major Malcolm himself, since the Commander-in-Chief has long ago reported that all Scindiah's forts and dominions within the line

of demarcation in Hindostan, are in our possession. Why Major Malcolm has not restored Asseerghur under General Wellesley's orders, and under this communication from General Lake remains to be explained. It is impossible, however, not to observe that the personal and private interests of Scindiah's ministers with reference to the question of Gwalior and Gohud may appear to derive some strength from this delay. The delay affords a new pretext for discontent, and it may be hoped, that the appearance of so many causes of discontent concurring to disturb the temper of Scindiah's councils may alarm me for the stability of the peace, and may terrify me into the cession of Gwalior and Gohud, and into a general system of concession and submission, conformably to Major Malcolm's principles. In this expectation, however, Scindiah's advisers and friends will be disappointed, they will not move me as easily as they have shaken Major Malcolm. I am perfectly ready to renew the war to-morrow, if I find that the peace is not secure.

WELLESLEY.

No. XXIV.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Camp Luvai, May 12, 1804.

I have the honour to enclose a letter, (private) from the honourable Major-General Wellesley,* with my answer to that officer for the information of your Lordship, and am extremely sorry to find that he is so uneasy at the thought of his appointment in India, not being approved by his Majesty, or the Duke of York. It is not in my power to give him any information upon the subject as my letter to him will show.

I shall feel most exceedingly the loss of his abilities and exertions, should the war continue with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, both in his military and political knowledge of affairs in this country. I have not an idea that the King and Duke would have objected to his appointment, and if he does not know they have, from any private channel, I cannot believe they have done so. Your Lordship will perceive I have granted him permission to proceed to Europe whenever he wishes it, I have done it with the greatest reluctance, as however great the loss I should sustain by his absence, I would not for the world do anything that could militate against his feelings; I hope and trust your Lordship will approve what I have done.

* See p. 65.

I shall be able to judge by Holkar's next march which way he means to bend his course, if towards Seronge, as it is supposed by many he may, to join Meer Khan, who does not seem much inclined to have anything to do with him, and attempt to penetrate by Bundelcund into our territories, I shall of course move towards Agra, and take up position upon the Jumna, leaving Colonel Monson with a force somewhere near Ranpoora, to prevent him from retiring into these parts.

I shall wish to get back to Agra as soon as I can, as if the rains set in, I fear my army will find it difficult to get supplies, which must come from our own provinces, as the harvest in these parts has not been very productive from the want of rain this year; indeed, they have had no rains for these two last years, which has of course caused great scarcity of grain of all sorts. I think this robber is quite off from this quarter, and do not apprehend he can now do much mischief any where. If Bapoojee Scindiah chooses to act properly, he has a force with him perfectly sufficient to destroy his army, but these people are so dilatory and so little to be depended upon that it is difficult to guess what they will do.

It appears by the letter which will be forwarded to your Excellency by this Dawk, that General Wellesley thinks it will be impossible for the army from Poonah to act until after the rains, or that the army from Guzerat can do much till then. I understand, during the rainy season in the quarter the army would have to act, that it is almost impossible to move. In fact, an army in this country cannot act in the rainy season. Your Lordship will perhaps stare at reading this after what passed in last rainy season, but it must be recollected that such a season has not been known for years, as we had not seven days rain I believe from the time we left Cawnpore until the surrender of Agra. The natives, who are extremely superstitious, say that God Almighty ordered the dry season for the purpose of our conquering Hindostan, and hold that language to this moment, saying that nothing can stand against the British, as God fights for them. I do most sincerely agree with them, as our successes have been beyond all parallel, and must have had the assistance of an invisible hand. I cannot help offering my thanks to Providence whenever I reflect upon the operations of this cam-

paign, which nothing but his guidance could have carried into effect. The heat is excessive in the tents of the Europeans, but they continue uncommonly healthy; I dread the rains, as I understand, after a campaign of this sort, they are very apt to suffer severely in that season. It is always the most unhealthy time with them.

If it was possible for the Guzerat army to do any thing before the rains set in, great advantage might be derived from it, but I think that will be impossible from General Wellesley's account, whose judgment from his knowledge of the country I have the greatest reliance upon. Should that army advance, and be stopped by the rains, the consequence would be most unpleasant. I therefore fear we must desist from any active operations during that season.

I shall not decide finally until I hear again from General Wellesley and your Lordship, but I wish much to get my troops under cover before the rains fall.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with affection and regard,
your faithful and devoted servant,
G. LAKE.

1st Enclosure.

Major-General Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

SIR,

Bombay, April 23, 1804.

It is with great reluctance that at a time like the present I trouble you upon a subject relating only to myself; but I hope that the extraordinary circumstances which have induced me to trouble you, will be my excuse.

Above a year and a half have now elapsed since my promotion to the rank of Major-General was announced in India, and since Lieut.-General Stuart unsolicited by me, in a manner most gratifying to my feelings, recommended to the government of Fort St. George, that I should be appointed to the staff of that Presidency. Since that period accounts have reached England that I had been appointed to the staff in the manner to which I have above alluded, and that I had the command of a body of troops employed in this country. From recent appointments made I judge that the staff in India must have been under discussion lately, and that my appointment must have drawn the attention of his royal Highness the Commander-in-chief, and of his Majesty; but I find that no confirmation has been made or notice taken of this appointment.

Under these circumstances, however flattering in other respects, it has become of an ambiguous nature; there is reason to doubt whether it

meets with the approbation of his royal Highness the Commander-in-chief; and it is not impossible but that his royal Highness may appoint another officer to the situation which I fill; and at all events, I do not conceive it to be creditable, and I am not desirous to remain in a military situation in his Majesty's service, my appointment to which has not been approved by his royal Highness and by his Majesty.

I am therefore upon the whole very anxious to return to Europe; and I have to request your Excellency's permission to do so. If I should obtain it, I propose to resign the appointments which I hold under the government of Fort St. George, when an opportunity will offer for my return.

Upon the occasion of making this request, I beg to assure your Excellency, that in case you should grant it, I do not intend to avail myself of your leave as long as I can be of the smallest service to your Excellency's operations, or as I can forward the objects of the Governor-General's policy in this country; unless I shall find an officer has actually been appointed to fill the situation which I hold upon the staff.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
with the greatest respect,
your most obedient and faithful humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

2d Enclosure.

Lieut.-General Lake to Major-General Wellesley.

(Private.)

DEAR SIR,

Camp Nuwae, May 12, 1804.

I have this day been honoured with your letter of the 23d ultimo, and am extremely sorry to perceive that some unpleasant sensations have arisen in your mind respecting your staff appointment in India, from a supposition that it has not been approved by his Majesty, and his royal Highness the Commander-in-chief. Upon this subject I can form no opinion, as I have received no directions from the Duke of York respecting it, nor have I indeed received any despatch from his royal Highness of a later date than the 14th of June 1803. I can only assure you that, however reluctant I may feel to part with your services, advice, and exertions to carry on the operations we are at present entering into, I will not from any selfish motive withhold the permission you request to proceed to Europe, at whatever time you may wish to avail yourself of it. Believe me, I shall regret most sincerely your departure, and hope General Stuart will order Major-General McDowall to take the command of the troops, if unfortunately you deem it necessary to quit your gallant army, who will, I am certain, be equally sensible with myself of the loss they sustain by your absence.

I will write again immediately respecting Holkar, who has crossed the Chumbul, and is retiring with the greatest precipitation. The cavalry,

of which his army is entirely composed (his infantry and artillery having been sent to Juwâd some time since,) are very few in number, without food, pay, and every necessary of life, are quitting him daily, and coming into my camp by hundreds; from the accounts they give, I think his army will soon be totally dispersed.

Colonel Monson is near Bhoondee, but this robber flies so quick that there is no possibility, I fear, of coming up with him. He has laid waste the whole country, however he is totally off from this quarter.

I am sorry to find by a letter of yours to Major Malcolm, that you have received no letters from me. I wrote several, and in particular one in answer to yours, recommending Lieut.-Colonel Wallace and others, informing you that I had appointed these officers to the situations you proposed; at the same time assuring you that nothing could afford me more satisfaction than obeying any commands of yours.

I have the honour to be,

dear Sir,

with respect and esteem,

most faithfully yours,

G. LAKE.

No. XXV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

(Most Secret and Confidential.)

SIR,

Fort William, May 25, 1804.

1. I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy of notes intended to form the basis of instructions which will speedily be forwarded to your Excellency, to Major-General Wellesley, and to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay. These notes will apprise your Excellency of my views with regard to the general distribution of the British troops throughout India in the actual state of affairs. Your Excellency will be pleased to carry into execution, with every practicable degree of expedition, such parts of the arrangements described in the notes as relate to the forces under your Excellency's immediate command.

2. The great advantage to be derived by relieving the finances of India from the burthen of maintaining the subsisting military establishment in the field will induce your Excellency to effect every possible reduction of expense

which may be compatible with the security of our dominions in Hindostan.

3. It is not my intention, under any circumstances of the present moment, to authorize any augmentation to the military establishments under any of the Presidencies. This important question must be reserved for future consideration after the arrangements, of which the basis is stated in the accompanying notes, shall have been effected.

4. Copies of the notes now forwarded to your Excellency have been transmitted to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, and to the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, with orders to carry into immediate effect such part of the general arrangement as may depend upon their respective authorities.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure.]

(Secret and Confidential.)

Fort William, May 25, 1804.

1. Holkar's force having been compelled to retire from the north-western frontier of Hindostan, and no prospect appearing of danger to our possessions in that quarter during the approaching season, no reason appears to require the continuance of the Commander-in-chief's army in the field, for the mere purpose of security to our territories.

2. It appears that war against Holkar cannot be prosecuted with advantage at present by the army under the Commander-in-chief.

3. It appears that at present war against Holkar cannot be prosecuted with advantage either by the forces under the immediate command of Major-General Wellesley, or by the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and that the forces from Guzerat cannot advance with safety to the internal tranquillity of that country, or without hazard of suffering in their progress towards Holkar's possessions by the general distress of the country.

4. It appears that Holkar's army and resources diminish daily, and that his reputation has suffered from his precipitate flight. It may be supposed that Scindiah's troops in Malwa will endeavour to accelerate Holkar's ruin, unless Scindiah should have formed some treacherous project against the English.

5. In any of these cases it is unnecessary and inadvisable that any part of the British army should attempt, in the present season, to advance further towards the central or southern parts of Hindostan. The most effectual preparations which can be made with a view to meet every pos-

sible contingency during the approaching season will be, to establish each of the new subsidiary detachments at their respective stations, and to employ the period of time which cannot advantageously be used for action in the field, in effecting such arrangements as may enable us to oppose the most powerful permanent restraint to any possible designs of Holkar, or of Scindiah, or of Ragojee, at the least possible expense.

6. With these views orders will be transmitted to the Commander-in-chief, to Major-General Wellesley, and to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay respectively, to the following effect :

7. The Commander-in-chief to withdraw his army from the field, and to canton it in such a situation as he shall deem most eligible for the protection of our frontier on the right bank of the Jumna, leaving a sufficient force at Delhi, Muttra, Agra, and in Bundelcund; appointing and stationing the subsidiary force for the Rana of Gohud; and stationing a strong garrison in Gwalior, making also such arrangements as may be requisite to establish good order within our conquests in the Doab.

8. The Commander-in-chief will either withdraw the force now advanced under Colonel Monson, and actually stationed at the Boondée Ghaut, or will maintain that force in advance, and strengthen it with Europeans and cavalry, as his Excellency may deem most expedient. It would appear most advisable to withdraw that force altogether, unless a hope should be entertained of employing it actively against Holkar in the present season, of which operation no hope can now be reasonably formed.

9. The subsidiary force for Dowlut Rao Scindiah ought certainly to be stationed permanently in Guzerat; and it will, therefore, ultimately be furnished most conveniently from Bombay. Some time, however, must elapse before the government of Bombay can establish the subsidiary force for Scindiah in Guzerat, and it is necessary to provide immediate arrangements for the establishment of a force in such a position in Hindostan as shall (under the denomination of the subsidiary force for Scindiah) serve either to protect Scindiah's dominions against Holkar, or to frustrate Scindiah's treachery, if Scindiah should pursue measures equally repugnant to his interests and public faith. This army must be formed by the Commander-in-chief for the present. The Commander-in-chief will determine whether this separate army shall be formed by an addition to Colonel Monson's detachment, or whether it shall be formed altogether from the army now remaining with his Excellency. The Commander-in-chief will also determine the position which this force ought to occupy; adverting to the necessity of forming and stationing the detachment in such a manner as to enable it to act offensively in any direction in which its services may be required. The Commander-in-chief and the government of Bombay are to be apprized that the subsidiary force for Scindiah must be supplied permanently from Bombay, and stationed in Guzerat. But until the government of Bombay can complete the necessary detachment in Guzerat, it will be necessary, in the first instance, for the Commander-in-chief to establish upon the frontier of our territories in Hindostan, or in those of our allies on that frontier, a force calculated to

perform the service of the subsidiary force granted to Scindiah under the treaty of Burhanpoor.

10. In considering a proper position for this provisional subsidiary force in Hindostan the Commander-in-chief may be of opinion, that it may be conveniently stationed at Agra or Delhi, or in Gohud or Bundelcund, and that this force may therefore form a part of the general cantonment of his Excellency's army. In this event, a considerable reduction of expense might be effected. The provisional subsidiary force for Scindiah must, however, be regularly and separately formed by the Commander-in-chief, under the command of an officer, to be selected by his Excellency. This force must be equipped for immediate active service, and such temporary staff appointed as may be deemed necessary for that purpose. The particular station of this separate force must be determined by the judgment of the Commander-in-chief.

11. In returning the army into cantonments, the Commander-in-chief will of course abolish all such extraordinary and field establishments as it may not be deemed indispensably necessary to maintain.

12. The government of Fort St. George will be directed to recal all troops belonging to the establishment of Fort St. George, and now serving without the territories of that Presidency and of Mysore, on the continent of India, with the exception of any troops belonging to Fort St. George, and now forming a part of the garrison of Goa, with the exception also of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and of one regiment of native cavalry at Poonah.

13. The government of Bombay will in the same manner be directed to recal all its troops serving without the limits of its authority, and to provide the subsidiary forces for the Guikwar and for the Peishwah immediately, and also to station in Guzerat six battalions, with a due proportion of artillery, for the purpose of forming the subsidiary force for the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The troops intended to form the subsidiary force for Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be stationed in a body on the frontier of Guzerat, and to be maintained in a state of the highest equipment and efficiency. The officers for the chief command of each of the subsidiary forces will be ultimately appointed by the Governor-General in Council, and are not to be removed without his express permission.

14. Under these arrangements, the government of Fort St. George will therefore recal within its territories, and those of Mysore, the troops serving in Cuttack, the additional troops beyond the amount of the subsidiary force now serving at Hyderabad under Major Irton, the forces under the command of Major-General Campbell, and those of the establishment of Fort St. George under the command of Major-General Wellesley, with the exception of one regiment of native cavalry, which must remain at Poonah to complete the subsidiary force for the Peishwa.

15. The government of Bombay will recal all its troops serving in Cochin, Malabar and Canara, or at Goa.

16. The transfer of the troops of Fort St. George and Bombay will necessarily require some time, but it is desirable to effect it with the utmost practicable expedition, adverting to the necessity of precluding,

during the operation of the proposed relief, any hazard of the security of Poonah, Goa, Malabar, Canara, or Cochin.

17. Bengal will supply the force to be stationed in the province of Cuttack, and the force necessary for the defence of Bundelcund, and of all our conquests upon the Jumna and in the Doab, together with a subsidiary force for the Rana of Gohud and the garrison of Gwalior, and provisionally the troops to be stationed in Hindostan under the denomination of the subsidiary force granted to Scindiah by the treaty of Boorhanpoor.

18. The troops of Fort St. George to furnish the service in the Northern Circars, the Nizam's ceded districts, Mysore, Cochin, Malabar and Canara, the Carnatic, Tanjore, &c., the garrison of Goa, and the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, with one regiment of native cavalry for Poonah.

19. The subsidiary forces at Poonah, and for Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Guickwar, to be furnished permanently from Bombay. Bombay is also to provide for all the service of the garrison of Bombay and for Surat, and for all our territories in Guzerat.

20. Under these arrangements, with the exception of the subsidiary forces, all the troops are to be withdrawn from the field as soon as possible, and all extra establishments to be discontinued.

21. The army in Guzerat, with the addition of the subsidiary force for Scindiah, will probably be sufficient to check Scindiah and Holkar, either separately, or combined in any event. This army, aided by the force provisionally appointed by the Commander-in-chief to serve in Hindostan under the denomination of Scindiah's subsidiary force, by the subsidiary forces at Hyderabad and Poonah, by the troops in Cuttack, and on the frontier of Bengal and Behar, and by those stationed in Bundelcund and Gohud, will completely check any treacherous disposition on the part either of Scindiah, or of Ragojee Bhooslah. The troops on the Jumna will be so cantoned as to afford effectual protection on that side, with the addition of proper arrangements at Gwalior, in Gohud, Bundelcund, Agra, Muttra, and Delhi, and within the Doab.

WELLESLEY.

No. XXVI.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.—(Extract.)

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Camp Hindoun, May 28, 1804.

This unfortunate business in Bundelcund is very distressing, but I trust from Colonel Fawcett's intention of calling together his officers to consult upon the best plan to be adopted under the present circumstance that good may arise, as I seldom knew a council of war assemble till affairs were in such a situation as those in Bundelcund seem to be, that

a retreat was not proposed, which will in this instance be the most advisable thing that can be done.*

* The following letter from Colonel Fawcett to the Adjutant-General relates the unfortunate occurrence referred to in this paragraph.

*From Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett, commanding the Detachment, Bundelcund, to
Lieut.-Colonel Gerard, Adjutant-General.*

SIR, Head Quarters, Camp at Kooch, 22d May, 1804.

In my despatch of yesterday, I reported to you my having detached a battalion, a troop of cavalry, with two 12-pounders and howitzers, to reduce a small fort within a few miles of camp; my immediate object in which was to obtain forage, there being none remaining in the district but what is in the villages of the refractory Jemadars.

I further informed you that intelligence had arrived at midnight of a body of horse, said to be 5000, having advanced as far as Erritch, and which, from having received no accounts of their approach from Colonel Shephard, I concluded to be Pindaries. At two o'clock this morning, Hurcarrahs came in with intelligence of the enemy being on their march towards this camp in great force, commanded by Meer Khan in person; as the Hurcarrahs reported the enemy to be within three miles of camp, the whole troops were immediately got under arms; and although the enemy did not come in sight, the certainty of their being very near, was confirmed, by the villages in front of the camp being seen in flames. At day break no enemy appeared in sight, and at sunrise the troops broke off, and the camp was again pitched.

As it occurred to me that Captain Smith's detachment was opposed to some risque, if the enemy went against it, I despatched a mounted trooper about half-past two o'clock in the morning, to order Captain Smith to return with his detachment to this camp immediately. In answer to this order Captain Smith replied by a note, saying, that he had taken possession of the village under the fort during the night, and he could not draw off the men stationed in it without suffering much loss, but in case he received no orders to the contrary, he should return to camp as soon after dark as possible. While at breakfast, a report was brought of the enemy having surrounded Captain Smith's detachment; and I gave orders for the 1st battalion 13th Regiment, to march immediately to Captain Smith's assistance, but before the battalion had time to get under arms, the alarm was given of the enemy coming down, and the whole line again turned out. I deemed it hazardous to detach a single battalion, while reports were every moment received of the enemy being in such force: to move with the whole detachment presented great difficulty, as not a drop of water could be obtained until the detachment returned again to this ground. But as I had great reason to apprehend that Captain Smith would be cut off if not relieved, I determined, after much hesitation to leave the camp equipage and baggage to take shelter under the fort, with

I think Meer Khan will not be rash enough to cross the Jumna so near the rains, he must be certainly prevented from retreat and ultimately completely lost.

one battalion to guard it, and marched with the remainder of the detachment at ten o'clock in the morning. I had not proceeded about a mile and a half from camp when from great bodies of people appearing in sight, the line was formed, and a few shots were fired from the cavalry gallopers; upon coming nearer, however, a body of sepoys was observed, which proved to be five companies of Captain Smith's detachment with the troop of cavalry, followed by large bodies of the enemy's horse. Captain Smith reports, that just as he had despatched his note in the morning, the village in which the attack against the fort was preparing was surrounded suddenly with immense bodies of horse; firing was heard in the village, which, after a short time entirely ceased; and by a man who escaped from the village, and came to Captain Smith's camp, which was distant from the village about half a mile, he learned that the detachment in the village, consisting of two companies of sepoys, fifty European artillery, fifty gun lascars, with two 12-pounders, two howitzers, one 6-pounder, and twelve tumbrils, were entirely taken by the enemy, and the men and officers all cut to pieces. The officers who were in the village were Captain Feade and Lieutenant Morrice of artillery, Lieutenant Gillespie, of the 1st battalion 18th regiment, and Master Hooper, assistant-surgeon. This is a most severe loss, and much as I lament it, both in a public and private point of view, I fear the ill consequences arising from the accident will prove very serious.

The enemy still remain in the villages all round camp, as no single one can supply the whole with water; and it is reported they intend to attack the camp to-night or to-morrow; and while they continue in this situation all my supplies must be cut off, and I cannot venture to detach foraging parties.

I had the honour to receive your letter of the 16th instant to-day; every account that I have received within these two last days tends to confirm the report you mention, of its being the intention of Holkar to join Meer Khan, and penetrate by the Pass of Multown into this country.

I feel greatly the want of cavalry at present, and if the force of the enemy should be augmented by that of Holkar, however reduced, I shall be perfectly at a loss what to do for supplies, and therefore beg to be favoured with instructions against every event. Colonel Shephard writes to-day that bodies of enemy are in every direction around him, and are daily approaching nearer, and his own detachment in the utmost distress both for cash and provisions.

W. D. FAWCETT,

Lieut.-Colonel, commanding the detachment,
Bundelcund.

P. S. Captain Smith's detachment have lost the whole of their baggage.

Holkar is certainly gone towards Meer Khan, which is the best thing for us, as they will then both be together. I do not believe this has been a concerted plan between them, as I have every reason to think that Meer Khan wished to shake him off and plunder expressly for himself. There are three battalions at Cawnpore, that is to say those of the 22d and a very good Sebundy one under Captain Hodgson. Mr. Smith having some days since declared his idea that there was no further occasion for Lieutenant-Colonel Prole and his battalion, and the total impossibility there was of procuring supplies for them, I ordered them on to Kurra, where there are lines for a battalion, from thinking they might be of use in case of any attack upon our new acquired territories in Bundelcund. I should imagine this battalion will be there by this time, and advanced towards the Jumna, as they have received orders for that purpose. I therefore hope nothing of any consequence can happen in the Doab. I will cross the Jumna at Agra with a large body of cavalry and some infantry, leaving a sufficient force to preserve quiet and tranquillity in the upper part of the Doab, and our acquisitions in these parts, and to secure them from any irruption hereabouts.

I will lose no time in getting down towards Cawnpore, and protecting that part of the Doab. Major-General St. John will command them, and as he will be guided by Colonel Clinton, I should hope no material injury could arise on that account. This will prolong the war in some degree, but at the same time shews how impossible it was to be avoided, as Meer Khan clearly intended to carry on a desultory kind of war whatever Holkar might do. Holkar will lose all his possessions on the other side of India, and will very easily be hunted down after the rains, by two or three light armies. He cannot exist by plunder long.

By Colonel Powell's illness, and the death of Colonel Polhill, the command of the detachment in Bundelcund devolved to Colonel Fawcett, events not to have been foreseen; and had it devolved to any other man in the army, this dreadful event could not have happened I do really think. With four battalions of sepoy and 450 Europeans, to have suffered these guns to have been carried away does seem most extraordinary. The folly of attacking a fort for no one reason

whatever is beyond all belief, and then only sending two companies of sepoys to protect the guns and batteries is not to be believed. I have ordered Colonel Fawcett to resign his command to Lieutenant-Colonel Wittit, a most excellent officer, till Colonel Martendell can arrive for that purpose. I should have ordered him up, had I not been fearful that the health of Lieut-Colonel Wittit is in too precarious a state for him to bear much fatigue of body and mind.

I really thought I had left a most ample force for the protection of Bundelcund against any number of irregular horse whatever. There is in these parts also Colonel Sheppton with his brigades, in short they have a force there amounting to upwards of 7000 men, a force with which, I think, I could have been able to beat any number of troops that could have been opposed to me, and particularly so of the description of which this banditti was composed.

I am much vexed—it is impossible to be everywhere. I trust the moment the army enters the Doab, all alarm will cease, and no mischief, at least very serious, is to be apprehended from Meer Khan or his followers.

I should have wrote some days since, but really the heat is so excessive that it is difficult to settle to anything, particularly when one's mind is a good deal harrassed. Several of the Europeans have died from the heat; they are taken suddenly ill, and die within an hour. The thermometer has been for many days in the tents under Tatties, at 110 degrees. If so high in the officer's tents, you may easily imagine what it must be in the men's. The sepoys feel the heat most exceedingly, and many of them have died from it.

I feel most extremely obliged for your attention to General Dowdeswell, he speaks with the highest gratitude and admiration of your Lordship in every instance, and with the most lively gratitude for your kindness towards him since his arrival in Calcutta.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with regard and affection,
your devoted faithful,

G. LAKE.

P. S.—I hope to send you more pleasing accounts soon.

It grieves me even to send any that are unpleasant. I fear you will not be able to read this letter, but trust you will make allowance for heat and hurry—we always march in the nights, which are also very hot.

No. XXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Major-General Wellesley.

SIR,

Fort William, 30th May, 1804.

1. Since the date of my letter of the 16th of April, I have received, through the commander-in-chief, and from you, the despatches noted in the margin* on the subject of eventual operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

2. In consequence of the intelligence contained in your despatches, and those of the Commander-in-Chief, I have issued the notes of instructions, which were forwarded to you under date the 25th of May.† You will be pleased to consider the instructions contained in these notes to supersede those contained in my despatch of the 16th of April, 1804.

3. The instructions which I had proposed to despatch to you, according to the intimation contained in the 3d paragraph of my letter of the 16th of April, 1804, are become unnecessary in the present moment.

4. The judicious arrangements which you have already made of the force in Guzerat and in other quarters, will facilitate the execution of my instructions of the 25th of May, 1804.

5. You will observe that my instructions of the 25th of May are founded upon the supposition, that difficulties, nearly insuperable, oppose the immediate accomplishment of the plan of operations against Holkar's possessions in the Deccan

* From Major-General Wellesley, enclosing copy of his letter, under date 23d April, to the Commander-in-Chief, and from the Commander-in-Chief, dated enclosing a copy of the same document.

† See page 68.

and the southern parts of Hindostan, suggested in your letter of the 18th of March, 1804. If, however, any circumstance should occur to remove your apprehensions of the obstacles enumerated in your despatches to the Commander-in-Chief, I authorize you to prosecute hostilities against Holkar's possessions, according to your original plan. It may, however, be useful to apprise you that I am fully satisfied of the extreme difficulty and danger of attempting to prosecute hostilities under the circumstances which you have stated, and that the conditional authority, signified to you in this paragraph, arises solely from my entire confidence in your judgment and discretion to be exercised upon the spot; and is unconnected with any wish or expectation that you can be enabled to proceed to execute in the present season any other plan than that contained in my instructions of the 25th of May, 1804.

6. Under these circumstances, my expectation is, that you may be enabled immediately after having issued your orders for the execution of the plan contained in my instructions of the 25th of May, 1804, to proceed to Fort William (by whatever route may appear to you to be most convenient) for the purpose of communicating with me and with the Commander-in-Chief upon the various and important political and military questions now depending in India, and bearing an intimate relation to your political commission and military command. I therefore authorize you at such period of time as may appear to you to be most convenient to proceed directly either by land or sea to Fort William, and I have ordered the commissioners in Cuttack, and the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, to make every practicable preparation for your conveyance by land, and the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay to provide armed vessels for your passage, to be stationed at Bombay and at Masulipatam, in order to receive you at either of those ports according to your determination, which I request you to signify at the earliest period of time to those authorities respectively.

7. In the event of your preferring the journey by land, you will also be pleased to make the necessary communication to the Resident at Hyderabad, to the commissioners at

Cuttack, and to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XXVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Major-General Wellesley.

Sir,

Fort William, June 3d, 1804.

Having taken into my consideration your despatches, together with those from the resident and assistant secretary at Poonah, I now proceed to furnish you with my instructions respecting the conduct to be observed by the British Government towards his Highness the Peishwa and the Southern Jagheerdars, with reference to their mutual relation and respective claims.

2. In your letter of the 7th of March,* you have stated four propositions as containing every possible line of conduct which could enter into contemplation in determining the mode of deciding the questions which have arisen between the Peishwa and the Southern Jagheerdars; and in your letter of the 21st of March,† you have recommended that proposition which appeared to you after having communicated with Colonel Close at Bombay to be most eligible for the adoption of the British Government.

3. I entirely approve your opinion on this subject, together with the arguments on which that opinion is founded; and it is therefore my determination to interpose the arbitration of the British Government for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of the service to which the Peishwa is entitled from the Southern Jagheerdars, and of inducing them to afford that service; and on the other hand of protecting the Jagheerdars from the oppression of the Peishwa's Government, and of guaranteeing to the Jagheerdars their

* See Vol. II. of the Duke of Wellington's Despatches, p. 140.

† Ibid. p. 181.

possessions while they shall continue to serve the Peishwa with fidelity.

4. With a view to accomplish this plan, I approve your proposition of applying to the Peishwa for his Highness's formal consent to the proposed interposition and settlement; and I have accordingly directed the resident at Poonah to make the necessary application to his Highness. I also authorize and direct you to make any communication to the Peishwa on this occasion which may appear to you to be necessary or expedient.

5. It may probably be requisite to appoint one or more public officers for the special purpose of conducting the several enquiries and negotiations connected with the proposed settlement; and I authorize and direct you to appoint any person or persons to that duty whom you shall deem competent to discharge it with advantage to the public service.

6. The most eligible period of time for the completion of the proposed arrangement would certainly be the season of the approaching rains; and if circumstances connected with the operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with the period of the season, and with the condition of the British troops should require you to move to the southward, that movement might facilitate the proposed settlement with the Jagheerdars.

7. I wish you however to understand that it is my positive determination not to employ the British arms against any of the Southern Jagheerdars, excepting in cases positively required by treaty. It is obviously the interest of the British Government to remain at peace with those states, and the condition of the Peishwa's authority, as well as the injustice of his Highness's system of internal policy would render the employment of the British forces in such a cause both difficult and disreputable.

8. I approve the letter which you addressed to the Rajah of Kolapore, of which a copy is enclosed in your despatch of the 21st of March,* and I have issued orders in conformity to that letter to the resident at Goa, and have communicated the same to the Governor of Fort St. George; I trust however that no hostile operations against the Rajah of Kolapore will become necessary until the general distribution of

* See Vol. II. of the Duke of Wellington's Despatches, p. 183.

the troops described in my notes of instructions of the 25th of May shall have been carried into effect.

9. As connected with the general subject of this letter, it may be necessary to apprise you that I approve the suggestions of the Resident at Poonah for the settlement of Goklah's claims under the proposed arrangement of the cession of the Peishwa's share of the revenue of Ahmedabad to the Company; I shall refer to the consideration of the Government of Bombay the expediency of collecting that revenue for the Company, or for the Guickwar, and I shall direct that government to decide the question according to its judgment.

10. The general tenor of this despatch will apprise you of my utter disapprobation of the Peishwa's projects of vengeance and rapine against the principal families of the Mahratta State, who are subject immediately to Poonah. I entirely concur in your opinion respecting the impolicy and injustice of those projects, and I have received with particular disgust his Highness's designs against the Putwurdhun family. You will therefore employ, in concert with the Resident at Poonah, every means of persuasion to induce his Highness to pursue a more wise and honourable policy, and you will positively refuse to lend the aid of the British Government to any such dishonourable cause.

11. The regulations which you have prescribed with regard to the employment of the British troops in the service of the Peishwa in all cases in which it may be proper to aid his Highness in his internal administration, appears to me to be perfectly judicious, and I shall direct them to be confirmed by my express authority.

12. I shall take an early opportunity of communicating to you my sentiments and instructions with regard to the system of measures to be pursued for establishing such a degree of order as may appear to be practicable in the internal affairs of the Peishwa's government, for providing the means of checking the growth of those armies of freebooters which now infest the Deccan, and for adjusting the questions depending between their Highness's the Peishwa and the Soobadar of the Deccan.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XXIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

SIR,

Fort William, June 8th, 1804.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch noted in the margin,* which reached me at a late hour in the night of the 6th instant.

Previously to the receipt of your Excellency's letter, I had received from Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett a copy of his letter to the Adjutant-General of the 22nd May,† and under the disastrous and disgraceful events which that letter announces, it is a great consolation to me to find that my sentiments entirely accord with those expressed by your Excellency with relation to this grievous and unexpected calamity.

In communicating to your Excellency my opinion on this occasion, I am happy to commence, by declaring in the most distinct terms, my entire approbation of the arrangements which you had judiciously and wisely provided for the protection of our interests in Bundelcund, and for the exclusion of the enemy from that quarter. The force appointed for this service was completely adequate to secure the proposed objects. It was impossible to anticipate the flagrant misconduct by which the honour of the British arms has been disgraced, and the interests of the British Government hazarded, by an officer, furnished with such ample means of maintaining both.

It is difficult to calculate the extent of the evil consequences which may result from this unparalleled accident. The least mischief which can be expected is the encouragement of Holkar, Ameer Khan, and the whole horde of freebooters and professional robbers in Hindostan and the Deccan, and we must prepare to encounter their repeated attacks upon every part of our frontier, which the shameful failure of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett's army will induce them to think vulnerable with impunity.

Your Excellency's prompt, spirited, and judicious proceedings on this occasion are calculated to afford immediate security to our territories in the Doab and in Benares against any depredations of the gang collected in Bundelcund. It is certainly highly desirable that an example should be made of

* Dated 26th May, received 6th June.

† See p. 72.

those atrocious disturbers of the public peace. Ameer Khan, or whoever may be the ringleader of the predatory force in Bundlecund, cannot justly be considered to be in the situation either of an independent power, acknowledged by the States of India, or of an officer acting under a commission from an acknowledged state. Ameer Khan, or the ringleader of those robbers, probably acts without Jeswunt Rao Holkar's authority. We possess no proof that Ameer Khan, or that leader, whose name even is uncertain, is in Jeswunt Rao Holkar's service or pay; and it is most likely that Ameer Khan or that leader, proceeds upon a separate plan of plunder for his own benefit, or in other words, is a common robber.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar cannot be classed among the States of India, and even if Ameer Khan, or the plunderers in Bundlecund, possessed a commission from Jeswunt Rao Holkar, such a commission could not entitle them to the benefit of the law of nations, applicable to the case of war between contending states. This banditti therefore must be treated as common robbers; nor am I aware of any circumstances which should entitle Jeswunt Rao Holkar in his present condition to be considered in any more respectable point of view. Your Excellency will be pleased to regulate your conduct towards Ameer Khan, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and their respective forces, and towards the freebooters of a similar description upon the principle stated in this paragraph, and at a proper season you will issue a proclamation signifying your intention to treat all such persons as common robbers and felons.

After a succession of the most splendid victories, able military operations, and extensive conquests, which have ever adorned the annals of any nation, the British Government has concluded an equitable, honourable, and liberal peace, with all the acknowledged powers of India, and has cemented that peace by treaties of defensive alliance with several of the most respectable states of Hindostan and the Deccan. The benefits which this auspicious pacification promised to diffuse among the subjects of the acknowledged states of India must not be frustrated by the predatory incursions of professional robbers under the assumed title of independent states claiming national rights, while they pursue practices incompatible with every principle of the law of nations, and with every institution of civilized society.

In the present temper of the Durbars of Scindiah and Ragojee, I should not be surprised if the misconduct of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett were to renew the war in every part of India, unless measures be immediately adopted, which shall convince all India that this disgrace is to be ascribed exclusively to the misbehaviour of a few incapable officers, and unless an immediate and severe blow be struck against the party of freebooters which has obtained this temporary triumph over the British arms.

For these purposes I authorize and direct your Excellency to appoint an officer of high rank in whom you can repose confidence, to take the command in Bundlecund, with such a force as shall enable him to proceed immediately to the complete expulsion of all predatory invaders, and to the settlement of the province. As soon as I shall learn from your Excellency the name of the officer selected for this purpose, I shall vest him under your Excellency's orders with the whole civil and military government of the Province, under the title of Commissioner for the affairs of Bundlecund; appointing Captain Baillie,* with your Excellency's approbation, secretary to the commission. In the mean while, for the purpose of consolidating the civil and military authorities in that country, I authorize your Excellency to direct Captain Baillie to act in his civil capacity under the directions of the officer commanding in Bundlecund.

It appears to be probable that Jeswunt Rao Holkar will be encouraged to direct his movements towards Bundlecund, if he should not endeavour to enter our territories on that side of Hindostan whence your Excellency has been called

* The late Colonel John Baillie, of Leys, Inverness, member for Hythe. This distinguished officer and eminent Oriental scholar, while holding the situation of professor of Arabic and Persian in the college of Fort William, volunteered his services in the field, and joined the army under Lieut.-General Lake before Agra, at the siege and capture of which fortress he served; he was thence despatched to Bundlecund by the Commander-in-Chief to superintend our political relations in that quarter. Towards the close of the year 1805, Captain Baillie was appointed agent to the Governor-General in Bundlecund, after the extensive sessions in that province made by the Peishwa, in which capacity he rendered the most important services, and on the ground of those services was ultimately selected to fill the high situation of Resident at Lucknow, the arduous duties of which he fulfilled with distinguished ability during more than ten years.

by the state of affairs in Bundlecund. I am satisfied that your Excellency has taken every possible precaution to preclude Jeswunt Rao Holkar's advance into the territories which you have recently left; and if he should be so imprudent as to enter Bundlecund, I flatter myself that the misconduct of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett may prove the source of additional glory to your Excellency's name; for I am convinced that in such an event you would employ every endeavour to bring Holkar's forces to action; and I am perfectly confident that the result must be highly advantageous to the British cause.

In consequence of the state of affairs in Bundlecund, it appears to be necessary to apprise your Excellency of my opinion that the arrangements stated in my instructions of the 25th May, 1804, must be postponed, and every possible effort and exertion must be made to reduce Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and the predatory chiefs connected with him, or acting upon our frontiers, or on the territories of our allies, in the pursuit of schemes of plunder. Until these objects be effected no hope can exist of tranquillity in any part of India.

Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to frame all your arrangements with a view to these important objects, and you will signify your orders accordingly to Major Wellesley and to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindia, and to the officer commanding Scindiah's forces.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

P. S. Since the conclusion of this letter, I have received copies of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett's despatches to the Adjutant-General, as noted in the margin.* Those despatches contain the recital of further calamities and disgraces, together with the most ample proof of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett's desertion of his duty, to the hazard, if not ruin, of the British interests in Bundlecund, to the imminent peril of all our provinces in that vicinity, and to the disgrace of the British name and arms. Convinced of the indispensable necessity of bringing Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett to speedy justice, I hereby authorize and direct your Excellency to place Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett in arrest, and to bring him to immediate trial before a general court martial. Your Excellency will judge whether it will be most proper to institute this proceeding under a warrant from

* Dated Kooch, 26th May; dated Hurdaon. 27th May.

my authority, or from your own; and you will act in that respect according to your discretion; but I earnestly recommend it to your Excellency to use every degree of expedition consistent with justice in bringing Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett to trial. The intelligence which I have received leaves me in doubt whether Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett may not have surrendered his whole force to the gang of robbers opposed to it, and whether they may not have passed into our provinces and carried desolation to the walls of Benares. The state of the rivers has been variously represented to me from different quarters, and although I am inclined to think that the Jumna is not fordable below Calpee, nor the Ganges below Allahabad, even in this remarkable season, I am left in doubt respecting that most important fact. Your Excellency will therefore appreciate my solicitude, and I am persuaded that you will partake those sentiments of grief and indignation with which I behold the safety of the most opulent city in the British dominions in India exposed to hazard by the misconduct of a British officer at the close of the most glorious war in which the British arms has ever been engaged in this quarter of the globe.

No. XXX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, June 10, 1804.

At the earliest practicable period of time, after the conclusion of peace with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, the attention of the Governor-General in Council was directed to the important object of establishing the general principle which should regulate the partition of our late acquisitions (under the treaties of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar,) between the British Government and its allies, and of applying that principle to the circumstances of those states which were to be considered as allies in the war, and the Governor-General in Council now deems it his duty to communicate to your honourable Committee the sentiments and resolutions of the Governor-General in Council on that important subject.

With a view to determine and to apply the principle of

partition of conquests, it was necessary to decide, 1stly, what states of India should be considered as the allies of the British Government in the late war; 2dly, what states possessed a positive right to participate in our conquests; and 3dly, whether it was expedient to admit the participation of any of the allies, who might not be considered to possess a positive right to participate in our conquests, and to what extent the admission of such participation might be deemed politic and just.

The Governor-General in Council was decidedly of opinion that the only states which could properly be considered as allies of the British Government in the late war were those of the Peishwa, and the Soubahdar of the Deccan. The nature of the relations and the engagements subsisting between the British Government and the states of Mysore and of the Guickwar (the troops of which, particularly of the former, were employed in the prosecution of the war) is not such as to place them in the condition of the allies designated by the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, nor was it probable that the governments of either of those states entertained any expectation of benefiting by the result of the war in any other manner than by acquiring an additional degree of security in the peaceable enjoyment of their respective rights and possessions.

The Governor-General in Council, however, was decidedly of opinion that none of the states of India claiming to be allies of the British Government, could justly found a right to participate in the conquests of the war, merely on the declaration contained in the treaties of peace, that the cessions were made generally in favour of the British Government and its allies.

This declaration was introduced into the treaties of peace with reference, first, to the engagements actually subsisting between the British Government and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, by which that Prince is entitled, under certain considerations, to participate equally with the British Government in the conquests of joint war. 2dly. To the declared intention of the Governor-General to admit the Peishwa also to a participation in the conquests of the late war, in such a proportion and in such a manner as should appear to be expedient on the conclusion of a general peace. That declara-

tion was not intended to convey to any of the allies any right of participation which they did not possess on other grounds.

If a contrary principle were admitted, a right of equal participation on the part of the allies could not justly be denied, and that right must have been recognized independently of the conduct of the allies during the war, and with respect to the Soubahdar of the Deccan, independently of his fulfilment of those conditions, on which alone his right of equal participation is stipulated by positive treaty to depend. This could not be supposed to have been in the contemplation of either of the contracting parties at the conclusion of the treaties of peace.

The states of Hyderabad and Poonah, therefore, being the only states which could be considered as allies of the British Government in the late war, it became necessary to determine whether either or both of those states possessed a right to participate in our conquests; and under the defect of right, whether either or both those states should be admitted, on principles of expediency and policy, to a participation.

By the 3d of the secret and separate articles of the treaty of Hyderabad concluded in October 1800, his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan is entitled to participate equally with the British Government in the conquests of joint war on certain conditions. With a view, therefore, to determine whether his Highness possessed a right to participate in the conquests of the late war, it was necessary to examine in what degree his Highness had fulfilled the conditions on which that right was stipulated to depend.

It is declared in the 3d of the separate and secret articles of that treaty, that "in the event of war, his Highness shall be entitled to participate equally with the other contracting parties in the division of any territory which may be acquired by the successful exertions of their united arms, provided his Highness the Nawaub Asaph Jah shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of the preceding treaty, especially those contained in the 12th and 13th articles thereof."

The obligation imposed upon his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan by the 12th and 13th articles is, that in the event of war, his Highness shall furnish a force of 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry, to act with the subsidiary force; that his Highness shall also employ every further effort in

his power for the purpose of bringing into the field, as speedily as possible, the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions, and that his Highness shall collect as many Bunjarrahs as possible, and shall store as much grain as may be practicable in his frontier garrisons. In other words, his Highness is required to unite cordially with the British Government in the prosecution of the supposed war, and to combine with the exertions of the British power, all the force and resources of his own state, as the condition of his being entitled to participate equally with the British Government in the territories which may be acquired by the war.

Although the conduct of the state of Hyderabad, during the late war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, is described in the course of the narrative of transactions contained in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 12th of April, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper with a view to trace distinctly the grounds of his decision on the question of his Highness's right of participation to repeat on this occasion the leading facts of the case.

After long and urgent solicitation on the part of the Resident at Hyderabad, a body of his Highness's troops, amounting nearly to the number stipulated by treaty, joined the subsidiary force, and the general conduct of those troops was consistent with the obligations of the treaty. In other respects, however, the state of Hyderabad altogether failed in the discharge of the duties of an ally, and the conduct of his Highness's officers was of a nature actually hostile to the British Government.

At an early period of the war Major-General Wellesley was invested by his late Highness the Nizam with a general power of control over the officers of his Highness's government on the western frontier of his dominions. That power of control, however, proved entirely nugatory. The orders of Major-General Wellesley were utterly disregarded; every exertion on the part of his Highness's officers in facilitating the movement and supply of the British troops, and in opposing those of the enemy, was insidiously withheld or directly refused, and his Highness's officers not only neglected to store grain in the frontier garrisons for the service of the combined troops in conformity to an express stipulation in the

treaty of Hyderabad, but refused to furnish any supplies, and even to permit the purchase of grain in his Highness's territory for the use of the British army.

His Highness's officer commanding the fort of Dowlutabad refused admission to the sick and wounded of the British troops engaged in the battle of Assye. The Killadar of Dharore refused to give protection under the guns of his fort to a convoy proceeding with supplies to the army, without orders for that purpose from the Court of Hyderabad, and the Killadar of Budnapore actually fired upon a detachment of British troops on its march to join Major-General Wellesley.

Although the conduct of his Highness's officers may be ascribed in a great measure to the weakness of his government, yet the sentiments which his Highness Secunder Jah himself is stated to have declared upon that occasion, justify a suspicion that their hostile conduct was encouraged by his Highness. The Governor-General in Council here refers to a declaration of his Highness to Azim Ool Omrah, reported by that minister to the Resident of Hyderabad, and communicated in a despatch from the Resident of the 13th October 1803, that it was not necessary for him to attend to all the remonstrances of the British Government on the subject of the conduct of his officers; that "no apprehension should for instance be entertained on the representations that had lately been made to him regarding the Killadar of Dharore and others, for that it was not stipulated in any part of his engagements that British officers and their troops should positively be admitted within the forts of his government, and that it was a matter of equal indifference whether the Killadars did or did not admit them."

These unwarrantable sentiments, and those which his Highness is stated by the Resident to entertain generally with regard to the alliance subsisting between the British Government and the state of Hyderabad, accompanied by the several acts enumerated in the preceding paragraph, are manifestly inconsistent with a due attention to the obligations of the alliance.

In addition to these facts, it was manifest that his Highness did not, agreeably to the spirit of his engagements, combine with the exertions of the British power all the force and re-

sources of his own state for the prosecution of the war, and consequently did not fulfil the conditions on which he would be entitled to participate equally in the conquests which have resulted from the war.

The conclusion of any engagements between states necessarily supposes the ability, as well as the disposition of both parties, to fulfil the obligations of them. Admitting therefore that the conduct of his Highness's officers originated in causes wholly independent of his Highness's control, and that his Highness was precluded by the inherent vices and defects of his Government, from applying the resources of the state to the promotion of the common cause, his Highness could not consistently with the acknowledged principles of reciprocity, be permitted to claim the benefit of this argument, and to found a right to an equal participation of conquests on his inability to fulfil the conditions on which alone that right was admitted to exist.

Independently of these considerations, however, his Highness's claim to an equal participation is precluded by the tenor of the 15th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, combined with the actual conclusion of defensive and subsidiary engagements between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the basis of that article.

It is stated in that article that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall consent to the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty, the charges of the subsidiary force consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipment of military stores, &c., shall be defrayed out of the revenues of the lands ceded by the 2d, 3d, and 4th articles of the treaty of peace; his Highness therefore could not justly claim an equal share in the lands on which are charged the expense of the subsidiary force to be furnished by the British Government to Scindiah, and the Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion, that under a just construction of the 15th article of the treaty of Serji Anjengaum, combined with the provisions of the subsidiary engagement lately concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, his Highness the Soubahdar could not claim any portion of the territory ceded by the 2d, 3d, and 4th articles of the treaty of Serji Anjengaum, because the British Government being pledged by the subsidiary and defensive engagements concluded with

Dowlut Rao Scindiah, eventually to employ the whole power and resources of the state for the defence of that chieftain's rights and possessions, the lands on which are charged the expense of the subsidiary force, may be justly considered to be assigned for all the actual and contingent charges of fulfilling that obligation of our defensive engagements. It was also evident that those territories are subject to other charges connected with the general principles of the pacification, and that from the revenues arising out of those territories must be defrayed the expense of providing for Scindiah's principal officers and chiefs, and certain branches of his family, as well as for the charges incidental to our engagements with several chiefs and states in Hindostan, and for the maintenance of the king and the family.

It follows from this statement, that if his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan had maintained a claim to an equal participation of conquests, he must also be subjected to an equal share of the charges incidental to the security of those conquests, and resulting from the general principles of the pacification. If, therefore, the estimated value of all the cessions made to the allies by the peace were opposed to the necessary charges of the whole arrangement, there can be no doubt that his Highness the Soubahdar's share of the profits of the war would be greatly inferior to that which has actually been assigned to him, added to the positive gain which his Highness has acquired by the total abrogation of the claims of the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah on his Highness's government under the distinct provisions of an article in the treaties of peace with each of those chieftains.

Although his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan cannot be considered to possess on any ground a right to an equal participation in the territories acquired by the late war, a question may be supposed to exist, whether his Highness was not entitled to a share of the conquests proportioned to the degree in which he contributed the aid of his troops in the prosecution of the war. On this subject it may be observed, 1st, that the conditions on which his Highness's right of participation depends are absolute, and that the engagement does not state any obligation on our part dependent on a partial execution of those conditions on the part of his

Highness, and 2dly, that no definite principle of comparison can be established between the benefit which our cause may have derived from the co-operation of his Highness's troops, and any precise proportion of territory to be assigned as an equivalent to his Highness.

Under the circumstances above stated, the only points connected with the interests of the Soubahdar of the Deccan which remained to be decided were—

1st. Whether his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan should be admitted to any share of the conquered territory, and if this question were decided in the affirmative?

2dly. Whether without reference to the conduct of his Highness's government during the war, such territory should be assigned to his Highness on the ground of his Highness's right to participate in the conquests of the war, or simply as a gratuitous cession on the part of the British Government on grounds distinct from any question of a right to participation of conquests?

3dly. What territory should be assigned to his Highness if he should be permitted to retain any part of the conquered countries?

With regard to the first point the Governor-General in Council was of opinion that, adverting to considerations of a political nature, and to the local position of a considerable part of the conquered territory, it was expedient to assign a certain portion of it to his Highness the Soubahdar.

On the 2d question, as the Soubahdar possessed no positive right to any precise portion of our conquests, it appeared to be just and expedient that the territory to be assigned to the Soubahdar of the Deccan should be considered as a gratuitous cession to his Highness on the part of the British Government, and not surrendered to his Highness on the ground of his right to participation in the conquests effected during the war.

The territories which it was expedient to cede to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, were obviously those which were intermixed with his Highness's present possessions, or were contiguous to them.

Those territories are, 1st, the districts, of which the Rajah of Berar collected the revenues in participation with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and generally all the territory formerly

in the possession of the Rajah of Berar, situated to the southward of the hills, on which are the forts of Narnulla and Gawilghur, and to the westward of the river Wurdah, ceded by the 3d and 4th articles of the treaty of Deogaum, excepting only such districts as are stipulated by the 5th article of that treaty to remain in the possession of the Rajah of Berar.

2dly. The districts ceded by the 4th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, viz., those which are situated to the southward of the Adjunttee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapoor, the town and district of Gondapore, and all other districts formerly belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, situated between that range of hills and the river Godavery.

These territories had already been placed under the charge of his Highness's officers by the honourable Major-General Wellesley, under an express declaration on the part of that officer that his Highness's permanent appropriation of those territories must be subject to the future resolution of the Governor-General in Council.

Upon the grounds detailed in the preceding part of this letter, the Governor-General in Council resolved to annex those territories permanently to the dominions of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee his sentiments with regard to the question of a right to participate in the acquisitions of the late war, as applicable to our ally the Peishwa, and the arrangements which the Governor-General in Council finally adopted in favour of his Highness under the acquisitions resulting from the successes of the war.

The treaty of Bassein is framed on the basis of the treaties concluded with the Nizam in October, 1800. It stipulates for the aid of a certain portion of the Peishwa's troops in the event of a war, but does not provide for his Highness's participation in any conquests which may be achieved by the war.

Admitting, therefore, that the Peishwa had furnished the stipulated number of troops for the prosecution of the late war, he would have acquired no right to participate in the conquests which have resulted from it. It was unnecessary, therefore, to enter into any discussion on the question of his

Highness's right of participation, founded on the consideration of his having contributed to the support of the common cause in the degree in which the weakness and confusion of his Highness's government admitted of his co-operation. The peculiar circumstances of his Highness's situation rendered such a pretension in the highest degree exorbitant and unreasonable.

The war originated in the measures adopted by the British Government for the restoration of his Highness from a state of exile and of personal danger to his legitimate dominions, and to a condition of comparative dignity and permanent security.

The utmost limit of the Peishwa's just and reasonable expectations was attained in the preservation of his dominion, by the result of the war, from the violence and ambition of external and domestic enemies. His Excellency in Council, therefore, could discern no ground of claim on the part of the Peishwa, to a participation of conquests effected in the defence of his Highness's rights and possessions by the exertions of the British arms and the wisdom of British councils, not only unaided by any efforts on the part of his Highness, but in some points impeded by the unaccommodating and vindictive spirit of his Highness's policy.

The Peishwa could not in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council establish any pretension to participate in the territories acquired by those arduous exertions of the British arms, to which his Highness was exclusively indebted for the existence of his power.

The restoration of the Peishwa's legitimate authority, together with the recovery of the dominions which he possessed previously to his expulsion from Poonah, and with the provisions established for securing his Highness in his state and actual possessions appeared to the Governor-General in Council to constitute an ample participation in the success of the war, and in the benefits of the peace.

Considerations of policy, however, suggested the expedience of admitting the Peishwa to a participation in our late conquests.

The jealousy with which the Peishwa contemplated an intimate connexion with the British Government prevented his acceptance of our proposals for the conclusion of a defensive

alliance until the successful rebellion of Jeswunt Rao Holkar had subverted his government, and had compelled him to abandon his capital.

The Peishwa has experienced the benefits of that alliance by his restoration to the exercise of his legitimate authority, under the protection of the British arms and of the British power.

The Governor-General in Council, however, was of opinion that the characteristic jealousy of the Peishwa could not be completely eradicated until he should be satisfied by a further experience of the moderation and liberality of our proceedings under the alliance, that it is our object rather to augment than to impair the power and resources of his government. The assignment of a portion of our recent conquests to the Peishwa, under the total defect of his Highness's right to participate in them, founded either on the obligations of treaty or on the aid which his Highness contributed in the prosecution of the war, was calculated in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council to impress upon his Highness's mind the most favourable opinion of the equity and liberality of the British Government, to encourage his confidence in its public faith and honour, and to fix his attachment to the alliance, as well as to elevate the fame and character of the British Government in the judgment of every state in India.

For these reasons his Excellency in Council deemed it advisable to assign to the Peishwa as large a portion of our late territorial acquisitions as could be conveniently annexed to his dominions, consistently with the security of our own rights and possessions, and with the arrangements which the Governor-General in Council had resolved to accomplish in favour of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

His Excellency in Council accordingly resolved that the city and province of Ahmednuggur, excepting such portion of the latter as was restored to Dowlut Rao Scindiah by the terms of the treaty of peace, should be annexed to the Peishwa's dominions.

Upon the basis of the observations and resolutions stated in the preceding part of this despatch, instructions were transmitted to the Residents at the courts of Hyderabad

and Poonah, under the date the 30th of March, 1804, directing those officers to communicate to their Highnesses the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa respectively, the territorial arrangements which the Governor-General in Council had resolved to adopt in favour of their Highnesses, and to be prepared to oppose any assumption on the part of their Highnesses of a right to participate in the conquests of the war. The Resident at Poonah was especially directed to endeavour to impress upon the mind of the Peishwa a just sense of the liberality of the British Government in assigning to his Highness so valuable a portion of our recent conquests, under the total defect of his Highness's right to participate in them, founded either on the stipulations of the treaty, or on the aid afforded by his Highness in the promotion of the common cause.

The draft of a treaty of partition framed in conformity to the resolutions above described, was at the same time transmitted to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah respectively, with directions to obtain the seals and signatures of their Highnesses the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa to separate treaties to be prepared in conformity to that draft.

The Governor-General in Council deeming the period of adjusting the participation of conquests to be the fittest opportunity for obtaining their Highnesses the Soubahdar's and the Peishwa's ratification of the treaties of peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, transmitted with his instructions to the Residents on the subject of a partition of conquests, copies of those treaties directing the Residents to present to their Highnesses the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa respectively, copies of those treaties, in order that their Highnesses might affix their seals to each of those treaties in testimony of their recognition of the terms of the pacification, and the Residents were further instructed to return those treaties so attested for the purpose of being deposited among the records of Government. It was at the same time signified to the Residents that the Ratification of the treaties of peace must precede the execution of the treaties of partition.

On the 28th of April the Resident at Hyderabad waited

upon his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan for the express purpose of obtaining his Highness's ratification of the treaties of peace, and his execution of the treaty of partition.

His Highness, after an attentive perusal of the treaties of peace, affixed his seal and signature to those documents. The Resident then delivered to his Highness the proposed treaty of partition, which, after being attentively perused, was executed by his Highness without the slightest hesitation. The Resident at the same time delivered a counterpart of that treaty to his Highness the Soubahdar. Immediately after the exchange of those instruments, the minister, Azim Ool Omrah, in the presence of his Highness, expressed to the Resident his Highness's entire satisfaction at the amicable and liberal spirit of the territorial arrangements for which the treaty of partition provided.

In the course of the conversation, the Resident took occasion to intimate to the minister that the assignment of territory to his Highness, prescribed by the treaty of partition, must be considered as gratuitous on the part of the British Government, and not as surrendered on the ground of his Highness the Soubahdar's right to participation in the conquests of the war. But no pretensions having been advanced by his Highness to an equal share of conquests, the Resident judged it unnecessary to press the discussion of that question upon the court of Hyderabad.

The treaty of partition, executed by his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, was received at Fort William on the 13th of May, and was ratified by the Governor-General in Council on the following day.

Adverting to the extent and value of the cessions to the Soubahdar of the Deccan under the treaty of partition, and to the benefits which his Highness derives from the renunciation on the part of the Rajah of Berar and of Dowlut Rao Scindiah of all claims of every description on the state of Hyderabad, the Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion that under the treaty of partition the Soubahdar of the Deccan has acquired a share in the conquests and advantages of the war greatly exceeding the proportion in which his Highness contributed to its success, and not inferior to that which his Highness must have received under

an admission of his right to an equal participation of conquests.

The court of Poonah on this occasion manifested a spirit of cavil and of inordinate pretension, wholly unbecoming the relative situation of his Highness the Peishwa, and unsuitable to the nature of the obligations imposed upon his Highness by the arduous exertions of the British Government for the re-establishment of his authority, and by the liberality of its conduct in resolving to assign to his Highness a portion of the conquered territory under the total defect of his Highness's claim to such a participation.

When the Resident submitted to his Highness the Peishwa copies of the treaties of peace for ratification, apprizing him that when his Highness should have ratified those documents, the Resident would communicate to his Highness an arrangement for the cession of the fort and territory of Ahmednuggur to the state of Poonah, his Highness refused to ratify those treaties with his seal and signature, justifying his refusal by claims and pretensions of a most extravagant and unreasonable nature.

The instructions of the Governor-General in Council, however, enabled the Resident to oppose with success the exorbitant demands and expectations of the Peishwa, who finally consented to recognize the provisions of the treaties of peace by affixing his seal to the copies of those treaties presented to him for that purpose by the Resident.

The Resident then proceeded to submit the treaty of partition to his Highness's acceptance. Upon this occasion the Peishwa renewed his unreasonable claims, and even advanced pretensions to participate equally with the British Government in the conquests of the war. The Resident found no difficulty, however, in demonstrating to his Highness and his ministers the absurdity of these pretensions, and after some further discussion his Highness consented to withdraw his unreasonable claims and to affix his seal and signature to the treaty of partition.

Accordingly on the 14th of May the Resident at Poonah waited on his Highness the Peishwa, who on that occasion affixed his seal to the treaties of peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and duly executed the proposed treaty of partition.

The treaty of partition, as concluded with his Highness the Peishwa, has also been ratified by the Governor-General in Council.

Copies of the treaty of partition, as concluded with their Highnesses the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa, are also annexed to this despatch for your honourable Committee's information.*

We have the honour to be,

honourable Sirs,

your most faithful humble Servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. UDNY.

G. H. BARLOW.

No. XXXI.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

15th June, 1804.

The position of a body of troops under the command of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and the conduct and language of that freebooter rendered it necessary for the security of the British interests, and those of our allies, to retain the army under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the field for a considerable period of time after the conclusion of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar. The most important considerations of policy, and especially of economy, required that the earliest means should be employed for establishing the British army at the stations which might be fixed for its permanent position in consequence of the peace. And it was therefore necessary to bring Jeswunt Rao Holkar to some definite explanation of his designs, the uncertainty of which might have involved considerable expense by occasioning the protracted detention of the army in the field.

2. The result of these negotiations has finally compelled the Governor-General in Council to adopt the most decisive measures for reducing the power and resources of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

3. Your honourable Committee has been apprized of the

* See Appendix.

important concessions made by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, under an implied engagement on the part of Holkar to combine his troops with those of the confederated chieftains in hostility against the British Government. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, however, not having joined Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in the war, and having committed no act of aggression against the British Government during the continuation of hostilities with those chieftains, no attempt was made on the part of the British Government to molest Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

4. Although that chieftain's exactions from Aurungabad, a city belonging to our ally the Nizam (which are noticed in the 13th paragraph of our letter to your honourable Committee of the 10th of June 1803), would have justified a determination on the part of the allies to enforce a compensation, the Governor-General, however, in his instructions to the honourable Major-General Wellesley of the 27th of June, 1803 (a copy of which formed an enclosure in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 1st August), positively prohibited that officer from prosecuting hostilities against Holkar, merely for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the plunder of Aurungabad, or for any other predatory incursion.

5. Towards the conclusion of the war, Jeswunt Rao Holkar advanced towards the frontier of our ally the Rajah of Jyenagur, in prosecution of his habits of predatory warfare, and occupied a position with the main body of his forces, which indicated an intention to violate the territories of the Rajah of Jyenagur. Many other indications of an hostile nature were also manifested by Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

6. In the month of December, 1803, Jeswunt Rao Holkar addressed letters to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, which, though expressed in the spirit of arrogance, which Jeswunt Rao Holkar assumed upon all occasions, contained assurances of his disposition to cultivate the friendship of the British Government.

7. The conduct of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, however, at this period of time, was wholly inconsistent with these amicable professions. A letter was delivered to the Commander-in-Chief by the Rajah of Macherry, addressed to the Rajah by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the object of which was to detach that chieftain from his alliance with the British Government. Fur-

ther correspondence of a nature hostile to the British Government was discovered between Holkar and persons owing allegiance to the British Government. Authentic information was also received that Holkar had barbarously murdered three British subjects in his service on a charge of a correspondence between one of those officers and the Commander-in-Chief.

8. The replies of the Commander-in-Chief to the letters which his Excellency had received from Jeswunt Rao Holkar expressed the wish of the British Government to abstain from the prosecution of hostilities against him, declaring at the same time our determination to resist any attempt on the part of any chief or power to molest the allies, or to invade the rights of the British Government. The tenor of these answers was entirely approved by the Governor-General, who deemed it proper at this time to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with a statement of his views and intentions with respect to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and with instructions for the guidance of the Commander-in-Chief's conduct with respect to that chieftain.

9. It appeared to the Governor-General to be indispensably necessary either to adopt measures for the reduction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's predatory force, or to frame some arrangement with him which, without compromising the dignity of the British Government, and without violating the general principles of justice, or the acknowledged rights of other chieftains, might render it the interest of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to abandon his predatory habits, and preclude the necessity of an expensive permanent arrangement for the defence of our territories, and those of our allies against the incursions of that freebooter.

10. The detail of the arguments and considerations which influenced the determination of the Governor-General upon this point is too voluminous to admit of being inserted in this despatch, the Governor-General deems it sufficient to state to your honourable Committee the general result of the Governor-General's deliberations on the question, referring your honourable Committee for that detail to the annexed copy* of the instructions to the Commander-in-Chief.

* As the substance of these instructions is contained in the subsequent paragraphs of this letter, it is not thought necessary to insert a copy.—[Ed.]

11. Jeswunt Rao Holkar being justly considered as an adventurer, and as the usurper of the rights of his brother Cashee Rao Holkar, consistently with the principles of justice no arrangement could be proposed between the British Government and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, involving the formal sanction of the British Government to that chieftain's usurpation, and to the exclusion of Cashee Rao Holkar from his hereditary dominion. But on the other hand, no obligation was imposed on the British Government by any existing engagements to assert the rights of Cashee Rao Holkar against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. With the limitation above described, the British Government was at liberty to act towards Jeswunt Rao Holkar exclusively, according to the dictates of policy and expediency. The Governor-General in Council therefore ultimately determined to authorize the Commander-in-Chief to conclude an agreement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, engaging on the part of the British Government to leave Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the unmolested exercise of his authority, provided only that Jeswunt Rao Holkar should engage on his part to abstain from any acts of aggression and hostility against the British Government, and from any invasion of the rights of our allies. For the accomplishment of this arrangement the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to signify to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, either by letter or through the channel of the vakeels whom he might be invited to despatch, that the British Government entertained the most amicable disposition towards him, and harboured no intention of prosecuting hostilities against him, unless compelled to that extremity by acts of aggression on his part against the British Government, or any of its allies. That the British Government was pledged by the obligation of its engagements with various chiefs and states in Hindostan to guarantee them against all exactions and demands unfounded in justice; that we did not admit his claim to tribute of any denomination upon those chiefs or states founded upon the pretensions of the Holkar family, and that we should therefore be compelled to resist any such demands on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. That with the consent of his Highness the Peishwa, the British Government would be disposed to arbitrate the differences subsisting between Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Cashee Rao Holkar, and to adjust the claims of the several

branches of the family on the principles of equity and justice. That we were desirous of preserving peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that we would abstain from any unsolicited interference in his concerns beyond the limits required for the protection and security of the rights and territories of our allies, and that we merely required that he should manifest a similar conduct by abstaining from all measures and operations of a contrary tendency, by withdrawing his troops from any position which they might at that time occupy menacing to the British Government or to our allies, and by withholding all demands on the states or chieftains with which the British Government was in alliance; adding, that if Jeswunt Rao Holkar should advance any claims on those states in his individual capacity, the British Government would be disposed to arbitrate all such claims on principles of equity and justice.

12. The Commander-in-Chief was desired to exercise his discretion with regard to the degree of security which we might possess under Jeswunt Rao Holkar's acquiescence in the terms of the proposed arrangement; and the Commander-in-Chief was also authorized to employ the British forces against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, if the views of that chieftain should appear to be evidently hostile.

13. Those instructions were communicated to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, with directions to carry them into effect in the event of his position becoming approximated to that of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to such a degree as to render his communication with that chieftain more practicable and convenient than the Commander-in-Chief's.

14. In conformity to these instructions, the Commander-in-Chief addressed a letter to Jeswunt Rao Holkar on the 29th of January, 1804, stating generally the terms on which the British Government was disposed to leave him in the unmolested exercise of his authority, and to require him as a proof of the sincerity of his amicable professions, to withdraw his army from the menacing position which it then occupied, to retire within his own territories, and to abstain from the exaction of any tribute from the allies of the British Government.

15. The Commander-in-Chief also invited Jeswunt Rao Holkar to despatch vakeels to his camp for the purpose of

making known his wishes, and of effecting an amicable arrangement on the basis of the Governor-General's proposition. The Commander-in-Chief at the same time advanced with his army to Hindoun, a position which commanded the principal roads leading to the Company's territories, and whence the army could move with ease in whatever direction the movements of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's predatory troops might render necessary.

16. On the 27th of February the Commander-in-Chief received Jeswunt Rao Holkar's reply to the letter which his Excellency addressed to that chief under the instructions of the Governor-General. It was expressed in terms which appeared to indicate a wish on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to accede to the Commander-in-Chief's propositions, and contained a promise to withdraw his troops from the menacing position which they occupied. Jeswunt Rao Holkar also announced his intention of despatching a vakeel to the British camp.

17. At different periods of the negotiation letters addressed by Jeswunt Rao Holkar to allies and subjects of the British Government were intercepted by the Commander-in-Chief. Those letters contain proofs of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's endeavours to excite those persons to revolt against the British Government, and state his intention to despatch forces for the purpose of ravaging the territories of the Company.

18. The Governor-General in Council deemed it to be proper to enclose copies of the intercepted correspondence * for the information of your honourable Committee.

19. The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of the negotiation conducted by the Commander-in-Chief with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. In reply to the letter of that chief, to which the 16th preceding paragraph refers, the Commander-in-Chief repeated his amicable assurances and urged Holkar to carry into effect the resolution which he had avowed of retiring within the limits of his usurped dominion.

* Letters to Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Gholau Mahomed from Ram Dyal. To Holkar from Nyn-Sing. Do. Do. Begum Sumroo. From Holkar to the Rajah of Macherry. From Futeh Oolah Beg to Do. From Holkar to Mohabut Allee Khaun. From Hussain Allee to Do. From Shahamut Khaun to Do. From Holkar to Do.

The Commander-in-Chief also intimated to Holkar his knowledge of the correspondence which had been detected, and warned him of the danger of such a proceeding.

20. On the 16th of March two vakeels from Jeswunt Rao Holkar arrived in the British camp, and on the 18th of that month held a conference with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. It appeared that the vakeels possessed no powers to conclude any arrangement, but were simply instructed to state the propositions of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to acquaint him with the terms which might be offered by the Commander-in-Chief. The demands which the vakeels brought forward in the name of Jeswunt Rao Holkar at this conference were,

1st. "That he should be permitted to collect the chout agreeably to the custom of his ancestors.

2d. "That the ancient possessions formerly held by the family, such as Etawa, &c. twelve Pergunnahs in the Doab, and a Pergunnah in Bundelcund should be granted to him.

3d. "That the country of Hurriana, which was formerly in the possession of the family, should be given to him.

4th. "That the country then in his possession should be guaranteed to him, and a treaty should be concluded with him on the same terms as that with Scindiah."

21. These demands were of a nature so extravagant, and in every point of view so entirely inadmissible, that they were positively rejected by the Commander-in-Chief, who expressed his surprise at the conduct of Holkar in proposing terms utterly incompatible with the propositions of the Commander-in-Chief and inconsistent with the tenor and apparent spirit of his late communications.

22. The Commander-in-Chief referred the Vakeels to the former letters of Holkar, containing the terms on which his Excellency was authorized to conclude an arrangement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and required as a preliminary to any negotiation, Holkar's immediate return within his own territories. The Commander-in-Chief directed the attention of the Vakeels to the promise expressed in Holkar's letter to the Commander-in-Chief, that he would withdraw his troops from their actual position, and asked the Vakeels if he might depend on the performance of the promise. They replied in explicit terms, that Holkar would not consider

that promise to be binding, unless the demands now brought forward by the vakeels should be complied with. The whole of the conversation on the part of the vakeels during this conference was distinguished by the most offensive spirit of arrogance and haughtiness. They appeared to entertain an expectation of inducing the Commander-in-Chief to accede to their demands by an exaggerated description of Holkar's military power and resources, and by insinuating that Holkar while soliciting the Commander-in-Chief's compliance with his demands possessed ample means of enforcing them.

23. After the conference was concluded, the vakeels conveyed an intimation to the Commander-in-Chief, that although the demands which they had brought forward were conformable to their instructions, they were authorized to recede from those demands and to accept on the part of Holkar any provision in lands or money which the British Government should think proper to assign to him. The Commander-in-Chief replied to this proposal by referring to his former proposition, and by again requiring as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation, the immediate return of Holkar within his own possessions.

24. Shortly after this conference, the vakeels quitted the British camp on their return to that of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

25. Previously to their departure, the Commander-in-Chief delivered to them a letter addressed to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, repeating once more the terms in which Jeswunt Rao Holkar might remain at peace, and desiring him to send to the British camp a person in his confidence, vested with sufficient powers to conclude an arrangement with the British Government.

26. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to enclose, for the information of your honourable Committee, a copy of the despatch* from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, containing the details of his Excellency's communication with the vakeels of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

27. While the negotiation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar was depending, the Governor-General in Council received a copy of a letter,† addressed to the honourable Major-General Wel-

* Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, dated 19th March, 1804.

† Letter from Holkar to Major-General Wellesley, dated 1st of February.

lesley by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, apparently written at the commencement of the month of February, 1804, in which Jeswunt Rao Holkar distinctly demands the cession of certain provinces in the Deccan, stated by him to be the original property of the family of Holkar, as the condition of peace; adding, in terms of insulting menace, that in the event of war, although unable to oppose the British artillery in the field, "countries of many hundred coss should be overrun and plundered and burnt. That he (meaning the Commander-in-Chief) should not have leisure to breathe for a moment, and that calamities would fall on lacs of human beings in continued war by the attacks of his (Holkar's) army, which overwhelms like the waves of the sea."

28. The insolent and hostile declarations contained in that letter, combined with the equivocal conduct of Holkar in his negotiation with the Commander-in-Chief, and his detected attempts to create rebellion within the Company's provinces, appeared to require the immediate adoption of measures of extremity against that chieftain.

29. The Governor-General, however, deemed it advisable to await the result of the negotiation which the Commander-in-Chief had been directed to commence.

30. On the 4th of April the Commander-in-Chief received the reply of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to the letter which his Excellency had transmitted by the vakeels of that chieftain.

31. In this letter Jeswunt Rao Holkar evaded an answer to the propositions which had been renewed in the letter from the Commander-in-Chief, and required from his Excellency a communication of the leading articles of the proposed arrangement between Jeswunt Rao Holkar and the British Government, previously to his despatching a confidential agent to the British camp.

32. A letter was at the same time received from Bhowanny Shunker, the principal servant of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, addressed to Captain Gardner, an officer who had formerly been in the service of Holkar, subsequently in that of the Rajah of Jyenagur, and had recently joined the British camp, and had been employed by the Commander-in-Chief in the negotiation with Holkar. In that letter Bhowanny Shunker renewed the demands which had been formerly

brought forward by the vakeels of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and had been decidedly rejected by the Commander-in-Chief.

33. In reply to the letter from Holkar, the Commander-in-Chief recalled the attention of that chieftain to the indulgence and forbearance manifested towards him by the British Government, and exhorted him to adopt the only line of conduct consistent with his true interests, and with the preservation of peace with the British Government.

34. A copy of the despatch* from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, containing the correspondence referred to, is enclosed for the information of your honourable Committee.

35. At the period of the Commander-in-Chief's receipt of Holkar's letters, above referred to, Jeswunt Rao Holkar was in Ajmere, a province in the possession of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to which quarter he had marched some time before, ostensibly for the purposes of devotion, having assured the Commander-in-Chief of his intention to proceed thence to his own territories.

36. Holkar levied considerable contributions in Ajmere, and attempted, though without success, to obtain possession of the fort. A considerable part of his force, however, remained on the frontier of Jyenagur, after having committed depredations on the territory of the Rajah. This circumstance, combined with the tenor of the letters of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Bhowanny Shunker, with the renewal of those extravagant and inadmissible demands which had already been positively rejected by the Commander-in-Chief, and the evasive and deceitful conduct of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, throughout his negotiation with the Commander-in-Chief, precluded all expectation of effecting any pacific arrangement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, on terms compatible with the security of the British interests and those of our allies, or with the honour and dignity of the British name.

37. The Governor-General in Council deems it proper in this place to suspend the narrative of the proceedings of Government with relation to Holkar for the purpose of stat-

* Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, dated 4th April, 1804, with its enclosure.

ing the transactions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar with respect to each other since the conclusion of peace.

38. The enmity which subsisted between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar before the commencement of the late war, was not cordially renounced by either of those chieftains, even at the time when they negotiated a combination of their powers for purposes hostile to the British Government, and was greatly exasperated on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by Holkar's violation of his faith, to which Dowlut Rao Scindiah ascribed the unsuccessful issue of the war. The territory of Scindiah had been plundered by Holkar both during the war and subsequently to the peace. In the reduced condition of Scindiah's power, his apprehensions were excited by the position of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's numerous predatory forces in the vicinity of the most valuable portion of his remaining territory, and Scindiah was anxious to augment his reduced power and resources by the acquisition of a part of the territory of the family of Holkar, which he might hope to obtain by the destruction of his rival. Every motive, therefore, of revenge, interest, and ambition, combined to render Dowlut Rao Scindiah solicitous for the extinction of Holkar's power.

39. In several conversations which Scindiah's ministers held with the acting Resident at his court, those ministers represented the violence, rapacity, and faithless character of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the strongest terms, and urged the necessity of attacking that chieftain without delay.

40. At one of those conferences the minister of Dowlut Rao Scindiah acknowledged to the acting Resident the conclusion of a treaty between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, by the mediation and under the guarantee of the Rajah of Berar, containing those important concessions to Jeswunt Rao Holkar to which the (3d) paragraph of this despatch refers, and added that all the essential stipulations of that engagement had been fulfilled by Dowlut Rao Scindiah: that every measure had been adopted by Scindiah which could tend to conciliate the good will of Holkar, but that Jeswunt Rao Holkar notwithstanding his professions of amity, had pursued a conduct uniformly hostile to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and had violated both the spirit

and letter of his engagements; that no degree of confidence could be reposed in Holkar's public faith, that he was a "plunderer" who had been raised by fortune to a degree of power of which he knew not the proper use, and that every attempt to divert him from the prosecution of his predatory habits or to maintain with him the relations of amity and concord, must prove abortive, and that while Holkar possessed any degree of power and influence he would continue to be the leader of a band of robbers, and therefore if it were necessary to attack, it would be politic to destroy him: that no motive but that of urgent necessity could have induced Dowlut Rao Scindiah to consider Jeswunt Rao Holkar in any other character than that of an usurper; but having once acknowledged Jeswunt Rao Holkar as a regular state, so far as to conclude an engagement with him, Dowlut Rao Scindiah was still disposed to maintain with him the relations of amity and peace, provided that Jeswunt Rao Holkar would adopt a course of conduct consistent with those relations." The minister concluded by urging the necessity on the grounds above stated of the immediate adoption of measures on the part of both states, calculated either to restrain Jeswunt Rao Holkar's turbulence, or to reduce his power.

41. The engagement to which the preceding paragraph refers, and of which a copy is annexed to this despatch, consists almost exclusively of concessions on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in favour of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. It contains no corresponding concessions on the part of Holkar, but an obligation was necessarily imposed upon Jeswunt Rao Holkar by the general nature of that engagement to act towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah as towards a state in amity with him. Adverting, however, to all the circumstances of the case, it cannot be supposed that such was the limit of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's corresponding obligations. Great as had been the successes of Holkar, the power and resources of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were not reduced to such a state of comparative weakness as to compel him to purchase an accommodation with a chieftain, against whom he had reason to entertain sentiments of the deepest animosity, whom he considered "as a robber and usurper, and with whom no motive but that of urgent necessity could induce him to con-

clude engagements," by abandoning the cause for which he had so long contended, by acknowledging that "usurper" to be a legitimate power, by important concessions of a political nature, calculated to render the power and influence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in Hindostan and the Deccan equal to his own, and by extensive territorial cessions which would place in the hands of Jeswunt Rao Holkar additional means of prosecuting his ambitious and predatory projects without any corresponding concession on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, excepting an implied obligation to maintain with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the relations of amity and peace. These considerations alone would suffice to demonstrate that Jeswunt Rao Holkar was required to accede to some distinct conditions as the price of such important and extensive concessions on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. That Holkar's consent to such conditions was required and obtained, and that those conditions were the accession of Holkar to the Mahratta confederacy, and the combination of his power and resources with those of the confederates in an united effort for the destruction of the British Empire might be established by a reference to many facts and circumstances which have been already stated in our several despatches to your honourable Committee, but the necessity of such reference is entirely precluded by the distinct and recorded avowal of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers who negotiated the treaty of peace with the honourable Major-General Wellesley, as stated in the following extract from the honourable Major-General Wellesley's report of his conferences with those ministers.

"Major-General Wellesley said that he understood that the Maharajah had lately made a treaty with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and he wished to know whether any thing was granted to the Holkar family by that treaty."

"In answer Eetul Punt said that Holkar's right to a share in Hindostan was admitted by that treaty, but that he had not performed its conditions, and that therefore he could derive no rights from it. Goorpara said, the conditions may as well be acknowledged, they were that he should join in the attack of the British Government, which he has never done."

“ Eetul Punt added, or said, that Ragojee Bhouslah Rajah of Berar mediated the treaty, and was the guarantee, and that he had it at that moment in his possession.”

42. Your honourable Committee will not fail to observe the distinct declaration of Scindiah's ministers (one of whom was the minister who held the discourse with the acting Resident, described in the 40th preceding paragraph) that the condition under which Holkar's right to the benefit of the treaty concluded by him with Dowlut Rao Scindiah was acknowledged, was, that he should join with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in “ attacking the British power.”

43. Independently of the inference to be deduced with regard to the period of time when this engagement was concluded from the expression of “ attacking the British power,” the engagement itself contains evidence of its conclusion not only before the junction of the armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar at Mulkapoor on the 4th of June 1803, and consequently before the commencement of our negotiation with those chieftains for the return of their forces within their respective dominions, but before the Rajah of Berar commenced his march from Nagpore, that engagement being stated in its preamble to have been prepared at that city, by Jadoon Rao Bhasker, at that time Scindiah's prime minister and agent at the court of Berar.

44. The Governor-General in Council has deemed it proper to state these circumstances in detail as constituting the most positive, distinct, and irrefragable proof of the originally hostile designs of the Rajah of Berar and of Dowlut Rao Scindiah against the British Government, and of their real intentions in maintaining their armies united upon the Nizam's frontier, until repelled by the successful operations of Major-General Wellesley's army.*

45. From the facts above stated, it is now manifest that the meeting between the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao

* This fact fully discloses the treacherous policy and hostile intentions of the Mahratta chieftains, as foreseen by the Governor-General previous even to the junction of Scindiah and the Berar Rajah, and while they were professing the most pacific views.—[Ed.]

Scindiah at the head of their respective armies was not for the purpose of determining the question of peace or war with the British Government, but of concerting and providing the most effectual means of prosecuting with success a war of aggression against the British power, which they had previously resolved to undertake in concert with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

46. Adverting to the conference between Dowlut Rao Scindiah's minister and the Acting Resident, which is described in the 40th preceding paragraph, your honourable Committee will not fail to remark the extraordinary effrontery of that minister in urging to the Acting Resident Holkar's violation of the conditions of this offensive alliance against the British power as a principal cause for the prosecution of hostilities against Holkar, in which Dowlut Rao Scindiah expected the aid of the British power, under the general provisions of the treaty of Burhanpore.

47. On the 5th of February a vakeel despatched by Holkar had arrived in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The minister of Scindiah intimated to the Acting Resident that the principal object of the mission of Holkar's vakeel was, to engage Scindiah to accommodate his differences with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and unite in an attack on the British possessions. The minister stated that Scindiah had signified his refusal to engage in the proposed measure in the most positive terms, adding, that even if he were inclined to violate his faith with the British Government, the character of Holkar and the experience which Scindiah had acquired of his utter disregard of the most solemn engagements, would effectually prevent him from forming any connection with that chieftain. The minister added, that Scindiah had declared to Holkar's vakeel that he had no inclination to attack Holkar, provided he would retire within his own territory, and abstain from committing acts of hostility against Scindiah and his dependants.

48. Adverting to the enmity subsisting between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to the solicitude of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to induce the British Government to adopt measures of extremity against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the assertions of the Durbar of Scindiah with respect to the

proceedings of Holkar, must be received with distrust. The Governor-General in Council, however, entertains no doubt of the truth of those assertions, the conduct of Holkar being entirely consistent with such a project of combined hostility against the British Government.

49. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to enclose for the information of your honourable Committee, a copy of the despatch from Major Malcolm, containing the detail of the communication to which the preceding paragraph refers.

50. Dowlut Rao Scindiah being sensible of his inability to oppose a successful resistance to the arms of Holkar, and being apprehensive that Jeswunt Rao Holkar would take advantage of the reduced condition of Scindiah's power and resources to prosecute hostilities against him, deemed it advisable to adopt measures both with a view to effect an accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to obtain authentic and early information of that chieftain's real views and designs. Accordingly Dowlut Rao Scindiah despatched a vakeel to the camp of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. That vakeel was instructed to apprise Jeswunt Rao Holkar that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was disposed to overlook his past conduct, and to maintain with him the relations of amity and peace, provided that Jeswunt Rao Holkar would in future refrain from plundering Scindiah's territories and those of his tributaries, but that Holkar's disregard of that amicable proposition, and the repetition of his outrages against the territories of Scindiah, or of his tributaries, would compel Dowlut Rao Scindiah to resort to arms. The vakeel was at the same time directed to obtain the most accurate information of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's designs, and to transmit the intelligence of his proceedings.

51. On the 3d of March Scindiah's vakeel arrived in Holkar's camp.

52. The vakeel was received with every mark of peculiar distinction, and was soon after admitted to a private conference. At that conference (as it was reported by Scindiah's ministers to the Acting Resident), Jeswunt Rao Holkar distinctly declared his intention to direct his predatory force against the British possessions.

53. The vakeel having expostulated with Holkar on his attack upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fortress of Ajmere, Holkar attempted to justify his conduct on that occasion by declaring that the Rajah of Jodepore, with whom he intended to leave his family when he commenced his operations against the English, would not consent to the terms which he had proposed, unless he first placed the fort and province of Ajmere in his possession; and he hoped that Scindiah would excuse a measure which necessity compelled him to pursue, and which was adopted solely with the view to "enable him to prosecute a war (meaning a war against the Company) which involved the independence of the Mahratta empire."

54. The ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah accompanied this report to Major Malcolm of the negotiations of Scindiah's vakeel at the camp of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with the communication of a paper which they stated to have been received from the vakeel of Scindiah at Nagpore, containing the concurrent report of messengers despatched for intelligence to the camp of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with respect to the declared intention of that chieftain to carry on a predatory war against the British possessions.

55. The detail of those communications is stated in the annexed extracts from the correspondence of Major Malcolm, connected with the mission of the vakeel from Scindiah to Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

56. These combined facts demonstrate that such of the possessions of the Company and of our allies, as might be accessible to the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, were the immediate objects of his predatory designs. But even the amicable disposition of Holkar would not have afforded to the British Government or to its allies any security against the predatory incursions of that chieftain's forces. The charges of Holkar's numerous troops greatly exceeded the precarious resources of his usurped dominion, and had hitherto been defrayed by the profits of indiscriminate plunder; and the continuance of the same system of predatory warfare directed against such territories as were most accessible and had not yet been desolated, afforded to his tumultuous followers the only prospect of relief from the distress to which they were

exposed by the inability of Holkar to provide for their subsistence.

57. By the extension of the system of political alliances which had been adopted by the British Government during the war, most of those petty states from whose territories Holkar and other freebooters had been accustomed to derive their plunder, were now connected by alliance with the British Government, which was bound to protect them against all aggressions.

58. The scarcity occasioned by the unusual deficiency of rain during the last rainy season, the operations of the contending Mahratta armies, antecedent to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, and the subsequent depredations of the troops of Holkar had spread desolation over the greater part of the Deccan and of the southern provinces of Hindostan. Holkar's predatory force, therefore, must shortly have been compelled for subsistence to violate the territories of the British Government or of states, for whose defence the British Government was bound to provide.

59. The plunder of the opulent city of Jyenagur, which would probably have been the first object of his depredations, would have afforded to Holkar a great accession of pecuniary resource, would have enabled him to retain a formidable force, and would consequently have augmented his means of plunder and devastation, and the employment of our military force for the suppression of Holkar's predatory operations, would ultimately have become indispensably necessary under circumstances of augmented inconvenience, difficulty and expense.

60. The recent peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar has deprived of employment numerous bands of irregular troops. Persons of that description would either have been encouraged by the hope of plunder, or impelled by the necessity of obtaining subsistence to unite with Holkar in the plunder of the countries towards which he might direct his force. Under these circumstances, it would have been indispensably necessary either to maintain our army in a state of inactivity in the field upon a scale of expense not inferior to that which would attend the most active operations of war, or to have exposed the territories of the British

Government and those of our allies, to the certain ravages of Holkar's troops, until the army could again be placed at a still more burthensome expense in a condition to repel their incursions.

61. The facts and considerations above stated sufficiently demonstrate that the existence of the horde of freebooters which Holkar conducted was hazardous to the tranquillity of our possessions and those of our allies, and that our continued forbearance was calculated to encourage his predatory designs, to augment his means of carrying them into effect within the limits of our own possessions, and to involve the British Government in great additional expense. The reduction of that predatory power therefore was manifestly a measure not only of just policy and necessary security, but of ultimate economy with reference to the finances of the honourable Company.

62. The Governor-General therefore on the receipt of the despatch from the Commander-in-Chief to which the 34th preceding paragraph of this despatch refers, issued orders to the Commander-in-Chief, and to Major-General Wellesley, under date the 16th of April, for the immediate commencement of hostile operations against Holkar in Hindostan and the Deccan. The Governor-General at the same time notified this determination to Major Malcolm, and directed that officer to apprise Scindiah of his Excellency's resolutions. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to enclose for the information of your honourable Committee copies * of the instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Wellesley, and Major Malcolm, to which this paragraph refers.

63. The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to submit to your honourable Committee a review of the military operations which have been directed to the object of reducing the power and resources of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of the success with which they have been attended down to the date of the latest advices which have been received by the Governor-General in Council.

64. On the receipt by Major-General Wellesley of the

* Letters of the 16th April to the Commander-in-Chief, to Major-General Wellesley, and to Major Malcolm.

letter addressed by Holkar to that officer, referred to in the 27th paragraph of this despatch, Major-General Wellesley, judging from the tenor of that letter, and from the advices which he had received of the proceedings of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in Hindostan, that the Governor-General in Council would deem it necessary to direct the immediate prosecution of hostilities against that freebooter, thought it advisable to adopt without delay such measures as should enable him to afford the most effectual support to the operations which might be commenced under the orders of the Governor General in Council by the Commander-in-Chief from Hindostan. The principal possessions now occupied by the partisans of Jeswunt Rao Holkar under that usurper's authority in the Deccan are, the fort and territory of Chandore. Jeswunt Rao Holkar's partisans also possessed some territory in Candesh, and a few districts intermixed with the territories of his Highness the Nizam. The capture of the fort of Chandore would deprive Holkar of all those possessions. The siege of that fort therefore was the primary object to which the operations of the British army in the Deccan was to be directed. The state of the country however between Poonah and Chandore, which was suffering under the calamity of a severe scarcity, presented serious obstacles to the advance of an army in that direction, and Major-General Wellesley was apprehensive that unless the commencement of hostilities was postponed until the rainy season, he might not be able to conduct active operations against Holkar's possessions in the Deccan. Major-General Wellesley however proceeded to place the troops under his immediate command in a state of equipment for active service.

65. Major-General Wellesley was of opinion that considerable effect might be produced by the advance of the British troops in Guzerat against the possessions of Holkar in Malwa; and Major-General Wellesley accordingly adopted immediate measures for reinforcing the troops in that quarter with three battalions of native infantry. The probability that it might be the determination of the Governor-General in Council to station in Guzerat the force to be subsidized by Dowlut Rao Scindiah according to the stipulations of the defensive alliance, operated as a farther inducement to Ge-

neral Wellesley to reinforce the troops in Guzerat, which after the addition above stated, amounted to two regiments of European infantry and six battalions of native infantry, one battalion of which was 1,600 strong.

66. These arrangements, together with the sentiments of the honourable Major-General Wellesley on the subject of a general plan of operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, were stated by that officer to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in a letter dated 23rd April, of which a copy is annexed to this despatch for the information of your honourable Committee.

67. On the receipt of the instructions of the Governor-General, under date the 16th April, Major-General Wellesley issued immediate instructions to Colonel Murray, commanding the British troops in Guzerat, for the guidance of his conduct in the operations which General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray to adopt without delay against Holkar's possessions in Malwa.

68. Major-General Wellesley, at the same time, directed the Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to require Dowlut Rao Scindiah to employ his arms without delay in the reduction of such parts of the possessions of Holkar as might be accessible to Scindiah's troops. The Resident was also directed to desire that Scindiah would despatch an officer on his part to join the army under the command of Colonel Murray for the purpose of procuring supplies for the use of the army under the command of Colonel Murray, and of taking charge of any districts captured from Holkar, which Colonel Murray might think proper to deliver to his charge. The Resident, with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, was also apprized of General Wellesley's opinion that a detachment of British troops should join Scindiah's army, and was desired to call on Scindiah to provide battering guns for the eventual use of Colonel Murray's army.

69. Dowlut Rao Scindiah had received the notification of the Governor-General's resolution to reduce Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of his Excellency's intention with respect to the future division of the territory under the usurped authority of Holkar, as stated in the instructions to the acting resident with Scindiah under date the 16th April, a copy of which

is annexed to this despatch; with every demonstration of satisfaction Scindiah promised to employ every exertion to co-operate effectually with the British troops against Holkar, and after some discussion with the Resident, consented to adopt the measures recommended by Major-General Wellesley.

70. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to annex to this despatch a copy of the instructions issued by Major-General Wellesley to Colonel Murray. That document, together with the letter from Major-General Wellesley to the Commander-in-Chief to which the 66th paragraph of this despatch refers, will afford to your honourable Committee complete information with respect to the plan of operations against Holkar to be undertaken from the Deccan and Guzerat.

71. The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of the proceedings of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in Hindostan under the Governor-General in Council's instructions of the 15th of April.

72. During the negotiation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar the Commander-in-Chief had continued to advance slowly towards the territories of the Rajah of Jyenagur for the combined purpose of accelerating the progress of the negotiation with Holkar, of protecting the country of Jyenagur from any hostile attempt on the part of Holkar, and of more effectually protecting the dominions of the British Government, and of our allies, against the predatory incursions of any bodies of troops in the direction of the Jumna.

73. A detachment of considerable strength, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Ball, occupied a position near Canoon, a town situated about eighty miles south-west of Delhi, which was calculated effectually to oppose the attempts of any body of troops to penetrate in that direction into the recently acquired possessions of the British Government.

74. Previously to the receipt of the Governor-General's instructions of the 16th of April, the Commander-in-Chief had judged it to be expedient to adopt some arrangement calculated to arrest the progress of the depredations which Holkar, returning from Adjmeer, had actually commenced within

the territories of the Rajah of Jyenagur, where he occupied a position which menaced the security of the capital of that province. Holkar had previously despatched his guns towards Malwa, but remained at the head of a considerable body of horse. With a view to protect the city of Jyenagur, and to give confidence to the government and troops of the Rajah, the Commander-in-Chief formed a detachment of three battalions of native infantry, under the command of the Honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson, of his Majesty's 76th regiment, which marched towards Jyepore on the 18th of April. The march of the detachment was regulated in such a manner as to enable the Commander-in-Chief eventually to join it in one forced march with the whole army. On the 21st of April, the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Monson arrived in the vicinity of Jyenagur. The detachment was accompanied by an officer despatched by the Commander-in-Chief, with instructions to confer personally with the Rajah of Jyenagur on the means of opposing the designs of Holkar, and to persuade the Rajah to adopt the most vigorous and decisive measures towards the accomplishment of that object. The march of the detachment to Jyenagur immediately compelled Holkar to retreat. On the morning of the 23rd of April that chieftain suddenly retired from his position within the territory of Jyenagur, and commenced his march with great precipitation to the southward. Holkar was followed in his retreat by parties of Hindostanee horse, under the command of European officers, who had been detached by the Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of observing Holkar's motions, and harrassing his troops on their march.

75. A short halt made by Holkar of two days having induced the Commander-in-Chief to suspect that Holkar's retreat might be intended as a feint, his Excellency thought it proper to advance with his army, directing the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Monson to precede the main army with the utmost expedition. On the approach of the British troops, however, Holkar resumed his flight with the utmost precipitation, and with every appearance of apprehension and alarm.

76. Holkar continued his retreat with the utmost celerity until he arrived in the vicinity of Kotah, at which place he

halted, the rapidity of his flight having placed him at so great a distance from the British troops as to relieve him from the apprehension of any immediate attack. The parties of Hindostanee horse which had been detached by the Commander-in-chief continued to accompany his retreat, and had opportunities of engaging parties of his troops. Regular information was received by the Commander-in-Chief from the officers commanding the Hindostanee horse employed in the pursuit of Holkar, which described the situation of that chieftain during his flight to be in the utmost degree wretched and distressed. The countries through which he passed had been nearly desolated by his former outrages, and afforded a scanty subsistence for his troops, of whom great numbers deserted.

77. After Holkar's flight the Commander-in-Chief received a letter from that chieftain, recommencing protestations of friendship, and proposing to despatch a vakeel to the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief replied to this overture by referring to the propositions which he had originally offered to Jeswunt Rao Holkar's acceptance. Copies of those documents are annexed to this despatch.

78. The Commander-in-Chief continued the march for some days in the direction of Holkar's flight. The detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Monson still continuing in advance. His Excellency proposed to attack the fort of Rampoorah, belonging to Holkar, the occupation of which by the British troops would deprive that chieftain of his possessions in that quarter of India. For this service his Excellency detached a force consisting of three battalions of native infantry, one regiment of native cavalry, and a proportion of heavy ordnance and field artillery, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Don. The detachment arrived before Rampoorah on the . That fort was assaulted by a party of the troops under Lieut.-Colonel Don on the 16th of May, and carried with the greatest gallantry and rapidity. The despatch from the Commander-in-Chief, of which a copy is annexed to this despatch, contains an account of the assault and capture of Rampoorah, which reflects the highest honour on the officers and troops who were engaged on that service.

79. The rapid flight of Holkar, and his distance from the

Commander-in-Chief, and from the detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Monson, rendered it highly improbable that any force acting from Hindostan would be able to bring Holkar to action. The improbability of Holkar's return to the upper parts of Hindostan, combined with the advices which the Commander-in-Chief had received of the forward state of preparations in Guzerat, and the conviction that the operations of the British troops in that quarter, in concert with those of Scindiah, afforded during the present season the only prospect of making an effectual impression on the territories of Holkar, appeared to render it expedient to withdraw the main body of the British army from the advanced position which it occupied, and to confine the plan of operations on the side of Hindostan to the adoption of measures for the effectual exclusion of Holkar from that quarter.

80. With this view, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief directed Lieut.-Colonel Monson to form such a disposition of his force as should completely obstruct the return of Holkar in that direction. The force under Lieut.-Colonel Monson was fully equal to any which it was probable that Holkar would be able to oppose to it before the season for more active operations should arrive. The possession of Rampoorra, and of the territories of Holkar which depended on that fort, also contributed to oppose any attempt of that chieftain to return towards the position from which he had fled.

81. A large body of Scindiah's troops, which had advanced from Ougein to co-operate with the Commander-in-Chief, was instructed to press upon Holkar, and to harrass him on his march.

82. The Governor-General entirely approved the arrangement which the Commander-in-Chief had resolved to adopt.

83. In the actual state of affairs, it appeared to the Governor-General in Council to be impracticable to carry on active operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar until the close of the rainy season, when it might be expected that those countries which had been desolated by the ravages of the predatory troops of the Mahratta chieftains, in the contests which preceded the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, and by the deficiency of rain during the last season, would afford

subsistence to the British troops which might be employed against the territories and resources of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the Deccan. The Governor-General in Council deemed this to be a favourable moment for withdrawing the British troops in every quarter of India to their usual stations, with the exception of the subsidiary forces which the British Government is bound to furnish to the Peishwa and the Guikwar, to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Ranah of Gohud. With this view, the Governor-General, on the 25th of May, issued the notes of instructions of which a copy is transmitted for the information of your honourable Committee.*

84. The completion of the arrangements prescribed in the notes of instructions will enable the British Government, at the close of the rainy season, to reduce the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar within due bounds, without entailing any further expense than that to which the British Government is exposed by the establishment of the subsidiary forces at Poona and with the Guikwar, Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Ranah of Gohud; for which, however, the most ample resources have been provided by our subsidiary engagements with those states respectively. Your honourable Committee will remark with satisfaction, that the whole of the subsidiary troops in the Deccan, forming a force of upwards of 22,000 men,† may be employed against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or any other disturber of the public tranquillity, without incurring any serious demands on the permanent establishments of your respective presidencies, or without making any considerable addition to the military charges in India. Your honourable Committee will not fail to appreciate the advantages of an arrangement by which the charges of so considerable a proportion of the established military force of

* See p. 67.

† *At Hyderabad*—1 regiment Europeans, 6 battalions Sepoys, 2 regiments Native Cavalry, 2 companies Artillery, 1 company Pioneers. *At Poona*—6 battalions Sepoys, 2 companies Artillery, 1 regiment Native Cavalry. *With Dowlut Rao Scindiah*—6 battalions Sepoys, 2 companies Artillery, 1 regiment Native Cavalry. *With the Guikwar*—2 battalions Sepoys, 1 company Artillery. *Total*—1 regiment Europeans, 3 regiments Native Cavalry, 20 battalions Native Infantry, 7 companies Artillery, 1 company Pioneers.

India is defrayed by foreign subsidies. Adverting to the constant state of preparation and equipment in which the subsidiary forces must be maintained, your honourable Committee will not fail to estimate the influence and security which the British Government must derive from the establishment in the heart of the Deccan of so formidable a force, in positions calculated at once to repel external aggression and to secure the maintenance of tranquillity within your flourishing and extensive possessions in the peninsula of India.

85. On the of May last, the Commander-in-Chief commenced his march on his return towards the British possessions, for the purpose of cantoning the troops at their usual stations, with such changes of position as the state of our newly-acquired possession may demand.

86. It has been stated in the 74th paragraph of this despatch, that the Commander-in-Chief had detached a body of Hindostanee cavalry to accompany the movements of Holkar's troops. That body of cavalry consisted of two parties; one commanded by Captain Gardiner, an officer in the service of the Rajah of Jyenagur, and the other by Lieutenant Lucan, of his Majesty's 74th regiment.

87. On the morning of the 29th of May, Captain Gardiner, with the detachment under his command, arrived at a place called Balloo-Khery, where he received intelligence that a native chieftain, in the interest of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, named Tantia, was encamped with 3 battalions of infantry, 11 guns, 200 Mewattees, and 3,000 horse, at the distance of about 5 miles from Captain Gardiner's position. Captain Gardiner immediately addressed a letter to Lieutenant Lucan, who occupied a position about two miles in the rear, apprizing him of the circumstance, and requesting Lieutenant Lucan's assistance in attacking Tantia's party. Lieutenant Lucan soon joined Captain Gardiner's party, and the two divisions lost no time in advancing towards the enemy.

88. Tantia having before been apprized of the approach of the force under Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant Lucan, was retreating with his battalions to a strong position, which they reached about nine o'clock on the 29th of May. In this situation they were attacked by the united detachments of

Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant Lucan, which had been divided into four parties for the purpose of pressing the battalions on every side and of preventing their escape. At five o'clock P. M. the guns attached to Lieutenant Lucan's division arrived after a march of thirty-five miles, when the native chieftain commanding Tantia's battalions demanded a parley, and agreed to surrender his party on condition of being escorted in safety to the camp of Bappoo Scindiah, the officer commanding the advanced army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of never serving against the British Government. These terms having been acceded to by Captain Gardiner, the battalions (surrounded by parties of Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant Lucan's cavalry) immediately commenced their march to Balloo-Khery. The force of the battalions, including 200 Mewattees, amounts to 2099 effective men. Tantia himself retreated with his cavalry, on the first appearance of the divisions under Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant Lucan.

89. On the 2d of June the Governor-General in Council received information that a body of predatory horse had made an incursion into the province of Bundelcund.

90. Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, who, by the illness of Colonel Powell, and the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Polhill, had accidentally succeeded to the command of the British troops serving in the province of Bundelcund, consisting of 450 European infantry, four battalions of sepoy, and two squadrons of native cavalry, had sent a detachment of seven companies of sepoy, a troop of native cavalry, and the park of artillery, under the command of Captain Smith, to attack a fort at the distance of about five miles from Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett's position at Kooch.

91. On the morning of the 22d of May, the party of predatory horse succeeded in cutting off a part of Captain Smith's detachment, which was posted in the Pettah of the fort. This party consisted of Captain Feade, and Lieutenant Morris of the artillery, with two serjeants, two corporals, four gunners, and forty-one matrosses, and a proportion of Lascars, Mr. Hooper, assistant-surgeon, and two companies of sepoy from the 1st battalion 18th regiment, under Lieutenant Gillespie. The whole of the party was

cut off with the exception of 130 wounded natives, who returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett's camp on the 24th of May, two howitzers, two 12-pounders, one 6-pounder, and all the tumbrils belonging to the parks were also captured by the party of predatory horse. Captain Smith, with the remaining five companies of sepoy, retreated (with the loss of one man only) to Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett's camp. The party of predatory horse made several attempts to cut off Captain Smith's retreat but without success.

92. The detail of this disaster will be found stated in the annexed copy of a despatch* from Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett, under date the 22d of May.

93. The party of predatory horse was originally stated to be fifteen or twenty thousand in number, and to be commanded by Ameer Khaun, formerly a partizan of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. From information, however, subsequently received, there is every reason to believe that this party of predatory horse did not exceed five thousand, that they did not belong to Ameer Khaun, and that the predatory incursion had no connection with the movements of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, but was a mere incursion of vagrant banditti for the purpose of obtaining subsistence by plunder.

94. The same party of predatory horse afterwards attacked the town of Calpee, and attempted to cross the Jumna, but was repulsed by two companies of sepoy under the command of Captain Jones; and was afterwards defeated near Kooch on the 30th of May by Colonel Sheppard, commanding a small party of troops lately in the service of Ambajee Inglija. Since that period of time, the predatory horse have entirely evacuated the province of Bundelcund.

95. Their progress, however, from Eritch to Calpee, and from Calpee to Kooch, the greatest part of which tract of country belongs to the Nana of Calpee, was marked by plunder, cruelty, and devastation.

96. Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett subsequently moved with his detachment in various directions from Kooch to the river Betwah, thence to the Jumna, and ultimately marched to Calpee.

97. In the course of the various marches of the detach-

* See p. 72.

ment, the troops experienced the utmost degree of distress from the intense heat of the weather, and from the deficiency of forage and provisions, and the lives of several valuable officers and men were lost by the mere effects of excessive heat and fatigue.

98. The conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett on this occasion appearing to the Governor-General to be in the highest degree censurable, contrary to the positive orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and utterly inconsistent with the duty of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett, and unworthy of the character of a British officer, the Governor-General directed that Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett should be placed under arrest, and that a judicial investigation into his conduct should be instituted. The Commander-in-Chief, immediately on receipt of the intelligence of the destruction of the party detached from the force under the command of Captain Smith, had issued orders to Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett, directing that officer to deliver over his command to the officer next in rank with the design of instituting a judicial enquiry into Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett's conduct. The Commander-in-Chief has also placed Captain Smith in arrest, with a view of instituting an enquiry into his conduct, which appears also to have been blameable.

99. At this period of time, Captain John Baillie who conducted on the part of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief all political and civil duties in Bundlecund, resided at Banda, a place situated to the southward of the river Betwa, and nearly in the centre of that part of the province of Bundlecund, in which the British authority had been established. The force with Captain Baillie consisted only of a small force of cavalry belonging to Shumshere Bahauder, about 200 cavalry belonging to Rajah Himmud Bahauder, and 1000 sepoys, under the command of an European officer in the service of the latter chieftain. Notwithstanding the consternation which had spread throughout the province of Bundlecund on the incursion of the predatory horse, whose numbers had been greatly exaggerated, Captain Baillie deemed it to be his duty to maintain his situation at all hazards, and the Governor-General in Council is satisfied that the preservation of tranquillity in the districts in our possession south of the Betwa is to be ascribed entirely to

the confidence inspired, and to the subordination maintained throughout those districts, by the firmness, manly prudence, and fortitude manifested by Captain Baillie on that occasion.

100. On the day after the receipt of the intelligence of the destruction of the party detached from the force under the command of Captain Smith, the Commander-in-Chief marched from the position which he then occupied with the whole of the cavalry with the intention of crossing the Jumna, and of proceeding through the Doab to the south-east, for the protection of that territory from the eventual incursion of the predatory horse.

101. In consequence of the late occurrences in Bundelcund, the Governor-General deemed it necessary to adopt an arrangement for the complete establishment of the British authority throughout the districts of Bundelcund, ceded to the honourable Company by his Highness the Peishwa, and for the consolidation of the civil and military authorities in that province, and for its future security against any irruption of predatory horse.

102. By the latest accounts, Jeswunt Rao Holkar had retreated to within a short distance of Ougein, still followed by the irregular cavalry, under the command of Captain Gardiner, and whilst the detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Monson occupied a position calculated to preclude the possibility of Holkar's return into Hindostan.

103. It may be reasonably expected that during the course of the rainy season now commencing the situation of Jeswunt Rao Holkar will be arranged in such a manner as to secure the peace of India. In the meanwhile the Company's provinces enjoy a state of perfect tranquillity, and the Governor-General in Council expects to be able to complete all the arrangements connected with the late treaties of peace and subsidy previously to the conclusion of the rains. With a view to accelerate these desirable objects, the Governor-General proposes to proceed by water to the upper provinces in the course of a few days, and hopes to be able to meet the Commander-in-Chief in the course of the month of August; after which event, the Governor-General will have the honour to submit to your honourable Committee a more

detailed state of the arrangements connected with the late treaties of peace and subsidy.

We have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

J. UDNY.

P. S.—Your honourable Committee has been apprized by the 548th paragraph of our address of the 12th of April, of the discussions then depending between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the subject of the territory of Gohud and the fortress of Gwalior. Your honourable Committee was also informed by the 66th paragraph of the same despatch, that a question had arisen, and was at that time depending between the British Government and the Rajah of Berar, with respect to the validity of engagements concluded by Lieut.-Colonel Broughton with certain Zemindars, formerly subjects to the Rajah of Berar, by which those Zemindars were rendered independent of the Rajah's authority. The Governor-General in Council has the satisfaction to apprise your honourable Committee, that those questions have been terminated at the courts of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in the most amicable and satisfactory manner, Dowlut Rao Scindiah having formally renounced all claim to the district of Gohud and to the fortress of Gwalior, and the Rajah of Berar having acknowledged in the most formal and distinct manner, the validity of the engagements concluded by Lieut.-Colonel Broughton with the former subjects of his government.

No. XXXII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, July 9th, 1804.

The official communications by this despatch will have informed your Lordship of our general situation in India. I wish to add a few lines, merely for the purpose of assuring your Lordship that every appearance promises durable peace

in India. The necessity of repelling Holkar's banditti from the frontier of Hindostan, and of reducing him to a peaceable conduct, will not lead to any serious interruption of peace, and will probably tend to consolidate our connection with Scindiah. The Commander-in-Chief, with the greater part of the main army in Hindostan, is returned to the cantonment of Cawnpore, and my attention is now directed to the desirable object of withdrawing the whole army from the field, and of reducing the military charges. I propose to embark for Cawnpore at the close of this week; and as I expect that General Wellesley may be at liberty to meet the Commander-in-Chief with me, I hope to be enabled, in the course of the months of August and September, to conclude all our military arrangements in every part of India, and to resume the system of reducing debt.

Many details remain for adjustment in every branch of public affairs, connected with the late war, with the peace, and with the settlement of our conquests and new political relations. I still, however, expect to be able to embark for England in February; and the injuries accumulated upon me every day, render me impatient of the restraints of this Government, even under all the circumstances of general support and applause which have attended me in India.

Public credit in India continues to improve; and I am particularly happy to be able to assure your Lordship, that the financial system at Fort St. George has at length been placed on the foundations prescribed by my repeated orders; and that public credit now wears a most favourable aspect at that presidency. The state of public credit, and the effect of the reduction of interest, and of the entire discharge of the 12 per cent. securities, cannot fail to accelerate the progress of the plan for reducing debt, as soon as the armies shall be placed on the peace establishment.

I am extremely anxious to hear from England. My last advices from your Lordship were of the 28th of November, 1803; and my last intelligence from England is of the 23rd of February, 1804.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and esteem,
my dear Lord, your most faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. XXXIII.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 13th July, 1804.

1. In our despatches to your honourable Committee, under dates the 12th of April, and 15th of June, the Governor-General in Council expressed an intention of addressing your honourable Committee in a separate despatch on the subject of the peace lately concluded between the British Government and the confederated Mahratta chieftains.

2. The Governor-General proposes to transmit with that despatch all the documents connected with the pacification, and to communicate to your honourable Committee the detail of the negotiations conducted between the Honourable Major-General Wellesley and the respective ministers despatched to the camp of that officer by the confederated chieftains, for the purpose of concluding peace with the British Government, together with a statement of the various important questions arising out of the terms of the pacification, and of the final result of the discussions on the subject of those questions with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and it is the intention of the Governor-General in Council to combine with that narrative such explanations and remarks as may tend to illustrate the principles which regulated the conduct of the British Government in prescribing the terms of the peace, and in adjusting the various complicated questions, connected with the stipulations of the treaties of Deogaum and Surjee Angengaum.

3. It is also the intention of the Governor-General in Council in that despatch to state in the most ample detail the advantageous operation of the arrangements of the general pacification upon all the interests of the Company, and of the nation in India.

4. The voluminous nature of the documents proposed to accompany that despatch, together with the continual pressure of other urgent points of business, has hitherto precluded the completion of the proposed letter. The Governor-General in Council, however, being anxious to afford to your honourable Committee at the earliest practicable period of time, the

fullest information with regard to the condition in which the interests of the British Government have been placed by the terms of the pacification, deems it proper to forward to your honourable Committee by the honourable Company's extra ship *Hope*, now under despatch, and also by a packet overland, the present letter, containing a summary view of the details which will compose the despatch described in the preceding paragraph.

5. The advantages which the British Government has derived from the terms of the pacification are to be considered with reference to the cause and objects of the war; to the improvement and consolidation of our territorial strength and general resources, and to the improvement in our system of political relations, effected by the operation of the several treaties of peace, subsidy and alliance, upon the general tranquillity and welfare of the native states of Hindostan and the Deccan.

6. The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the confederated Mahratta chieftains to separate, and to withdraw to their usual stations within their respective territories, the armies which they had assembled and united on the frontier of our ally, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, after having declared that the intention of that junction was to decide whether there should be peace or war with the British Government and its allies.

7. Under these circumstances the continuance of the confederated army in the position which the chieftains appeared determined to maintain, was a manifest indication of a design to frustrate by hostilities, or by the terror of their arms, the operation of the alliance concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, and to disturb the tranquillity of the dominions of the Nizam, and ultimately of the Company.

8. The union of the confederate forces, and their commanding and menacing position, afforded every advantage to the chieftains in prosecuting the hostile design which they had manifested, and enabled the confederated chieftains to hold the issues of peace and war in their hands, and to arbitrate the fate of the Deccan according to their interests or caprice; at the same time the position and state of Scindiah's forces, under the command of his French officers in Hindostan, and

the machinations of M. Perron with the adjoining states, and with the subjects of the Company and of the Vizier, manifested additional proofs of the hostile designs of the confederates, and furnished those chieftains with additional means of prosecuting such designs.

9. The primary objects of the war, originating in these causes, were to deprive the confederates of the means which they possessed of prosecuting their unwarrantable designs, and to preclude the confederates from reviving the sources of that military and political power which they had employed to disturb the security of our alliances, dependencies, and dominions.

10. The power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, considered with reference to his means of affecting the security of the British Empire in India, may be described to have consisted at the commencement of the war in the following branches of military and political resource.

Firstly. The efficient state of Scindiah's military establishment under the direction of European officers, and particularly the formidable condition of his regular infantry and artillery under the command of those officers.

Secondly. The possession of an extensive and rich territory,* and of various strong forts, magazines, foundries, and arsenals,† with considerable supplies of ammunition and military stores, deposited in convenient stations on our frontier, contiguous to the most vulnerable part of the British dominions in Hindostan.

Thirdly. The establishment of a large and well disciplined body of troops, with a formidable train of artillery, under the command of French officers within that territory.

Fourthly. The actual assignment of that territory to the French officer,‡ holding the chief command of those troops.

Fifthly. The possession of the person of his Majesty, Shah Allum, under the immediate power of the forces commanded

* The Jaghire of Monsieur Perron in the Doab of the Jumna and Ganges, and his territorial possessions on the right bank of the Jumna from Delhi to Agra.

† Arsenal and Magazine :—Coel, Aligurh, Delhi.—Foundry :—Mutra. Arsenal and Magazine :—Agra. Coel and Aligurh, Head Quarters.

‡ M. Perron.

by French officers in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the exercise of the nominal authority of the Moghul through those French officers.

Sixthly. The ascendancy established by the agency of the French officer in command of Scindiah's troops in the north-west of Hindostan, over the Rajpoot chieftains of Jyenagur and Jodepore, and other states and chieftains in the northern and western provinces of Hindostan, and over many of the Sikh chiefs, and others occupying the territory from the Jumna to the banks of the Indus, and the facility afforded by the advanced posts of M. Perron's army towards the Indus, of aiding the invasion of the British dominions through that quarter.

Seventhly. The facility which the possession of the seaport of Baroach afforded to Scindiah of improving his military establishments, by the accession of French or other European officers, military supplies and stores, and even of a body of French or other European auxiliary troops.

Eighthly. The power of disturbing the tranquillity of the possessions of the Guikwar, and of the Company in the province of Guzerat, by means of Scindiah's intermixed territories and fortresses in that province, and by his claims and influence in that quarter.

Ninthly. The power of disturbing the tranquillity of the state of Poonah, and the stability of our alliance with the Peishwa by Scindiah's intermixed territories and fortresses in the vicinity of Poonah, and to the southward of the river Taptee (especially the territory and fortress of Ahmednugger), and by Scindiah's various claims upon the state of Poonah, and by his influence at that court.

Tenthly. Scindiah's intermixed and bordering fortresses and possessions which enabled him to menace the dominions of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and to impair the efficiency of the British alliance with that Prince, and Scindiah's various claims upon the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and consequent influence at Hyderabad.

Eleventhly. The general magnitude, wealth, and strength of Scindiah's dominions and army, and the reputation of his military power, from which he derived a general influence and ascendancy at Poonah, and over all the Mahratta states, and even at Hyderabad, which influence and ascendancy had been

for some years past uniformly directed to injure the British power in India.

11. Under this view of the condition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's power at the commencement of the war, it was dangerous to the British Empire ;

First. By the facilities which it afforded to the French of injuring the British interests in India, either in co-operation with Scindiah, or through the independent aid of his French and other European officers.

Secondly. By maintaining against the British Government a rival and hostile influence throughout every native state in India, and especially amongst our most important dependants and allies on the western side of India, and by affording a powerful bond of union to any hostile confederacy of the native states against the British Government, as well as an efficient and formidable instrument for the prosecution of the objects of such an union.

12 With a view to submit to the particular notice of your honourable Committee, the extent and magnitude of the dangers to which the British Empire was eventually exposed at the commencement of the late war by the condition of Scindiah's power, and of the several states in the north-west of Hindostan, and especially by the existence of the French force under the command of M. Perron, combined with his independent possession of a large tract of country in the Doab of the Jumna and the Ganges, the Governor-General in Council deems it advisable to insert in this place an extract from the instructions of the Governor-General to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, under date the 27th of July, 1803, a copy of which accompanied our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 1st August, 1803, and the substance of which is stated in the 302nd, and following paragraphs of our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 12th of April, 1804.

“ To every person conversant with the true nature of the British interests and power in India, the north-western frontier of Hindostan must have appeared to present the most vulnerable point of our extended Empire.

“ The condition of the power of the Sikhs, as well as that of the Maharrattas, and of the Rajpoots, and other petty states, offers considerable advantage to an invading enemy from the more remote north-western countries of Asia, or from the Banks of the Indus ; and it is unnecessary to re-

mark to your Excellency's judgment, experience and knowledge, that the enterprising spirit of France, or the ambition of Russia, or even the violence and rapacity of the Afghan Tribes, or of other Asiatic nations inhabiting the northern and western countries of Asia, might have pursued projects of invasion in that quarter which might have occasioned considerable embarrassment to the British power in India.

"A sense of this danger concurred with other motives to induce me to conclude those arrangements with the Nabob Vizier, which terminated in the treaty of Lucknow, and which secured a considerable augmentation of military, political and financial resources and power of the British nation on the north-western frontier of Oude.

"The result of that happy settlement has certainly afforded a great accession of security against the dangers which menaced the stability of our empire on that side of India.

"But the local position of Scindiah's territories, the condition and nature of Scindiah's military force in Hindostan, and the corrupt and profligate counsels of that weak, arrogant and faithless chief, still constitute a serious danger to the British interests. The territories of Scindiah between the Jumna and the Ganges, interrupt the line of our defence in that quarter; and some of his principal posts are introduced into the centre of our dominions; while the possession of Agra, Delhi, and of the western and southern bank of the Jumna, enables him to command nearly the whole line of our north-western frontier.

In the event of any considerable accession to Scindiah's power, or in the event of his forming any connection with France, or with any enemy to the British interests, the actual position of his territories and forces in Hindostan, would furnish great advantages to him in any attack upon the Company's dominions.

"Formidable as the power of Scindiah might have become in the event of any accession to his strength, a danger more urgent and more direct in all its consequences, has grown out of the decline of Scindiah's local authority in Hindostan, and has recently assumed a more alarming aspect in proportion to the accumulated embarrassment of Scindiah's circumstances in the Deccan, and to the general decay of his resources and power.

"The regular infantry in the service of Scindiah, under the command of European officers, is supported by funds derivable almost exclusively from the territorial possessions of that chief, situated between the Jumna, the Ganges, and the mountains of Cumaon.

"A considerable portion, if not the whole of this territory, has been assigned to M. Perron, a French officer, who has succeeded M. Dubois in the chief command of Scindiah's regular infantry.

M. Perron has formed this territory into an independent state, of which Scindiah's regular infantry may be justly termed the national army. That force is now stated to amount to 39,050 men.*

* This is the number of the regular infantry under the command of M. Perron; of that number 16,600 men were in the Doab in the month of June 1803.

“ The inhabitants of the districts comprehended in M. Perron’s Jagheer consider that officer as their immediate sovereign, while the troops supported from the revenues of the country regard M. Perron as the immediate executive authority, from which the army is to receive orders, subsistence and pay. Possessing such means, M. Perron dictates, with the authority of a sovereign state of superior rank, and with the vigour of efficient military power, to the petty states, occupying the countries to the southward of the Jumna, and by the terror of his name and arms, holds in abject submission the Rajpoot states of Jyenagur and Joudpore, together with the Jauts, and the state of Gohud, extending his influence even to Bundelcund, and to the country occupied by the Sikhs.

“ Scindiah retains no efficient controul over M. Perron, or over his regular troops. Various instances must be familiar to your Excellency’s knowledge, in which M. Perron has either openly disobeyed, or systematically evaded the orders of Scindiah, especially in the late crisis of that chief’s affairs.

“ M. Perron has for some time past manifested a systematic disposition to remove all British officers from the command of Scindiah’s regular infantry, and to introduce French officers under his own immediate patronage.

“ M. Perron is supposed to have amassed a considerable fortune, and your Excellency is intimately acquainted with his anxious desire to return to Europe, and to dispose of his actual command and of his territorial possessions to some person of the French nation.

“ To these considerations it is important to add, that M. Perron is in possession of the person of the unfortunate Shah Allum, and consequently is master of the nominal authority of that unhappy Prince. M. Perron therefore may transfer this valuable possession, together with his property of any other description, to any French adventurer or officer who may be enabled to complete such a purchase.

“ Thus, the coincidence of various extraordinary and uncontrollable accidents, the weakness of Scindiah’s personal character, the rapacity and profligacy of his ministers (who have engaged him in pursuit of aggrandizement, avarice, and ambition, at a distance from Hindostan, in the Deccan, at Poonah, and in the southern provinces of the Mahratta empire) the treachery of many of his chiefs, whose interests consist in diverting his attention from the affairs of Hindostan to those of the Deccan, and the recent shock which his power has received from Holkar, have contributed to found an independent French state on the most vulnerable part of the Company’s frontier.

“ Under the influence of a succession of French adventurers, this state must be exposed to every intrigue of the French in India, and even to the ambition and hostile spirit of the person who now rules the French nation; nor could an instrument of destruction more skilfully adapted to wound the heart of the British Empire in India, be presented to the vindictive hand of the chief Consul of France.

“ This French state actually holds possession of the person and nominal authority of the Mogul; maintains the most efficient army of regular

native infantry, and the most powerful artillery now existing in India, with the exception of his Majesty's and the Company's troops, and exercises a considerable influence over the neighbouring states from the banks of the Indus to the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges.

"In the supposition of the most intimate and established connection of amity and alliance between Scindiah and the British power, and in the event even of Scindiah's accession to the treaty of Bassein, and to the general defensive alliance with the Company, the Nizam and the Peishwa, it is impossible to suppose that this French state would co-operate with cordiality in support of the British interests. The aid of this state could be least expected in the case which would most urgently demand it, and which would require the most active operation of the principles of the general defensive alliance.

"In the event of an attack from France upon the British dominions or power in India, it could not be expected that a French state, erected under the nominal and ostensible auspices of Scindiah in Hindostan, would afford any substantial aid to the ally of the British power in a contest against France, even if that ally should be disposed to assist us in such a crisis.

"On the other hand, no doubt exists, that Scindiah would receive the most zealous aid from the same state in any attempts which he might be disposed to make either for the reduction of the British, or for the aggrandizement of the French power in India.

"In addition to these remarks, your Excellency is apprized, that the vicinity of M. Perron's regular infantry operates as a constant drain upon the population of the Company's provinces, and diminishes the sources of our agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and revenue, as well as of our recruits for the army in that quarter.

"In the present crisis, when every circumstance announces the probability of a renewal of the war with France, and urges the necessity of resorting to every practicable measure of precaution and security, the safety of the British dominions requires the reduction of M. Perron's military resources and power, independently of any question which might exist between Scindiah and the British Government.

"In a state of profound peace, and even of alliance with Scindiah, the necessity of providing for our own security would justify a formal demand for the removal of a danger so imminent from the frontier of our dominions. The refusal of Scindiah to comply with such a demand would afford a just ground of war against that chief, and any true or false plea of inability on the part of Scindiah, to control the movements or to reduce the power of this French state, would authorize and require the British Government to assume the protection of its own territories, and to remove with its own hand the proximate cause of insecurity and alarm."

13. That this state had not, to the knowledge of the Governor-General, been formally connected with the Government of France, will not be deemed by the judgment of your honourable Committee to be a circumstance affecting the

Governor-General's view of the danger to be apprehended from the formation and growth of such a power in India. That power was fully prepared to afford efficient and cordial support to the French cause in India; and to meet the projects of France with adequate alacrity and zeal.

14. The dangers arising from the condition of the Rajah of Berar's power with reference to his means of affecting the security of the British empire in India, appeared to be at the commencement of the war:—First, a military force greatly inferior to Scindiah's in point of discipline, numbers, and artillery, but furnishing a considerable accession to the general strength of the confederacy against the British Government. Secondly, the possession of an extensive territory, and some strong forts commanding the dominions of the Company and of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, in vulnerable points. Thirdly, the possession of the province of Cuttack, by which the Rajah of Berar was enabled to interrupt the communication between our northern and southern possessions, to facilitate the invasion of Bengal and of the northern Circars, and to obtain the aid of French or other European officers or troops, to be landed in the province of Cuttack. Fourthly, the intermixture of the Rajah of Berar's possessions with those of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, his vexatious claims upon the Court of Hyderabad, and his consequent influence at that Court. Fifthly, the Rajah of Berar's pretensions to the Government of Poonah, and the ascendancy and influence which he derives from his descent, connected with the general magnitude of his dominions and resources, with his supposed wealth, and with the hostile spirit which had been manifested by the state of Berar for many years in counteracting the interests of the British empire in India.

15. Under the preceding review of the means possessed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and by the Rajah of Berar respectively, of affecting the security of the British empire in India, the most desirable objects of eventual war with those chieftains manifestly were:—First, with reference to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the entire reduction of M. Perron's regular corps; the annexation to the British dominions of the whole of the territory within the Doab, and the Ganges in the possession of M. Perron, thereby rendering the river Jumna the north western frontier of our dominion in that quarter; the occu-

pation of Delhi and Agra, and of a chain of posts on the western and southern bank of the Jumna sufficient to secure to the British power the free navigation of the Jumna and the possession of both banks of that river; the permanent exclusion of the Mahrattas from the north west of Hindostan; the establishment of a system of defensive alliances with states of Hindostan, the local position of whose territories might form a barrier between the possessions of the Company and the Mahrattas, and secure the exclusion of the authority and influence of Scindiah from the north western division of Hindostan; the protection of the person and nominal authority of his Majesty Shah Aulum; the occupation of the seaport of Baroach and of the territory annexed to it, together with the reduction of Scindiah's general power in Guzerat; the cession of Scindiah's territories intermixed with those of our allies the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa, and generally the reduction of Scindiah's military power and territorial resources within the limits necessary for the purpose of our security, and of the safety and tranquillity of our allies. Secondly, with reference to the Rajah of Berar, the occupation of the province of Cuttack, and the cession of all the Rajah of Berar's possessions intermixed with those of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

16. These may be considered to have constituted the necessary objects of the war with reference to its original causes, and these objects properly formed the basis of our demands in negotiating the terms of peace with the confederated chieftains.

17. In estimating the dangers to which the security of the British Government was eventually exposed at the commencement of the war, by the existence in the hands of the two principal Mahratta states, of those means of injury which have been described in the preceding part of this address, your honourable Committee will justly appreciate the advantages which the British empire has derived from the permanent removal of those dangers by the successes of the war and by the terms of the peace.

18. In the moment of our most brilliant victories, when the rapid and glorious success of our arms had nearly extinguished the power both of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and when we possessed ample means of en-

tirely subverting both those states by the continuance of military operations at that time actually in progress, the concessions which the hon. Major-General Wellesley was instructed to demand from the confederated chieftains were limited to the extent absolutely necessary to preclude the revival of the original causes of the war, and to provide for our permanent security and for the faithful discharge of the obligations of positive engagements contracted either previously to the war or during the progress of hostilities.

19. It would have been neither a just, humane, nor honourable policy to have insisted upon the reduction of the enemy's power to any extent unnecessary to secure the just objects of the war, and the safety of the British Government and of its allies. Public duty required the employment of every effort to reduce the strength of the enemy within the bounds prescribed by the just interests of the British Government and of its allies; but we should have deemed it equally injurious to the glory and power of the British Government in India, as well as contrary to our duty, to the commands of the honourable Company, and to the laws of our country, to have prosecuted war for the purposes of vengeance, aggrandizement, or ambition, or to have urged the fall of a vanquished enemy beyond the just limits of national security and public faith.

20. Among the principal advantages of the late pacification, must be ranked the maintenance of the national character in India by the moderation, clemency, and justice manifested by the British Government in the terms of peace granted to our enemies, under circumstances which had placed the existence of their respective states absolutely at our disposal.

21. Immediately after the reduction of Gawailgurh, the hon. Major-General Wellesley prepared to pursue the Rajah of Berar to Nagpoor, the capital of his dominions; and arrangements had been adopted for the invasion of Berar from the province of Sumbulpoor by Lieut.-Colonel Broughton's corps, and from Cuttack by the troops under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt.

22. The brilliant and decisive success of his Excellency General Lake, and the entire destruction of Scindiah's power in Hindostan, left General Lake at liberty to detach a

force against the possessions of the Rajah of Berar. In conformity, therefore, to the Governor-General's instructions, General Lake prepared a considerable detachment for the purpose of invading Berar from the northern quarter of Hindostan.

23. At that period of time, the whole of the Rajah of Berar's possessions on the west side of the river Wurda, the province of Cuttack and its dependencies, and the provinces of Sumbulpoor and Patna, had been wrested from his dominions, and the only strong fortress within the limits of his former territories had been reduced by the British arms.

24. In this extremity of the Rajah of Berar's affairs, the British Government granted peace to that chieftain on terms regulated exclusively by considerations of the national security and public faith.

25. Previously to the conclusion of the separate treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, the military power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been destroyed in Hindostan, and deeply wounded in the Deccan, by the brilliant success of the British armies in the field, under the command of his Excellency General Lake and the hon. Major-General Wellesley, and the whole of Scindiah's possessions in the north of Hindostan and in the Deccan had been conquered by the British arms.

26. As soon as Major-General Wellesley had received the treaty of Deogaum, ratified by the Rajah of Berar, every arrangement was adopted for the purpose of employing the whole of the forces under General Wellesley's command against Dowlut Rao Scindiah. In addition to the troops under the personal command of Major-General Wellesley, a considerable force had been assembled in Guzerat, under Colonel Murray, for the eventual attack of Scindiah's possessions in the province of Malwa. This force being left at liberty, by the conquest of Baroach and Powangurh and of all Scindiah's possessions in the province of Guzerat, to commence offensive operations in Malwa, was ready, at this period of time, to advance directly upon Scindiah's capital Ougein, and had actually marched to the frontier of Guzerat in the prosecution of that design.

27. The conclusion of a separate peace with the Rajah of Berar also enabled General Lake to be prepared to direct the operations of the detachment which had been intended

for the invasion of Berar, against the southern possessions of Scindiah, in co-operation with the forces under Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Murray.

28. Under this severe pressure on every quarter of his remaining territories, Dowlut Rao Scindiah sued for peace. Your honourable Committee will consider the terms of the peace granted to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in that extremity of his affairs, to have been regulated by principles of lenity and forbearance to the utmost extent consistent with our just right of reasonable indemnity, and with the security of our possessions and of the dominions, rights, and interests of our allies.

29. The concessions on the part of the enemy which provide in the manner already described for the security of the British Government against the return of those dangers which existed at the commencement of the war, necessarily comprise additional advantages to the cause of the British Government and of its allies. The arrangements deemed to be indispensably necessary for the security of the British Government and its allies, have augmented and consolidated our territorial resources, and those of his Highness the Peishwah and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the only powers possessing any just pretension to participate in the conquests of the war. Combined with other provisions of the peace, these arrangements may be considered to have secured the complete accomplishment of that general system of political relations in India which it has been the uniform and approved policy of the Governor-General in Council, under the orders of the honourable Court of Directors, to establish, and which experience has demonstrated to afford the only practicable means of preserving general tranquillity, and consequently of providing effectually for the permanent security and prosperity of the British empire in India.

30. In order to afford to your honourable Committee a distinct view of the advantages of the late pacification, the Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state, in regular order, the several provisions of the treaties of peace concluded respectively with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, accompanied by such remarks as appear requisite to illustrate the intent and operation of each article respectively with reference to the treaties of partition con-

cluded between the honourable Company and the allies, and to the treaty of defensive alliance and subsidy concluded between the honourable Company and Scindiah.

Treaty of Peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

31. The first article provides for the permanency of friendship between the contracting parties.

32. The second article provides for the cession of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's rights and possessions in the Doab, and to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore and of the Rana of Gohud, with the exception of certain districts specified in a subsequent article.

33. By this article, combined with the third article of the treaties of partition, and the fourth article of the defensive alliance with Scindiah, the authority of the British Government has been established over the whole of the territory formerly occupied by M. Perron. The provinces which, previously to the war, constituted a state under the rule of French adventurers, and furnished resources for a numerous body of regular infantry, and for a formidable artillery under the direction of French officers, now form a part of the hon. Company's possessions, and of the territorial security for the subsidiary payments due from Scindiah to the Company; and the British Government has been enabled to accomplish the objects originally proposed, of rendering the river Jumna the frontier of our dominion in that quarter, and of occupying the fortresses of Delhi and Agra, together with a chain of posts on the right bank of the river Jumna, sufficient to secure to the British power the free navigation of that river.

34. By the provisions of this article also the power and influence of the French and of the Mahrattas has been excluded from the north-western division of Hindostan.

35. A settlement has been made of the revenue of that portion of M. Perron's territory, which is situated between the Jumna and the Ganges, for one year, amounting to near thirty-six lacs of rupees, and this revenue may be expected to increase.

36. It has been impracticable to ascertain with accuracy the annual produce of the territory, formerly belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah or to M. Perron, situated on the right

bank of the Jumna. A correct report, however, upon the subject of the produce of the ceded territories in that quarter will be transmitted for the information of the honourable Court at the earliest practicable period of time.

37. By the third article the fort and territory of Baroach, together with the fort of Ahmednuggur and its dependant territory, with the exception of certain districts specified in a subsequent article of the treaty, are also ceded by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

38. By the cession of the territory of Baroach, and under the fourth article of the treaty of partition, an annual revenue of ten or eleven lacs of rupees is added to the resources of Bombay, and Scindiah's communication with the sea is completely precluded; and under the defensive alliance with Scindiah, this cession forms a further part of the security for the subsidy from that chieftain.

39. By the cession of Ahmednuggur, and by the conditions annexed to Scindiah's reservation of a portion of the territory dependant on that fortress, Scindiah's means of interfering in the affairs of Poonah, and of affecting the just operation of the alliance between the British Government and the Peishwa, are essentially impeded, and by the treaties of partition, concluded at Hyderabad on the 28th of April last, and at Poonah on the 14th of May last, Ahmednuggur is ceded to the Peishwa, and will form an important addition to his Highness's military strength under the protection of the Company.

40. By the fourth article of the treaty, Dowlut Rao Scindiah cedes all the territories in his possession at the commencement of the war, situated between the Ajuntah Hills and the river Godavery. By this arrangement, Scindiah abandoned all that part of his territorial possessions which was intermixed with the territory of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan; and the British Government was enabled, by assigning those cessions to his Highness the Soubahdar, under the sixth article of the treaty of partition, to improve and to consolidate his Highness's territorial power and resources.

41 By the stipulations of the fifth article, which provide for Scindiah's renunciation of all claims of every description upon the British Government and its allies, the Soubahdar

of the Deccan, the Peishwa, and the Guickwar, every ground of interference on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the internal concerns of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Peishwa, and the Guickwar, has been precluded, and a dangerous source of intrigue, disturbance, and encroachment has been effectually destroyed.

42. The sixth article provides for the restitution to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the fort of Asseergurh, the city of Boorhanpore, the forts of Powangurh and Dohud, and the territories in Candeish and Guzerat dependant on those forts. This article affords a proof of the disposition of the British Government to make every concession to the enemy even in the moment of victory, which might be consistent with our security, and with good faith towards our allies in the war.

43. By the seventh article of the treaty, Dowlut Rao Scindiah is allowed to retain possession of the districts of Dholepore, Baree, and Rajahkerrah, situated to the northward of the territories of the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore and of the Rana of Gohud, stated by Scindiah to have been long held by his family as a gift from the kings of Hindostan, and by the provisions of the same article it is stipulated, that certain members of the family of the late Mahajee Scindiah, and certain officers of his government, who formerly possessed Jagheers in the territories ceded by the second article of the treaty, shall either retain possession of such Jagheers, or shall receive pensions at the option of the British Government, provided that the annual value of such Jagheers and the amount of such pensions do not exceed the sum of seventeen lacs of rupees; the same article also precludes the introduction of Scindiah's troops either into the districts of Dholepore, Baree, and Rajahkerrah, or into the lands eventually to be restored in Jagheer to Scindiah's family and officers. This prohibitory clause obviated in a considerable degree the objections to the admission of the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah into the territories of Hindostan, from which it was a principal object of the peace to exclude that chieftain's power and influence. These concessions originated principally in a spirit of conciliation and lenity, which it was our wish to exercise on this occasion to the utmost extent compatible with our safety,

and with our just rights and interests. But your honourable Committee will perceive the advantages which the British Government derives from an arrangement, by which the sources of the subsistence of some of the principal branches of the family of Dowlut Rao Scindia, and many of his principal officers are placed under the immediate control and authority of the British Government.

44. By the eighth article of the treaty, certain districts stated to have been long in the possession of Scindiah's family, and situated within the territories of his Highness the Peishwa, are also restored to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the condition that no troops shall ever be introduced into those districts under any pretence whatever. Observations similar to those which have been stated with regard to the seventh article are applicable to the restrictions under this article of the treaty. Your honourable Committee will remark that the defensive and subsidiary alliance concluded with Scindiah since the peace, diminishes the danger of any concessions made to Scindiah under the stipulations of the treaty of Serje-Anjengaum.

45. By the ninth article of the treaty, all engagements concluded between the British Government and any of the feudatories or dependents of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, are recognized and confirmed, provided only that territory formerly belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and situated to the southward of the territories of the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore, and of the Rana of Gohud, shall not be alienated by such engagements from the possessions of Scindiah.

46. The provisions of the ninth article were indispensably necessary to enable the British Government to fulfil the obligations of faith contracted in the progress of the war. They were at the same time essential to the security of a principal object of the war; the establishment of a system of alliances with states of Hindostan, the local possession of whose territories might form a barrier between the possessions of the Company and the Mahrattas, and secure the exclusion of the authority and influence of Scindiah from the north-western division of Hindostan.

47. With the attainment of that object, was combined the immediate effect of promoting our success in the war, by detaching from the interests of Scindiah his tributaries and

dependants, and by obtaining their co-operation with the British power. Of the engagements contracted with the chieftains of Hindostan, and recognized by the provisions of the ninth article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, those which principally contribute to the security of the ultimate object of our political arrangements in Hindostan, are the treaties concluded with the Rana of Gohud and the Rajah of Jyenagur.

48. By the treaty with the former, the ancient possessions of the Ranas of Gohud are restored to the representative of the family, under the protection and guarantee of the British Government. That chieftain is bound to subsidize three battalions of British troops at the rate of nine lacs of rupees per annum. The possession of the fortress of Gwalior, which commands one of the principal entrances from the south into the north-western division of Hindostan, is permanently vested in the honourable Company, and the British Government possesses the privilege of stationing its troops in any of the forts or positions within the territories of the Rana, at whatever time the British Government may deem expedient, with the exception of Gohud.

49. The Rana of Gohud is pledged to employ the whole of his forces and power, in conjunction with the British troops, against any power which shall ever endeavour to disturb the possessions of the honourable Company, and in the event of war, to employ his troops in conformity to the advice and direction of the commanding officer of the Company's forces.

50. With a view of preserving in the hands of the British Government the means of checking the growth of dissensions tending to produce war, and consequently to require the interposition of our military power in the defence of the Rana's possessions, the British Government reserves to itself the right of arbitrating any cause of dispute which may eventually arise between the Rana of Gohud and any other state or chieftain.

51. The Rana of Gohud having been relieved from imprisonment and distress, and restored to his hereditary dominion by the aid and under the protection of the British Government, it will be manifest to your honourable Committee, that the Rana of Gohud is in the highest degree

interested in maintaining his attachment to the Company, and that the British Government can at all times command every advantage derivable from the local position, strength, and resources of the territory of Gohud.

52. The treaty concluded with the Rajah of Jyenagur is founded on the basis of reciprocal aid against external enemies. The Rajah of Jyenagur is pledged to employ the whole of his military power and resources in repelling any attempt to invade the possessions of the honourable Company in Hindostan, and a reciprocal obligation is imposed on the British Government with the necessary reservation of a right on the part of the British Government to arbitrate eventual disputes for the purpose of preventing war.

53. The Rajah further engages in the event of war to employ his troops in concert with the British forces in such a manner as the commanding officer of the British forces may advise and direct.

54. On the other hand the British Government is pledged not to interfere in the internal concerns of the Rajah's Government, nor to demand from him any tribute whatever.

55. By this engagement the Rajah of Jyenagur is permanently relieved from the payment of his accustomed tribute to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and from the apprehension of future exactions and encroachments on the part of that chieftain, or of any foreign state.

56. These important benefits which the Rajah of Jyenagur derives from his alliance with the honourable Company, cannot fail to secure his fidelity to the British interests. Under the obligation of these engagements, a detachment of the Rajah of Jyenagur's forces has been employed with the British detachment under the command of the honourable Colonel Monson, in repelling Jeswunt Rao Holkar from the frontier of Hindostan. •

57. A similar treaty was concluded by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with the accredited agent of the Rajah of Jodepore, and that treaty was actually ratified by the Governor-General in Council. The Rajah of Jodepore, however, on the return of his agent, refused to ratify that treaty, and the engagement was therefore considered to be dissolved. The Rajah of Jodepore in withholding his ratification, was probably influenced by the apprehension of the

immediate resentment of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who then occupied a position near the territory of Jodepore: since the retreat of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the Rajah of Jodepore has expressed an anxious desire to conclude the treaty of alliance. The Governor-General in Council, however, has not considered it to be expedient to renew the engagement. The detail of this transaction will be communicated to your honourable Committee in the despatch to which the first paragraph of this letter refers.

58. The engagements which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief concluded, under the orders of the Governor-General with the Rajahs of Machery and Bhurtpore, and which are also recognized and confirmed by the ninth article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, are framed upon the same principles as those of the alliance with the Rajah of Jodepore. Those chieftains are guaranteed by the British Government in the independent possession of their respective territories, on the condition of their co-operation with the British troops against an invading enemy, and of submitting in all cases their disputes to the arbitration of the British Government previously to engaging in actual hostilities.

59. The local position of the territories of those chieftains is well calculated to strengthen the barrier opposed to the attempts of an invading enemy by the countries of Gohud and Jyenagur.

60. The system of alliances established by the British Government in Hindostan, affords the means of controlling in a considerable degree the primary causes of that disorder and confusion which during so long a period of time have disturbed the territories of Hindostan, and have afforded encouragement to the lawless ambition, predatory habits, and restless violence of the native states of Hindostan and the Deccan. The continuance of these disorders must tend to affect the tranquillity and security of the Company's contiguous possessions. By controlling the sources of dissension among the petty states of Hindostan, and by protecting them from the ambition and rapacity of their more powerful neighbours, these states may be encouraged and enabled to cultivate the arts of peace in the independent enjoyment of their respective rights.

61. The extension and operation of this system must tend gradually to mitigate the turbulent spirit of such of the native states of India, as are contiguous to the borders of our extensive empire, and the same policy promises to provide the most solid security for the prosperity of our valuable possessions, in the concord and tranquillity of surrounding powers.

62. These several treaties having been formally recognized and confirmed by the provisions of the ninth article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the benefits immediately resulting from these engagements, may justly be considered among the advantages of the general pacification.

63. The tenth article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, is directed to the protection of the subjects of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who might still be within the limits of his authority from the effects of his resentment, for the disposition which any of them may have manifested to promote the British cause. This stipulation was indispensable to the preservation of our good faith.

64. The eleventh article of the treaty which secures the Peishwa's territorial rights in Malwa, also provides for the arbitration of the British Government, in the event of any difference which may arise with respect to those rights between his Highness the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

65. In stipulating with Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the Peishwa's restoration to his territorial rights within the province of Malwa, our guarantee and consequent arbitration of those rights was naturally combined with that stipulation. But it was an obvious principle of policy to render the states of the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah as distinct as possible, and to close every avenue to intrigue which the intercourse either of cordiality or dissension, might have opened to the machinations of the Mahratta Durbars.

66. By the twelfth article, Dowlut Rao Scindiah renounces all claims upon his Majesty Shah Aulum, and engages to abstain from all interference in the concerns of his Majesty.

67. Your honourable Committee is aware that the late Mahajee Scindiah, after having rescued the unfortunate representative of the house of Timour from the sanguinary

violence of Gholaum Kaudir, obtained from his Majesty the grant of the office of Vakeel ool Mutluck, or executive prime minister of the Moghul Empire, for his Highness the Peishwa, and was himself appointed to execute the functions of that office under the title of deputy, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah succeeded to the office of deputy Vakeel ool Mutluck, and to the consequent control which his predecessor had established over the person and family of the aged and unhappy monarch of Delhi. By successful intrigue, M. Perron obtained the office of commandant of the fortress of Delhi, which is the residence of the royal family, and thus secured the possession of the person and of the nominal authority of the Emperor.

68. Notwithstanding his Majesty's total deprivation of real power, dominion, and authority, almost every state and every class of people in India continue to acknowledge his nominal sovereignty. The current coin of every established power is struck in the name of Shah Aulum. Princes and persons of the highest rank and family still bear the titles, and display the insignia of rank which they or their ancestors derived from the throne of Delhi, under the acknowledged authority of Shah Aulum, and his Majesty is still considered to be the only legitimate fountain of similar honours.

69. The pride of the numerous class of Mussulmans in India is gratified by a recognition of the nominal authority of the illustrious representative of the house of Timour over the territories which once constituted the extensive and powerful empire of the Moghul, and the Mussulmans are still disposed to acknowledge the legitimacy of pretensions or demands, ostensibly proceeding from the authority of the imperial mandate.

70. Under these circumstances, the person and authority of his Majesty Shah Aulum might form a dangerous instrument in the hands of any state possessing sufficient power, energy, and judgment, to employ it, in prosecuting views of aggrandizement and ambition.

71. The Moghul has never been an important or dangerous instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas, but the augmentation of M. Perron's influence and power and the growth of a French interest in Hindostan, had given a new

aspect to the condition of the Moghul, and that unfortunate Prince might have become a powerful aid to the cause of France in India, under the direction of French agents.

72. The views with which the Government of France prepared to resume its possessions in India under the provisions of the treaty of Amiens, were unequivocally manifested by the extent and nature of the staff and equipments which accompanied the officer appointed to exercise the chief authority over all the restored possessions of the French in this country, and additional demonstrations of those views have appeared since the renewal of the war with France. No doubt remained that it was the intention of the Government of France after the conclusion of peace, to establish on the foundation of her possessions in India a political and military state, and to strengthen and augment it by every practicable connection with the native states of India, and by every art of indefatigable intrigue and systematic ambition. The system of introducing French adventurers into the armies of the native states, for the improvement of their discipline and efficiency had been found to afford the readiest and most effectual means of establishing the influence and authority of the French in the government of those states, and of erecting an independent territorial and military power within the limits of a foreign dominion. The extension and improvement of this system during the continuance of peace, would undoubtedly have constituted a principal object of the attention of the Government of France in India, and adverting to the facilities which would be afforded to the views and projects of the French by the extent of territorial and military power and independence established under the direction of M. Perron in the north-west of Hindostan, it cannot be doubted that under the continuance of peace between his Majesty and France, and between the British Government and the Mahratta states, the progress of French intrigue, and the aggrandizement of the French power in India, would have been most rapid and dangerous to our security. In the prosecution of these views, the French would manifestly have derived essential aid from the possession of the person and family of the Emperor Shah Aulum. The name of that monarch would have been employed to justify exaction, violence and encroachment, and under the plea of restoring his Majesty to

his hereditary dominion, the power of France in India might have been directed to the subversion of every state, and to the appropriation of every territory unprotected by alliance with the British nation. The Emperor might have been compelled to constitute the territorial possessions of France in India an independent sovereignty, and under the plea of possessing sovereign authority, the proceedings of the Government of France in India might have proved in the highest degree injurious to the interests and security of the British Empire in this quarter of the globe.

73. If any doubt could be entertained of the views of the French in this respect, that doubt would be removed by the tenor of documents obtained at Pondicherry and Calcutta, and transmitted by the Governor-General to the Right Honourable Lord Hobart, of which copies are now annexed to this despatch.

74. With a view however to submit to your hon. Committee's immediate and particular notice a distinct proof of the projects in the contemplation of the Government of France with respect to the Emperor Shah Aulum, the Governor-General in Council deems it advisable to insert in this place a translation of an extract from one of the documents to which the preceding paragraph refers.

75. That document is entitled a Memorial on the present importance of India, and on the most "efficacious means of re-establishing the French nation in its ancient splendour in that country."

76. That document was obtained at Pondicherry from a French officer, named Le Febre, who accompanied General Decaen to India. "Such has been the treatment received from a company of merchant adventurers by the Emperor of Hindostan, the sole branch of the illustrious house of Timour, so revered throughout the East, that his sovereignty is universally acknowledged although his power is no more, and the English Company derived its own constitutional power from his infinite goodness. It is evident that Shah Aulum ought to be the undisputed sovereign of the Moghul Empire, as the great grandson of Aurung Zebe, the tenth succession in a direct line from Tamerlane. This great question with respect to the sovereignty of the Empire being decided, it remains to consider whether it is not possible that the branches of this

unfortunate family may find at some time protectors, who shall assert their sacred rights and break their ignominious chains. It will be then that a mutual alliance, and a judicious union of powers shall secure the permanent sovereignty of the Emperor, and render his immediate subjects, as well as his tributaries, happy in the enjoyment of personal security, and of that wealth which springs from peace, agriculture and a free trade. The English Company, by its ignominious treatment of the great Moghul, has forfeited its rights as dewan and treasurer of the Empire; the Nabobs of Oude and of Bengal are equally criminal, because they have acted as traitors towards their lawful sovereign: thus the Emperor of Delhi has a real and indisputable right to transmit to whomsoever he may please to select, the sovereignty of his dominions, as well as the arrears due to him from the English. These arrears of the tribute of 26 lacs of rupees, promised by the Company, with the interest of the country added, will amount at this present time to four hundred and fifty-two millions tournois, a sum which greatly exceeds the value of the Company's moveable capital."

77. The preceding observations may serve to illustrate the importance of placing the person, family and nominal authority, of his Majesty Shah Aulum under the protection of the British Government, and the accomplishment of that arrangement was accordingly considered by the Governor-General to be a principal object, though not a cause of the war, and an indispensable condition of the peace.

78. Independently of the considerations above stated, adverting to the degree of veneration with which the illustrious descendant of Timour is regarded by all classes of people in India, and especially by the class of Mussulmans, and to the state of indignity and misery to which that unfortunate monarch had been reduced under the oppressive control of the Mahrattas and the French, the Governor-General in Council considered among the most important political benefits of that arrangement, the reputation which the British name would acquire by affording an honourable and tranquil asylum to the fallen dignity and declining age of the King of Delhi, and by securing the means of comfort to his Majesty's numerous and distressed family.

79. By the thirteenth article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that chieftain engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British Government, or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British Government.

80. The observations contained in this despatch with regard to the aggrandizement of the French power in India, and the experience of the formidable resistance opposed to the British forces during the late war by the regular troops of the enemy under the command of European officers, and composed in a considerable degree of natives of India, subjects of the British Government, sufficiently demonstrate the importance and advantage of providing for the perpetual exclusion of the several classes of persons described in this article from the service of the native powers, excepting to such an extent as the Governor-General in Council may deem consistent with the safety of the British interests in India.

81. The indefatigable zeal with which the French nation is disposed to pursue any measure calculated to injure the interests of the British Government in India, and the consequent necessity of providing, by every practicable means, for the exclusion of the agents of France from the dominions of the native states, has lately been manifested by the arrival at Poonah of three French officers, who landed clandestinely at a port in the Kokun from a French corsair (subsequently captured by his Majesty's ship *St. Fiorenzo*) on the 6th of January, 1804, charged with letters or proclamations in the Persian language, addressed generally to all the native states of India, for the purpose of engaging native states to combine their powers for the destruction of the British Empire in this quarter of the globe.

82. These Frenchmen were apprehended by his Highness the Peishwa at the requisition of the British Government, under the general provisions of the treaty of Bassein, and four of those proclamations were found upon them. A translation of one of the proclamations is enclosed for your honourable Committee's information. The prisoners have since been sent to Bengal; the Governor-General in Council has thought it proper not to admit them to their parole for a

certain period of time, in order to deter others from engaging in similar missions. Under our subsisting defensive alliance with the Peishwa in a season of actual war, in which the Peishwa and the Company were equally engaged as allies, the conduct of these Frenchmen would have entitled the Governor-General in Council to proceed against them as spies, and to have resorted to the means warranted by the law of nations in similar cases.

83. It is probable that an examination of these persons may enable us to trace a connection between their mission to this country and some hostile project of the French Government at the Isle of France directed against the British Possessions in India, the prosecution of which may have been prevented by the successes of the late war.

84. The fourteenth article stipulates for the residence of accredited ministers on the part of the British Government, and of the Government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with those Governments respectively.

85. The advantage of securing such an intercourse by treaty will be obvious to your honourable Committee.

86. The fifteenth article provides for the eventual admission of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the benefits of a defensive and subsidiary alliance with the British Government, on terms similar to those of the alliance between the British Government and the Peishwa.

87. Our despatch of the 22nd March, 1804, conveyed to your honourable Committee the intelligence of the actual conclusion of a defensive and subsidiary treaty of alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the basis of this article, and a copy of the treaty accompanied that despatch.

88. The general principles on which a treaty of defensive and subsidiary alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah was at all times desirable, were corroborated by the relative condition of Scindiah's power and resources at the conclusion of the peace.

89. In the course of the war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, the power and resources of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been greatly reduced, while those of Jeswunt Rao Holkar had been augmented by a considerable accession of territory, which had been ceded to him by Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the condition of his joining the confederacy

against the British power. The nature of the differences subsisting between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar precluded all expectation of concord and amity between those chieftains.

90. In the actual condition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's power at the close of the war, that chieftain could not reasonably entertain any prospect of success in a contest with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Unaided therefore by a foreign power, the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah must shortly have been added to that of his rival Jeswunt Rao Holkar; such an accumulation of territorial strength in the hands of that turbulent freebooter would have been utterly incompatible with the tranquillity of India, and with the security of the British Government and its allies. The danger which the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah apprehended from the superior power and hostile disposition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, induced them in the course of the negotiations for the conclusion of peace, to express great anxiety for the establishment of a closer connection with the British Government, and the considerations of policy above described, suggested the expediency of offering to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's acceptance the benefits of the defensive and subsidiary alliance concluded with his Highness the Peishwa. The treaty of defensive and subsidiary alliance concluded in consequence between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah corresponds with all the stipulations of the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in the month of October 1800, excepting only with respect to the extent of the subsidiary force, and its permanent continuance within the territory of the subsidizing power. The British force subsidized by Dowlut Rao Scindiah consists of six battalions of infantry, or six thousand men, with a due proportion of artillery; and that force is to be stationed at such place near the frontier of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as may be deemed most eligible by the British Government; and it is to be holden in readiness for the execution of any service on which it is liable to be employed by the conditions of the defensive treaty. However desirable it might be to station the subsidiary force permanently within the dominions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion, that in the actual condition of the several native states of India, every essential purpose of the defensive

alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, has been attained by the terms of the treaty actually concluded with that chieftain.

91. That treaty renders whatever may remain of the power of Scindiah an additional bond of the general peace, and of the safety and strength of the British power; nor can any just apprehension be entertained of the growth of any disorder dangerous to our interests in India while Scindiah's reduced power shall depend for its existence upon the British Government. The growth of the hostile power of Mysore from the year 1792 to 1798, might probably have been controlled, or even converted to the purposes of our security, had it been possible to induce Tippoo Sultaun to enter into a subsidiary alliance with the Company at the close of the war in 1792.

92. The power of Tippoo Sultaun, however, had not been reduced by that war to such a scale as to induce his haughty and vindictive character to listen to any terms of alliance with the Company. Such has been the reduction of Scindiah's resources of every description by the late war, that his existence as a power in India depends absolutely upon the generosity of the Company, and cannot be sustained without our active aid. Under such circumstances, the power of Scindiah no longer remains an object of apprehension to the British Government, nor can Scindiah view with jealousy the protecting influence of that state, to whose clemency he is absolutely indebted for the restoration, and on whose strength he must rely for the security of every possession which he retains.

93. The defensive alliance concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under the stipulations of the treaty of peace therefore, combined with the provisions of the treaty of Bassein, has precluded any future combination of the Mahratta states of a nature dangerous to the British Empire, and has opposed a permanent and insuperable obstacle to the revival of Scindiah's military strength beyond the scale which may be deemed by the Governor-General in Council to be consistent with the security of our interests. This important treaty not only precludes the eventual employment of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's remaining power against the British Government under any contingency, but secures the eventual application of that power to purposes connected with the safety of the British Empire in India. At an early period of the negotiation

on the subject of the defensive alliance, Dowlut Rao Scindiah expressed great anxiety for the introduction of a stipulation by which the British Government should engage to employ its influence in securing from the Peishwa in favour of Dowlut Rao Scindiah that treatment and consideration which was due to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's rank, and was consistent with usage. Dowlut Rao Scindiah also expressed an earnest desire that his right to countries, which he held under grants from the Peishwa, and of which he had taken possession, in consequence of orders from his Highness, should be recognized in the treaty of defensive alliance, and that the British Government would employ its endeavours to prevent the subversion of any acts of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of his ancestors, under the authority reposed in him or them by the Peishwa.

94. Major Malcolm, the acting Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who negotiated the treaty of defence and subsidy with that chieftain, objected to the introduction of an article to that effect, on the ground of its being entirely foreign to the nature and object of a defensive engagement. But the extreme solicitude of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the insertion of the proposed stipulation ultimately induced Major Malcolm to comply with that chieftain's wishes on that occasion, provided he would consent to certain modifications, the object of which was to preclude the operation of the proposed stipulations in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty of peace, or with the just rights, honour and dignity, of the Peishwa, and to provide for the arbitration of the British Government in all cases of difference which might arise out of the stipulations of that article.

95. To these modifications Scindiah readily consented. This earnest solicitude on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah that the British Government should guarantee his just claims upon the Peishwa, affords a convincing proof that Dowlut Rao Scindiah placed the fullest reliance in our public faith, honour and justice; and that far from being jealous of the interference of the British power in his concerns with the Peishwa, or any other state, that chieftain earnestly solicited our interference as the only means of securing his legitimate rights, and of supporting his hereditary dignity.

96. The 16th article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, provides for the ratification of the treaty by the Governor-Ge-

neral in Council, and prescribes that the orders for the cessions of territory stipulated in the treaty shall be delivered to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, at the same time with the ratification of the treaty of peace; but that certain forts, which by the terms of the treaty are to be restored to Scindiah, shall not be delivered up to Scindiah's officers until certain information shall have been received that all the territories ceded to the British Government and its allies, have been evacuated by Scindiah's officers and troops. It may be proper to observe that all the reciprocal cessions and restitutions under this treaty have actually been completed.

97. The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to consider the stipulations of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

98. The first article provides for the permanence of friendship between the contracting parties.

99. The second article connected with the first article of the treaty of partition cedes the whole of the province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Balasore to the honourable Company. That province connects the territory of Bengal with the northern Circars. In the hands of an enemy that province would afford peculiar advantages in the prosecution of hostilities against the British power. It furnishes the means of interrupting the communication between Bengal and all our possessions and dependencies in the southern and western provinces of India. That portion of the sea-coast which the province of Cuttack includes, and the port of Balasore, would enable a native enemy to receive succours from an European state. An auxiliary French force, combined with a Mahratta army, might thus have assembled on the frontier of our most valuable territories, and might have endangered the safety of the primary source of the power, wealth and influence of the British Empire in India. In the hands even of a neutral native state, the province of Cuttack presents a favourable point for the disembarkation of an hostile European force, and for an attack upon the British dominions.

100. The intermixture and contiguity of the territories of the Company and of the Mahrattas on the southern frontier of Midnapore, occasioned constant disputes between the subjects of the two governments, and the ready asylum which

robbers and delinquents obtained within the Mahratta territories contiguous to Midnapore, operated as an encouragement to the commission of every species of outrage within the limits of the Company's contiguous districts. These facts demonstrate the importance of the cession of the province of Cuttack and its dependencies, independently of their value in a financial and commercial point of view.

101. The Governor-General in Council is not yet enabled to submit to your honourable Committee a complete report upon the revenue of the territory ceded by this article. This report will be transmitted to the honourable Court as soon as the necessary accounts shall have been received. By a statement, however, extracted from the Mahratta records, the revenue of Cuttack proper is estimated at from 16 to 17 lacs per annum; in this statement are included the intermixed territories in Midnapore.

102. The third article provides for the cession of all the territories of which the Rajah of Berar collected the revenues in participation with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and of all the territory which the Rajah of Berar possessed to the westward of the river Wurda.

103. By the transfer to the Soubahdar of the Deccan, under the treaty of partition of the territory ceded by this article, all the inconveniences, embarrassments and hazards, arising from the intermixture of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Rajah of Berar, have been removed; by this article the dominion of the Soubahdar of the Deccan has been augmented and consolidated, and a distinct limit has been established between the territories of his Highness, and of the Rajah of Berar.

104. The faithful attention which this article combined with the treaty of partition manifests to the interests of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan, has produced the most favourable impression at the Court of Hyderabad, and has tended to cement the ties of alliance, as well as to render our ally more efficient and useful.

105. The arrangements of the fourth and fifth articles, which restore to the Rajah of Berar the forts of Narnulla and Gaweilgurh, together with districts contiguous to those forts, yielding an annual revenue of four lacs of rupees, were the result of a liberal and just consideration for the future security of the Rajah's remaining possessions.

106. By the sixth article the Rajah of Berar renounces all claims of every description on the territories ceded by the preceding articles, and on all the territories of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

107. By the latter stipulation the vexatious pecuniary claims of the Rajah of Berar on the Soubahdar of the Deccan have been relinquished. Those claims constituted a perpetual source of disagreement between the two powers, and afforded to the Rajah of Berar the means of maintaining a considerable influence, and of prosecuting intrigues at the court of Hyderabad of a nature injurious to the interests of the British Government.

108. The seventh article stipulates for the arbitration of the British Government in all cases of difference between the Courts of Poonah and Nagpore, and Hyderabad and Nagpore. By this stipulation the British Government will be enabled to control the causes of dissension between those states respectively, and the intercourse between them under the operation of this article will be too limited to admit the successful prosecution of any intrigues injurious to the interests of the British Government.

109. The chief object of this article was to meet the wishes of the Rajah of Berar, whose vakeels expressed an anxious desire for the interference of the British Government, both for the purpose of protecting the Rajah of Berar against all claims of the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan on his territories, and of securing the rights of the Rajah of Berar, under grants obtained from the Peishwa, or the Soubahdar of the Deccan, or under treaties concluded with those chiefs.

110. In reply to the proposition of the Rajah of Berar's Vakeels upon these points, the honourable Major-General Wellesley observed, that without possessing accurate information with regard to the nature of those claims, grants and treaties, the faith of the British Government could not be pledged in the manner proposed by the vakeels : with a view, however, to meet the wishes of the Rajah of Berar, without incurring the hazard of compromising the faith of the British Government, the honourable Major-General Wellesley proposed the arbitration of the British Government in the terms stipulated in the seventh article of the treaty, to which proposition the vakeels readily assented, observing that the

Rajah of Berar possessed no security against the encroachments of the Peishwa, but in the justice and generosity of the British Government.

111. Your honourable Committee will remark with satisfaction this demonstration of the entire confidence of the Rajah of Berar in the equity and honour of the British Government.

112. The eighth article of the treaty contains the same stipulation for the exclusion of European, American, and British subjects from the service of the Rajah of Berar, as that which is contained in the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and by the same article the British Government engages neither to assist nor to encourage any relations or subjects of the Rajahs of Berar in rebellion against that chieftain.

113. The ninth article provides for the residence of accredited ministers on the part of the British Government, and of the government of the Rajah of Berar with those governments respectively.

114. This article is of peculiar importance, on account of the difficulty which has long existed of obtaining correct information with respect to the conduct and views of the court of Nagpore.

115. The tenth article of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, which corresponds with the ninth article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, recognises and confirms all engagements concluded by the British Government with feudatories and dependents of the Rajah of Berar.

116. The object of this stipulation was not only to secure the benefits which the British Government might derive from such engagements, but to enable us to discharge the obligations of our public faith towards the persons with whom those engagements might have been contracted. The 701st and following paragraphs of our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 12th of April refer to the engagements concluded by the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, with certain feudatories and dependents of the government of Berar. Engagements were contracted during the course of the war with the Rajahs of Boad, Sonapore, and Ramgurh, occupying territory contiguous to the southwestern frontier of Cuttack, and commanding the principal

passes into that province, by these engagements the Rajahs of Boad, Sonapore, and Ramgurh, are exempted from the payment of tribute, and are guaranteed in the possession of their respective territories on the condition of their faithful discharge of the duty of tributaries to the honourable Company.

117. The Commissioners of Cuttack also concluded engagements with the Rajah of Koonjur, a powerful chieftain, whose territory is situated on the northern frontier of the province of Cuttack; and who has always been considered to be independent of the Mahratta power, although at the period of the war that chieftain rented a portion of the province of Cuttack. Engagements, comprising the settlement of the revenue payable to the British Government, were also concluded by the collector of Midnapore with the Zemindars of the district of Mohurbunge and its dependencies, and of certain districts formerly belonging to the Rajah of Berar, on the north-eastern side of the river Soobunricka, and intermixed with the territories constituting the Zemindary of Midnapore.

118. By the confirmation of these engagements, under the stipulations of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, the authority and influence of the Mahratta government has been completely excluded from all the territories in the vicinity of Cuttack and Midnapore, and a barrier has been established between the province of Cuttack and the Rajah of Berar's remaining territories, composed of petty states, exercising an independent authority within their respective territories, under the protection of the British Government.

119. Other engagements, also, concluded by Lieut.-Colonel Broughton with the Zemindars of Sumbulpoor and Patna, districts formerly belonging to the Rajah of Berar, and situated near the western frontier of Bengal and Bahar were confirmed by the stipulations of the tenth article of the treaty of Deogaum.

120. The instructions which were issued to Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, and the military operations and negotiations of that officer, under those instructions are described in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 12th of April 1804.

121. Lieut.-Colonel Broughton found it impracticable to

carry into effect the whole plan of political arrangement prescribed by his instructions; that officer, however, received every degree of support and assistance from the inhabitants and landholders in the provinces of Sumbulpoor and Patna in the prosecution of his military operations against the troops of the Rajah of Berar; and the principal Zemindars of those provinces, conveyed to Lieut.-Colonel Broughton the most earnest solicitations to be relieved from the oppressive control of the Mahratta power, and to be placed under the protection of the British Government, upon any terms which the British Government might think proper to prescribe. In conformity to the tenor of his instructions, Lieut.-Colonel Broughton engaged on the part of the British Government to afford to those Zemindars permanent protection from the power of the government of Berar, and under those engagements, the whole of the provinces of Sumbulpoor and Patna became subject to the authority of the British Government. Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, however, judged it proper to leave to the decision of the Governor-General in Council the precise relation in which those provinces should ultimately be placed with relation to the British Government. In this stage of his proceedings, Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, who was then at Sumbulpoor, received intelligence of the conclusion of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

122. The conquest or alienation to the greatest possible extent of the territories composing the dominion of the enemy, constituted a necessary object of the operations of the war, without reference to the future policy of annexing such territory to the British possessions, or of distributing it among the allies or of restoring it to the enemy.

123. During the progress of the war, it was evidently a wise policy to limit within the most contracted bounds, and with the utmost practicable despatch, the political, financial, and military resources of the enemy. On the conclusion of the treaty of peace, however, with the Rajah of Berar, by the specific cessions of which the power and resources of that chieftain were reduced in the degree necessary for our security, no material advantage could be derived from the annexation of the provinces of Sumbulpoor and Patna to the British dominions. At the same time the Governor-General in Council was aware, that although the au-

thority which the government of Berar possessed over those provinces was imperfect, and the revenue which it derived from them was inconsiderable, the Rajah of Berar would deeply regret the loss of those provinces. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, anxious to render the operation of the tenth article of the treaty of Deogaum as little injurious to the interests of the Rajah of Berar, as was consistent with the preservation of our public faith, resolved to restore to the Rajah of Berar the provinces of Sumbulpoor and Pâtna (which by the operation of the tenth article of the treaty of peace were permanently annexed to the honourable Company's dominions) provided that the Zemindars of those provinces with whom Lieut.-Colonel Broughton had contracted engagements would consent to that arrangement; and Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was accordingly directed to propose it to all the persons with whom he had concluded engagements.

124. Similar considerations induced us to propose, through the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, the dissolution of the engagements concluded by the Commissioners with the Rajahs of Boad, Sonapore, and Ramgurh, although the connection established with those chieftains secured to the British Government the considerable advantages described in the 116th and 117th preceding paragraphs.

125. All these chieftains and Zemindars, however, without exception, declared their utter aversion to return under the authority of the Mahratta government, and earnestly solicited the continuance of the honourable Company's protection. Under these circumstances the preservation of our public faith rendered indispensably necessary the confirmation of the engagements with those chieftains to the extent of precluding the Mahratta Government from the exercise of any authority over them at any future period of time.

126. With a view, however, to manifest towards the Rajah of Berar a spirit of liberality and conciliation, by rendering the operation of the tenth article of the treaty of Deogaum as little injurious to his interests, as was compatible with the obligation of our public faith, the British Government offered not only to guarantee to the Rajah the payment of an annual sum equal to the revenue which he derived from the territories alienated from his dominion by the tenth

article of the treaty, but even to grant to the Rajah a reasonable compensation for the loss of power and dominion occasioned by the alienation of those territories.

127. Under this resolution, a draft of articles intended to be annexed to the treaty of Deogaum, was prepared and transmitted to the Resident at Nagpore, for the acceptance of the Rajah of Berar, together with the list of the chieftains and Zemindars, with whom engagements had been concluded. The proposal of compensation, however, was not included in the additional articles, but instructions were issued to the Resident at Nagpore, directing him to communicate to the Rajah this liberal offer on the part of the British Government. Those articles specifically recognized the future independence, with relation to the Mahratta power, of the chieftains and Zemindars named in the list.

128. After a protracted discussion with the court of Nagpore, on the subject of the confirmation of the engagements concluded on the part of the British Government with those chieftains and Zemindars, the Rajah of Berar accepted the list, but refused to execute the additional articles proposed to be annexed to the treaty of Deogaum.

129. The stipulations of those articles with the exception of the clause containing a recognition of the independence of the chieftains and Zemindars named in the list, being exclusively in favour of the Rajah of Berar, his refusal to execute those articles could only be ascribed to the Rajah's secret determination to withhold any direct renunciation of his authority over the chieftains in question, and to the Rajah's supposition, that the mere acceptance of the list of chieftains and Zemindars, did not involve an acknowledgement of their independence.

130. The Resident at Nagpore, therefore, under instructions which he had previously received from the Governor-General in Council, required from the Rajah of Berar a written recognition of the engagements concluded by the British Government with the chieftains and Zemindars named in the list, which after some discussion the Rajah consented to deliver. As the Rajah of Berar has thought proper to decline the liberal offer of the Governor-General in Council, it is not our intention to admit the Rajah of Berar to the benefit of that proposition, unless the Rajah of Berar shall previously

express a due sense of the liberality of the British Government on this occasion.

131. The detail of these transactions will form a part of the proposed despatch to your honourable Committee, to which the first paragraph of this letter refers. The preceding general statement of those transactions, however, appeared to be necessary in adverting to the operation of the tenth article of the treaty of Deogaum.

132. It is not the intention of the Governor-General in Council under any circumstances to establish the British authority within the provinces of Sumbulpoor and Patna. The Governor-General in Council is decidedly of opinion that the advantages to be expected from the reputation which the justice, liberality, and moderation of this proceeding must add to the British name in the estimation of all the states of India, exceed any which could be derived from the annexation of the provinces of Sumbulpoor and Patna to the honourable Company's possessions.

133. By the 11th article of the treaty of Deogaum, the Rajah of Berar renounces "all adherence to the confederacy formed by him, and other Mahratta chiefs to attack the honourable Company and their allies, and he engages not to assist those chiefs if the war with them should continue."

134. This article has reference to the continuance of war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, after the conclusion of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

135. Your honourable Committee will remark that this article contains a distinct avowal* on the part of the Rajah of Berar of the confederacy formed by that chieftain and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the express purpose of making war upon the British Government and its allies.

136. The twelfth and last article of the treaty of Deogaum relates exclusively to its ratification by the Governor-General in Council.

137. With a view to afford to your honourable Committee the fullest information with regard to every point connected with the pacification, the Governor-General in Council

* This avowal on the part of the Rajah of Berar, combined with a similar avowal on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, completely justifies the original policy of the war.—[ED.]

deems it proper to annex to this despatch the following documents.

A copy of the Minutes of the Conferences between the honourable Major-General Wellesley, and the vakeels of the Rajah of Berar, on the subject of the terms of peace to be granted to that chieftain.

A copy of the honourable Major-General Wellesley's letter to the Governor-General in Council, under date the 17th December, 1803, communicating the treaty of peace concluded with the Rajah of Berar.

A copy of the Minutes of the Conferences between the honourable Major-General Wellesley, and the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah relative to the terms of peace.

A copy of the honourable Major-General Wellesley's letter to the Governor-General in Council, dated the 30th of December, 1803, communicating the treaty of peace concluded with that chieftain.

A copy of the Governor-General's detailed instructions to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, dated the 11th December, 1803, on the subject of the terms of peace to be granted to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar.

138. These instructions did not reach the honourable Major-General Wellesley until after the conclusion of peace with those chieftains, but the substance of them was communicated to that officer in a paper of notes dated the 16th of October 1803 and despatched on the 26th of that month, which reached Major-General Wellesley in the month of November.

A copy of Major Malcolm's letter to the Governor-General in Council dated the 28th of February last, communicating the treaty of defensive and subsidiary alliance concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

139. The Governor-General in Council deems it proper to close this despatch by a general recapitulation of the benefits which the British Government in India has derived from the operations of the war, and the combined arrangements of the pacification, including the treaties of peace, of partition, and of defensive alliance and subsidy. Those benefits may be enumerated under the following heads:

The reduction of the military power and territorial re-

sources of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, within the limits indispensably necessary for the security of the British Government in India and of its allies.

The destruction of the French territorial power established by M. Perron, on the most vulnerable part of the frontier of the British possession in India, under circumstances of internal strength, military resource, and political influence, which menaced the British Government with great and extensive dangers.

The barriers opposed by the stipulations of treaty,* to the revival of the French power and influence in any quarter of India.

The annexation to the British possessions of the territory formerly occupied by the French force under M. Perron. Under this accession of territory, our north-western frontier has been strengthened by being advanced to the banks of the Jumna, and by the occupation of the several important posts and fortresses, which command that river, and from the source of former danger we now derive additional security to the British possessions in India.

The augmented sources of revenue and commerce acquired by the annexation to the British territories of the fertile countries situated in the Doab of the rivers Jumna and Ganges (in which the authority of M. Perron had been established) combined with the complete command over the navigation of the Jumna.

The deliverance of the Emperor Shah Allum from the control of the French power, established in the north-western quarter of Hindostan; by which the government of France has been deprived of a powerful instrument in the eventual prosecution of its hostile designs against the British Empire in India, and the British Government has obtained a favourable opportunity of conciliating the confidence, and securing the applause of surrounding states, by providing a safe and tranquil asylum for the declining age of that venerable and unfortunate monarch, and a suitable maintenance for his numerous and distressed family.

The establishment of the British influence in the north-

* 8th article, treaty of Deogaum; 13th article, treaty of Serje Anjengaum; 7th article, treaty of defensive alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

western division of Hindostan, and the additional security acquired by the conclusion of treaties of defensive alliance with the Rajpoot state of Jyenagur, and the petty states in the vicinity of our possessions in that quarter. Those states under the operation of the alliances concluded with them, constitute a barrier between the British territories and the Mahratta states; which arrangement, with other stipulations of the pacification, secures the permanent exclusion of the influence and control of the Mahrattas from the north-western quarter of Hindostan.

The commanding position which the British Government has secured by the possession of the strong fortress of Gwalior, and by the establishment of a subsidiary force within the territory of the Ranah of Gohud, under the conditions described in the 48th paragraph of this despatch. This branch of the general arrangements of the peace contributes in a particular degree to maintain the tranquillity of Hindostan, and to consolidate the barrier established for the exclusion of the Mahratta power and influence from that quarter of India. The same arrangements also connect our possessions in Bundelcund with those to the northward of the province of Gohud, and provide additional security to the navigation of the Jumna, and additional protection to our valuable possessions in the Doab, from the hostile attempts of any regular state, or from the predatory incursions of any enterprising adventurer.

The additional means of defence acquired by the established system of our external relations in the north-western quarter of Hindostan, against any attempt on the part of the northern powers of Asia, or of the French Republic, through the aid of those powers, to disturb the security of the British possessions in India.

The augmented security which the British Empire derives from the annexation of the valuable province of Cuttack, including the sea-port of Balasore, and all the dependencies of that province to the British dominion. By establishing between the province of Midnapore, and the northern Circars, a continuation of the British dominion and authority, and thereby completing the line of connexion between the territories under the immediate government of Bengal, and

those under the authority of Fort St. George. By depriving the government of France of the facilities which the province of Cuttack while in the possession of a foreign power, afforded for the prosecution of intrigues, injurious to the British interests, and for the invasion of the British territories, either singly, or in co-operation with a native power. By the advantages which our possession of the province of Cuttack would afford to us in the event of a contest with the state of Berar; and by the augmented sources of revenue and commerce opened to the British Government by that fertile and valuable province, and by the influence and reputation to be acquired throughout India, from the possession of the great temple of Jaggernaut, and from the just and benevolent administration of the affairs of that temple with relation to the innumerable pilgrims, who frequent it from every part of India.

The acquisition of the port and territory of Baroach, and of the sea-ports belonging to Scindiah on the western side of India, which afforded to Scindiah, and to the French officers in his service, the means of intercourse with the government of France, and to the French an easy access to the Mahratta states, in a quarter where our military power was less formidable, and our political influence less firmly established than in other parts of India.

The degree of security afforded by the possession of the sea-port and territory of Baroach against any attempt on the part of France, to supply by that channel any native state with arms and military stores, or with officers for the purpose of disciplining their armies, and against the prosecution of any intrigues between the government of France and any native state, by means of the facility of communication which the sea-port and territory of Baroach might afford while in the hands of a Mahratta power, to the indefatigable zeal of French emissaries.

The additional security which our possessions and interests in Guzerat must derive from the possession of the port and territory of Baroach, and from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's renunciation of all claims on our ally the Guikwar.

The augmented sources of revenue and commerce, acquired by the possession of the port of Baroach and its district.

The improved state of our alliances with the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa, under the provisions of the treaties of peace and of partition. By the combined operation of those treaties the power, territory, and resources of the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan have been increased and consolidated, and their means of discharging the duties of alliance have been consequently augmented. The confidence of those allies in the power, justice, and moderation of the British Government has been confirmed and encreased by their experience of the advantages of the alliance in the prosecution of the war, and in the ultimate arrangements of the peace.

The stipulations of the treaties of peace have in a considerable degree removed the causes of dissension, and the means of political intrigue between our allies and the Mahratta states, by precluding the future intermixture of their territories, and the consequent collision of their authorities; by requiring from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, the renunciation of their claims on the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa, and by vesting in the British Government a right of arbitration in all cases of difference which may arise between those powers respectively. Thus the influence and ascendancy of the British Government in the councils of Hyderabad and Poonah have been encreased and permanently established, not by limiting the authority, controlling the independence, or reducing the power of those states, but by the operation of arrangements which have confirmed and corroborated their respective rights, authorities and independence, extended their dominion, consolidated their power, and augmented their resources; secured them from the vexatious claims, and litigious and violent interference of other powers, and established the sources of permanent tranquillity and prosperity within the limits of their respective dominions.

Our influence and ascendancy in the councils of those allies are now founded on the solid basis of their entire confidence in the equity and moderation of our views, and in their just reliance on our protecting power.

The elevation of the fame and glory of the British nation in India, by the splendid achievements of the war, and by the clemency, moderation, and public faith, which

distinguished the British counsels in the conclusion of the peace.

The conclusion of a defensive and subsidiary alliance between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, by which the British influence has been completely established at the court of that chieftain on the foundation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's deliberate view of the real interests of his government, and by which the most formidable enemy of the British power in the late contest with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, has been rendered an efficient ally of the honourable Company.

The power acquired by the British Government under the general arrangements of the peace and the treaties of partition and subsidiary alliance, of controlling the causes of dissension and contest among the several Mahratta states, and of precluding the restoration of any of those states to a formidable degree of power, their combination for purposes injurious to the British Government or its allies, their communication and co-operation with an hostile European force, and their means of prosecuting dangerous intrigues with allies or subjects of the British Government.

The security afforded to the territories of our allies the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Guikwar, the Rajah of Mysore, and the honourable Company, from the dangers to which they were exposed by the anarchy and confusion existing in the Mahratta empire, and by the character and habits of the contending Mahratta chieftains.

140. The general arrangements of the pacification combined with the treaties of partition, with the defensive and subsidiary alliance now concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with the general condition of our external relations, and with the internal prosperity of the British empire, have finally placed the British power in India in that commanding position with regard to other states, which affords the only possible security for the permanent tranquillity and prosperity of these valuable and important possessions.

141. By the establishment of our subsidiary forces at Hyderabad, and Poonah, with the Guikwar, Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Ranah of Gohud, an efficient army of 22,000 men is stationed within the territories, or on the frontier of foreign states, and is paid by foreign subsidies. That

army is constantly maintained in a state of perfect equipment, and is prepared for active service in any direction at the shortest notice. This force may be directed against any of the principal states of India, without the hazard of disturbing the tranquillity of the Company's possessions, and without requiring any considerable encrease to the permanent military expences of the governments of India.

142. The position, extent, and equipment of this military force, combined with the privilege which the British Government possesses of arbitrating differences and dissensions between the several states with which it is connected by the obligations of alliance, enables the British power to control the causes of that internal warfare, which during so long a term of years has desolated many of the most fertile provinces of India, has occasioned a constant and hazardous fluctuation of power among the native states, has encouraged a predatory and military spirit among the inhabitants, and formed an inexhaustible source for the supply of military adventurers, prepared to join the standard of any turbulent chieftain for the purposes of ambition, plunder, or rebellion.

143. A general bond of connection is now established between the British Government, and the principal states of India, on principles which render it the interest of every state to maintain its alliance with the British Government, which preclude the inordinate aggrandizement of any one of those states by an usurpation of the rights and possessions of others, and which secure to every state the unmolested exercise of its separate authority within the limits of its established dominion, under the general protection of the British power.

We have the honour to be,

Honourable Sirs,

Your most faithful humble servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

No. XXXIV.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, July 21, 1804.

It grieves me to have sent you any account which I know must vex and torment you, but I trust nothing serious can happen from the falling back of Monson's force.* Holkar's cavalry is, I believe, most despicable, and his brigades, if my information is correct (which I think it is) are far from strong, the battalions, upon an average, not more than three hundred men; if complete, they amount only to four hundred and fifty each. Had Colonel Murray fortunately come on, Holkar would have been completely destroyed. However, no blame can attach to that officer, as his want of cavalry and other circumstances rendered it, in his opinion, necessary to make the movement he did. I am certain he would have come on if he could, or had known of Monson's position, but, as unfortunately most of the letters upon the subject have not reached him, his information was not to be depended upon, and he was in want of provisions, consequently it would have been extremely difficult for him to advance. The number of irregular horse is always exaggerated, ten or twelve thousand when dispersed in their sort of order appear a prodigious number. I think Holkar will not easily get his cavalry to attack our infantry again unless he brings his guns, which will retard him, and prevent his horse from doing much mischief. His guns will, in the end, be the cause of his ruin. His insolence is abominable. I think he cannot do us any immediate injury. Let what will happen, he will not be able to penetrate into our territories, and I think he will be easily kept out of Hindostan, at least, if he does attempt coming on, he will not get far. He will, of course, be a little elated, but I trust he may yet get a very severe check from Colonel Monson. I lament most sincerely that our forbearance some months back prevented me from attacking, which, if we had done, he would to a certainty have been totally destroyed. I expect every moment to hear from Monson, when I shall be able to form a plan for assisting him in any designs he may

* See p. 189. This letter had not been received by the Governor-General when the despatch No. XXXV. was written.—[Ed.]

have. Zaulim Sing of Kotah has acted uncommonly well, and proved himself a staunch friend to our government, and will in all probability suffer most severely from it, particularly if Colonel Monson should quit his country. His troops which have been employed with ours have behaved extremely well, and I think his battalions and horse, joined with ours, will be fully equal to Holkar. I trust I am not wrong in my conjecture, and sincerely hope it will not be long before I send you more pleasing accounts. If I see the smallest necessity for it, I can soon be at Agra, from whence I can render Monson every assistance by sending troops to Colonel Monson or joining him myself. Rest assured, my dear Lord, nothing shall be wanting on my part to prevent the glory of our late campaign being tarnished by any advantage that can be gained by this freebooter. He certainly has not at present one man of power or consequence attached to him, and I think it will be in my power to prevent any one from joining him, as they are pretty well convinced of his rapacity, which must ruin them.

I write in great haste, and have only to beg you will not suffer this late unpleasant business to affect you, but believe every thing shall be done to correct the evil, which is certainly not agreeable. Despondency will be of no avail, we must therefore set to work, and retrieve our misfortune as quick as possible. I feel myself quite well and able, if necessary, to encounter any fatigue of body and mind; of the latter I am like your Lordship, pretty well used to it. That I may live to see you enjoy peace of mind, health and happiness, is the sincere wish, my dear Lord, of

your affectionate and devoted servant,

G. LAKE.

No. XXXV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, July 28, 1804.

I send you a paper of notes dictated this evening, on the subject of the late advices from Colonel Murray and Lieut.-Colonel Monson.

Ever yours,

most faithfully and affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

Enclosure.

(Most Secret and Confidential.)

Fort William, July 28, 1804.

1. The instructions to Mr. Webbe of the 30th June 1804, relative to a peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, were written under a supposition, that Holkar's army and resources had been greatly reduced, and that his affairs were in the utmost distress; but it appears by the last despatches from the Commander-in-chief, and from Lieut.-Colonel Monson, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has collected a very considerable force near the Mucundra Pass, and now commands in that position an army stated to consist of a large body of cavalry, a corps of regular infantry, and a large train of artillery. It is not probable that he will again separate this force, if he really possesses the means of keeping it together, as such a measure could not be adopted without exposing some of the divisions of his force to attack from the detachments under Colonels Murray and Monson, or from Scindiah's troops, or those of the petty states.

2. This state of circumstances presents a favourable opportunity for striking a decisive blow against Holkar's power and resources. No expectation can be entertained of any accommodation with Holkar as long as he shall remain in any degree of force. In the actual situation of affairs, a defensive war on our part would be attended with the most serious consequences to our reputation and interests. It does not appear that either of the corps under the command of Colonel Murray, and of Lieut.-Colonel Monson, are sufficiently strong to encounter singly Holkar's force in the field. We must not depend on Scindiah for assistance, and whether his recent conduct proceeds from treachery, or from inability to put his troops into motion, it is evident that no aid will be derived from his co-operation in the prosecution of hostilities against Holkar. It is also evident that as long as Holkar shall be enabled to maintain a superiority in the field, it will be impossible for the detachments under Colonel Murray and Lieut.-Colonel Monson, to effect a junction of their forces, and a protracted and expensive war may be expected to be the consequence of this system of operations.

3. Under these circumstances it appears to be highly expedient to adopt immediate measures for the attack of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The first step with a view to this desirable object is to reinforce either of the detachments under Colonel Murray or Lieut.-Colonel Monson, to the extent which may be necessary to enable either of those detachments to encounter singly the army of Holkar. The two detachments may then effect a junction, or adopt any other system of operations which may be deemed more advisable.

4. From the distance of Colonel Murray's detachment from the troops in the Deccan, it will be impossible to reinforce him from that quarter; and the force stationed in Guzerat will be required for the protection of that province against predatory incursions. It appears, therefore, to be necessary to reinforce the detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Monson, with

a regiment of European cavalry, and *two*, or if possible *three*, regiments of native cavalry, and with such a proportion of native infantry and European artillery, as shall enable Lieut.-Colonel Monson to advance against Holkar, and to leave a sufficient corps to defend the Mucundra Pass, and to prevent any incursion in that direction into Hindostan. It would be very desirable, if possible, to afford to Lieut.-Colonel Monson a reinforcement of European infantry. The Commander-in-chief knows how far he can rely on our native infantry for the attack of Holkar's artillery, supposing Holkar's artillery to be as formidable as it has been lately described.

5. If the native troops should be deemed unequal to the attack, what arrangement can be immediately adopted for the attainment of that important object? How can an European force be supplied to Lieutenant-Colonel Monson for the attack of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's artillery?

6. The Commander-in-chief will also determine whether it may be necessary to send an officer of superior rank to take the command of the detachment to be employed against Holkar, and to be invested with the necessary powers for concluding, under favourable circumstances, a pacific arrangement with that chieftain, on the basis of the Governor-General's instructions to the Resident with Scindiah, under date the 30th June 1804, (of which a copy has been transmitted for the Commander-in-Chief's information) or on such other basis as the General may think proper. This suggestion is entirely compatible with the greatest respect for the character and services of Lieut.-Colonel Monson, in whose approved zeal, courage, and skill, the Governor-General reposes the utmost confidence. In the prosecution, however, of active operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the two detachments under Colonel Murray and Lieut.-Colonel Monson, may effect a junction, and the chief command will then devolve upon Colonel Murray; and the Commander-in-chief may probably consider the command of the united detachments to be too extensive for an officer of the rank of Colonel Murray, particularly as Colonel Murray is invested with the chief command of the province of Guzerat, and with the discharge of many political duties connected with that command. This point must be decided by the judgment of the Commander-in-chief.*

7. Although the Governor-General is desirous of concluding an amicable arrangement with Holkar, on the basis of his instructions to the Resident with Scindiah, the principal object of the Commander-in-chief will be directed to the means of making an early and vigorous attack on the resources of Holkar, and of entirely reducing his power, if that measure should become necessary. Holkar must be made sensible of the superiority of our strength, before he will submit to the terms on which alone he can be safely admitted to the protection of the British power,

* The despatches received to-day seem to leave no hope of success, unless the Commander-in-chief can again take the field in person, and attack Holkar with vigour; in that case, all my apprehensions would be converted into a certainty of success.—WELLESLEY.

which he has insulted and attacked with so much wanton outrage. The moment of victory on our part will afford the best opportunity of commencing a negotiation with that restless freebooter.

8. The principal points to which it is the object of these notes to direct the attention of the Commander-in-chief, (upon a supposition that Holkar is now actually in force,) are firstly. The immediate adoption of a plan of offensive operations against Holkar's main army, by the reinforcement of the detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Monson to the extent, if possible, of *one* regiment of European, and *two* or *three* regiments of native cavalry, a proportion of European artillery, of native infantry, and, if possible, of European infantry. It is supposed that the junction of Colonel Murray's army is the best, if not the only, mode of strengthening Colonel Monson by European infantry.

Secondly. The adoption of a system of precautionary measures for the defence of the passes leading into Hindostan, when Lieut.-Colonel Monson may deem it expedient to advance against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The province of Bundelcund will, of course, be included in the line of defence.

Thirdly. The eventual appointment of an officer of rank to take the command of the troops to be employed against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with full powers to negotiate with that chieftain on the basis of the Governor-General's instructions of the 30th June 1804, to the Resident with Scindiah, or of such further instructions as may be sent from the Governor-General.

9. If Holkar finds himself pressed by the corps under Lieut.-Colonel Monson, he may attempt, 1st. to penetrate through the Mucundra Pass. 2d. Crossing the Chumbul towards its source, he may attempt to advance to Ajmere, and against the city of Jeypore by the route to the westward of the Chumbul. 3d. He may endeavour to enter the province of Bundelcund by the route of Narwar. 4th. He may turn towards the province of Guzerat. 5th. He may attack Ougein. In determining the nature of the operations to be prosecuted against Holkar, it appears to be necessary to advert to all these contingencies, and to adopt with all possible expedition such arrangements as may enable us at the same time to protect our own territories, and those of our allies, and to carry on the most vigorous and active operations against the main army of Holkar.

10. By a letter just received* from Lieut.-Colonel Lake to Captain Armstrong, dated 20th July, it appears that Colonel Monson's detachment was retreating before Holkar, and had quitted the Mucundra Pass.†

This is a most painful state of affairs. Nothing can retrieve our character but the most vigorous effort. I fear that all our exertions will now be too late to recover all we have lost.

WELLESLEY.

* Half past 4 o'clock, P. M.

† For an account of Colonel Monson's retreat, see p. 199.

No. XXXVI.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 13th August, 1804.

1. Having for some time past had reason to believe that a correspondence very inimical to the British interests existed between Rajah Runjeet Sing the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, I directed your Excellency's agent to inform Mr. Thomas Mercer, who is in charge of the police of the city of Muttrah, of my suspicions; and to desire that he would use the means which his vicinity to Bhurtpore, and the superintendence of the police of Muttrah might afford him to discover the channel of this correspondence.

2. Mr. Mercer, accordingly, having been informed by the people whom he had employed secretly for the purpose, that the accredited vakeel from Jeswunt Rao Holkar to Rajah Runjeet Sing was then in the city, caused him to be apprehended, and his papers to be taken charge of and sealed until he should receive my further orders.

3. The deposition of this person, by name Nerunjun Lall, taken before Mr. Mercer on the 1st instant, states that he has been long employed as the channel of communication between Jeswunt Rao Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and several Zemindars in the Doab, and that the object of the correspondence carried on was the entire subversion of the British power and influence in Hindostan.

4. I yesterday received from Lieutenant-Colonel Monson at Rampoorah, with a letter dated the 1st instant, several original letters which he had on that day intercepted, addressed by Koer Rundhere Sing, the eldest son of Rajah Runjeet Sing, by others of his confidential servants, and by the above-mentioned Nerunjun Lall to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to his confidential servants.

5. The contents of these letters very fully corroborate the deposition of Nerunjun Lall, not only in regard to the object of the correspondence, but in respect to the mode in which it has been conducted, and from the impossibility of collusion, afford conclusive proof of the treacherous conduct of the parties concerned.

6. Translations of the several papers relative to this subject

are now enclosed for your Excellency's information, and copies of the original Persian papers will be transmitted to the Secretary to Government in the Persian department.

7. I have directed Mr. Thomas Mercer to send Lalla Nerunjun Lall under a proper guard to the fort of Agra, and to take the first safe opportunity of transmitting the papers taken in his possession to your Excellency's agent.

8. Although these papers will probably, from the confidential terms in which Nerunjun Lall appears to have been with the parties concerned, furnish many particulars in regard to the extent of this combination, yet as I deem the fact itself sufficiently established by the documents now laid before your Excellency, I lose no time in forwarding them, that I may be speedily favoured with your Lordship's sentiments and instructions in regard to the line of conduct to be hereafter observed towards Rajah Runjeet Sing.

From the meeting I had with Rajah Runjeet Sing in camp, and from common report, I am inclined to believe that his character is by no means of that daring stamp as to induce him readily to pursue measures so fraught with danger to himself as his present conduct would appear to indicate. His son, Koer Rundhere Sing, who was also in my camp, is of a character equally indolent and devoid of ability. The people who possess their confidence, however, are characters of a description likely, from the desperate state of their fortunes, to advise the most violent measures. It has been a constant practice with the Bhurtpore Rajah to afford refuge and countenance to persons of whatever character who may have been expelled by the chiefs of the neighbouring countries. Jewun Khan, a principal person in the accompanying correspondence, was formerly a confidential servant of the Rao Rajah, and was dismissed by that chief for repeated acts of treachery and villainy.

10. It may be proper here to remark, that this treacherous correspondence appears to have commenced soon after Rajah Runjeet Sing had entered into a treaty with the British Government, by which he was permanently released from the tribute formerly paid by him to the Mahrattas, and was carried on at a time when he was receiving the most undoubted proof of the friendship and favour of the British Government, by my having granted to him Sunnuds, subject to your Excel-

lency's confirmation, for countries of the annual revenue of about four lacs of rupees, which were contiguous to his former possessions, and not included as the line proposed by your Lordship as the boundary of the British possessions.

11. Although the power or resources of Rajah Runjeet Sing, cannot reasonably give any cause of alarm for the result should it be deemed expedient to punish his treacherous conduct; yet, under present circumstances, it would not appear advisable that the army should advance to any considerable distance from the frontiers of the Doab, without leaving a strong force, which might both counteract any designs of Runjeet Sing's against the Company's territories, and prevent his interrupting the supplies of the army in advance, which must pass through his country.

12. I am at the same time aware of your Excellency's anxiety for a speedy termination of hostilities with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and shall use every exertion in my power to effect that object by the employment of as large a force as can be furnished for that purpose from this quarter, consistently with a due attention to the more immediate and important object of the safety and quiet of the British territories in Hindostan.

G. LAKE.

(Enclosures.)

Extract of a Letter from Mr. T. Mercer, in charge of the Police at Muttra to the Agent to the Governor-General.

Muttra, 1st August, 1804.

Immediately on the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, I set to work to endeavour to ascertain the truth of the suspicions entertained by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief respecting the conduct of our allies; and have been uncommonly successful in the attempt. I was last night informed by the people I employed that the accredited Vakeel of Holkar at the Bhurtpore Durbar was actually in the city of Muttra; I consequently seized him and all his papers, and now transmit you his declaration. The original letters alluded to in the enclosed, he says, will be found amongst the papers in my possession. I have not thought it proper for me to examine these papers until I hear from you, as the business is of so much importance as may induce his Excellency to send you or some other person up for this purpose. I never in my own mind had a doubt of the existence of this treachery, which I hope may be sufficiently proved by the documents in my possession to warrant any measures Government may think proper to pursue. I shall keep the whole of this business as secret as possible,

and shall of course keep Nerunjun Lall* in confinement till further orders. I send this by two horsemen to Colonel Blair, with a request that he will forward it express.

T. MERCER.

Translations of Letters, &c. intercepted by Lieut.-Colonel Monson at Ram-poorah on the 1st August, 1804.

Letter from Koer Rundhere Sing, eldest son of Rajah Runjeet Sing, to Jes-wunt Rao Holkar.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

(No date.)

I have been much delighted and comforted by the receipt of your letter in answer to mine, in which you inform me of your welfare, evincing the steady and heartfelt friendship which you have long had for this family, and particularly for myself, your sincere friend, although at a distance and not personally acquainted; and mention that the bands of the wicked shall speedily meet their due punishment, as your conquering army will soon arrive in this quarter. Other proofs of your dignified friendship towards me I have also learned from Lalla Nerunjun Lall. God preserve and prosper you for these instances of your friendship and remembrance.

I am prepared to act as your servant, and neither am now nor shall hereafter be in any way divided from you. I am most sincerely desirous of a meeting with you, and God grant that this wish of my heart may be effected. The delay in answering your letter has arisen entirely from the circumstance of the risk of the road, on which letters are lost, otherwise how is it possible that I could allow such a delay in informing you of my affairs. You will have been informed of all these circumstances without my writing, by the letters of Lalla Nerunjun Lall. That I consider my own interest and welfare, as entirely depending on the increase of your dignity and prosperity, your friendly heart will bear witness. Other circumstances tending to increase our friendship and union, will be transmitted to you by the above-mentioned Lalla; whom I have sent for to my presence, and personally informed of them. Until a meeting can be effected, you will continue to favour me with an account of your welfare, &c.

P. S. I have answered Lalla Nerunjun Lall in the fullest and most satisfactory manner on the subject which he mentioned to me. He will certainly represent the circumstance accordingly to you. You will certainly consider the report of the Lalla as faithful.

(A true translation.)

G. MERCER,

Agent to the Governor-General.

* His declaration is of great length, its whole tenor is to prove the treachery of the Bhurt pore Rajah. [Ed.]

*Extract of a Letter from Jeewun Khaun and Elahi Bucksh Khaun to
Seo Lalla.*

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

It is reported here that Maha Raja is encamped at Nerwah, and Meer Khaun has crossed the Jumna at Calpee, and is raising disturbances on the opposite side of the river. Write me fully the news from your quarter, and what is meant to be done. You have, I suppose, heard of the Faringies,* viz. that they have not the power to do any thing (literally, that which is called life they have no longer in them), they have here and there made every thing their own. If you do not seize this opportunity when will you do it? Write me all the news from your part of what you and Maharajah settle. The French have beat the English, and are arrived at Calcutta; write me the accounts of this. Write me what are the negotiations between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Faringies. The Sirdars in the Doab, Bugwunt Sing, and Diaram Sing, have wrote to me, so I send you their letters without delay. Great and small are all ready, and only watching your steps. Write me if you mean to arrange the affairs of the Doab according to these letters or not: On my part, make my Arz† to Maharaje that he must lose no time now the Faringies have crossed the Jumna. If Maharaje comes and fixes his camp at Muttra, I will be able to settle all the country according to the Maharaje's orders, and Maharaje need not have the smallest uneasiness on any account; I will bring great and small to fall at his feet, and take the Mahmulah‡ according to his pleasure; make an Arz of this in private. Send me daily accounts of your marching and halting. We are alone, in the hopes of Maharaje's arrival.

(A true translation.)

G. MERCER,

Agent to the Governor-General.

Letter from Nerunjun Lall to Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

Before this, six Hircarrahs carrying intelligence from this quarter were sent off, but hitherto I have received no answer. What is the cause of this want of attention? I on a former occasion represented the disposition of the inhabitants of this country and of Koer Rundhere Singh, son of Rajah Runjeet Singh. Rundhere Singh is now prepared to join you, he this day sent for me privately, and said with a sincere heart, "I will join Holkar. I consider my own interest interwoven with the exaltation of Holkar. I am ready to join his victorious army. By the blessing of God, when his triumphant troops arrive in this country, and we shall have a meeting; I can join him with near 100,000 horse and foot, and I will procure all the inhabitants, great and small, in Hindostan to join. Having sworn," he added, "I am henceforth a companion of Holkar's in all his toils and pleasures; he has also written to you—safety to my Lord." Seeing Koer Rundhere is enterprizing and high-minded, and detesting the continuance of the English in this quarter, and their killing cows, and scorns to yield obedience to them; he has therefore taken an oath to join you heart and hand, has bound his loins§ in the

* Europeans.

† Verbal representation.

‡ Affair or business.

§ A phrase, signifying a state of resolution and preparation.

determination to extirpate them, and now expects your answer. But he fears your army is still distant; that the veil of concealment will be torn, and the secret revealed. The idea is horrid, and the business would become difficult.

My Prince, when the enemy went towards Kota to encounter your victorious army, the disposition of the country greatly changed, but now when you design to come this way, and the enemy overwhelmed by fear are again creating disturbances in their own country, so weak are their measures that they put to death the guards belonging to the Zemindars.

You who are a boundless river adopt this arrangement, which will make the reprobates fly; send some chief by the way of Dhoolpore or Kerowly and Subbelgur into this country, which will be of great advantage. Rajah Runjeet Sing also says, "necessity compelled me to temporize with the English, but from my heart I wish to see you victorious; and by the blessing of God, I shall be prepared to join you on your arrival here. All the great and the low, praise the wisdom with which God has endowed you who have formed such a plan as will put all the Caffers* (English) to flight."

The English have established guards, and made provision for the Brahmins at the Dhujunter Ghaut, but the Misser and the Maharajah's Gossain say, if you command it, they will work on the Brahmins to go away, but an order is necessary.

(A true translation.)

G. MERCER,

Agent to the Governor-General.

Letter from Nerunjun Lall to Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

Just now Rajah Runjeet Sing is ready to join you, and has told me that he was from necessity compelled to join the reprobated (English), for the enemy surrounded his country, and the Rajah of Jyepore had also joined them, and your victorious army was at a great distance. But now, conformable to this oath, and by the worship of the cow, he has girt his loins with firmness. If just now your victorious army will approach, he is ready to sacrifice his life; but do not act as formerly, for the enemy tremble like reeds at your power and greatness: your victorious army, without fighting retreated, evading an action. If again the same should happen, what place will remain to us? If you have suspicions of us, bury them; for in this country, which is a most sanctified place of worship, and the residence of our God, how can we support the slaughter of cows but through necessity—safety to you! There is just now a misunderstanding between Runjeet Singh and the enemy, and their troops will certainly besiege Bhurtpore and the other forts. At the different forts horse and foot are entertaining, and stores of provisions collecting for the garrisons. The English openly say how long is Bhurtpore to stand? It is a place of refuge, and a residence of the Mahrattas; and they say, has not the dominion of the Mahrattas been removed from this country? It is not therefore good that Bhurtpore should remain. Now, the Rajah clearly understands that the establishment of the English power is deadly poison to him, and that the English will not leave him his forts; he is therefore making

* Infidels.

preparation, and is desirous, if Holkar will come on just now and be steadfast in his design, he will join him. There are no troops of the enemy just now, and the whole is bare of soldiers. If you put Lucan to death and advance, you will conquer the whole country without a battle. I am united and confederated with the whole; but if, as before, you are not firm in this design, we are helpless, and will temporize in the best way we can. I am hopeful answers will be immediately sent to both letters, and also to those of Rajah Runjeet Singh and Koer Rundhere Singh.

(A true translation.)

G. MERCER,

Agent to the Governor-General.

No. XXXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

(Private.)

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, August 17th, 1804.

I transmit to you further notes upon the present state of affairs with Holkar. I should wish to receive your sentiments upon these notes previously to the transmission of any official despatch.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
always yours, most affectionately
and sincerely,

WELLESLEY.

The Marquess Wellesley's Notes. A.

Fort William, August 17, 1804.

1. Since the date of my last notes, it appears that Colonel Monson's detachment has retired altogether from Malwah with loss of guns, camp equipage, &c. and in great distress. It appears also that Colonel Murray's detachment has arrived at Ougein, but without any efficient body of cavalry, and that little hope can be formed of any efficient aid in cavalry or otherwise from Scindiah. It is therefore advisable to consider the general outlines of a plan of operations against Holkar under these circumstances.

2. The power of Holkar is said to consist principally in a large body of horse, with a body of infantry, and a very large proportion of artillery. The horse is said to be in general Patans, collected from Rohilcund and the countries in the neighbourhood of Delhi, and from Candeish, Musselmans driven from the Mysore country, and others who have quitted the service of the Nizam and the Nabob of Arcot, a few Mahrattas and some parties of Pindarries.

3. Holkar's infantry is said to have never been of a superior descrip-

tion, even when commanded by European officers. The sepoys have mutinied frequently, and under the command of native officers they cannot be in that state of subordination and discipline to resist our troops with effect. Since the defeat of Scindiah's armies by the British troops, Holkar's corps of infantry have been joined by deserters from Scindiah's corps; and Holkar's battalions are said to be strong, although their discipline is deficient. This remark, however, applied to the state of Holkar's force previously to his retreat from the Commander-in-Chief's army in Hindostan. It is not known whether Holkar has suffered in numbers or character by that retreat; it may, however, be inferred that Colonel Monson's retreat will have added to the reputation and strength of Holkar in a considerable degree. And the same unfortunate consequences must be expected to have been aggravated by our disgraces and disasters in Bundelcund, and by Colonel Murray's original retreat, although that officer has advanced since that time to his proposed destination.

4. Holkar's artillery is supposed not to be very formidable. He is said to have taken some guns from Scindiah in his contest with that chief, which, however, are said to have been retaken by Scindiah. Holkar, subsequently, took the guns belonging to Scindiah in the battle at Poonah, but as the corps engaged at Poonah were Ambajee's, it is probable that the ordnance was not equal to that of Scindiah's regular establishment. Holkar carried off from Poonah all the guns he found there belonging to the Peishwa. Whatever may be the description of Holkar's artillery, it is certainly numerous, and the capture of a numerous artillery if tolerably served, must be a matter of some difficulty and exertion.

5. Holkar's army is not paid; it depends for its subsistence entirely upon plunder, and its means must be very precarious.

6. No principle of union can exist in such a body as that commanded by Holkar. The Patans and Mussulmans can have no attachment to Holkar, and most probably have no knowledge of each other, and the whole force must have collected about Holkar as a chief of note, and with the sole object of gaining a subsistence.

7. The defeat of such a body in any one action would annihilate it; the persons composing it, who might escape with their lives, would probably return to their homes. But it is probable that Holkar will endeavour to avoid an action; a necessity therefore occurs of framing the system of measures to be adopted against him with reference to this probability.

8. It will not answer to operate upon Holkar by detachments neither possessing all the component parts of an army, nor the power of moving with celerity. A detachment of this description placed in the strongest post, unless that post shall afford all the means of subsistence, is always liable to be distressed, and to be compelled to retreat before such an army as Holkar's. These partial successes, as they will increase the reputation of Holkar, will induce additional numbers of vagabonds to resort to his standard, and he will become more formidable in point of

strength, at the same time that it must be expected that a series of these successes will tend to depress the spirit of our troops.

9. Adverting to these considerations, the following suggestions are submitted to the Commander-in-Chief's superior judgment, as comprizing my general view of the objects to be pursued in the present war, and of the means of attaining the proposed end, with the greatest practicable degree of certainty and despatch.

10. A small army from Hindostan to take the field as speedily as possible against Holkar directly. This army to be composed of regular and irregular cavalry, European and native infantry and artillery. The operations of this army to be directed immediately against the army commanded by Holkar himself, the object to be to bring Holkar to an action if possible; if he should avoid an action, this army to pursue Holkar to the last extremity. This army should be equipped for light movements; it must, however, be of sufficient strength to defeat the main body of Holkar's troops. This army to be commanded by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in person.

11. Besides this army to be employed in direct operations against Holkar's army, it would appear necessary to employ detachments to co-operate against him.

First. The passes into the Company's territories in Hindostan should be sufficiently guarded by a detachment of such strength as to preserve tranquillity in those territories, and to be able to attack any body of the enemy which might pass round the Commander-in-Chief's army, to be employed in direct operations against Holkar's forces. It would appear desirable to form this detachment somewhere between Delhi and Agra towards the passes, and to strengthen it by a certain reduction of the garrisons of Delhi, Muttra, Agra, &c. and if absolutely necessary, an efficient force in the field, acting as a reserve to the Commander-in-Chief's army in this quarter, seems desirable, if attainable consistently with the object of providing adequately for those garrisons. It is not probable that Holkar could attempt any siege of a place of strength. Delhi, however, will certainly require a strong garrison, unless the position of the proposed field detachment should be such as to protect Delhi.

Secondly. A detachment of the same description should be placed in Bundelcund, under an officer of rank, skill, and activity.

Thirdly. It would be highly useful that the corps under Colonel Murray should be enabled to move towards the frontiers of Guzerat, where Colonel Murray's force might occupy a position for the protection of that country, and might co-operate effectually with the army acting immediately upon Holkar, if Holkar should move towards Guzerat. For this purpose it would be highly desirable that the subsidiary force for Scindiah, consisting of six battalions, should be furnished from Hindostan, should form a part of the Commander-in-Chief's army, and upon his Excellency's advance into Malwah, should be thrown forward to Ougein and remain in that post, prepared to operate according to the direction which Holkar might take when pressed by the Commander-in-Chief; while Colonel Murray's force should march to a position on the

frontier of Guzerat. If it should not be practicable to furnish such a force to Ougein from Hindostan, Colonel Murray's corps must remain at Ougein, unless he should have certain intelligence that Holkar flies before the British army into Guzerat, in which case, Colonel Murray ought to follow Holkar into Guzerat.

12. According to these suggestions, Holkar would be enclosed between four British detachments, in addition to the Commander-in-Chief's force, supposing it to be possible to form a subsidiary force for Ougein in Hindostan; namely, 1st. The Commander-in-Chief's main army. 2dly. Detachment between Delhi and Agra. 3dly. Bundlecund detachment. 4thly. Ougein subsidiary force. 5thly. Guzerat, Colonel Murray. Holkar certainly might pass round these detachments into the Company's provinces. This risk is, however, preferable to any system of a defensive nature. The Commander-in-Chief's glorious success in the last campaign is in no respect more admirable than in the judgment displayed by the forward movements of the British troops under circumstances, which induced persons of less firmness and skill to recommend a defensive system for the supposed purpose of covering our own frontier. The active pursuit of the enemy's main force is the most efficient plan of defence, and this plan steadfastly pursued, constituted the principal source of our triumphs in the late war. It is of the utmost importance to accelerate the conclusion of the war with Holkar; under any defensive system, the war must be protracted, with a repetition of the misfortunes which have already occurred.

WELLESLEY.

The Marquess Wellesley's Notes. B.

Fort William, August 17, 1804.

1. As the nature of the campaign against Holkar will necessarily lead the army of Bengal to much greater distance from our frontier than has been usual in the operations of that army, a particular and early attention will be required to the system of supply.

2. That supply will probably be managed partly by a commissary of grain, partly by the service of Brinjarries, and partly by the resources of the country, which is the scene of operations, supplied by dealers attending upon, and belonging to the camp bazars.

3. In such a campaign, the first mode will not answer for all the demands of grain which must exist in the army; the last must always depend upon the state of the country in which the army may act. When the country is overrun by an army, such as Holkar's, the supplies from the country cannot afford a certain resource. The Brinjarries also in such a case afford but a precarious supply.

4. Each of these modes of supply may, however, be serviceable to a certain degree. In addition, however, to all these modes of supply, the collectors in the countries in the Doab, on the right bank of the Jumna, and in Bundlecund, should be directed to collect as much grain as may be practicable, and to forward it in such quantities as may be convenient to either of the detachments collected in Hindostan, or in Bundlecund,

according to the distance from the spot at which the grain may have been purchased. Officers ought to be appointed to take charge of this grain. The Commander-in-Chief possesses full authority to issue such orders to the collectors, and to appoint all the necessary officers for the care and transportation of the grain.

5. With a view to the convenience of keeping the collections of grain in security, even if the detachments should move, it would be desirable that the grain should be lodged in a fort in the neighbourhood of the camps of the several detachments.

6. This grain might then be forwarded to the camp of the army engaged in direct operations against Holkar, either by the bullocks belonging to the commissary of grain, or by the Brinjarries, or by the dealers attached to the bazars, sufficiently escorted from the several detachments to the grand army. When arrived at the army, the grain may be disposed of in such manner as the Commander-in-Chief may think proper.

WELLESLEY.

No. XXXVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

SIR,

Fort William, August 22, 1804.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter noted in the margin,* together with its enclosures.

2. I entirely approve your Excellency's proceedings respecting the traitorous correspondence intercepted by Lieutenant-Colonel Monson, and the examination and apprehension of the agent of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the city of Muttra.

3. The documents transmitted with your Excellency's despatch, afford ample proof of the existence of a traitorous design to engage the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the prosecution of purposes inimical to the British interests in Hindostan.

4. I am however disposed to believe that Rajah Runjeet Sing Rajah of Bhurtpore, and his son Koer Rundhere Sing, although deeply implicated in the existing design by their intercepted letters and communications, are rather to be considered as the instruments of their respective servants and adherents, than as principal contrivers of this nefarious project.

5. The project has probably originated among the despe-

* Dated 13th August, 1804; received 22d August.

rate characters justly described in the 9th paragraph of your Excellency's letter, and it appears reasonable to presume, that the intrigues and machinations of those abandoned adventurers have involved the Rajah of Bhurtpore and his son in a design evidently contrary to their interests, and of which the success could not prove advantageous to any other class of persons than the mean, profligate, and indigent contrivers of the original plot.

6. The just principles of policy, as well as the characteristic lenity and mercy of the British Government, require that a due indulgence should be manifested towards the imbecility, ignorance, and indolence of the native chiefs, who have been drawn into these acts of treachery and hostility by the depravity and artifices of their servants and adherents; on the other hand, every principle of justice as well as of public security demand, that an example should be made of the real authors of this design, and that the due punishment of their guilt should operate as a restraint upon similar dispositions to commit acts of wickedness and audacity.

7. I therefore hereby authorize and direct your Excellency to assure the Rajah of Bhurtpore in the most distinct terms, of the determination of the British Government to discharge all the obligations of the existing treaty with him in the most strict and punctual manner, to apprize the Rajah of the falsehood and wickedness of the imputations alledged against the British Government, respecting a supposed design of violating that treaty by any interference in the Rajah's internal government, or by any attempt to subject his territories, forts, or garrisons, to the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the Company's courts, or to interpose the authority of the Company in any manner whatever in his civil or military government, or in any manner whatever to depart from the terms of the subsisting treaty.

8. Your Excellency will be pleased to make this communication to the Rajah of Bhurtpore either by letter, or by the direct mission of an accredited agent, or by both modes of communication, according to your judgment and discretion.

9. You will accompany this communication by transmitting to the Rajah copies of any letters which may have fallen into your Excellency's hands, from himself or from his son, ad-

dressed to Jeswunt Rao Holkar; you will also signify to the Rajah your Excellency's knowledge of the conduct of his servants and adherents, and of the persons who have maintained an intercourse in his name with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and you will admonish the Rajah respecting the inevitable ruin in which the practices of such persons must involve him and his family, if suffered to proceed with impunity; you will also require the Rajah and his family, to relinquish all communication with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and with every other enemy of the British Government, and you will signify to the Rajah that if he should continue such intercourse, or correspondence, he will compel your Excellency to treat him as a public enemy.

10. Your Excellency will further inform the Rajah of Bhurtpore of your determination to seize and bring to speedy justice, all the agents concerned in any traitorous correspondence between the allies or dependants of the Company and its enemy, wherever such agents may be found, and you will apprize the Rajah that the indulgence manifested towards himself and his son, will not be extended to the inferior agents of the conspiracy, whom your Excellency will punish in the most signal and exemplary manner.

11. Your Excellency will be pleased to employ every degree of alacrity and exertion in apprehending all the agents and instruments of the existing conspiracy, and you will not scruple to seize any such persons, although they should have taken refuge in the territories of any of our allies or dependants; especially you will use every endeavour to seize any such persons who may remain within the territories of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, apprizing the Rajah in the most distinct terms of your determination not to sanction any asylum for criminals of such a description.

12. In pursuance of this communication, I hereby authorize and direct your Excellency to bring to trial before a court martial all such persons concerned in the present conspiracy as shall have been apprehended within the territories of our dependants and allies, or within the territories of the Company not yet subjected to the code of regulations, and your Excellency will inflict upon such persons the punishment awarded by the sentence of such court martial.

13. Under this instruction your Excellency will bring to

trial, and upon conviction, to punishment Nerunjun Lall apprehended in the city of Muttra, together with the other persons whose correspondence appears in your despatch, if they shall have been apprehended within the limits described in the preceding paragraph.

14. With regard to such persons charged with the same crime as shall be apprehended within the Company's provinces subject to the regulations, your Excellency will be pleased to bring this description of criminals to trial before the Company's Court of circuit and appeal.

15. The effectual and early reduction of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar will afford the only certain and permanent security against the consequences of this conspiracy, as well as against every similar design; I flatter myself that your Excellency will be enabled by forming a detachment between Agra and Delhi to provide a sufficient restraint upon any internal disaffection, or upon the conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, while the main body of the army shall move with celerity against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

16. I rely with implicit confidence upon the seasonable application of your Excellency's transcendant talents and activity to this most urgent purpose, being firmly convinced that an early pressure upon the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar from Hindostan, will provide immediate safety for all our possessions, as well as for the general tranquillity of India; any delay in the movement of the force destined to act immediately against Holkar must tend to encourage that freebooter and his adherents, as well as every disaffected person within our dominions. I entertain no doubt that the first appearance of your Excellency's army in the field will dispel all these vain hopes and wicked artifices; until an impression shall have been made upon Holkar's forces, by the British arms, it is evident, that however contemptible in fact, his power will obtain considerable reputation among the native states, and the existence of such a reputation must tend to disturb the British territories, and to weaken the British influence and power in the northern provinces of Hindostan.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect, Sir, &c.
WELLESLEY.

No. XXXIX.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, Sep. 2d, 1804.

The accompanying letter from Colonel Blair will, I am certain be the cause of as much misery to yourself as to me. In consequence of it I shall move every man I possibly can to encounter this war, and I trust, under the protection of divine Providence, I shall once more have the satisfaction of reporting to you, my dear Lord, that we have been successful. I will not at present say anything more upon this disgraceful and disastrous event, as my feelings are for many reasons too much agitated to enter into the misfortunes and causes of it. A finer detachment never marched, and sorry I am to say, that if this account of Lieutenant Anderson is correct, I have lost five battalions and six companies, the flower of the army, and how they are to be replaced at this day, God only knows. I have to lament also the loss of some of the finest young men and most promising in the army.

I will not say more upon these matters, only assure you that no exertion of mine shall be wanting to crush this freebooter, whose force is not I believe by any means what it has been represented, or at all formidable if attacked. The first object is in my opinion, to destroy Holkar, I shall therefore do every thing in my power to bring him to action at an early period, which by his bringing his guns, and having met with success, I think very probable may soon take place. The taking a large force with me will of course leave our provinces in a weak and defenceless state, but as it appears the whole of India is at stake, some risk must be made to accomplish this our principal object. You may be assured that I will not leave it in a worse state than I can possibly help, nor will I get too far from our own provinces to run the chance of any material bad consequences arising during my absence.

If Colonel Murray could advance, the general consequences attending a forward movement from that quarter would have a most wonderful effect. He complains of want of provision and cattle. I have written to him if possible to come on, but letters are so long getting to him, besides the chance of

their not reaching him from this quarter, gives me but little hopes of his rendering any effectual service before it is too late.

I shall begin the march to-morrow, and hope ere long to write a more agreeable letter.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with the most affectionate regard,
your devoted,

G. LAKE.

No. XL.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Head Quarters, Camp near Gunge, Sept. 8th, 1804.

I have now the honour to forward for your Lordship's information, the honourable Colonel Monson's report of the operations of his detachment from the 23d to the 31st of August, the period of the arrival of the detachment at Agra. This with my former despatches will put your Lordship in possession of every information I have received respecting the movements of Colonel Monson's corps since he retreated from Mochundie Ghaut.

Although I cannot sufficiently lament the unfortunate turn affairs have taken with this detachment, or the circumstances which led to them, still I feel it my duty to represent to your Lordship, that both officers and men of the detachment, on every occasion in which they were actually engaged with the enemy, maintained the superiority of British discipline, and showed the utmost steadiness and gallantry; and that should an opportunity occur of leading against the enemy, those who remain, I shall place the fullest confidence in their attachment, and approved bravery and experience.

I shall cause every possible enquiry to be made into the apparent disaffection, on the part of some of the corps, who formed the detachment, but I have the pleasure to assure your Lordship, that it does not appear to have been by any means extensive; numbers of the sepoys are daily coming in; and those that are still with the enemy and have been obliged to take service, have sent word to their officers that they will avail themselves of the first opportunity of escaping

to return; those who refused to enter the enemy's service, have been most cruelly treated and in general mutilated in the right hand.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord, &c.

G. LAKE.

1st Enclosure.

Hon. Colonel Monson to Lieutenant-General Lake.

SIR,

Agra, Sept. 2nd, 1804.

I had the honour to inform you, in my letter under date the 22nd instant, that I was encamped on the banks of the Banas river, which I was in hopes I should be able to cross the following day, but finding the river did not fall so rapidly as I had reason to expect, I ordered Captain Nicholl with six companies of the 2nd battalion of the 21st regiment to cross in boats and proceed immediately to Khoosshall Ghur, in charge of the treasure with my detachment. On the evening of the 23rd the whole of Holkar's cavalry came up, and pitched their camp about two coss from me; on the morning of the 24th at day-light, finding the river fordable, I began to cross my baggage. At eight o'clock, A.M. the enemy took possession of a large village on my right, and commenced making embrasures for two guns, I therefore ordered without delay two companies from the 12th regiment and the advanced picquet from the 2nd battalion, 2nd regiment, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Parr of the latter corps, to storm it, which they did with the loss of few men killed and wounded. About twelve o'clock the whole of my baggage with the 12th regiment, 1st battalion 14th, 2nd do. 9th regiment had crossed and one howitzer, the above corps leaving their picquets standing, the 2nd battalion, 2nd regiment remaining to support them, finding any attempt to withdraw my picquets before dark must prove inevitable destruction to them. About four o'clock P.M. Jeswunt Rao Holkar's infantry came up; in the morning nearly the whole of his cavalry had crossed at a ford three or four miles below me for the purpose of attacking my baggage, which had obliged me to cross my infantry as his cavalry crossed. When his infantry had surrounded my picquets, they opened a heavy cannonade, which obliged the party I had posted in the village we had taken in the morning, to withdraw, and of which the enemy took possession directly, and planted two guns, but our right flank being protected by a high hill, they had no effect, they therefore soon withdrew them more to our left, and after having cannonaded us for nearly an hour, they came down to the attack making a hideous noise. Our troops received them with great coolness and charged; the enemy fled, and we carried a line of guns, but were prevented making use of them, the whole of the ammunition being carried away. The enemy immediately opened a fire extremely heavy from a fresh line of guns, and surrounded us with bodies of infantry and cavalry; most of my troops were now either killed or wounded, and further re-

sistance being vain, I retreated to the Ghaut with the howitzer, the enemy pressing on me very fast, when we reached the river, the confusion was very great. The enemy's horse cut in, and every man that stood by the howitzer was cut down. Our troops now pressed fast into the river endeavouring to make their escape, but the enemy pushed after and many were either killed or drowned. At this instant while the enemy were making a dreadful slaughter of our troops, Colonel M'Culloch with the 1st battalion, 14th regiment came down to the river on the opposite side, upon which the enemy retired, and enabled a few of our troops to escape, which was scarcely done, when the enemy brought their guns to the Ghaut, and under the cover of their fire began to cross. I immediately formed my troops into an oblong square and commenced my march.

The enemy's cavalry pressing me hard, I found it impossible to save the whole of my baggage, therefore leaving my baggage to make the best of its way, I moved rapidly on, and I reached Khooshall Ghur on the evening of the 25th, the greater part of my baggage having fallen into the hands of the enemy. We had been greatly annoyed the whole of the day, the enemy's horse hanging on the rear, and threatening to charge, which had obliged me to halt and open the howitzer on them, several times. I found Captain Nicholl's detachment encamped in the fort; they had been attacked by the battalions belonging to Rao Mahdoo Sadishoo Buxy; for the particulars I refer your Excellency to Captain Nicholl's letter which I have the honour to enclose. I was much surprized on my arrival at Khooshall Ghur, not to find five battalions and twenty pieces of cannon belonging to the Rajah of Jeypore, as I understood from that court that I was to be joined by that force on my arrival there, but they had left it some days previous to my arrival. On the morning of the 26th the whole of the enemy's cavalry arrived, and in the evening they encamped in separate bodies all around me. It is with great pain I now inform your Excellency that I discovered during the day a correspondence going forward between some of the native commissioned officers of the 1st battalion 14th and 2nd battalion 9th regiment, with Holkar, respecting those corps going over to the enemy, fortunately a letter from Holkar to a Soubahdar was brought to me, which put it into my power to take some steps towards preventing any thing serious with regard to the safety of the detachment being endangered taking place; however, nearly two companies from the 1st battalion 14th regiment going off, and about 400 of Major Frith's irregular cavalry deserting at the same time, and receiving two verbal summons from Holkar to surrender during the day, made my situation truly alarming, not knowing to what extent the treachery of my troops might exist. I must in justice notice that the exemplary conduct of the 12th regiment, and the six companies of the 2nd battalion 21st regiment during the whole of the campaign, shewed their attachment to the government and their reliance on their officers, and at this period in particular, their steady good conduct was very conspicuous. On the 26th at seven o'clock, P.M. I moved out of the fort, and formed an oblong square:

finding the howitzer would prove a serious delay to us, I ordered it to be spiked, and commenced my march. The enemy, as soon as they knew we had moved, followed us, and one body charged but were easily repulsed, the guns nearly at the same time belonging to Rao Mahdoo Sadishoo Buxy's battalion opened on us but with no effect. It being so dark they could not distinguish our troops at the distance we were. The enemy's cavalry followed us the whole of the night of the 26th, and during the day of the 27th, harassing our troops by attempting to charge and keeping up a constant fire from three gallopers, but which fortunately did little mischief. In the evening about six o'clock we reached Hindoun, the troops greatly exhausted. I took possession of an old ruined fort and remained until one o'clock, A. M. on the 28th, when I commenced my march; at day-light the enemy's horse were in sight, they keeping the high road whilst we marched among the ravines, the guide taking what he said was the best road. We had just cleared the ravines when the enemy's cavalry made a desperate charge in three bodies, which was received by our troops with determined coolness and bravery, the 12th regiment reserving their fire until the enemy were within a few yards of their bayonets which when delivered did great execution, several Sirdars falling. The enemy finding they could make no impression, wheeled off and made no more attempts to charge during the day.

We reached the Biana Pass about sunset and finding the troops greatly fatigued, I halted, intending to remain for the night at the entrance of the pass. The enemy's guns at this time came up, and finding I had halted, brought their guns around me and opened a furious cannonade, which obliged me to proceed. We got to the city of Biana about nine o'clock, P. M. The night being extremely dark, the baggage had mixed with the line, and thrown the troops into great confusion: however I got the corps together as well as possible and moved on, but they were soon separated again, owing to the darkness of the night and the great cultivation. Finding it impossible to collect the whole together again, each corps made the best of their way to Agra, keeping together as much as possible, where most of the troops arrived by the 30th and the whole by the 31st at day-light.

I beg leave now to assure your Excellency that the coolness and determined bravery shewn by the officers and men of the detachment during this arduous contest, merits my warmest praise; the firmness with which they received the repeated attacks of so superior and powerful an enemy and the patience with which they underwent the greatest hardships, claims my admiration and gratitude, and shewed themselves worthy of the name of British troops. To Lieutenant Colonels M'Culloch and Ashe, Major Radcliffe, Captains Nicholl, Featherstone, and Fletcher I feel greatly indebted for their exertions. Lieutenant Colonel Don and Captain O'Donnel, both in a bad state of health, exerted themselves greatly and rendered me essential service.

Your Excellency will perceive, by the enclosed return of killed and wounded, that our loss has been very great. Though I cannot but lament with the deepest regret the loss of so many noble fellows, yet I

cannot but observe with some satisfaction, that even in the hour of death, each emulated the other to deeds of glory, and fell as became British soldiers and men.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. MONSON.
Brig. Com.

2d Enclosure.

Captain Nicholl to the Hon. Brigadier General Monson.

SIR,

Agra, Aug. 31st, 1803.

I take this, the earliest opportunity of detailing the occurrences of the detachment you did me the honour to place under my command on the river Banas.

After crossing the Banas in the evening of the 22nd, with six companies of the 2nd battalion of the 21st regiment, (not exceeding 240 firelocks) I moved from its bank about ten o'clock in the following morning in charge of the treasure, tumbrils, &c., and proceeded according to your instructions on the road to Coossial Ghur. About seven in the evening I halted at a small village to refresh the people; and between three and four of the morning of the 24th, moved with the intention of waiting your arrival at the town of Bebonda agreeable to your directions, but being refused admittance, I hesitated not a moment in pushing for Coossial Ghur, under the supposition that my presence there might favourably operate upon the Mahratta chiefs, with whom I had understood negotiation was carrying on. My approach to the town was arrested by a body of Mahratta cavalry, which I (reluctantly) submitted to upon the principle of moderation, and as we came upon them rather unexpectedly, the military etiquette of stopping our approach to their camp to ascertain the cause of our mission, might not be deemed irregular or improper. After being informed that our arrival was for the express purpose of conciliation, we were permitted to proceed to the Fort, under the walls of which I encamped about 12 o'clock, forming a junction with a company of the 12th regiment which had been there some days. Our arrival seemed to excite a good deal of commotion among the Mahrattas, who immediately got under arms, and in an hour sounded a signal for march; I then advised them again that we had come on terms of friendship, and begged they would persuade themselves to remain where they were until your arrival, which might be expected in all the next day; this, however, had no other effect than producing a declaration, on their part, that they had been deceived, and about 4 o'clock they marched off and encamped a coss distant on the opposite side of the town; at 9 o'clock at night all our picquets were attacked at the same moment by horsemen, &c. With our little line under arms, I directed the picquets to stand their ground, which they did until the morning, when I recalled them and moved into the Fort of Coossial Ghur, having several gates and more openings. Between 7 and 8 o'clock on the 24th I was apprized of the Mahrattas' intention of levying a maumlah* upon

* Contribution.

the town, accompanied with a threat, that if in two hours a certain sum was not paid, they would open a cannonade upon it. Conceiving that in alliance with the Jeypoor Rajah, it was my duty to defend his rights, I wrote to the Mahratta Chiefs, repeating the cause and intention of our arrival, adding that if they were determined to insist upon unjust exactions, I was equally determined under all the circumstances existing to oppose them, to which they replied as enclosed (leaving me no doubts as to my own conduct) in haughty terms demanding all my elephants, treasure, arms, &c., and observing that if I would resign them I should be permitted to retire unmolested wherever I pleased. Not having great confidence in Mahratta faith, and feeling all the indignity annexed to the insolence of such a demand, I of course made no reply, and in an hour they opened a battery of 10 guns, 9 and 6 pounders, which they continued playing until 3 o'clock P. M., when finding they could make no impression, they moved round to the northward. Although their battery had been within musket shot, I treated them with silent contempt, which may have encouraged their attack upon the town in the evening, as about 5 o'clock they recommenced their cannonade (all the towns-people quitting the fort), and their infantry, 6 or 800, entering by the north gate with colours flying and drums beating, but by the brisk gallantry of Lieutenant Harriott with his own company of the 2d battalion of the 12th regiment, followed with equal spirit by about 100 men of the 2d battalion of the 21st regiment, the enemy were beat back under disgrace, leaving several killed, and many must have been wounded. Observing the animated conduct of this spirited detachment, I regretted most seriously that I had not a few more sepoys to have enabled me to take advantage of an exulting moment, but the responsibility of a charge so serious in its nature as the treasure, made me pause, fearful of carrying even gallantry too far, though I had not the smallest doubt of success had I attempted their battery. After repulsing their attack upon the town I had however determined to storm this battery upon the close of day, and had given orders to that effect, but whether the enemy had been apprized of your approach or my determination, they wisely moved off their guns to their camp, where altogether they possessed 24 or 25 pieces of cannon. The spirited conduct of our small body in this little affair does them great credit, and is, in my humble opinion, deserving of praise. The men of the 2d battalion of the 21st followed with animated courage the bright example of the company of the 12th regiment. Lieutenant Brownrigg, who upon this occasion acted as a volunteer, behaved with great spirit.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. NICHOLL,

Capt. commanding a Detachment.

The Company of the 12th, one Drummer killed.

Do. do. 21st, one Sepoy do.

No. XLI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

(Official and Secret.)

SIR,

Fort William, Sept. 10, 1804.

1. I have the honour to transmit enclosed, for your Excellency's notice, an extract from a letter from Mr. A. Seton, the Governor-General's Agent at Bareilly, on the subject of the overtures received from a chieftain of the tribe of Sikhs, named Dolcha Sing, for establishing a connection with the British power.

2. Your Excellency will observe, from the information contained in that letter, that Dolcha Sing is desirous of being subsidized by the British Government, and that proposals to that effect may be expected from him.

3. It is possible that the services of this chieftain may eventually be employed with effect in contributing to the protection of the Doab from the incursions of predatory horse, when the river Jumna shall become fordable. I deem it advisable, therefore, to authorize your Excellency, if you should think proper, to subsidize Dolcha Sing, during the war. I have accordingly issued instructions to the Acting Resident at Delhi, to the Agent at Bareilly, and to the Collector of Sehaunpore, directing those officers to communicate directly to your Excellency, whatever information they may obtain respecting Dolcha Sing, and whatever proposals they may receive from him, and to conform to such orders as your Excellency may think proper to address to them on the subject of a negotiation with that chieftain.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XLII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, Sept. 11, 1804.

I received this morning your letter of the 2d of September, and Lieut.-Colonel Lake's letters to Captain Armstrong of the 2d and 3d September. Grievous and disastrous as the

events are, detailed in those letters, the extent of the calamity does not exceed my expectation ; from the first hour of Colonel Monson's retreat, I have always augured the ruin of that detachment, and if any part of it be saved, I deem it so much gain. From Colonel Blair's letter to Colonel Macan, I trust that the greater part of the detachment is arrived at Agra, but I fear my poor friend Monson is gone. Whatever may have been his fate, or whatever the result of his misfortunes to my own fame, I will endeavour to shield his character from obloquy, nor will I attempt the mean purpose of sacrificing his reputation to save mine. His former services and his zeal entitle him to indulgence ; and however I may lament or suffer for his errors, I will not reproach his memory if he be lost, or his character, if he survive. Your letter manifests your usual judgment and spirit. We must endeavour rather to retrieve than to blame what is past, and under your auspices I entertain no doubt of success. Time, however, is the main consideration. Every hour that shall be left to this plunderer will be marked by some calamity ; we must expect a general defection of the allies, and even confusion in our own territories, unless we can attack Holkar's main force immediately with decisive success. I trust that you will be enabled to assemble your army in sufficient time to prevent further mischief, and above all, the most dangerous consequence of any interruption to the formation of your army in full strength. I perfectly agree with you, that the first object must be the defeat of Holkar's infantry in the field, and to take his guns ; I hope your force is fully equal to that object ; but I highly applaud your determination to leave nothing to fortune on that point ; and rather to risk the internal tranquillity of the provinces for a season, than to hazard any contest on unequal grounds with the enemy. Holkar defeated, all alarm and danger will instantly vanish ; even a doubtful battle would be perilous ; we must therefore look steadfastly at that grand object, and if we accomplish it, every other will be easy.

It will be necessary to advert to the possibility of Meer Khan, or some other plunderer in Holkar's pay entering Bundelcund. In that quarter I think every inferior object should be sacrificed to that of keeping out the enemy from our own provinces, and of aiding the operations of your army ; the

settlement of that country is now a secondary consideration; that consequence will follow our success against Holkar, and I wish you to look to affairs in Bundelcund with this view. I have written to Captain Baillie and to Colonel Martindale to this effect.

Benares and Mirzapore require particular attention. I have ordered the battalion from Kishengunge to Benares; and my body guard (200 strong, with two gallopers) to stop there for your orders; I have also ordered the 75th regiment to stop at Benares for your orders.

By the last letters from Colonel Murray, it appears that on the 8th of August he talked of advancing to the Chumbul as soon as the Guikowar cavalry should join him. General Wellesley, however, expresses great doubt whether the security of Colonel Murray's supplies may not require him to remain at Ougein, or to take up a position on the frontier of Guzerat, until your army shall have pressed upon Holkar's main force. If Holkar should be expelled again from the Chumbul, then Colonel Murray's force might be expected to intercept his retreat with advantage: but General Wellesley apprehends, that with Colonel Murray's deficiency of cavalry, his supplies might be exposed to risk, and he might be compelled to follow poor Monson's example, if he should advance from Ougein before you have pressed upon Holkar.

I rejoice in the decisive and manly view which you have taken of the present crisis: it is impossible to make peace with Holkar, and we have no safety until he shall be destroyed; you will therefore pursue that object with unremitting attention. I admit no doubt in my mind of your complete and early triumph; but it is necessary on all great occasions to look the utmost possible or rather imaginable degree of misfortune distinctly in front; and I wish you to consider, and to forward to me your opinions of the steps to be pursued by me, if contrary to all human prospects, you should experience any difficulty in crushing this mischief.

You will of course proceed immediately to any new levies of infantry and cavalry, regular or irregular, which you may deem advisable.

You will also take every step for confirming our allies, and for encouraging desertion from Holkar by renewing the proclamations of last year; or by other encouragements.

All these points, however, are subordinate to the primary object of giving Holkar a signal defeat in the field; that once accomplished, the peace of India is firm for many years.

When I look at the date of this letter* I cannot entertain a shadow of apprehension for the result of this war. This is the anniversary of the battle of Delhi; a victory gained under circumstances infinitely more unfavourable than the present. Even after that glorious success, you well know, that our situation in every part of India was far more perilous than this danger. To you, my dear Sir, we must look now, as in that crisis; our means are now greater; our confidence in our army augmented (notwithstanding this misfortune). It is not wise to despise any enemy; but surely neither the resources, nor any other circumstance belonging to our present enemy, can be compared to the advantages possessed by the enemy, whom we have recently vanquished. Holkar indeed appears to me to possess no other advantage when compared with our former enemy, than that he has succeeded in distressing a detachment of our native infantry, and that he has gained some time in the field. My only apprehension is, that he should be permitted to gain more time, or that he should find an occasion of attacking any other detached part of our force. I am convinced that you will not allow him to attack you, but that you will attack him with all practicable despatch. In that event, I anticipate a renewal of the glory of this day. The success of your noble triumphs of last year proceeded chiefly from your vigorous system of attack. In every war the native states will always gain courage in proportion as we shall allow them to attack us, and I know that you will always bear this principle in mind, especially against such a power as Holkar.

In the event of your giving Holkar a signal defeat, I leave you at liberty to propose terms of peace to him on the basis of the propositions contained in my instructions to Mr. Webbe, of which a copy is enclosed to Lieut.-Colonel Lake; but I advise you by no means to treat with him unless he will come into your camp, and disband his forces. In fact we cannot trust him with any power. Experience has manifested his

* 11th of September, anniversary of Lord Lake's victory at Delhi.—
[Ed.]

treachery, rapacity, and arrogant pretensions; and if we cannot reduce him, we have lost our ascendancy in India.

I hope it will be satisfactory to you, my dear Sir, to perceive that the only effect produced on my mind by this misfortune is an anxious solicitude to afford you every aid in remedying its consequences with every degree of dispatch; that I neither vent myself in idle complaints, nor feel vain regret, nor harbour useless resentment; our joint efforts must be employed to avail ourselves of our real strength and established reputation, to suppress the growth of this upstart power, and to efface the degree of disgrace which has been cast upon our arms by a temporary and limited failure.

May your uneasiness on this occasion be speedily converted into feelings more correspondent with the sentiments which this anniversary is calculated to inspire, and may the month of September 1804 witness new triumphs of the British arms under your auspices conformably to the glory of the same month in the last year.

Ever, my dear Sir,
with the most sincere respect,
gratitude and affection,
your most faithful and obliged servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. XLIII.

*The Governor-General's Address at the Examination of the College
at Fort William.*

20th Sept. 1804.

GENTLEMEN OF THE COLLEGE OF FORT WILLIAM,

The successful progress of this Institution during the last year has been manifested by the satisfactory result of the public examinations and exercises, by the various useful works in Oriental literature, published under the auspices of the College, and by the general conduct of the Students in the diligent and laudable observance of their prescribed duties.

The instruction of the Students in the Oriental languages, constitutes a primary object of the Institution. In pursuing this important object a more considerable advancement has been accomplished during the last year, than in any preceding period of the existence of the Institution. In the Persian, Hindostanee, and Arabic classes the comparative proficiency

of the most distinguished scholars has surpassed the utmost attainment of former years, while the comparative number of students who have attained a competent knowledge of those languages has not been diminished. Declamations in the Arabic language, were pronounced for the first time at the public disputations of the year, 1803. On the present occasion the improvement of the students in the knowledge of the Arabic language is apparent from the disputations maintained in that language.

A commendable proficiency has been made by those students, who have applied their attention to the vernacular language of Bengal. A more general attention to the study of that language is however desirable; and I recommend this subject to the consideration of the officers and students of the College.

The declamation pronounced on the present occasion in the Shanscrit language, forms a peculiar distinction in the exercises of this year. The difficulties which have embarrassed the attainment of a correct knowledge of that ancient language, appear to have been considerably diminished by the zeal, assiduity, and talents of the professors and students, and by the exertions which have been successfully employed to facilitate the study of its elementary principles.

A general improvement has been made by the students in writing the Persian, Nagree, and Bengalee character. This attainment is highly useful, and tends to promote a more correct knowledge, and more familiar use of the language to which each character is appropriated.

Of the students who now enter the public service, some have successfully commenced the study of the Mahummedan law.

In conferring degrees of honour upon—

Mr. George Swinton, Mr. William Oliver, Mr. John Wauchope, Mr. George Henry Keene, Mr. John Romer, Mr. John Walker, Mr. Clotworthy Gowan, and Mr. Thomas Perry, it is highly satisfactory to me to be enabled to declare, that the general proficiency of those gentlemen in the oriental languages, exhibits the most convincing proof of the prosperous course of this Institution. In each successive year, the standard of comparative merit has been progressive in the highest classes. On the present occasion the gentlemen who

have received degrees of honour afford an honourable example of the rapid progress of a system of education, calculated to open and enlarge the sources of oriental knowledge, and to excite and maintain the spirit of emulation in its pursuits.

In addition to these instances of extraordinary and distinguished merit, the general state of the examinations of January, 1804,* and the reports of the several professors have satisfied me that a great majority of the students who proceed to the public service in this year, have attained a proficiency in the oriental languages, sufficient to afford essential aid in the several departments to which they have been appointed. The delay which the exigency of my numerous and laborious public duties has occasioned in the period of the annual disputations, has enabled me to signify at this time the cordial satisfaction which I have derived from examining the reports of the officers of the College, at the close of the second term of 1804, respecting the proficiency and conduct of the students, who now remain subject to the rules of the College. With sincere pleasure I observe, that the general spirit of emulation in their prescribed studies not only continues unabated, but has acquired additional strength and ardour; that their general progress has been attended with extraordinary success, and that the instances of diligent application and considerable attainments are so numerous among them as to promise high honour to their characters, permanent advantage to their interests, and to those of the public, and augmented credit to the Institution, which has favoured their progress, and accelerated their success.

In distributing the official appointments of the present year, the attention of the Governor-General in Council has been anxiously directed to the important purpose of encouraging industry and diligence, and of apportioning offices and distinctions to those whose attainments under this Institution afford a fair promise of adequate qualification for the public service.

The same spirit of justice will continue to regulate the proceedings of the Governor-General in Council; and the due rewards of merit will ever be secure in the honourable hands

* The examinations were held in January, 1804, but the Governor-General's Address did not take place until September, 1804.—[Ed.]

destined to exercise the arduous charge of this great government.

They, who now proceed to the public service, may therefore anticipate a just but vigilant observation of their conduct in the discharge of their respective official functions, and may be assured that their future promotion will be proportional to their respective merits; while those students who remain subject to the rules of the College, may contemplate with confidence the plain and direct course which leads to prosperity and honour in this service.

The students from the establishments of Fort St. George, and Bombay, have justly obtained the most eminent honour on this occasion. Their high attainments, and distinguished industry and talents, will be received with ample encouragement at their respective presidencies, and cannot fail to contribute useful aid in the administration of the extensive dominions subjected to Fort St. George and Bombay, by the success of our counsels and arms. In departing from this College, and from this presidency, their sense of grateful respect and attachment, will be best evinced, by preserving and improving the benefits of the education which they have received, and by cultivating and diffusing in their respective stations the principles of this Institution, and the example of this service.

Considerable exertions have been employed during the last years, in publishing elementary works of general utility in the Shanscrit, Bengalee, Hindostanee, Arabic and Persian languages. A grammar of the Tamul language has also been composed in this College, and in consequence of the transfer of the Tamul department to Fort St. George, has been transmitted in manuscript to that presidency. Great improvements have been introduced in the art of printing the oriental characters by native artists, and several of the learned natives are employed in publishing various works of oriental literature, under the aid derived from the improved art of printing.

It is proper in this place to add, that a commencement has been made in the study of the Mahratta language, and that public examinations in that language may be expected in the approaching month of January.

Adverting to these circumstances, the primary object of

this College in the diffusion of oriental knowledge among the public officers of the British Government in India, appears to have been promoted during the last year to an extent, highly creditable to the character of the Institution, and beneficial to the service of the State. In the meanwhile, the general conduct of the students has been conformable to the prevalent spirit of study and of honourable emulation in laudable pursuits; many instances have been distinguished of exemplary propriety in the observance of the rules and statutes of the College. Exceptions of comparative irregularity must occur in every large society; but they have neither been numerous nor important. In all instances they have been duly noticed, and in most, effectually corrected.

The reports which I have received of the conduct of the present students have satisfied me, that they will continue to observe a strict conformity to the discipline enjoined by the rules and statutes of the College. The observance of all the statutes is equally essential to the interests and honour of the students, nor is their duty confined merely to the diligent pursuit of the prescribed course of study. The intention of the statutes is not only to provide instruction in the oriental languages, and in the several branches of study immediately connected with the performance of official functions, but to prescribe habits of regularity and good order. My principal purpose in founding this Institution, was to secure the junior classes of the service from all undue influence in the discharge of their official functions, and to introduce them to their public duties in perfect freedom and independence, exempt from every restraint, excepting the high and sacred principles of their civil, moral, and religious obligations.

With this salutary view, the statutes furnish the means and enforce the necessity of acquiring that knowledge, without which, every public officer must become dependent upon the influence of those whom he is appointed to control.

With the same view, the statutes have prescribed a due attention to those habits of regularity and order, which cannot be neglected without the immediate hazard of forfeiting all independence and freedom of action, without endangering every safeguard of integrity, and every security of reputation and honour.

The high character of the East India Company, the fame

and glory of our country demand from you a correct observance of all those rules, which have been framed for the purpose of securing you against the evils of ignorance, indolence and extravagance, and of qualifying you in knowledge, in freedom, in virtue and honour, to administer to these populous and opulent provinces the blessings of a just, an honest, a British Government.

The advantages provided for you by the liberality and munificence of the Company under this Institution, are unrivalled in the history of the world. Your gratitude will be manifested, if you shall employ those advantages to the advancement of your own reputations and interests, by pursuing that course of diligence, industry, regularity and order, which will conduct you to the faithful accomplishment of all your duties, and qualify you to perpetuate the ultimate objects of this Institution—the prosperity and honour of the British Empire in India.

WELLESLEY.

No. XLIV.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Agra, Sept. 22, 1804.

Your letter of the 11th instant, reached me at this place this morning, and is most truly gratifying to my feelings. Your sentiments respecting Monson are noble, and like yourself, and are worthy of the great mind you possess. He is fortunately alive to answer for himself, it is a subject I do not wish to enter upon, I, like yourself, foresaw what would probably happen, and was in hopes I had taken precautions to prevent any further ill effects after his getting to Rampoorah, but alas! it was not to be. His remaining at that place was fatal.

I have crossed the eighth dragoons this morning, and hope to get the rest of my cavalry and infantry over to-morrow, and flatter myself things will wear a very different aspect before the month of September is at an end. I only fear he

will be off before we get to him, and yet I think his guns, &c. must fall into our hands. His troops are in a strange state, some of them are again making proposals to come over, they shall be received if they come, but I have little faith in any thing they say; however, any thing like disaffection among them has its weight and may be of use, therefore it shall be encouraged. They are a most despicable set, and will I think be an easy conquest. I shall in consequence of the authority you have given me to raise troops, order two regiments of infantry to be raised immediately, and hope to have them efficient corps immediately, as I mean to call upon the provincial corps in the present exigency of affairs, to suffer such a number of men as will enlist and are fit for the regulars to enter into our service. I have had a conversation with several of the officers commanding these corps, and know they will do every thing in their power to assist my wishes. The men will be happy to come for the encrease of pay, and they can replace them instantly; they are in general very fine men. I do not think I shall raise any more irregular troops, as they are little to be depended upon, cost money, and are under no control, and get alarmed in the hour of danger. If upon perusing my statement of the troops necessary for the peace establishment you think it right to raise more regiments, I wish you would determine upon the number *directly*, that they may be ordered at the same time, as by that means the promotion can be carried on much more to the advantage of the officers, than by raising the corps at different periods, and indeed is a much fairer mode.

I have ordered as few men to be raised as I possibly could, and shall order no more till I hear from your Lordship; I trust you will believe, I would not have ordered a man if I had not thought them absolutely necessary. Be assured I have not raised near enough.

I am quite clear that the country is in that unsettled state that nothing but a stroke at this wretch will keep it quiet, which if he will stay for, must annihilate him, and if he don't stand, his flight though by no means so desirable, will convince the natives that no power whatever can stand against the Company's troops. Indeed they are all astonished at the feats

the sepoys performed, when harrassed, without food, or guns, against Holkar (in person as it is said) aided by every possible advantage. Believe me, the sepoys with the exception of a very few, behaved most gloriously, and have in general evinced a strong attachment to our government. They are coming in daily and say, that all the others are endeavouring to escape by every opportunity.

Every part of the country shall be looked to; it appears impossible that Holkar will try for Bundelcund, and I believe Ameer Khan's troops are in a dreadful state; Colonel Murray might destroy him with great ease. Jean Baptiste would join him, but cannot move from his present situation for want of subsistence for his troops. He is desirous of coming to me but requires a lac and-a-half of rupees to pay his troops. He is reported to be a good and fair man, and by what I have seen of him lately from his correspondence, has every appearance of being so; but I must be more convinced that he is so before I give him money, at any rate not to that extent; if he does any thing worth notice it will be time enough to pay him then. A report prevails that Murray is near Kotah which I cannot believe; he might be of great use there, but I fear I shall derive no advantage from his movements.

I really, in answer to that part of your letter where you say it is necessary on all great occasions to look the utmost possible, or rather imaginable, degree of misfortunes distinctly in the front, and that you wish me to forward my opinion of the steps to be pursued by you, if contrary to all human prospects, I should experience any difficulty in crushing this mischief, I can only say that I can see no other measures to be adopted than those you have already done. Holkar once defeated will ensure peace in India, and I sincerely hope it will not be long before that is established. The only thing I fear is the rapidity of his retreat, no other untoward circumstance is I think to be apprehended.

Be assured my dear Lord, it is most highly satisfactory to me to perceive that your mind is full of energy and anxious solicitude to afford me every aid in remedying the consequences of this misfortune, by using every effort to avail ourselves of our real strength and established reputation. I could say

much upon the subject, and take much blame to myself, but of that I shall say no more till I have the pleasure of seeing you, when every part of my conduct shall be laid open to you, and I flatter myself I shall not be found to have acted very wrong.

That your ideas respecting the month of September, 1804, may be realized; rest assured, my dear Lord, that no exertion shall be wanting on the part of

Your affectionate
and devoted servant,

G. LAKE.

P. S. Pray let me know your determination upon the number of regiments to be raised *without delay*.

No. XLV.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Secundra, Sept. 24, 1804.

From the very bottom of my soul do I congratulate you upon the just sense the House of Commons and the country at large entertain of your judgment and conduct in India. I was always certain that this would be the consequence of all your wise and great undertakings. Believe me, my dear Lord, I have derived the greatest satisfaction from reading the resolutions of the House of Commons respecting you, and I trust every honour will follow. Be assured I will do every thing in my power to recover the late unfortunate disaster, and sincerely hope success will attend us; indeed, I have no doubt of it. He will, I fear, be too precipitate in his retreat. Although you so nobly declare your determination to shield the character of Colonel Monson from obloquy, whatever may be the result of his misfortunes, to your own fame—here, my dear Lord, I must remark, that whatever may be said upon the subject, you surely cannot be implicated in the business, as all blame ought to fall upon me for detaching the force in the first instance, when I thought I had selected corps with a man to command them who would have accomplished all my wishes, and obtained the end proposed.

This being the case, I certainly become the responsible person in the first instance, and shall, upon every occasion, declare publicly and privately, both here and at home, that you had nothing to do with the march of that detachment, and that all censure for that measure must be attributed to me, and me alone, and if called upon, I am ready to answer for it before the House of Commons or any other set of men that may choose to call upon me for explanation of my reasons or conduct on that subject. I stand perfectly at ease on that score, unless it may be said that I left too much to the discretion of Colonel Monson. All I wish to be understood is, that no blame in sending out that force can fall to your share, but to myself who sent it. It has caused me many an uneasy moment, but I now look forward only to the destruction of this monster and the recovery of our fame.

I am much hurt at seeing that General Wellesley is not *particularly* thanked by Parliament.

Believe me, my dear Lord, with every wish that you may receive all honours and dignity that a grateful and admiring country can bestow upon you, I remain

your affectionate and devoted servant,

G. LAKE.

No. XLVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Stuart.

SIR,

Fort William, October 5th, 1804.

In addition to the interruption which the extraordinary pressure of public business has unavoidably given to the regularity of my private correspondence, I have been rendered incapable of writing for some time past, by repeated and vexatious attacks of illness, which have frequently confined me to my couch, under violent pain. At present I am confined by a severe attack of the same nature, and I am still utterly unable to write for many minutes together; but my apprehension that your Excellency might leave India without receiving a letter from me, has induced me to employ another hand than my own, to write to you on the present occasion.

The orders which I have transmitted to Fort St. George, relative to the encrease of the military establishments under that Presidency, will have apprized your Excellency of my general concurrence in the sentiments which you have expressed on that important subject, and which were contained in the very able, clear, and judicious statements enclosed in your letter of the 30th of July.* I have directed the plan which your Excellency has proposed for the encrease of the army of Fort St. George, to be carried into effect to the extent which appears to me to be necessary at present, and I trust that my orders will have reached Fort St. George in time to secure the advantage of being executed under your Excellency's immediate superintendence.

I have not been able to ascertain from the tenor of your Excellency's last letters, whether it is your intention to embark for Europe on the fleet now under despatch at Fort St. George, or to defer your embarkation until the departure of the first fleet of the approaching season. I am inclined to believe, and I anxiously hope that your Excellency will adopt the latter resolution, and that you will not leave India until your successor shall have arrived. If, contrary to my expectation, your Excellency should depart on the fleet which will sail from Madras in the course of the present month, it is my intention, upon receiving intimation of that event, to publish a general order to the army in India, in which order I propose to record my sentiments of the eminent public services which your Excellency has rendered to the state during the whole course of my administration in India. It would be satisfactory to me, however, to publish that order previously to your Excellency's departure; and in the event of your embarkation being deferred until the commencement of the approaching season, I request your Excellency to write an official letter to me, notifying your intention of returning to Europe, which will enable me to issue the proposed order on that occasion.

It has been intimated to me that your Excellency entertained some idea of visiting Bengal previously to your departure from India. I trust I need not express the pleasure I should receive from such a visit, nor declare the satisfac-

* The papers are very voluminous.—[Ed.]

tion I should derive from such an opportunity of conversing with you on the state of affairs at Fort St. George, and of manifesting towards you the most cordial sentiments of public and private esteem and respect.

Although your Excellency should determine to embark in the present month, I still trust that this letter will reach you before your departure from Fort St. George. In that event I request your Excellency to accept the assurance of my most sincere and ardent wishes for your safe and prosperous voyage to Europe, and for your health, happiness, welfare, and honour, in England.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XLVII.

Lieutenant-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Head Quarters, Camp at Muttra, Oct. 7, 1804.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that having ascertained that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had collected the whole of his cavalry at the village of Anoukee, about two coss in front of my position, I moved out this morning before daylight to attack him.

My force was formed into three columns, the 76th regiment and three battalions of native infantry, forming the left, under Major-General Frazer, with the horse artillery on their right, the reserve under Lieut.-Colonel Don in the centre, and the cavalry under Colonel Macan, at an increased distance on the right, moving parallel with the infantry columns. The piquets were left standing, and the rest of my force with the park was left for the protection of the camp, under Lieut.-Colonel Horsford.

We reached the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp at a few minutes after daylight, but not before they had been alarmed at our approach, and had mounted their horses, forming a line with their right to the village, and their left extending to the northward.

On perceiving this, I ordered the horse artillery under Captain Browne to advance, and on their commencing a brisk cannonade on the enemy's right, they were immediately

thrown into confusion, and commenced a precipitate flight. The cavalry moved forward against the left of their position, and did some execution with their gallopers; but the rapidity of the enemy's flight rendered it impossible to effect a charge. From the information received from some of the enemy's wounded, who were left on the ground, it appears that Jeswunt Rao Holkar was the first to fly; their general direction appeared to be Bhurtpore.

Several of the enemy's men and horses were killed. I returned to my camp soon after eight o'clock.

Though your Lordship will perceive that little else has been effected by the operation of this morning, than that of driving the enemy from his position, yet I trust this will have a considerable effect on his troops, as well as on the people of the country in general, as it must prove the inability of his cavalry to oppose our army in any way; at the same time that it deprives his followers of the confidence they may hitherto have placed in their own strength.

G. LAKE.

No. XLVIII.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Delhi, October 19, 1804.

A fresh disappointment in grain has prevented me from marching this day, and will, I have no doubt, be the cause of my losing Holkar's guns, which have got the start of me by so many coss, that I fear it will be impossible for me to overtake them. However, I am not without hopes of doing something that may be of material service. I shall take with me my cavalry and some infantry lightly equipped, indeed more so than I believe any army in India ever was before, the officers are in general so very desirous of conforming to any wish of mine, and have really laid aside all thoughts of comfort in order to settle this business, which I am confident, could I but have been supplied with provisions, would have been very shortly put an end to. This monster will of course be driven out of Hindostan, and where he is to go I know not. He has no money nor any provisions but what he gets

by plunder. The season of the year is certainly in his favour, and he seems to have given up all thoughts of our territories. He with his horse is not very far from me, but so very wary, that I fear it will not be possible to do so much with them as I could wish, yet I still hope to make them feel me, but at present I can answer for nothing, and only beg you will believe that whatever can be done shall be attempted, and I trust with success, of which indeed there is not the shadow of a doubt if they will but let us come near them. I have this day sent two battalions from Delhi into the Doab, and shall send one from my army there to-morrow, therefore nothing is to be apprehended in that quarter. They will forward supplies to Muttra and Delhi, and those troops below will ensure their being sent to Agra. It is most provoking that this fellow should escape, but really so many untoward circumstances have happened that I am quite wretched. If Colonel Murray, or any one else who may be in command, would but come forward at all, this monster could not escape. When I get supplies I could pursue him till he must fall; without them I durst not proceed far, as the going forward for a short time, and then being obliged to make a retrograde motion would be construed into a retreat, which is the thing of all others most to be dreaded. I shall move to-morrow and take up a forward position, and keep getting on, at the same time not getting out of the reach of my supplies, by which means there will be the appearance of an advance. I shall have nothing to fear for our own possessions, he will never leave watching me and looking to the safety of his guns. They are certainly of some use in his possession, as he never will lose sight of them, which prevents him from becoming an entire freebooter, and by crossing into the Doab, laying waste our lands from which he is gone quite away.

I saw the King last night, he has behaved extremely well. His Majesty received me with every appearance of esteem and regard, I might almost say affection. He embraced me both at my being presented to him and when I retired, with great warmth. I believe he is perfectly sensible of the advantages he derives from being under the protection of the British Government. I have desired Colonel Ochterlony to forward a statement of every circum-

stance that occurred during the late unpleasant attack upon the town and country. It is impossible for me to say how much I feel obliged to Colonel Ochterlony for his conduct during the late event. From the moment I left him at Delhi he has acted entirely to my satisfaction, shewn great firmness, and at the same time conciliated both King and family, and managed the whole affairs at the court with great address. In short I cannot express sufficiently strong how much he deserves my praise, and sincerely hope he may meet with your Lordship's approbation, patronage and protection.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
your affectionate and devoted,

G. LAKE.

P.S. The Bhurtpore Rajah has behaved like a villain, and deserves chastisement; a very short time would take his forts.

No. XLIX.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.

London, 21st May, 1804.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 14th October, 1804.]

With respect to the great question to which your Lordship's last despatches principally relate, the pressure of other business has prevented Mr. Pitt from going into the subject in that detail, which he deems to be necessary previous to his forming a conclusive judgment upon it: he feels, however, all the importance of it, and has promised me to apply himself as early as possible to its examination. Until his Majesty's ministers have gone through the various despatches, and come to a decision upon them, and more particularly till I have had an opportunity of conferring deliberately with Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville, I should wish to postpone troubling your Lordship with any very detailed remarks upon this subject, in the new and enlarged shape in which it is now presented to our consideration. Hitherto I have been led to examine it as a question of alliance merely, upon the

presumption, that the Mahratta empire was to continue to subsist in the same shape, or nearly so, as it has hitherto done, and in this point of view I own reflection has only served more strongly to impress upon my mind a conviction, that the principles of connection as laid down in the despatch from the secret Committee of February* last, is upon the whole the best adapted to states so circumstanced as those composing the Mahratta confederacy, and that which I apprehend would be the most likely sincerely to dispose them towards a connection with us.

Your Lordship's instructions to the Generals Lake and Wellesley of the 27th June and 27th July, take up the question upon a much wider range, and suggest a comprehensive scheme for the partition and new distribution of the greater portion of the Mahratta territory. The splendid and unexampled success of our arms may probably have brought the execution of such a measure within the reach of your Lordship's power, and I am by no means at present prepared to convey to your Lordship a conclusive opinion upon the comprehensive scheme of policy laid down in those instructions; I wish only at present to draw your Lordship's attention to the marked distinction between the two questions. When lately reasoning upon the treaty of Bassein, we were considering how we could best connect ourselves with the state of Poonah, and what plan of alliance was upon the whole the most likely to conciliate, and include some of the other leading states in that connection. Now we are to examine the effects upon our Indian system, not only of that state being occupied by a British force, but of the other leading states materially reduced in territory being almost entirely encompassed either by the possessions, which it is intended should be acquired in direct sovereignty by the Company, or by the Rajpoot states, with whom it is proposed to enter into close alliance. The arrangement in question carries the Company's frontier far to the north and west of Delhi; it adds to their dominions in direct possession, exclusive of introducing their authority over the whole

* The letter of the Secret Committee here referred to, is probably that of the 6th of March, 1804, which I have appended to Lord Castlereagh's letter.—[Ed.]

of the Mahratta empire, a territory considerably exceeding in extent the entire of Oude, and brings them in contact with Sikhs and other northern tribes, with whom it is proposed to establish connections throughout the Panjab as far as the Indus.

Such I take to be the question, which may have been presented by the result of the war to your Lordship's decision, and it is impossible not to feel that it is the largest in its bearings, and the most important in its effects upon our Indian system that has ever come into discussion. As an Indian question merely, it involves considerations of the highest moment, two of which I shall only at present slightly glance at. 1st. Whether assuming the whole to be the result of legitimate conquest, it does not in the great extent of direct acquisition, or indirect control thus to be acquired, contravene too strongly the system of policy, upon which the legislature has professed to act, by pushing our dominion beyond what the necessity of the case may fairly appear to warrant. 2nd. Whether it does not swell so largely and so suddenly not only our immediate possessions, but our dependencies necessarily included within the dominion of our army, as to run some risk of rendering the frame of our government complicated and unwieldy in such a degree as to hazard its becoming enfeebled and embarrassed in ordinary hands, and in weighing the latter consideration we should deceive ourselves if we expected to find a successor to replace your Lordship, capable of giving and continuing to the machine of Government that impulse which every department of the state so visibly receives from the mind that now directs it.

It is fair on the other hand to weigh the increased security resulting from there being no longer any native power capable of contending with us in the field; an advantage, however, which I apprehend will not relieve us (if we may judge from past experience) from the necessity of carrying forward our military establishments, nearly in the proportion in which the sphere of our dominions is extended.

The question is not less serious as applied to the empire at home, not so much from any claims which it may furnish the enemy with, to limit our pretensions at a peace, to preserve in our hands in other parts of the world points of

importance to our general security, but as founding our Indian system upon a basis so broad, as to create a doubt, whether such an empire can be fed with its due proportion of European troops from hence. When I recollect that the number of Europeans civil and military governing fifty millions of subjects, do not exceed thirty thousand, I cannot but look with anxiety to the extension of our native population and dependencies, whilst I am unable to see my way through the means of carrying forward, as our empire advances, even this apparently inadequate proportion of the governing principle. At this moment, I regret to observe, that our European is not to our native army more than in the proportion of one to seven; I have always been taught to consider this as too low a proportion, and it has been an anxious, though a fruitless object of my solicitude, since I have been in office, to obtain for India a larger proportion of King's troops. Having hitherto failed of completing an establishment of 24,000 men, which is deficient at this moment nearly six thousand of its complement, I am the less disposed to be sanguine in my expectations that an establishment of 31,000 men can be preserved complete, which is the force specified in your Lordship's second plan, which I take to be that which you conceive to be required for India, should the proposed arrangements in the Mahratta empire be carried into effect. I shall have occasion to address your Lordship more in detail on this subject by another conveyance; in the meantime I must fairly apprise your Lordship, that as it would require above 10,000 men to bring your establishment to the proposed standard, from my past experience of the difficulties which occur at home in raising the amount of force requisite for the public service at large, I wholly despair of such an army being in the first instance supplied, or subsequently kept complete for the service of India.

My object in calling your Lordship's attention to these considerations at the present moment, is not for the purpose of conveying to you by anticipation a decision upon the main question itself, but from a desire that you should be aware of the doubts that are to be well weighed, before it shall be finally decided on.

I cannot close this letter either in justice to your Lordship, or to myself, without acknowledging an error into

which the result has proved, I had fallen from defect of information in my former reasonings upon Mahratta affairs. Indeed I believe others who had better means of intelligence were inadequately impressed, as well as myself, with respect to the extent of the regular force in Scindiah's service. It certainly has proved much more formidable than even Mr. Henry Wellesley, from whom I have on all subjects connected with India, obtained the most satisfactory and accurate intelligence, conceived it to be; and although it would be doing injustice to the grounds of the war, to state the destruction of this force, as being in itself any part of the cause upon which it was undertaken, distinct from the intended hostile application of that force against the British power; yet I must reckon its dissolution and annihilation as amongst the most valuable services which your Lordship could have rendered; and I look upon the war as carrying with it in this collateral effect, the most solid advantages to our empire in the east. I will only add one remark on this subject, that it will still remain a question, supposing a close connection* could have been formed with Scindiah as well as the Peishwa, subsequent to the expulsion of the latter from Poonah, whether the dissolution of this corps, of the leading officers of which, I have understood Scindiah had latterly become exceedingly jealous, might not have been accomplished by more amicable measures.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with great regard,
yours most faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

P. S. Reserving the discussion of the military establishment in a larger sense for a future occasion, it may be satisfactory to your Lordship to be apprized, that in addition to 12 or 1500 recruits, which have already been despatched in the ships of the present season to join their regiments

* The establishment of such a connection with Scindiah was repeatedly attempted (see Vol. III. *passim*), but with signal failure, Scindiah's object being to seize the whole empire of the Mahrattas. The nature and extent of Scindiah's jealousy of his European officers is fully stated in Vol. III., and in this Vol., as well as the description of the French state, erected by M. Perron, and of the intentions of France respecting the descendant of the Great Mogul. See Appendix.—[ED.]

in India, having been completely disciplined and formed previous to their departure; the 17th foot completed to 1000 rank and file is now under orders, and will proceed in the next fleet appointed to sail in the end of June.

Your Lordship will have also learned before this reaches you, that a complete regiment of infantry, I think the 66th, was embarked for Ceylon in March last; exclusive, therefore, of this reinforcement sent to Ceylon, the army on the continent will have received in the course of the present season an addition of 2500 men, which added to the 12,211 the effective force in December, 1803, will raise the King's infantry, exclusive of Ceylon, to about 14,000 rank and file.

C.

[Enclosure.]

From the Secret Committee of the honourable Court of Directors of the East India Company to the most noble the Governor-General in Council, Bengal.*

East India House, London, 6th March, 1804.

We have received despatches from our Presidency of Bombay, dated the 8th September, 1803, announcing to us the actual commencement of hostilities between our forces and certain of the Mahratta powers.

The successes with which the campaign has opened by the immediate reduction of Ahmednuggur and Broach, in a manner so highly creditable to the British arms and to the officers who directed those operations, could not fail to afford us the highest satisfaction. But as it was always our wish to avoid a connection with the Mahrattas at the expense or even at the serious risk of a war with any of the leading members of that confederacy, we deeply regret that such has been the result of the treaty concluded with the Peishwa at Bassein, and we feel it necessary in consequence thereof at this early period, to convey to you our sentiments upon the present posture of affairs.

Removed as we are from the immediate scene of action, much must necessarily at all times be left to the discretion of our governments on the spot, in applying the principles which we may think it necessary to prescribe for the direction of their conduct to the precise state of circumstances under which they may be called upon at the moment to act. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves in the present despatch, to a statement of the general considerations by which we desire your conduct may be governed.

Whilst we are prepared to make every exertion which is due to the good faith, and which the character and honour of our government may require, we do not, as a measure of policy, attach that value to the pro-

* The Secret Committee consists of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and the senior Director.—[Ed.]

visions of the treaty in question, which would lead us to wish that it should be maintained at all hazards in its present form, if by any modifications of the stipulations therein contained, our connection with the state of Poona can be rendered a measure of less alarm and jealousy to the other Mahratta powers, being firmly persuaded that no alliance with a Mahratta power, but more especially with one in military rank not standing higher than the third or fourth in the empire, can in the long run be consistent with our interests, unless the preponderating majority of the confederacy can be reconciled to that connection.

The most prominent grounds of jealousy entertained by the Mahratta states of the late treaty, appear to arise out of the third and seventeenth articles, the former introducing and permanently stationing a commanding British force in the Peishwa's dominions, the latter binding his Highness without the stipulations being reciprocal, not to commence any negotiation with any other power without previous communication with the British Government, which two stipulations they consider as tending to place under our control and guidance the legitimate head of their Empire.

Under a strong conviction of the embarrassment which must arise from our mixing ourselves too intimately in the complicated politics of this distracted empire, our wish is to confine the purposes of the treaty strictly to the support and defence of the Peishwa in the quiet possession of his own immediate dominions, and to avoid not only in fact but in appearance every thing which can be construed to affect the independency of the Mahratta confederacy through its legitimate head, or which can create distrust and jealousy between the Peishwa and the other great powers of the empire. We are therefore desirous whilst the support to which his Highness is entitled under the treaty of Bassein (so long as he shall remain faithful to his engagements), is afforded to him in the fullest manner that we should not hesitate to relax in such stipulations as were introduced into that treaty rather for our, than for his Highness's accommodation. When we refer to the Peishwa's former reluctance to the introduction of a subsidiary force within his dominions, and when we couple this with the decided repugnance which undoubtedly exists to the arrangement lately concluded, on the part of the other states, we cannot doubt that a relaxation of this condition of the treaty will prove highly satisfactory to his Highness, and we also flatter ourselves that by this relaxation a material objection in the feelings of the other states may be removed. In order more distinctly to mark that our object is sincerely to support and by no means to infringe the independency of our ally, our wish is that it should be expressly stipulated in an additional article to the treaty that the subsidiary force shall hereafter be stationed within the Company's territories, in such a position as shall enable it to act on the shortest notice in support of the Peishwa, but that it shall upon no account, except upon a formal requisition from the Peishwa, (unless restraint should be put upon his Highness's person) enter his dominions. We also are willing to abandon the seventeenth article, and to rely on the interest his Highness will have in cultivating a good understanding with the British for his fide-

lity to the general stipulations of the alliance in any connections he may form with other powers. It is material further to call your attention to the twelfth article of the treaty. Having in conformity to the treaty of Hyderabad stipulated in article thirteen for a right of arbitrating all the differences subsisting between the Nizam and the Peishwa, we entertain great doubts whether it is desirable, regard being had to the character and complexion which it is our object to give to the alliance, to stipulate for a general right of arbitration as between the Peishwa and other states. Such a right must in itself create much jealousy and we are inclined to think that it would be on the whole better not to push our claim of arbitrating so far. This course seems the less hazardous as the treaty of Bassein is not only guarded by the general principles which appertain to all defensive alliances, but is also specifically restricted with reference to certain states therein named. In thus conveying our instructions upon this important subject we think it due to the Governor-General in Council to state, that the objections which attach upon the treaty of Bassein in its present form did not when this subject was last under consideration in the months of September and December 1800, as circumstances then stood, impress themselves upon our minds with equal force. We therefore desire to be understood, as not attaching blame to the conduct of our government abroad with respect to the form of the treaty itself, however subsequent events may have convinced us of the hazard of aiming at so close a connection with the court of Poonah. We cannot close this despatch without adverting to the late proceedings of the other Mahratta chiefs. Whilst we are ready to admit that states jealous of their independency might naturally entertain some alarm at stipulations capable of being represented to them as placing the head of the empire under the immediate control of a foreign power, we cannot avoid noticing the deceitful and disingenuous conduct pursued by Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar previous to the rupture. Instead of openly avowing their sentiments and endeavouring by amicable explanation to obtain relief from any stipulations of the treaty which could be supposed to affect their interests, they in terms disclaimed any ground of objection, and disavowed any intention of obstructing this connection. Whilst such was their language it appears they were intent upon gaining time with a view of arranging a confederacy and of acting hostilely again the Company and its allies so soon as their measures were ripe for execution and the season favoured their operations. Such having been the conduct of these chieftains, the Company are clearly entitled to consider them as aggressors and (as far as prudential considerations will justify them in asserting the claim) to demand from the enemy a reasonable indemnity for the expences of the war. But you are to understand, however indisputable this claim in strictness may be, that it is our positive direction the war may by no means be protracted in pursuit of such an object. Upon the whole our wish is that a modification of the treaty should at all events take place in conformity to the above instructions, not on the ground of concession but upon a deliberate consideration of the system of policy which appears to us to be the best adapted to the genius and the character of this people. Determining to support the Peishwa on the

Musnud unless his Highness by some act of his shall have dissolved the alliance, as also the treaty of Bassein, upon the modified plan herein described, whenever the powers we are opposed to shall be disposed to recognize our rights and those of our ally the Peishwa as under the treaty so amended, we see no adequate motive for continuing the war, and should the success of our arms be such as under all the circumstances appear to you in prudence to warrant a demand of some concessions from our opponents, we desire that the demand be framed upon principles of great moderation and with a view to the improvement of the military security rather than the extension, of our present dominions.

We must however impress most strongly on your minds that the early termination of the war is the object to which we desire your efforts may be most earnestly directed, and although we have thought it right to advert to the possible expediency of requiring certain sacrifices in the nature of reparation from our opponents, you are by no means to consider such suggestions as controlling your conduct in case you should be of opinion under all the circumstances that peace is likely to be more firmly established and future causes of dissension more effectually obviated by an entire restoration of all our conquests.*

We are your affectionate friends,

JACOB BOSANQUET,

JOHN ROBERTS,

W. DEVAYNEZ.

No. L.

N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government, to the Honourable Mount Stuart Elphinstone, Resident at Nagpore.

SIR,

Fort William, Nov. 3, 1804.

I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council to transmit to you, for the immediate regulation of your conduct the enclosed notes, in conformity to which detailed instructions will be transmitted to you with the least practicable delay. You are authorized and directed, however, to proceed upon these notes without awaiting the receipt of those instructions.

Copies of these notes will be transmitted to the Commis-

* The entire restoration of all our conquests suggested by the Secret Committee, instead of firmly establishing peace, and effectually obviating future causes of dissension, would have laid the grounds of continual war, furnished ample means for its prosecution, and opened abundant sources of advantage to the designs of France, and of all our enemies. It is to be observed, that to this day, after a period of more than thirty years, not one of these conquests has been restored, nor has the peace with the powers from which they were obtained been disturbed.—[Ed.]

sioners for the affairs of Cuttack, and to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

I have the honour to be, &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Govt.

[Enclosure.]

Notes for Mr. Elphinstone.

The Rajah of Berar having now formally renounced all claim whatever to the restoration of Sumbulpore, &c. to his dominion, and having admitted the justice of the principles which have regulated the conduct of the British Government with regard to that question, the Governor-General in Council authorizes Mr. Elphinstone to renew the discussion on the subject of compensation to the Rajah of Berar, for the loss both of revenue and of dominion by the separation of Sumbulpore, &c. from his territory.

1. The only practicable compensation is the grant of an annual sum of money, together with certain privileges, distinctions, or immunities at the principal Hindoo places of worship within the British dominions.

2. The pecuniary compensation to be annual, to be regulated in some degree by the amount of revenue which the Rajah of Berar usually derived from the provinces and tributaries separated from his dominions by the operation of the treaty of Deogaum, but to exceed that amount considerably.

3. The pecuniary compensation may exceed the total amount of that revenue to the extent of one lac of rupees.

4. The payment to be made annually to the Rajah of Berar at fixed periods by the British Resident.

5. The information furnished by Colonel Broughton relative to the revenue of Sumbulpore and Patna, &c., to be communicated to Mr. Elphinstone; and the Commissioners at Cuttack to be required to furnish this Government and Mr. Elphinstone with all the information they possess or can acquire relative to the tribute formerly paid to the Mahratta Government by the tributary Rajahs (not included in the province of Cuttack) with whom they contracted engagements.

6. Mr. Elphinstone to ascertain with the utmost practicable accuracy, from the records of the Rajah of Berar, or from other sources of information, the amount of revenue derived from the provinces above described, and to communicate the result of his enquiries to Government, with a view to enable Government to determine the amount of pecuniary compensation to be made to the Rajah. Mr. Elphinstone at the same time to state the amount which he has reason to believe will be considered by the Rajah of Berar to be a satisfactory compensation, combined with the proposed privileges at the places of Hindoo worship.

7. The payment of the compensation to commence from the date of the treaty of Deogaum; and if Mr. Elphinstone should find that the Rajah and his Durbar are likely to be convinced of the sincerity of our views by

an early payment of a part of the compensation, he may pay a sum not exceeding one lac of rupees, immediately after settling the general principle of compensation in conformity to these instructions.

8. It may further be advisable to consider a mode of compensating the Rajah's minister in the manner pursued by Major Malcolm at the Durbar of Scindiah. Mr. Elphinstone is at liberty to enter also on this subject, and to promise pensions to the ministers not exceeding on the whole the total amount of *

9. The privilege proposed to be granted to the Rajah of Berar at the principal places of Hindoo worship within the Company's dominions, is that of granting exemptions from the payment of duties upon pilgrims at those places of devotion to a certain number of persons annually.

10. Suppose the total number to be 5000. This number, however subject to be reduced or augmented according to the report of the Resident upon that subject.

11. It is presumed that this will be considered by the Rajah of Berar to be a valuable privilege. But if it should be deemed by the Rajah of little importance, Mr. Elphinstone to endeavour to ascertain what other admissible privilege at the places of Hindoo worship, or what other reasonable compensation could be granted to the Rajah, and to report the same for the decision of Government.

12. The places of Hindoo worship at which it is proposed to grant the exemption are Jaggernaut, Gya, and Illahabad, and to these may be added Muttra, if duties are usually levied there. At Benares no duties upon pilgrims are levied, but any reasonable privilege which the Rajah may desire may be granted at that place.

13. If the Rajah accept the privilege of granting exemptions in the manner described, it will be necessary to impose some restraint on the abuse of that privilege. For that purpose the Resident should grant passes (according to a form which will be transmitted) for the number of persons to be exempted at one and the same time, and the production of those passes to the collector of the duties at the several places of Hindoo worship shall constitute an authority for the exemption of those persons from the payment of duties. No passes to be granted to more than † persons at a time.

14. These restrictions to be communicated to the Rajah of Berar, at the time of offering the proposed privilege, as they may possibly affect his sense of the value of that privilege.

15. Mr. Elphinstone to repeat to the Rajah of Berar that the British Government would readily restore the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna to the dominion of the Rajah of Berar, and the tributaries with whom we have contracted engagements which are confirmed by the treaty of Deogaum to their former connection with the Rajah of Berar's government, if that measure were not absolutely precluded by the obligation of our public faith. But that under the necessity of maintaining the engagements by which those provinces, &c. have been separated from the Rajah's dominion,

* Blank in the original.

† Blank in the original.

the British Government is anxious to afford to the Rajah of Berar every reasonable and practicable compensation.

16. It is the intention of the British Government to declare the provinces and tributaries above described to be now placed under the protection and authority of the British Government in conformity to the tenor of the engagements concluded with the persons exercising the authority in those provinces, and with those tributaries; and the British Government will consequently consider itself at liberty to adopt all such measures with respect to those provinces and tributaries as may be consistent with the relation in which they are placed towards the British Government by the tenor of their engagements.

17. The Rajah of Berar should be distinctly apprized that any attempt on his part to disturb those provinces and tributaries will be followed by the immediate loss of the proposed compensation in all its branches, including the proposed privileges; in such an event the annual payment will be suspended, and the proposed privileges will be revoked. In addition to which circumstances a great risk will be incurred of an interruption of the peace and amity now subsisting between the two states.

18. Mr. Elphinstone to apprise the Rajah immediately on the receipt of these notes, of the determination of the British Government to grant him compensation and of the proposed nature of that compensation, and to enter into the discussion of that subject, for the purpose of adjusting the preliminary points upon which its ultimate adjustment depends.

19. Mr. Elphinstone is at liberty actually to conclude (subject to the ratification of the Governor-General in Council) such of the articles of the proposed arrangement as may appear to him to admit of an early conclusion, always conforming to the principles stated in these notes.

20. On the other hand, if the present temper of the Rajah, or of his Durbar, as connected with the state of affairs relating to Holkar or Scindiah should appear to Mr. Elphinstone to render this communication liable to misconstruction, Mr. Elphinstone will exercise his discretion in suspending it to a more reasonable opportunity.

21. Mr. Elphinstone is directed to endeavour by some arrangement with the Rajah of Berar's ministers, to procure the enlargement of the Rajahs of Sumbulpore and Sonapore, and of any other Rajahs or Zemindars of districts placed in a tributary relation to the British Government, or under its protection and authority by the operation of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum.

WELLESLEY.

No. LI.

Honourable Brigadier Monson to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Camp near Deeg, Nov. 14, 1804.

However proud and happy I may feel in communicating to your Excellency some particulars respecting the brilliant and

decided victory, which through the favour of Providence we have obtained over the whole of the infantry and guns of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, commanded by his chief Sirdar, Hernaut Dada; at the same time I cannot sufficiently lament the event which has made it fall to my lot, in consequence of Major-General Fraser having received a severe wound, which obliged him to quit the field. I attribute our decided and glorious victory over the enemy, entirely to the arrangements made for the attack by Major-General Fraser, and to the confidence and enthusiasm with which he inspired the whole army, heading his Majesty's 76th regiment with the most undaunted gallantry.

Your Excellency has already heard from Major-General Fraser the particulars respecting the commencement of the action.

After we had carried the village, we descended the hill, and charged the enemy's advanced party under a most tremendous discharge of round, grape and chain, from their guns, which they abandoned as we came up to them, retiring to fresh batteries, the whole of which we carried for upwards of two miles, they flying before us in every direction; numbers of them perishing in the swamp which encompasses that angle of the fort of Deeg, and even in the ditch of the fort itself, being pursued by us close up to the very walls. After having carried the different ranges of guns, which extended from the village on their right flank to the south-east angle of the fort, we returned to attack a large body of the enemy drawn up to the eastward of the lower end of the lake, and who kept annoying us with a most destructive fire from 18 and 12 pounders, which until now we had no opportunity of dispersing; these however were kept in check by Major Hammond with the 1st battalion 2nd regiment, and three 6-pounders, who maintained his position with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. I ordered some more 6-pounders to be brought up, and, under cover of their fire, I moved round upon the enemy's left flank, who as we advanced made a precipitate retreat into the lake, where numbers perished, amongst whom were Mohummud Shah Khan and Abdil Khan, two of the principal Sirdars of the Ally-Goles. After this, the enemy made no further opposition, but entirely quitted the field, flying in all directions. Lieut.-Colonel Browne, with the 2nd and 3rd re-

giments of native cavalry and gallopers, continued to watch the motions of a considerable body of horse during the action, and afterwards moved down to the field of engagement to protect the removal of the captured guns and our wounded, who were unavoidably left there. Lieut.-Colonel Ball at the same time moved down with the 3rd brigade to support the cavalry.

I find it impossible to express my gratitude and obligation for the support I have received from every officer and soldier engaged. Were I allowed to offer my individual thanks, to Lieut.-Colonel Horsford, commanding the artillery, and to Lieut. Colonel G. S. Browne, commanding the 2nd brigade infantry, they are particularly due.

From Brigade Major Menzies, Captains Fraser and Mac-knight, the officers of Major-General Fraser's staff, I received the most active assistance, for which I feel myself highly indebted. My sincere thanks are also due to my Brigade Major Captain Carr, and to Ensign Bowyer, of the 12th regiment native infantry, who acted as my Aid-de-Camp on this occasion.

I should not be doing justice to my feelings were I not to mention in the most pointed manner the undaunted bravery and steadiness of his Majesty's 76th regiment, which was never more conspicuously displayed than on this day.

I have equal satisfaction in mentioning the conduct of the 1st European regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Burnet, who showed themselves in every way worthy of the name of British troops.

From the most accurate accounts I can obtain, the enemy's force consisted of twenty-four battalions, a considerable body of horse, and one hundred and sixty pieces of cannon, the greater part of which is already brought to camp. The enemy's loss, as far as I can ascertain, has been very great, and it is supposed near two thousand have been killed and drowned in their efforts to escape. At the same time, glorious as has been the result of this day, I have to lament the death of many a gallant soldier.

The remains of the enemy's army which took shelter in the Fort of Deeg are in the greatest consternation, and are deserting in vast numbers.

I have the honour to enclose a general return of killed,

wounded, and missing,* of the corps engaged, and a return of ordnance, &c. captured and brought into camp; more guns are hourly discovered. I have the satisfaction to add, that among the captured guns are eleven 6-pounders and two 12-pounders, lost by the detachment under my command.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient
and most devoted Servant,
W. MONSON.

No. LII.

Lieutenant-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Head Quarters, Furruckabad, Nov. 17, 1804.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that in pursuance of my intentions expressed in my despatch of yesterday's date, I reached this place this morning with the cavalry before day-break, after a march of upwards of thirty-four miles.

The enemy occupied a position close under the walls of Furruckabad, and I completely succeeded in surprizing them. The consequence has been, that vast numbers of their men and horses have been destroyed, and the whole cattle and baggage taken which they possessed.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar escaped by an early flight, but his troops in the greatest confusion, were pursued and every where cut to pieces by my cavalry. I am happy to add, that we have sustained very little loss either in men or horses.

I have not time at the present moment to express the satisfaction I have derived from the good conduct of all the corps engaged, but I shall have the honour of forwarding to your Lordship my sentiments on this subject as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble Servant,
G. LAKE.

* See Appendix.

No. LIII.

N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. Secretary to Government, to Lieut.-Colonel Ochterlony, Resident at Delhi.

SIR,

Fort William, 17th November, 1804.

I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General to transmit to you the following notes of proposed instructions to you on the subject of establishing a permanent provision for the maintenance of his Majesty Shah Aulum and the royal family. His Excellency requests that you will state such observations as may occur to you upon those notes, in the margin of the document now transmitted, or of a transcript of it, and despatch it to me with your observations, for the purpose of being submitted to his Excellency's consideration. After the receipt of your observations, regular instructions will be prepared and transmitted to you.

2. A copy of the enclosed notes will also be despatched to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who will be requested to signify to you his sentiments on the subject of them, and his Excellency the Governor-General desires, that without awaiting the receipt of regular instructions, you will commence the execution of such parts of the plan, as may appear to the Commander-in-Chief to be unobjectionable.

I have the honour to be,

Sir, yours, &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

Sec. to Govt.

[Enclosure.]

Notes of Instructions to the Resident at Delhi.

Fort William, 16th November, 1804.

1. General subject. The nature and extent of the provision to be assigned for the support of the Emperor Shah Aulum and the royal family.

2. By the manner in which his Majesty and the royal family have been placed under the protection of the British power no obligation is imposed upon us to make any other change in their condition, than such as may relieve them from the embarrassment, distress, and degradation to which they were exposed under the oppressive control of the Mahratta power. The mode, therefore, of effecting this improvement of the condition of his Majesty and the royal family is a question of expediency and convenience

with reference to the British Government, combined however with a due regard to his Majesty's prejudices and feelings.

3. The various arrangements which might be adopted in favour of his Majesty are the following.

First. The assignment to his Majesty of a considerable tract of territory in the vicinity of Delhi, as a state or dominion over which his Majesty should exercise an efficient sovereign authority, collecting the revenues by means of officers of his own selection and appointment, and in all respects exercising the rights of an independent state, controlled only by the presence of a subsidiary British force and of a British representative, and by such engagements as it would be necessary that his Majesty should under such an arrangement contract with us, with a view to secure to the British Government the advantages of a condition of alliance with the state so constituted under his Majesty's sovereign authority.

Secondly. To assign certain territories for the support of his Majesty and the royal family, to be managed by officers acting nominally under the authority of the King, but really under the control of the British authority. The extent of such territory to be regulated by an estimated amount of nett revenue to be derived from it, equal to the exigencies of the royal household.

Thirdly. To establish the real and nominal authority of the British Government in all the territories in the vicinity of Delhi ceded to us by treaty, and assign for the maintenance of the royal family a stipend to an extent sufficient for all the purposes of comfort and convenience.

Fourthly. To blend the two preceding modes of provision.

4. Various objections, applicable either to the convenience, the comfort, or the feelings of his Majesty, or to the interests, security, or convenience of the British Government, oppose the adoption of any of the three first plans.

5. The most eligible arrangement, on the foundation of the fourth plan, will be to continue the assignment for the expences of the royal household of all the territories and resources assigned for that purpose under the authority of the Mahrattas, excepting such as may be situated within the Doab, and such as it may be necessary that we should maintain on the right bank of the Jumna, for the security of the navigation of that river, and for the protection of the frontier, and to supply by pecuniary payments the difference between the produce of those territories and resources, and the amount which (exclusively of the Jagheers held by individuals of the royal family) may be deemed to constitute an ample provision for the dignity and comfort of his Majesty and the royal family.

6. The complete introduction of the British authority and laws into the whole of the Doab, and into those parts of the conquered territory, situated on the right bank of the Jumna, the occupation of which by the British power is necessary for the security of that frontier, is indispensable. The introduction of our authority and laws into the conquered territories on the right bank of the Jumna, not coming under the latter description, would be embarrassing and inconvenient, without being advantageous to us, and the effect of such an arrangement would be extremely injurious to

the feelings of his Majesty and of all the principal persons residing at Delhi. Our civil jurisdiction must in such an event be extended to the city of Delhi, whilst the indispensable necessity of exempting the royal family and their attendants from the operation of our laws would produce inextricable confusion and disorder in the administration of justice: it would scarcely be practicable to define the limits of the operation of our laws and of the royal prerogative; and the impracticability of deciding where one authority should terminate and the other commence would prove a fruitful source of discontent and complaint on the part of his Majesty and the royal family.

The Governor-General, therefore, has determined to adopt the arrangement described in the 5th preceding paragraph.

7. It is not probable that the territories and resources to be assigned for the support of the royal household, under the proposed arrangement, will yield a revenue equal to the amount which is necessary for the maintenance of his Majesty and the royal family in a condition of dignity, ease, and comfort. It is superfluous, therefore, to contemplate the case of an excess of the produce of those territories and resources above that amount, and consequently it is necessary to determine the specific amount of income which may be deemed sufficient for the purpose above described.

8. Considering this question with reference to all the means which Government possesses of forming a judgment upon the question, his Excellency is of opinion that the provision for the maintenance of his Majesty and the royal family ought not to be below thirty lacks of rupees per annum, exclusive of Jagheers possessed by individuals of the family.

9. It is not, however, the intention of the Governor-General to fix this amount without further information, which may enable his Excellency to judge of the exigencies of the royal household, and of the extent of the additional resources which the British Government has required in the Doab and in Hindostan by the cessions of the peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

10. The amount payable by the British Government in money should be fixed, and not liable to fluctuation according to the actual produce of the assigned territories and resources, excepting in special cases to be referred specifically on their occurrence to the decision of the British Government.

The produce of the assigned territories and resources to be calculated on an average of years, and the amount payable in money to be determined by deducting the amount of the nett annual revenue estimated on that average, from the proposed annual provision of thirty lacs of rupees.

11. The whole of the assigned territories should be placed under the management of an Aumil, to be appointed by the King, at the express recommendation of the British Government. All inferior officers required for the collection of the revenue, and all farmers and petty aumils should be appointed with the sanction of the Resident at Delhi.

12. The principal officers for the collection of the customs and duties in the city of Delhi, and for the management of the police of the city,

should in like manner be appointed with the express concurrence of the Resident. The Resident, however, is not to interfere with the executive duties of any of those officers, nor with the municipal or revenue arrangements of the city or territory, excepting by his advice and recommendation.

13. The payments of money in part of the general provision, to be monthly.

14. The income arising from both branches of the proposed provision to be exclusively at the disposal of his Majesty.

15. The total designated amount of the provision for the King should include the estimated expense of the force to be permanently stationed at Delhi for the protection of that city and of his Majesty's person, but the amount to be assigned for the actual maintenance of his Majesty and the royal family is not to be affected by a fluctuation in the charges of that force.

16. This whole arrangement to be considered to take place from the time when the assigned territories, &c., shall have been placed under the management of proper officers, and when the state of affairs in Hindostan shall admit of the effectual operation of that arrangement.

17. The Resident should communicate to his Majesty the nature and extent of the proposed arrangement without delay.

18. The Resident should ascertain and transmit to Government as soon as may be practicable a statement of the territories to be assigned upon the principles of the proposed arrangement, for the maintenance of the royal household, and of the estimated produce both of those territories and of the customs and duties levied in the city of Delhi on an average of years.

19. The Resident should also ascertain with as much accuracy as may be practicable, and communicate to Government the amount requisite for the maintenance of the royal family in a condition of affluence and comfort. It is also very desirable to know the amount of the provision assigned for the maintenance of the King and royal family under the authority of the Mahrattas, and the amount which his Majesty usually received of that provision. In making inquiries, however, respecting the exigencies of the family great caution and delicacy should be observed, with a view to avoid all offence to the pride and prejudices of the King or of any branches of his household and family.

20. The Governor-General does not deem it advisable to enter into any written engagement whatever with his Majesty, nor is it his Excellency's intention to solicit any concession, nor to interdict or oppose any of those outward forms of sovereignty to which his Majesty has been accustomed. His Excellency is desirous of leaving his Majesty in the unmolested exercise of all his usual privileges and prerogatives.

21. The Governor-General therefore directs the Resident to continue to observe towards his Majesty all the forms of respect considered to be due to the Emperor of Hindostan, and upon all occasions to employ his utmost efforts to promote the ease and comfort of his Majesty and of the royal family.

No. LIV.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Futtyghur, Nov. 18, 1804.

My long silence in the private way to your Lordship you will, I trust, attribute to the real cause, a want of any thing satisfactory, and from a mind very much harrassed and fatigued by disappointment, which I could not have expected, and which gave time for Holkar to alter his plan and cross the Jumna with his cavalry, leaving his guns on the other side. In this choice of difficulties I determined to follow Holkar with six regiments of cavalry and the reserve, leaving Major-General Frazer with six battalions native infantry, his Majesty's 76th regiment, with the European regiment and two regiments of cavalry to take his guns. I was confident that General Frazer would obey my orders in attacking them, and that by his judgment, intrepidity and perseverance, he would succeed. My idea has been justified by the victory he has obtained, which appears to have been the hardest fought battle on this side India. Sorry I am to learn that he has lost his leg, but by a letter from his son I am happy to learn that he is doing well as possible; he appears to have acted most admirably well, and done every thing that man could do, and merits all the praise that can be bestowed upon him. I really feel quite distressed at his being wounded, as I have a sincere regard for him.

My principal reason for coming into the Doab was, from knowing the consequence my presence would be of in this quarter. Many people I conversed with upon the subject were of a different opinion, but I was convinced from the disposition of the Begum, some few Seiks having joined him, the inclination of the Zemindars, &c. to join for the sake of plunder, with the certainty of the Rohillas joining if he gained strength and power without being opposed, that if he was not followed, and that by me, the Doab would have been in such a state, that if not lost for a time, it would have been totally unprofitable to your Lordship's government. The sequel has proved clearly to me that I have acted perfectly right, and in my opinion that the country has been saved by

it. The people in all parts have assisted Holkar, and have been perfectly ready to rise, (in some parts they did show themselves openly) had he not been so closely pressed in the rear. The town of Furruckabad have behaved extremely ill, and would have behaved much worse if they had not known my army was close to them. The Regent has done every thing he could underhand to inflame the minds of the people and encourage Holkar to come on. The Nawaub has acted improperly to a degree, but he is a poor weak creature, and made the tool of the war; I shall know more of all their transactions to-morrow, and shall write officially to your Lordship upon the subject. Rest assured that all will now go well, at the same time I must say we have had a narrow escape. This victory of Frazer's, and our affair of yesterday, will have the most salutary effects and convince the natives we are all powerful. The Bhurt-pore Rajah throws off all disguise and shall suffer for it. His ingratitude deserves the severest punishment. The government has given him the finest country in India, the revenue of which is great; the return he has made for such kindness is too obvious to your Lordship to need any comment of mine.

I have only to hope your Lordship will approve my conduct, which is the greatest satisfaction I can receive. Believe me I have had a most trying time: had we failed in any instance, what would have been the fate of India God only knows. I tremble at the thoughts of it. I trust all our misfortunes are recovered, and that we shall have no more trouble except the taking of the forts of the Bhurt-pore Rajah, which will fall immediately, and terminate the war in a very short time. I suppose this war will be laid to my account at home, and gain me not a little abuse, which I can easily prove I do not deserve, and that your Lordship was not in any sense the cause of the detachment under Colonel Monson being detached or their proceeding so far without support. All responsibility rests with me upon that subject, which I shall ever be ready to answer for when called upon. God be praised, that disaster is remedied.

I understand the few that have escaped of Holkar's people yesterday, say their army are all destroyed. I hope to prevail upon the Zemindars to destroy these wanderers,

at least I have called upon them to do so. Had it not been for the blowing up of a tumbril yesterday morning I think we must have had Holkar.

The fatigue my army has gone through during the last seventeen days is beyond all description. The heat in the day has been excessive, but they continue healthy. Their good humour and cheerfulness upon all occasions is quite delightful.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
ever your devoted,

G. LAKE.

P. S. It is fortunate we have now no occasion for the co-operation of Colonel Murray.

No. LV.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Head Quarters, Futtighur, Nov. 18, 1804.

My report of yesterday conveyed to your Lordship an account of my attack on the enemy's cavalry. I now think it my duty to point out the very meritorious conduct of the troops engaged on this occasion.

Since I left Delhi on the 31st ultimo, the troops have daily marched a distance of twenty-three or twenty-four miles. During the day and night previous to the action they marched fifty-eight miles, and from the distance to which they pursued the enemy the space passed over before they had taken up their ground must have exceeded seventy miles.

The patience, perseverance and discipline, which they displayed under such uncommon fatigue, and the activity, zeal and resolution, with which they at last attacked the enemy, are circumstances which entitle them to my highest praise and approbation.

I feel myself particularly indebted on this occasion to Colonel Macan, the commandant of cavalry. The merits of this officer are so fully known to your Lordship, that I feel it unnecessary to say more than that he manifested the same judgment, spirit and zeal, which have so often distinguished him.

Lieut.-Colonel Vandeleur, who commanded the 1st brigade of cavalry, brought his corps into action with the utmost rapidity, and displayed the greatest judgment and gallantry in his repeated and vigorous charges of the enemy. His Majesty's 8th regiment of dragoons, commanded by Captain Abercrombie, and the 1st and 6th regiments of native cavalry, the former commanded by Captain Welsh, and the latter by Captain Swinton, charged through different bodies of the enemy's horse with the greatest resolution and effect. A small party of the 8th dragoons totally destroyed a considerable body of Allygole infantry, which formed part of the enemy's force.

Lieut.-Colonel Need, who commanded the second brigade, is likewise entitled to my highest praise and approbation. His Majesty's 27th and 29th regiments of light dragoons, the former commanded by Captain Philpot, and the latter by Major Wade, and the 4th regiment of native cavalry, commanded by Captain Elliot, attacked with the utmost energy and effect the different bodies of the enemy to which they were opposed.

Lieut.Colonel Toone commanded the advanced guard, and deserves my gratitude and approbation for the spirit and activity which he displayed in that situation.

I have great satisfaction in reporting to your Lordship the very meritorious conduct of Captain Browne, and the corps of horse artillery under his command, who by the rapidity of their movements were enabled to do great execution. Captain Browne's great attention in the management of his corps, and his zeal and activity when called into action, have on every occasion merited my best acknowledgments.

I cannot conclude this despatch without expressing to your Lordship the satisfaction I have derived from the good conduct of the infantry, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Don. Though not present in the affair of yesterday, the zeal and patience with which they supported the fatigues of so arduous a march deserve my warmest thanks. Their eagerness in the pursuit would, there is no doubt, have been equalled by their gallantry in the attack of the enemy, had they come up with them.

I have not yet ascertained completely where the enemy have fled to, but all accounts lead me to believe that they are

scattered over the country, and no where collected in any considerable numbers.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble Servant,
G. LAKE.

No. LVI.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private and Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Delhi, November 19, 1804.

You will receive in the accompanying packet the detailed account of the great and glorious victory gained at Deig by General Frazer and Lieut.-Colonel Monson, which I really do think appears to surpass any thing that has hitherto been done in India, and I should hope would end the war directly. Holkar and his horse are flying as fast as they can to get over the Jumna, at least those that belong to the other side, and many very many of his Patans who have escaped are going towards their homes: the country we are marching through is strewed with dead bodies, and by all accounts the numbers wounded that have crept into villages are beyond belief. The rapidity of my march has astonished all the natives beyond imagination, and made them think there is nothing we are not equal to. I am now quite clear the country has been saved by this pursuit; every information I receive of the deep laid scheme for destroying our government leaves me not a doubt that if I had remained on the other side the Jumna nothing would have prevented the country from being up in arms, and the junction of Sumroo's Begum, Seiks, and Rohillas. I hope and trust you will think I have acted right. But unfortunately after all we have done, Colonel Monson writes me in a private letter that he means to fall back upon Muttra for supplies, at which place there are sufficient for the whole army for two months, and from whence he ought to have drawn them. He might have spared a battalion or two to have fetched them. What will be the consequence of this retrograde motion I know not, but much fear it will be called a retreat, let the people out of Deig and encourage all the country to join the Bhurtpore

Rajah and protract the war, which I am confident without such a movement would have been over in a month. I will get to the army as fast as I can (but of course it must be some days), and endeavour to rectify this mistake of Monson. It is somewhat extraordinary that a man brave as a lion, should have no judgment or reflection. In all my letters to him during the command he had formerly, have I uniformly recommended it to him to reflect and consider before he acts. It really grieves me to see a man I esteem, after gaining credit in the extreme, throw it away in such a manner immediately. I have written to him the moment I received his letter, stating his determination to retreat, but know it must come too late, as from what he tells me I think he will move on this very day.

It is incalculable the mischief this may produce, however no exertion on my part shall be wanting to correct this blunder.

I am so completely annoyed by this idea of falling back, that I shall say no more than that I am,

My dear Lord,
your most affectionate
and devoted,

G. LAKE.

P. S. I am not without hopes that Monson may change his plan when such intentions are known to others, who will I trust see the impropriety of it.

No. LVII.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Head Quarters, Camp Eetah, Nov. 24, 1804.

I have much satisfaction in informing your Lordship that since my arrival on this ground I have received intelligence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with the remains of his cavalry, having crossed the Jumna at a ford in the vicinity of Mohabun.

The flight of Holkar out of the Doab has been most rapid, and, by every account, the number that suffered on the 17th instant almost exceeds belief; numbers of wounded are still with him, and many others have been left in the villages.

The enemy is said to be proceeding to Deig. I shall lose no time in joining the army before that place.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble Servant,
G. LAKE.

No. LVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

(Private.)

MY DEAR SIR,

Barrackpore, November 26, 1804.

I received this morning the satisfactory account of your astonishing march and glorious success over Holkar's cavalry, and yesterday I had the happiness also to receive the account of the gallant and most successful action at Deig on 13th instant. Most sincerely do I congratulate you on the prosperous result of the skilful and judicious disposition which you made for the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, and the capture of his guns at the same moment. Both events are equal in importance to the most splendid victories we have obtained; no greater display has been made of our power, valour, or skill. It is now evident that we are able to frustrate the Mahratta operations even according to their ancient and most approved mode of warfare; and, as the last war had manifested, that they cannot support a system of regular war against us, this war has shewn that their system of predatory and light movement must also fail in the face of our armies, and especially of our cavalry.

I trust that the affairs of the 13th and 17th of November will finish the most arduous branch of these vexatious hostilities, and enable me at length to fix the peace of India on a secure basis.

It is impossible to describe the astonishment and admiration excited by your rapid and judicious pursuit of Holkar's cavalry; the occurrences of the 13th, and the total loss of all his artillery happening under your orders in the same week, have produced the happiest effect; nor had we a day of greater lustre or happiness during the late glorious war than this day. One evil circumstance alone clouds a part of

the prospect, I mean General Frazer's sad misfortune; I trust, however, that his life is safe, and I am satisfied that his fame will stand very high. I conclude that you will immediately relieve Colonel Monson, who is not fit, however brave and zealous, for such a command. You will also, I trust, proceed against the Rajah of Bhurtpore, if his treachery should be proved.

It is unfortunate that Holkar's person should have escaped you; you are equally impressed with me by the absolute necessity of seizing or destroying him. Until his person be either destroyed or imprisoned, we shall have no rest. I therefore rely on you to permit no circumstance to divert you from pursuing him to the utmost extremity.

You shall hear fully from me on a great variety of points immediately; at present I write merely to offer my cordial congratulations on the success of your able plans, which has greatly restored the tranquillity of my mind. The grand point is now gained, and we may now proceed to vigorous and effectual measures for the establishment of our power in Hindostan. My opinions are fully digested on that point; and you will receive my instructions in a few days in the most detailed form. May you continue to preserve your health, and to augment the lustre of your reputation.

Ever, my dear Sir,

yours most sincerely and faithfully,

WELLESLEY.

P.S. I have received all your despatches private and public, with the exception of the letters of the 30th of October, and No. 192, which should bear date on the 9th instant.

I hope you approve my appointment of Colonel Ochterlony to succeed Colonel Scott at Delhi. I suppose that you will appoint another Deputy Adjutant-General. I should be glad if you would unite the military command at Delhi with the Residency.

I have sent instructions for placing Ackber Shah on the throne in the event of the King's death; copies have been transmitted to you.

No. LIX.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Jenah, November 27th, 1804.

I should have written to your Lordship yesterday, but the death of General Frazer agitated me so much, that I could not settle to any thing. The fate of this gallant officer my dear Lord, is most unfortunate, as it involves a large family of eight or nine children, with their mother in the greatest distress possible, what can be done for their relief, I know not; unless a pension is granted them by the King or Parliament, or something done for them by the Court of Directors. I fear this last idea is not likely to produce much, and yet surely he deserves well from them.

I mention this circumstance to you from knowing how much it is your inclination to assist the distressed, and reward the meritorious. It would afford me the greatest satisfaction if any provision can be made for this family, and sure I am, you will recommend them in the strongest manner possible, to those in power at home.

My official letter of yesterday will have informed you of the army under Lieut.-Colonel Monson, having been arrested at Muttra in its retreating to Agra, which is so far fortunate, as in the event of Muttra being left with the small force at present there, I have not a doubt in my own mind but that some attempt would have been made upon it by the enemy, who well knew that our principal depot is in that town. I shall join it to-morrow, and act as circumstances may require, when I know what the Bhurtpore Rajah and his colleague Holkar are about to do. I have received several reports of their intended motions, but till I can get information through my own people, I can place no dependence upon them. I have hitherto been most fortunate in that particular for which I am under the greatest obligation to Major Salkeld, whose indefatigable zeal and attention is beyond all description, he has rendered me upon all occasions the most essential service, and been the cause in a great measure of my success in surprizing the enemy. His abilities exceed what I had any idea of. In short he is to me invaluable.

Had our army not quitted Deig, I think we must have had Holkar's remaining guns and troops immediately. As it is, I trust it will not be long before they are in our possession. I last night received the notes from Mr. Edmonstone, respecting my conduct towards the Bhurtpore Rajah. They like all other directions from your Lordship, are perfectly clear, most excellent and flattering in the extreme to me. I will not involve government in a war if possible with this ungrateful man; but I fear he has entered so far into it already, that it will not be in my power to avoid attacking and reducing him and his forts without delay.

Holkar's power and resources appear to be almost exhausted, and if not assisted by Runjeet Sing,* in my opinion he cannot last long. My only fear is that the moment I cross with the cavalry, he will set off with all the expedition he can, as I am informed he has a most perfect dread of the cavalry and myself.

Depend upon my doing every thing in my power to draw this war to a lasting conclusion.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

your affectionate and devoted,

G. LAKE.

No. LX.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Muttra, November 30th, 1804.

I have received all your notes and remarks upon this war, which I am in hopes will not only end well, but shortly. What this treacherous fool Runjeet Sing can mean is beyond all comprehension; I believe he repents most heartily, and should not be surprized if I received overtures of peace from him: he certainly deserves no favour from our government, as his conduct has been the most unprovoked and violent that ever was heard of. In the event of any proposal of that sort from him after the vile treachery practised against our army on the 13th, and his behaviour previous to that period, I do not feel myself at liberty to enter into any treaty with him,

* The Rajah of Bhurtpore.—[Ed]

as there is no dependance to be placed in any thing he says or signs. I am fully aware of the necessity of avoiding war as much as possible at this moment, as it would appear there is a general combination against our government; and yet I cannot help thinking when the two last actions are fully known, that neither Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar will ever join themselves to a man of broken fortune like Holkar. I do not think it quite certain that Ambajee has began, but imagine it possible that the troops mentioned by Colonel White may be a banditti that have been annoying the Rana of Gohud for some time, who I have no doubt were encouraged by Ambajee; he is a cunning designing man, and will I think when he knows the real situation of Holkar, set down quiet and wait for some other opportunity. Should Ameer Khan join him, I can bring over from the Doab Lieut.-Colonel Don with the reserve, and order Colonel Murray to move on by Shahabad in his rear, which would completely settle them, and in all probability destroy Ameer Khan's force, which I believe to be in a miserable plight both from a want of pay and everything else. Colonel Martindale could come upon him on the other side. I do not apprehend any immediate danger in that quarter, every precaution and exertion shall be taken to prevent it.

We certainly have our hands full, but I look for a speedy end to all our difficulties, and destruction of all our enemies at once.

I shall move forward to-morrow towards Deig, and see what can be done before the battering train comes up. I may possibly get at Holkar once more. I believe he has no force left, at least so inconsiderable that they are little more than an escort for himself. They say a few men of his brigades remain. This report shall be ascertained whether true or false very shortly.

I have every reason to believe that the action of the 13th instant was a very near business. The personal courage of Monson and others alone saved it. It was a most glorious day, and deserves every credit possible.

I feel, my dear Lord, most flattered and obliged by your appointment of Lieut.-Colonel Ochterlony to the Residency at Delhi, who I sincerely believe and hope will prove himself worthy of the great trust reposed in him. He certainly is

well acquainted with the disposition and intentions of all the people about the court, and has gained very great and useful knowledge of all the chiefs and courtiers around Delhi, as well as their intrigues and politics.

I trust and hope I shall acquit myself to the satisfaction of your Lordship (which be assured is the first wish of my heart) in the trying situation I have been placed in, from the most unfortunate and unlooked for disaster that could possibly have happened in this country. I will leave nothing undone that can in my opinion tend to settle matters, and restore tranquillity in India with honour and glory to the British Government.

If my letter is not explicit, you must attribute it to the anxiety of my mind, and the various occupations in which I am employed.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
your affectionate and devoted,
G. LAKE.

No. LXI.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Most Secret.)

London, May 30, 1804.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received Dec. 3, 1804.]

The despatch which I have forwarded through the Secret Committee on the question of naval defence, leaves me little in addition to observe on this subject. Enclosed you will receive a copy of the Admiralty instruction to Admiral Rainer, which your Lordship will perceive is little more than an authority to act, and we rely on your Lordship for affording to the Commander-in-chief such advice and assistance, in the procuring and equipping the ships, as may enable him in the best manner to fulfil his instructions.

The measure herein suggested has arisen from the necessity which we feel to give you not only strength, but numbers; from the difficulty of sparing the entire of what we deem it desirable you should have at present from Europe, and from the resource, which upon looking over the Indian calendar appeared to Lord Melville and myself to present itself, in the

number of stout Indian built ships of large tonnage belonging to the ports of Bombay and Calcutta.

I understand the larger country ships are generally absent at China till towards February; this may narrow your choice at the outset; you will, however, be able immediately to lay hold of the *Cornwallis* and *Britannia*, and that the equipment may suffer as little delay as possible, Lord Melville will endeavour to have as many supernumerary seamen as the Company's ships can convey, sent out with the July fleet. The *Culloden* and the two sixty-fours can also carry out a proportion.

His Lordship hopes you will be enabled, by a mixture of lascars, to assist in manning these ships, able seamen being a valuable and scarce commodity, pressed as we are by various services.

Your Lordship is of course well acquainted with the public character of Sir Edward Pellew, who proceeds in the *Culloden* to the chief command in the East Indies; he appears to me highly qualified for the situation in every respect, and I trust will prove himself deserving of your Lordship's confidence.

I enclose a list of our squadron in the East Indies, as I conceive it will stand, when the proposed augmentation shall have been completed.

I am, my dear Lord,
with great regard,
yours most faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

P. S. Lord Melville having conversed with Mr. Dundas, who was long in the Company's marine service at Bombay, and is perfectly acquainted with the ships belonging to that port, desires me to point your Lordship's attention to the six following, which he deems to be particularly well adapted for frigates. The *Carron*, 960 tons; *Minerva*, 987; *David Scott*, 749; *Sarah*, 935; *Scaleby Castle*, 1237; *Shaw-Kan-Koosro*, 1046. Should the whole be in your Lordship's judgment qualified to be so employed, it is Lord Melville's wish not to confine the purchases to the four ships now ordered, but to avail himself of the two additional ships; in this case probably the Admiralty may think it more prudent to have the two additional ships sent to Europe with cargoes and fitted

here, than forward crews from hence upon the chance of their being wanted, but of this your Lordship will be duly apprized, probably by the *Belle* packet, which sails in a few days, at all events before you can have any occasion for the information for the purpose of acting upon it.

(Enclosure.)

SIR,

Admiralty Office, May 29, 1804.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to signify their directions to you, to purchase without loss of time, upon the best and cheapest terms in your power, four ships for his Majesty's service capable of carrying from 36 to 40 guns and carronades each; and to cause all possible despatch to be used in getting them equipped and fitted for sea; it being their Lordship's intention to send out officers and seamen proper for their respective complements by the first opportunity that may offer.

I am, &c.

WILLIAM MARSDEN.

List of Ships for the East India Station.

Russel, 74; *Tremendous*, 74; *Albion*, 74; *Sceptre*, 74; *Culloden*, 74, under orders for India; *Trident*, 64; *Lancaster*, 64; *Athenian*, 64, under orders for China. Two Ships to be fitted and despatched as early as possible, each 64.

Centurian, 50; *Grampus*, 50; *Sheerness*, 44; *Phaeton*, 38; *Caroline*, 36, said to be taken; *Terpsichore*, 34; *Fox*, 32; *Dedaigieuse*, 32; *St. Fiorenzo*, 32; *Concorde*, 32; *Lord Castlereagh*, 48; *Lady Castlereagh*, 42; *Bombay Frigate*, 36; *Cornwallis*, ; *Britannia*, . Four to be equipped in India. Frigate building at Bombay.

No. LXII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Written Dec. 4, 1804.

I have received with sentiments of the utmost affliction the melancholy intelligence of the decease of Mr. Webbe, the late Resident at your Court.* The distinguished abilities,

* The following order was issued by the Marquess Wellesley on the occasion referred to:—

Fort William, Dec. 6, 1804.

The Governor-General in Council has received with sentiments of the deepest regret and sorrow the melancholy intelligence of the death of

integrity and conduct of Mr. Webbe even within the short period of his residence at your Court, must have excited in your mind sentiments of respect and esteem for his character, and of sincere regret and concern for his death. With reference to the affairs of your government under the alliance now happily subsisting between the two states, the loss of Mr. Webbe's services is a subject of peculiar regret at this time, when various points of great delicacy and importance have arisen which require to be adjusted between the two states. With a view, however, to supply the defect occasioned by the loss of Mr. Webbe on this occasion, with the least practicable delay I have deemed it expedient to direct Colonel Close, the British representative at the Court of his Highness the Peishwa, to proceed to your camp, for the express purpose of communicating with you on those subjects. Colonel Close will accordingly proceed from Poonah to your camp with the utmost practicable expedition, in the meantime you will be pleased to consider Mr. Jenkins, for whose abilities, knowledge and integrity, I entertain a high respect to be the official channel of communication with the British Government, and to be empowered to act in all respects as the accredited representative of the British Government at your Court.

I take this occasion to apprise you that the honourable Major-General Wellesley has again been vested with the same extensive military and political powers which were formerly delegated to that officer under my authority. Major-General Wellesley has proceeded to resume the command of the British forces in the Deccan. The movements of the troops under that officer's personal command will expedite

Josiah Webbe, Esq., late Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who died at Hussingabad, on the banks of the Nerbudda river, on the 9th November 1804, after a long and severe illness.

The remains of Mr. Webbe were interred on the 10th November, with the respect and honour due to his superior character, talents and knowledge, to his eminent integrity and public virtue, and to his distinguished merits in the service of his country in India.

Published by Command of his Excellency the most
noble the Governor-General in Council.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Govt., Sec. Pol. and For. Depts.

your communication with him, and I request that you will consider Major-General Wellesley to be vested with powers to conclude with you through the agency of the British representative at your Court, any arrangement connected with the interests of the two states.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXIII.

Extract from a Letter from the Resident at Delhi to the Marquess Wellesley, under Date the 8th December, 1804.

In offering my opinions on the subject of your Lordship's liberal intentions for the comfort and protection of his imperial Majesty and the royal family, I was governed by a sense of duty to your Excellency, and I beg leave in addition to what I have already urged, to mention that by placing the duties of Delhi and its vicinity under his control, there will result an evil which did not occur when writing my last despatch.

The scarcity and dearness of grain compelled me, in order to encourage the importation, to relinquish all duties, and I may safely say that it was this measure alone which secured sufficient supplies for the city during the siege. If once placed in hands, rendered rapacious by long poverty, I doubt it would not be easy for any influence to effect the comfort of the subject at the expence of the crown, nor could that influence prevail on his Majesty to forego the advantages he would gain from grain-merchants in their transits to our armies or detachments.

To give him all that is realized, exclusive of the pay of establishments, would be an easy and sacred duty as well in the customs as in the Pergunnahs; but to invest him with a control, is to give him a power to injure himself, to which the avarice and self-interest of numberless dependents would undoubtedly lead. If, however, these reasons should appear to your Lordship trivial or ill-founded, I beg leave to assure your Excellency of my most zealous and unremitting exertions to carry any measures into effect which your Lordship's enlightened judgment may think proper to adopt.

During the Mahratta government, the person placed near

the person of his Majesty, under the title of Soubahdar, administered justice in all cases, civil and criminal, and all are accused of having polluted its pure stream by the grossest corruption or unjustifiable partiality. The establishment of courts of justice in his Majesty's name must be highly pleasing to him, and prove a blessing to his subjects.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that I waited on his Majesty on the 2d to present a letter from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, communicating the intelligence of Holkar's defeat at Futtý Ghur, and his Excellency's letter mentioned that I would make the customary offerings on the occasion. I paid my respects to his Majesty on the afternoon of that day, and instead of the usual Nuzzer, I gave him an order of release for all the gardens, houses, and other places, which were royal property, restrained by the Mahrattas, and mentioned that as I had made that choice from an idea none would be so acceptable to his Majesty, I was persuaded none would be so likely to meet your Lordship's approbation. The satisfaction he felt at this unexpected restoration of some very favourite gardens which he had often been accustomed to visit was very evident, and he shortly after commanded me to accompany him in his usual ride round some of the gardens of the palace. In this excursion he commanded the poets, who are always in attendance to recite verses extempore, and he dictated some himself; which were written down. I take the liberty to mention these trifles, as they evince the pleasure he felt on the occasion. Reverting again to your Lordship's beneficent intentions in favour of his Majesty, and conscious of the purest motives for my suggestions, I beg leave to observe, that if an officer appointed by the British Government was vested with the superintendence, there would be a most effectual check on the superintendent, by directing that the accounts of the lands so assigned should be kept in the imperial treasury or Dufter, and that his Majesty should nominate Peishkars with every Amil, who should report the exact amount of collections and expenditure.*

I have the honour to be, &c.

D. OCHTERLONY.

* The provision made by the Governor-General for the support of the Mogul's family will be found detailed in a subsequent letter.—[Ed.]

No. LXIV.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Camp near Deig, Dec. 8, 1804.

I have received your kind and flattering letter congratulating me on our late successes in Hindostan and the Doab, which has afforded me the most heartfelt satisfaction in hearing from you my dear Lord, that it has in a great degree restored the tranquillity of your mind. Believe me I felt most severely for the suffering and anxiety you must have experienced for some time, the thoughts of which added to the desire of saving our territories in India, and overcoming the disgrace we had sustained from our disastrous retreat, stimulated me to every exertion and endeavour to prove to the natives that nothing could withstand the British power or exceed the patience and perseverance of our soldiers through the greatest danger and fatigue. Happy am I to meet once more with your approbation and applause. I never in my life experienced so much vexation and disappointment till lately; however, my mind is now more at ease, but will not be completely so till after the surrender of this fort, and the capture of all Holkar's remaining guns, an event sure to happen I trust in a very few days. I think the ingratitude, the treachery and villainous behaviour of the Bhurtpore Rajah merit every misfortune that can be heaped upon him. It is impossible to express the mildness of my conduct to the man, my wish in every instance to advance his interests, the wonderful care and attention I paid to the preservation of his country at all times. The return he has made for such behaviour is diabolical in the extreme, and will I trust shortly meet with its due reward. Most sincerely do I lament the fall of General Frazer, he was a man I placed the greatest confidence and reliance in, knowing that he would do all in his power to carry my wishes and orders into effect, with energy, zeal and decision. I felt quite certain that he would succeed if possible; his coolness had a most wonderful effect upon the army, and had he not been wounded so early in the day, I really believe the victory would if possible, have been

still more glorious than it was. I know not where to supply the place of poor Frazer. God grant the campaign may soon be at an end, and that you may be able to fix the peace of India on a secure basis.

Holkar must be destroyed or laid hold of, but he is so extremely wary that he is off long before we can get to him. I have been out this morning for the purpose of reconnoitring, and have disturbed Holkar's cavalry; there are more of them than he brought from the Doab with him, as he has got some that were left with Bapojee Scindiah, and some from the Bhurtpore man; we killed a few of them.

I return you many thanks for the appointment of Colonel Ochterlony, and hope and believe he will fulfil the duties of his office to your satisfaction. It is difficult to find a man exactly calculated for such a situation, but I believe he will do it as well as most people you could have found. He has the advantage of being acquainted with the little intrigues and jealousy about the Court, which he will I am sure make a proper use of. The King is at present well as usual. I am glad to find you have sent instructions respecting his successor, as it will prevent confusion in the event of his Majesty's death.

I hope soon to send you good accounts from hence, and remain,

my dear Lord,
your affectionate and devoted servant,
G. LAKE.

No. LXV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Wm. Bentinck.

MY LORD,

Fort William, December, 17, 1804.

1. The British Resident at the court of the Rajah of Travancore has communicated to your Lordship the circumstances of an insurrection among the Nair battalions in the service of the Rajah of Travancore, and of the danger to which the authority of the Rajah, and the influence of the British Government in Travancore are exposed by the extent of that insurrection and the violence and activity of the insurgents.

2. The treaty concluded between the British Government and the Rajah of Travancore in the year 1797, does not contain any express stipulation for the aid of the British power in quelling internal commotions within the territories of that prince; but the spirit of the treaty certainly imposes upon us that obligation. The expediency however of affording such aid in the present crisis is obvious, especially under this consideration, that the avowed object of the insurrection is the subversion of the British influence in the councils of the Rajah.

3. If therefore your Lordship should not have adopted measures for the relief of the Rajah of Travancore, I request that on receipt of this despatch, your Lordship will issue orders directing the immediate dispatch of a British force from the most convenient quarter for the purpose of quelling the insurrection in the vicinity of Travancore, and of restoring the authority of the Rajah and his Dewan.

4. I consider this occurrence to afford a favourable opportunity for the modification of our subsidiary engagements with the Rajah of Travancore. The modification which I propose is, that the British force at present subsidized by the Rajah be permanently stationed within his dominions, and that the British Government possess authority to regulate the disposition of that force within the territories of the Rajah, in such a manner as may appear best calculated to secure the objects of its appointment.

5. I have accordingly directed the Resident at Travancore to propose that modification to the Rajah of Travancore at the earliest opportunity.

6. It may be proper on this occasion to state to your Lordship, that the preservation and improvement of our influence in that country has been uniformly considered by me to be an object of the greatest importance to the interests and security of the British Government in India; and in my judgment the present exigency of the Rajah of Travancore's affairs justifies and requires a vigorous exertion of our force for the restoration of his authority and for the preservation of the British interests in that quarter.

7. Your Lordship will also observe from the tenor of this despatch, that my opinion of the necessity of supporting the cause of the Rajah of Travancore with the aid of our troops

is founded on the obligations of treaty, combined with the importance of maintaining and improving our political connection with that state.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.

(Secret and Official.)

SIR,

Fort William, Dec. 20, 1804.

1. Having reviewed the whole of your Excellency's correspondence respecting the recent conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and adverting to the aid afforded by that chieftain to the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar at the battle of Deig on the 13th of November, and on various occasions since that period of time, I am decidedly of opinion that the Rajah of Bhurtpore has not only violated the treaty concluded with him by your Excellency on the 9th of October 1803,* but has committed the most unprovoked and violent acts of hostility against the British Government.

2. I entirely approve the measures which your Excellency has already pursued for the purpose of frustrating the effects of the Rajah's treachery and hostility, and for the reduction of the fortress of Deig. The entire reduction of the power and resources of the Rajah of Bhurtpore however, is now become indispensably necessary, and I accordingly authorize and direct your Excellency to adopt immediate arrangements for the attainment of that desirable object, and for the annexation to the British power, in such manner as your Excellency may deem most consistent with the public interests, of all the forts, territories, and possessions belonging to the Rajah of Bhurtpore.

3. In carrying these instructions into execution, your Excellency will be pleased to advert to the terms of my notes of the 13th November 1804, transmitted in a letter under date the 13th of November, from the Secretary to Government in the Secret and Political Department to Lieut.-Colonel Lake. The measures to be pursued against the

* See Vol. III. Appendix, p. 636.

Rajah of Bhurtpore must be considered to be subordinate to the main object of destroying the resources and power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. That chieftain however now derives his principal, if not his sole means of mischief, from the aid of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and the subjugation of the power and territory of the Rajah of Bhurtpore therefore, is essential to the reduction of Holkar's hostile force.

Your Excellency will still be pleased to consider the pursuit of Holkar's personal army, to be the principal object of the war; and adverting to the general tenor of my former instructions, you will constantly bear in mind my opinion that the entire destruction of whatever force may be attached to the person of this freebooter, is indispensably required for the tranquillity of India, and that even the arrest of his person is highly desirable.

5. You will therefore prosecute hostilities against the Rajah of Bhurtpore with reference to the object stated in the preceding paragraphs. Whatever portion of the territory of Bhurtpore may be conquered, I request your Excellency to establish a civil authority in it without delay for the temporary administration of the revenues, and of civil and criminal justice.

6. As your Excellency's proceedings against the Rajah of Bhurtpore are calculated to serve as an example to other petty states, I desire that your Excellency will be pleased to forward circular letters to our allies on the north west frontier, and to the several Rajpoot states, including Kota, &c. and also to Begum Sumroo, and the Sik chieftains, explaining the principles of your Excellency's conduct towards the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and assuring the allies and neighbouring states, of the continuance of our friendship for them, and of our wish to preserve the peace, and to respect the independence of all the contiguous states of India. It might also be useful to circulate a declaration of a similar tendency, warning all persons against the consequences of affording aid to our enemies, and assuring the inhabitants and chiefs of the surrounding countries, of our amicable disposition towards all who shall not favour the cause of the enemy.

7. I shall forward to your Excellency, letters, and a declaration, in my name, to the same effect, but in the mean-

while I request your Excellency to lose no time in addressing the several states in your name.

8. Bapojee Scindiah with his troops, has openly joined Jeswunt Rao Holkar: your Excellency is apprized that this person is not only an officer of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, (who was sent to co-operate with your Excellency in the attack of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, under the stipulations of the defensive alliance concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah,) but is actually one of those chieftains included in the list of persons, who receive pensions and jagheers from the British Government under the seventh article of the treaty of Surji Anjengaum. Under these circumstances, Bapojee Scindiah cannot be considered to be entitled to any of the rights of war, and it is my intention to proceed against him accordingly.

9. Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to issue a proclamation ordering Bapojee Scindiah and his followers, to proceed to your Excellency's camp, on a certain day, to be named by your Excellency, under the penalty, in case of failure, of being considered and treated as rebels and traitors to the cause of the allies, and to the British Government, from which he receives a pension. If Bapojee Scindiah should not join your Excellency's camp on the prescribed day, and should afterwards become a prisoner to the British army, your Excellency will be pleased to try him by a court-martial, and to carry into immediate execution, the punishment which may be awarded to him for his flagrant treachery and rebellion. Your Excellency will pursue similar measures against any of the followers of Bapojee Scindiah who may fall into your hands, notifying your Excellency's intention in the proclamation to be published under the instructions contained in this despatch.

10. Your Excellency will also be pleased to take similar steps with regard to Seddasheo Bhow and his followers, who, being ordered by Scindiah to join Lieut.-Colonel Monson, have also joined the enemy.*

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

* See letter of the Governor-General in Council of the 24th March, 1805.

No. LXVII.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

Head Quarters, Camp before Bhurtpore,

January 10th, 1805.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that in consequence of the breach in the wall of the town being reported practicable, I determined on storming the place yesterday evening. I chose this time, in order to prevent the enemy from stockading the breach during the night, which had hitherto been the case.

I am sorry to add, that obstacles of an insurmountable nature were opposed to the storming party, on their arrival at the breach; the water in the ditch was exceedingly deep; this difficulty however was speedily surmounted, and the party gained the foot of the breach; but though every exertion was made by both officers and men, the breach was so imperfect, that every effort to gain the top proved fruitless, and the column, after making several attempts with heavy loss, was obliged to retire, which they did in excellent order, to our battery.

Among the many brave men who have fallen on this occasion, it is with sincere grief I report the death of Lieut.-Colonel Maitland, of the 75th regiment, who commanded the storming party; his exertions are described by all to have been of a nature the most heroic, and his example animated the men to persevere in their attempts, which nothing but difficulties, of a nature the most unexpected, could have rendered unsuccessful. This gallant officer, though he had received several severe wounds, continued to exert himself until he received a shot in the head, which proved instantaneously mortal.

Although we unfortunately failed in gaining possession of the place, we were not wholly unsuccessful. A flanking column on the right, under the orders of Major Hawkes, gained possession of the enemy's battery, and succeeded in spiking and disabling their guns, and in destroying the greatest part of the enemy who were opposed to them.

I beg to assure your Lordship, that the conduct of our officers and men employed last night, has been as exemplary as on every former occasion; but circumstances, of an unex-

pected and unfortunate nature, occurred, which their utmost efforts could not surmount: but I hope, in a very few days, their excellent conduct will be rewarded by the possession of the place.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,
G. LAKE.

No. LXVIII.

Lieutenant-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

Head Quarters, Camp before Bhurtpore,
Jan. 21, 1805.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that the breach appearing in a sufficient state of forwardness, I determined to attempt the place again this afternoon.

The storming party moved out of the trenches, where they had been lodged for the purpose, a little before three o'clock. I am sorry to add, that the ditch was found so broad and deep, that every attempt to pass it proved unsuccessful, and the party was obliged to return to the trenches, without effecting their object.

The troops behaved with their usual steadiness, but I fear, from the heavy fire they were unavoidably exposed to, for a considerable time, that our loss has been severe.

I shall have the honour to forward returns of the killed and wounded, as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble Servant,
G. LAKE.

No. LXIX.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

Head Quarters, Camp before Bhurtpore,
Jan. 23, 1805, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7, P. M.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that I yesterday morning detached the 1st regiment of native cavalry,

and 1st battalion 15th regiment, under the command of Captain Welsh, of the former corps, to meet a convoy of provisions, on its way from Muttra to my camp.

The detachment, having yesterday evening joined the convoy, halted for the night about six coss from my camp, and moved again at an early hour this morning.

The detachment was attacked on its march by a very considerable body of infantry with guns, and the whole of the united force of cavalry belonging to Holkar, Ameer Khan, and Bappojee Scindiah, about four coss from camp, which obliged them to occupy a village, for the purpose of collecting the convoy, and preserving it from the numerous cavalry of the enemy.

Immediately on hearing the firing, I ordered Lieut.-Colonel Need, with his Majesty's 27th light dragoons, and the 2d regiment of native cavalry, to proceed to the relief of the party, whilst I followed with the main body of the cavalry of the army.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship, that the detachment under Captain Welsh made a most gallant defence, and immediately on the approach of Lieut.-Colonel Need, they moved out of the village, charged, and totally routed the enemy to whom they were opposed.

Great numbers of the enemy were killed, and nearly forty stands of colours, and all the artillery they had in the field, consisting of four guns, with their tumbrils, fell into our hands.

This body of infantry was commanded by Ameer Khan, who, (according to the information I have received from some of his servants who were made prisoners), was so close pressed, that to prevent himself from being known, he stripped himself of his clothes and arms, and is supposed to have escaped in that situation; some accounts render it probable that he has fallen, but on this subject I have no certain information.

Ameer Khan's palanquin, with a complete suit of armour, said to be his, has been brought into camp, as has also Bappojee Scindiah's palanquin.

Too much praise cannot be bestowed on the troops engaged, for their good conduct and activity on this occasion, and I feel infinitely indebted to Captain Welsh, who com-

manded the escort, for the gallantry with which he resisted the repeated attacks of a numerous enemy.

Lieut.-Colonel Need is likewise entitled to my best thanks, for the activity and spirit, with which he charged and completed the rout of the enemy, whose loss has been very great.

I feel it particularly incumbent on me to mention the service rendered by Major Salkeld, the Deputy Quarter Master General, who carried my orders to Lieut.-Colonel Need, and proceeded to point out the road to that officer; his services on this, as on every occasion, have been most conspicuous, for zeal and gallantry. I want words to express to your Lordship how infinitely I feel indebted to this meritorious officer for the assistance he has rendered me in every instance, where I have had an opportunity of availing myself of his services.

I am happy to add, that our loss on this occasion,* has not been considerable. Lieutenant Gordon, of the 15th native infantry, and Cornet Erskine, of the 1st native cavalry, have been wounded, but I hope not dangerously. The number of privates wounded does not exceed twenty, and I believe only two men have been killed.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,

G. LAKE.

No. LXX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Major-General Arthur Wellesley.

SIR,

Fort William, Jan 24th, 1805.

By the despatches noted in the margin,* you will perceive that although I had every reason to be convinced of the hostile designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, certainly originating in an erroneous estimation of the

* Instructions to Mr. Elphinstone, dated Nov. 17th, 25th, Dec. 18th, 22d, 1804; and two private letters from Mr. Edmonstone, under date 30th of Dec. 1804, and 2nd Jan. 1805. Instructions to Colonel Close, dated 4th Dec. 1804. Instructions to Mr. Jenkins, dated Dec. 4th, 12th, 18th, 22d, 22d, with Postscript.

extent of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power and success, it was not my intention to proceed to extremities with those chieftains excepting in cases of the most indispensable necessity. As long as the conduct of those powers appeared to be inconsistent with the relations of amity, and to indicate hostility, it appeared to me to be expedient to pursue such a course as might manifest to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar the determination of the British Government to vindicate its just rights, and to frustrate any designs which those chieftains might have formed of a description hostile to our interests, or to those of our allies.

2. It has always however been my desire to maintain with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, the relations of friendship which were so happily established by the treaties of peace concluded with those chieftains, and by the alliance concluded with Scindiah; and although the concurrent testimony of facts from every quarter of India have satisfied me of the treacherous intentions of those chieftains, I am now disposed to believe that they have abandoned the designs which they had formed in consequence of the exaggerated reports of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's progress, and that the events of the war in Hindostan and in the Deccan, have compelled them to return to a proper sense of their obligations towards the British Government.

3. No questions now depend either at the Courts of Dowlut Rao Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, which appear to menace any interruption of the subsisting relations with those powers, and the period of time is arrived at which the British Government may with safety extend to those chieftains the additional benefits by which I proposed to cement our connection.

4. The only point with regard to Scindiah which at present appears to require consideration is the establishment of his government in the Province of Malwa, and the transfer to Scindiah of the territories in that province, which have been conquered from Jeswunt Rao Holkar. It is certainly desirable to induce Scindiah to return to Ougein, and to occupy the territories which belonged to Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the province of Malwa; but it neither appears to be necessary to compel Scindiah to adopt these arrangements, nor to abandon the defensive alliance if he should refuse to comply with the

amicable representations which the British Resident at his Court has been directed to address to that chieftain for the purpose of improving the condition of his government under his existing connection with the British power.

5. With regard to the Rajah of Berar, the only question which is likely to require discussion is the late invasion of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan by the troops of the Rajah, or of the officers of the Rajah's government. But this question may be hereafter adjusted without difficulty by amicable negotiation under instructions which may be issued to the Residents at the Courts of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and of the Rajah of Berar respectively.

5. Under these circumstances, and advertng to the state of the campaign in Hindostan, as well as to the reduced state of the enemy's power and resources, I am of opinion that the maintenance of the troops under Colonel Haliburton in an advanced position in the Deccan is now become unnecessary as far as respects the state of our relations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

7. On the other hand, the state of the war with Holkar does not appear to me to require the continuance in the field of the troops now under the command of Colonel Haliburton, with a view to the prosecution of hostilities against Holkar. Scindiah and the Peishwa must be called upon to occupy and to provide for the defence of the territories which have been conquered from Holkar in the province of Malwa and in the Deccan respectively, and it would be inexpedient to employ the British forces in the Deccan in the protection of territories, which having been conquered by the British arms, have been gratuitously ceded to the allies.

8. Advertng to all these considerations, and to the state of the season at the period of time when this despatch may reach you and the authorities in the Deccan, I am of opinion that it is more advisable to adopt with every practicable degree of expedition the necessary arrangements for withdrawing the troops in the Deccan under the command of Colonel Haliburton from their present position, and for establishing them in such positions as may be best calculated to afford protection to the territories of our allies, the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa.

9. As it is uncertain whether you may be at Poonah

when this despatch may reach the authorities in the Deccan, I have addressed a letter to Colonel Haliburton, of which a copy is enclosed for your information, directing him to withdraw the troops under his command from their present advanced position to a convenient position on the north or left bank of the Godavery, and there to halt until he can receive your orders for the final distribution of the troops under his command. I have also ordered Colonel Haliburton to adopt arrangements for carrying into immediate execution the orders which you will be pleased to signify to him for the separation of the subsidiary forces belonging to the Peishwa and to the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and for the reduction of all expenses and establishments now existing beyond the establishment fixed for the subsidiary forces under the stipulations of the defensive alliance with those states. You will also give orders for returning to Bombay and to Fort St. George all troops and followers belonging to those Residencies respectively which may now be in the Deccan beyond the establishments of the subsidiary forces serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

10. In considering the positions which it may be most beneficial to the public interests to select for the subsidiary forces serving under the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, I have adverted to the reasoning contained in your despatch to me, under date the 26th of January 1804,* and I entirely approve of the proposed position on the Godavery for the main bodies of the subsidiary forces serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan and with the Peishwa, with two battalions from each of those forces, to be stationed at Hyderabad and Poonah. This distribution is calculated to meet every contingency either of peace or war, and is the most beneficial arrangement which could be adopted with a view to derive every possible advantage from the services of those forces respectively.

11. You will be pleased therefore, on the receipt of this despatch, to issue the necessary orders to Colonel Haliburton for the return of the troops under his command to the banks of the Godavery, and for the separation of the subsidiary

* Contained in Vol. II. of the Duke of Wellington's Despatches, p. 82. [ED.]

forces now united under his command, together with the reduction of all such establishments as may not in your judgment be deemed necessary for the efficiency of the subsidiary forces serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa. You will also direct the return to the territories of Fort St. George and Bombay of all corps and troops which may not belong to the subsidiary forces; and you will communicate early notice of your arrangements for this purpose to those governments respectively. It will also be necessary, that in concert with the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, you should adopt such measures as you may deem necessary to enable you to distribute the subsidiary forces serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa to the northward of the Godavery, as proposed in your despatch of the 26th January 1804, at the earliest period of time which may be deemed consistent with the security and advantage of the public interests in the Deccan.

12. Objections founded on the state of affairs at the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah may exist to preclude the proposed arrangements as far as may relate to the expediency of stationing the main body of the subsidiary forces on the Godavery. In that case you will be pleased to direct the return of the whole of the Nizam's subsidiary force to Hyderabad, and of the Peishwa's to Poonah or to Ahmednuggur, according to your discretion. Copies of this despatch will be transmitted to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, and they will be directed to furnish you with their sentiments respecting the most eligible arrangement for the distribution of the subsidiary forces serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peishwa.

13. In the actual condition of public affairs in the Deccan, it does not appear to me to be necessary for you to proceed to the Deccan and to assume the exercise of the powers vested in you by my instructions of the 9th Nov. 1804. I am unwilling however to abrogate those powers without affording you an opportunity of exercising your judgment with regard to the expediency of your retaining those powers, but unless any objections should occur to your mind, I am of opinion that they may now be resigned without inconvenience to the public service. It is not my intention to issue any orders on this subject until I receive a communication of your

sentiments in reply to this despatch. You have my permission however to resign these powers if you should think proper, and in that case it will be necessary for you to give early notice of your resignation to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the several authorities in the Deccan, in order that they may act accordingly.*

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Rear Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, Bart.

(Official.)

SIR,

Fort William, 7th Feb. 1805.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter, dated off Cape Negrais, 24th November, 1804, communicating to me the highly satisfactory intelligence of your Excellency's arrival in these seas for the purpose of assuming the command of his Majesty's fleet in the East Indies.

2. In offering to your Excellency my sincere congratulations on your arrival in India, I request you to be assured that I entertain a confident expectation that the public interests in this quarter of the world will derive great advantage from the exertion of the eminent zeal, activity, valour, and skill, which have ever distinguished your Excellency's public services. I return your Excellency many thanks for the obliging terms in which you have been pleased to express your disposition to co-operate with me in the maintenance of the national interests in this part of the British Empire. Your Excellency will always find a corresponding disposition on my part to afford to your Excellency every possible degree of assistance in the prosecution of such operations as you may deem to be necessary for the promotion of his Majesty's

* Major General Wellesley arrived at Calcutta from the Deccan in August, 1804. He had not visited the Presidency nor seen the Governor-General since the period of his departure for Mysore in 1798. For an account of the reception given to him by the Governor-General on reaching Fort William, see Appendix.—[Ed.]

service, and of the interests of the honourable Company and of the nation in India.

3. I shall not fail to submit to your Excellency's consideration such suggestions as may occur to my mind with reference to the employment of the naval force in these seas, and I shall at all times be solicitous to furnish your Excellency with every information which may contribute to facilitate the execution of the arduous duties entrusted to your Excellency's charge. I conclude that Vice-Admiral Rainier will have communicated to your Excellency copies of my recent despatches addressed to him; I have, however, directed copies of all such letters as appear to me to require your Excellency's notice, to be forwarded from Fort William to your address.

4. I am now employed in collecting materials for the purpose of stating my sentiments to your Excellency on the subject of the instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty relative to the construction of ships of war in India. In the meanwhile I shall be happy to receive any communication of your Excellency's opinion with respect to the most advisable mode of carrying these instructions into effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXII,

Speech of His Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, Visitor of the College of Fort William, delivered at the Disputations held 9th of February, 1805.

GENTLEMEN OF THE COLLEGE OF FORT WILLIAM,

At the close of the public disputations of the last year, the delay which had protracted the period of our annual meeting enabled me to signify my judgment with regard to the progress of the Institution at an advanced period of the season.

On that occasion, having signified to you my approbation of your general conduct, and having adverted to such objects as appeared to me to demand your particular attention, my duty on this day appears to be limited to the consideration

of the state and condition of this Institution within the period of time which has elapsed since the conclusion of the last disputations.

The diminution of the total number of the students by the separation of the gentlemen of the establishments of Fort St. George and Bombay, has unavoidably affected the number and variety of the public exercises pronounced, and of the honours conferred on the present occasion.

The sphere of emulation and competition has been contracted by the necessary operation of the same cause; but I am happy to perceive that you have persevered in the indefatigable exertion of your general zeal, industry, and spirit of study.

The students who have maintained arguments at the public disputations on the present occasion, have not passed through a course of study equal in point of duration with that which enabled the students of former years to attain the honours attached to similar public exercises. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, the gentlemen who have held disputations on the present occasion have successfully rivalled their most distinguished predecessors in correct language, fluent expression, and accurate pronunciation.

The degrees of honour conferred this day are the public and just rewards of merit, which has not been surpassed by any students of this College; and I entertain a confident hope that the public services of these gentlemen will prove highly valuable to the interests of the Company and of our country in India. The students distinguished by prizes and honorary rewards are also entitled to high commendation; and the principles of public justice demand my applause of the attainments of the greater proportion of those who now proceed to the public service.

It is highly satisfactory to me to declare that the general conduct and progress of the students continues to merit the highest approbation of this government, and to reflect considerable honour on the character of the Institution, and on the knowledge, talents, skill, and diligence of the professors in the discharge of their respective duties.

At the last disputation I expressed my desire that a more general attention should be paid to the study of the vernacular language of Bengal. I observe with pleasure that a

degree of honour has been merited and conferred for high proficiency in that language, and that the study of that useful attainment is now prosecuted by many of the students with diligence and success.

In the Mahratta language a progress has been made, which merits approbation and encouragement. The declamation pronounced for the first time in that language is highly creditable to the gentleman who pronounced it, and to the learned professor under whose care the students in that department have manifested meritorious industry and application, attended by great success, within a limited period of time.

The compilation and publication of useful works in the Oriental languages have proceeded with unabated spirit, and with evident public advantage, by affording additional facilities throughout India in the general attainment of the several languages requisite for the conduct of the service.

Amongst useful works of this description, a grammar of the Mahratta language has been completed and printed, and a vocabulary of the same language is now in the press.

Since the last meeting, therefore, the promotion of Oriental knowledge in the British service in India has received increased advantage by the progress of the studies and labours of those attached to this College.

The attention of the officers and students of the College appears also to have been successfully directed to those important objects of discipline, regularity, and good order which formed an essential part of my recent observations from this place. My solemn and sacred duty demands that I should enforce those admonitions on every seasonable occasion, and by every attainable sanction of reward, encouragement, and authority. I cannot therefore omit this public opportunity of expressing my particular satisfaction in the conduct of those students who have manifested their qualification for the due discharge of the highest stations in this service by an attentive observance, not merely of the letter, but of the true spirit of those statutes which prescribe strict attention to the maxims of regularity, economy, and good order.

The most eminent and brilliant success in the highest objects of study will prove inadequate qualifications for the

service of the Company and of our country in India, if the just application of those happy attainments be not secured by a solid foundation of virtuous principles, and correct conduct. The whole system of the education which you have received at home furnishes a sufficient explanation of the principles and objects of those statutes which ordain a due attention to the order and regularity of your private economy, and to those habits calculated to protect you from future embarrassment and distress in the exercise of your public duties; and the vital principle of this service, combined with the preservation of your most urgent interests and honour in this country, requires me to inculcate and enjoin the indispensable necessity of your strict conformity to these essential articles of the statutes.

In closing the proceedings of this day, I have the satisfaction to signify to you that a considerable progress has been made in the arrangements requisite to promote and to facilitate in this College the study of the laws and regulations enacted by the Governor-General for the government of the British territories, subject to the Presidency of Bengal.

With the able assistance of the principal public officers of this government, the commencement of a regular system of study in that important branch may be expected during the course of the present year.

To this system of study it is my intention to add rewards and honours, calculated to distinguish the merits of those students who shall appear at the examinations to have attained eminent knowledge of the laws and regulations, which they are destined to administer in their several stations to the people of these extensive provinces.

In the original foundation of this college, it was my intention to have provided sufficient means of instruction for the students in the principles of general jurisprudence and the law of nations, connecting that course of study with the principles of Mohammedan and Hindoo laws, and with those of the wise, benevolent, and salutary code of laws, introduced by the Marquess Cornwallis for the administration of these provinces, and improved and extended by succeeding governments, with the aid of the talents, knowledge, and virtues of that respected person, whose merits and services towards his country and mankind in the formation and sub-

sequent improvement of that code, are to be traced in the increasing prosperity and happiness of every province of the empire to which it has been extended.

Unavoidable circumstances have prevented the institution of a regular course of lectures in the general principles of jurisprudence and of the laws of nations. It is my duty, however, earnestly to recommend the study of the most approved elementary works in this branch to all the students of this college. The knowledge of these general principles will prove of the utmost advantage in every department of this service. In the judicial department, the necessity of such a course of study is obvious and incontrovertible. But in every department of the service the knowledge of the leading maxims of general law will tend to secure a due observance of the regulations of the government, and of the principles of universal justice and equity towards every class of our numerous and various subjects, and of all the native inhabitants of India.

The study of the Mohammedan and Hindoo codes of law will be facilitated by the works extant on those subjects, to which the attention of the students should be carefully directed. In the course of the present year, I trust that a considerable progress may be made, with the aid of the learning and skill of the principal judicial officers of this government, in establishing a regular course of study in the Mahommedan and Hindoo codes of law.

But the accurate study of the regulations and laws enacted by this government, under the guidance of the respectable and learned professor in that department, will afford sufficient opportunity of advantage and distinction to those students who shall pursue such a course with diligence and attention.

In pursuing that course, the plain and direct objects of this system of laws and regulations will be manifested in the due distribution of the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities of the state, in the establishment of an impartial administration of justice according to the existing laws, and in the provision of gradual means for the improvement and amendment of those laws; and the origin and stability of that prosperity are to be found in that code which you are

now directed to study, and hereafter destined to administer, to expound, and to amend.

Subject to the common imperfections of every human institution, this system of laws is approved by practical experience, the surest test of human legislation; and contains in its own substance an active principle of progressive amendment, which affords the best security for its gradual improvement.

It is not my intention in this place to illustrate the principles which constitute this code, or to trace their connection with the several maxims of jurisprudence, with the spirit of the British constitution or with the doctrines of the Mohamadan and Hindoo codes, and the customs, manners, and habits of our native subjects.

It is sufficient for me to direct your attention to the indispensable necessity of acquiring a correct knowledge of these laws and regulations for the purpose of enabling you to discharge your duty to the Company, to your country, and to the people of these populous provinces.

In every station in which you can be placed during the course of your public service, the due execution of these laws and regulations must in a certain degree depend upon your conduct. You must be either the instruments for the administration of the law, or the direct objects of its salutary control and restraint, and in every instance it will be your duty to conform to its spirit, to aid its operation and to suggest every practicable improvement in its provisions and regulations.

Under such obligations, I entertain a firm expectation that you will display the same zeal, industry, and success in the prosecution of this important object of study now recommended to your attention, which have marked the progress of the great body of the students of this college in every department to which their studies have been directed.

Nor can this government present to your attention an object more worthy to inspire honourable emulation to excite the highest efforts of industry and genius, or to reward the most transcendent success of just and laudable ambition.

The due administration of just laws within these flourishing and populous provinces, is not only the foundation of the

happiness of millions of people, but the main pillar of the vast fabric of the British Empire in Asia. From the prosperity of these provinces are derived all the sources of our revenue and commerce.

The main spring of our empire is situated here, and it is supplied and guarded by the laws and regulations of this government.

It is not the effusion of vain theory, resting upon speculative principles, or directed to visionary objects of impracticable perfection, but the solid work of plain, deliberate, practical benevolence, the legitimate offspring of genuine wisdom and pure virtue. Its excellence is attested by the noblest proofs of just, wise, and honest government; by the restoration of happiness, tranquillity, and security to our oppressed and suffering people; and by the revival of agriculture, commerce, manufacture, and general opulence in a declining and impoverished country.

Contemplating these great and exalted views, I trust that you will derive from the advantage offered to you by this institution, the most effectual means of preserving and improving the valuable code of laws now recommended to your attention, and of securing to the inhabitants of these prosperous regions the inestimable blessing of an impartial administration of just laws.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, Bart., or the Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's squadron in the East Indies.

SIR,

Fort William, Feb. 13, 1805.

1. The information received from Vizagapatam of the appearance of the French frigate the *Psyché* off that port, and the probability which exists that some of the other frigates or cruisers of the enemy are destined for the Bay of Bengal, render it my duty to provide as far as may be practicable for the security of the valuable fleets destined to leave this port early in the ensuing month.

2. With the view of preserving the property of British

subjects from the depredations of the *Psyché*, I prohibited the departure of all ships from the river Hooghly as soon as I was apprized that this vessel was in the Bay. The interests of the mercantile part of the community will however require the removal of this restriction in the beginning of March. By the 10th of that month three of the honourable Company's regular ships will be completely laden for Europe, and two extra ships will be ready to proceed to Fort Marlborough; many valuable private ships will be prepared to sail at the same time for Fort St. George and Bombay, and for China and other Eastern ports.

3. I consider it to be of importance that convoy should be appointed for each of those fleets, but the only vessels which can, under present circumstances, be employed on this service, and for the protection of the northern part of the Bay of Bengal, are those named in the margin.*

4. I accordingly propose to request Captain Lambert to proceed to sea with the *St. Fiorenzo* and *Bombay* frigate, in charge of the fleets for England and for Fort Marlborough, and of such other vessels as may be prepared to sail for the several ports in India and China on the 10th of March, leaving the *Teignmouth* and the gun brigs to cruize in the higher part of the Bay.

5. Under this arrangement the fleets may continue in company while their course shall be in the same direction, and I propose that one of the frigates shall ultimately proceed in charge of the ships for Bencoolen, and that the other shall afford convoy to the ships for Fort St. George.

6. The ships destined for Bombay and other ports to the westward of Cape Comorin, as well as those bound to the eastward, will however be left unprotected during a great part of their voyage, unless your Excellency can detach an additional force from his Majesty's squadron, to be employed on that service.

7. It is understood that the ships for Bombay are generally laden with grain, of which a large supply is at present required in the western provinces of India, and the vessels pro-

* His Majesty's ship, *St. Fiorenzo*; Honourable Company's frigate, *Bombay*; Honourable Company's cruizer, *Teignmouth*; Do. gun brig, *Charger*; Do. *Rattler*.

ceeding to the eastward will carry valuable cargoes of opium. It is therefore a material object of national importance that both fleets should have sufficient protection.

8. I conclude that your Excellency will receive this letter at Madras, at a period of time which may admit of your detaching some of the frigates under your Excellency's orders to Bengal, sufficiently early to ensure their arrival at Sagur previously to the 10th of March, and I accordingly request that your Excellency will be pleased immediately to dispatch to this port two vessels calculated for the service described in this letter, unless any circumstances of which I am not apprized, should in your Excellency's judgment render this measure inexpedient.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXIV.

Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Marquess Wellesley.

Dated 18th October, 1804.

[Received 18th February, 1805.]

May prosperity and happiness attend your Excellency through life!

Although the relations of harmony and friendship had long subsisted between the two states, they were confirmed last year by the conclusion of two treaties, through the honourable Major-General Wellesley and Major John Malcolm, but more especially by the second treaty, whereby a defensive alliance having been formed with the Company, the interests of the two states were completely identified. In the spirit of that union, the prosperity of the garden of friendship has formed the object of my anxious solicitude; accordingly when I saw and knew the hostile disposition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which had been anticipated by both states after the first conclusion of the treaty of alliance, I repeatedly communicated to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, to Major Malcolm, and to Mr. Webbe, verbally through Baboo Eetul Punt and Moonshee Kavil Nyne, propositions calculated to avert the evil effect of his hostility, and I took several opportunities of sending for Mr. Webbe, and of personally

explaining to him, in the most impressive manner, the hostile nature of Holkar's views, and the propriety and expediency of frustrating the mischievous effects of them; that the evil had not yet increased to such a magnitude that it might not be overcome by common exertion, and now that the British forces under the command of his Excellency General Lake had arrived near Jyepoor, it was highly desirable that my whole army should be assembled for the purpose of co-operating in the extermination of the enemy, by which means that object might be speedily accomplished, to the satisfaction of both states; but that in these times of trouble and confusion my government has sustained heavy losses, and had experienced the most severe pecuniary embarrassment, and that to enable me to collect an army, money was indispensably necessary; that without money it was impossible to assemble an army, or to prosecute war; that, as under the perfect union and identity of interests now subsisting between the two states, the loss and injury sustained by one must be considered to be the loss and injury of both; if in consideration of the embarrassed state of my finances, the honourable Company's government would, in the present crisis of affairs, grant me pecuniary assistance to the extent which might be requisite to prosecute the war, such assistance would be conformable to the dictates of that union, and would therefore not be misapplied; that if, however, there should be any hesitation about affording me such pecuniary aid, I requested that it might be given to me on loan, without interest, and the amount be afterwards deducted from the annual sum of twenty lac and fifty thousand rupees (which includes the revenues of Pergunnahs, Dholpore, Baree, and others), that I am to receive from the honourable Company.

Mr. Webbe replied, by saying that he would refer the questions to your Excellency's decision, and act accordingly. Conceiving that this honest counsel would meet with your Excellency's entire approbation, I wrote to the several commanding officers to assemble the troops at the different stations, under the supposition that they might be equipped and prepared for service, by the time of the receipt of your Excellency's answer to the reference made to your Excellency by Mr. Webbe, and be ready to march at a moment's notice. I also dispatched orders to Bapojee Scindiah and to Suddasheo

Rao to proceed with a force, consisting of six or seven battalions of infantry and of ten thousand horse, to join his Excellency General Lake; accordingly those officers, notwithstanding the extreme distress of the troops under their command for their pay, in obedience to my orders, and in the hope that when they should effect a junction with the British army, his Excellency General Lake, in consequence of the union and perfect identity of interests between the two states, would not fail to relieve their exigencies, set out for Kotah without a moment of delay, and when by several successive marches they had arrived near Kotah, those officers dispatched letters to his Excellency General Lake, informing the General, that in obedience to the commands of their masters, they had arrived with a body of troops in the vicinity of Kotah, and expected speedily to join the General. The Commander-in-chief however replied that their services immediately with him were unnecessary, and desired them to join Colonel Monson and Mr. Lucan, who had advanced with a detachment to oppose Holkar. They accordingly repaired with their whole force to Colonel Monson and Mr. Lucan, to whom they represented the distressed state of the troops on account of their pay, and requested some allowance to be made for their subsistence, assuring the Colonel, that if the necessary relief were afforded to the troops, they would manifest the utmost zeal and alacrity in the depending contest, and continue in perfect obedience to his authority; but the Colonel distinctly answered that he could afford them no pecuniary assistance whatever, and referred them to General Lake. Having no alternative, Bapojee Scindiah and Sud-dasheo Rao wrote to his Excellency General Lake a second time, when the General in reply desired them to return to Ougein. My officers received this communication from his Excellency with surprize and astonishment, and not conceiving it proper to retire to Ougein without my permission, reported these circumstances to me. I immediately sent a verbal message to Mr. Webbe on the subject, who said that I must do as his Excellency General Lake had desired. An interval of upwards of a month had now elapsed without receiving any answer to their reference. Bapojee Scindiah found that he could no longer sustain his troops without advancing them some money, and was absolutely compelled to

dispatch Suddasheo Rao with a whole body of horse and infantry in different directions to seek a subsistence, Bapojee Scindiah himself remaining with three thousand horse lightly equipped with Colonel Monson, in expectation of receiving an answer from me to his letter. About this time an action took place with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, when Colonel Monson sent a verbal message to Bapojee Scindiah, desiring Scindiah to leave his baggage and camp followers with the baggage, &c. of the British troops, and joining Mr. Lucan with his cavalry, advanced to oppose Holkar. Colonel Monson with the infantry, however, remained behind. Bapojee Scindiah acted conformably to Colonel Monson's desire, and advancing with Mr. Lucan with the cavalry, encountered the enemy, and notwithstanding the immense superiority of the enemy in number, opposed the utmost resistance in their power. At length the combined armies of the two states were repulsed. The loss sustained by Bapojee Scindiah in killed and wounded amounted to seven hundred horse, and much plunder was also committed. Colonel Monson, without bearing any share in the action, effected his retreat in the utmost confusion with the infantry, which had occupied a position at the distance of two coss from the scene of action, to Kotah. Bapojee Scindiah joined Colonel Monson on the road with the remainder of his broken troops. But when Colonel Monson reached Kotah, he found himself unable to maintain his ground there, and withdrawing his troops accordingly from that place, crossed the Chumbul river in boats which he found ready for that purpose. Bapojee Scindiah at the same time requested that, after crossing the river, the Colonel would allow the boats to return for the purpose of conveying his troops across the river, that they might be enabled to join him, but Colonel Monson never returned the boats. Bapojee Scindiah therefore, finding it impracticable to attempt to cross the river, without the assistance of the boats, took up a position close to Kotah. Holkar's army however arriving there, invested the place, and would have shortly seized the person of Bapojee Scindiah, had not Rajah Zalim Sing of Kotah sent a message to Bapojee Scindiah, informing Bapojee, that if he did not visit Holkar, he would inevitably lose his life; agreeably to whose advice, Bapojee Scindiah seeing that he had no alternative, acted by going

with Rajah Zalim Sing to visit Holkar, and by remaining some days with Holkar under plausible professions of amity. At last, however, Bapojee Scindiah found means to extricate himself from the power of Holkar, when he communicated to me all these circumstances, and the address by which he had preserved his life and succeeded in withdrawing himself from Holkar's party, stating at the same time that if I would even now make him some pecuniary advances, he would assemble his troops, recal Suddasheo Rao, and prepare to give the enemy battle. I accordingly renewed with the utmost degree of earnestness my application to Mr. Webbe, to furnish some pecuniary aid for the relief of the immediate exigencies of the army; but that gentleman, although in the course of the discussion of the depending question, he once acknowledged to me that your Excellency had authorized him to afford the required pecuniary assistance, took no measures to furnish it to me; and although I contrasted the fatal consequences which must attend his disregard of this question, with the advantage and extensive good to be derived from the immediate application of a sum of money to the purpose of preparing the army, my efforts proved wholly unsuccessful. Bapojee Scindiah being extremely distressed and embarrassed by the importunities of the troops, without the least hope of receiving any pecuniary assistance from me, was compelled ostensibly to espouse the cause of Holkar.

As all these evils originated in the defeat of a supply of money, I, with a view to obviate the future aggravation of them and the occurrence of more serious disturbance, came to a fixed determination either to march myself from Burhanpoor, for the purpose of assuming the command of my army in person, or to dispatch Bhow Gopaul Rao with a well appointed force of horse and foot, selected partly from the strength of the old military establishment, and partly composed of recruits, for the purpose of engaging the enemy. But it was impracticable either for me to move, or to send Bhow Gopaul Rao without providing a fund for the support of the troops and other exigencies.

I sent verbal messages by Bapoo Eetul Punt and Moonshee Kavil Nyne, to Mr. Webbe, informing him that all the existing evils were to be ascribed to the pecuniary distress of my government, which was manifest, and that the disturbances

were increased daily, and asking his advice, with respect to the propriety either of my marching or of dispatching Bhow Gopaul Rao, observing at the same time that as the interests of the two states were identified, whatever he should recommend for their mutual benefit, should be carried into effect; but that in that case he must obtain a supply of money for me, either as a gratuity, or on loan, without interest, for the purpose of preparing an extensive body of cavalry, to be collected from different quarters, for the purpose of bringing the enemy to condign punishment since without a very considerable body of cavalry to support the infantry it was impracticable to chastize Holkar; that the amount of any pecuniary aid which he might afford, should be hereafter deducted from the annual amount of the fifteen lacs of rupees settled by the treaty, and of the five lacs and a half of rupees on account of the Jumna of the Pergunnahs Dholpore, Baree, and others, and from the revenues collected from Dahood, Pawagurh, Chumarkoondah, Jaumgaun, and others, which the treaty stipulates to be restored to me, and that I should receive the revenues thereof annually from the 15th day of Ramzaun, corresponding with the 30th of December, 1803.

Mr. Webbe however treated this representation with the utmost contempt, and never consented to afford me the least degree of pecuniary assistance, but suffered the question to float in indecision, and has been guilty of palpable neglect in the payment of the third instalment of the fifteen lacs of rupees, as also in the payment of the revenues collected from the Pergunnahs Dholpore and Baree.

My friend! I once believed that Mr. Webbe faithfully reported to your Excellency an account of all transactions at this Court, but now that I perceive Mr. Webbe is capable of such inattention and neglect with regard to the adoption of these desirable and necessary measures, I am satisfied that he has never made any communication to your Excellency of my reiterated proposals, counsels or advice to him in the present important crisis of affairs. Your Excellency is distinguished by consummate wisdom and penetration, and in correctness of observance of the duties of friendship, may challenge the whole world. If, therefore, Mr. Webbe had transmitted to you, my friend! information of these points,

your Excellency would doubtless have returned a favourable answer to them.

Under these circumstances I have dispatched to your Excellency, by two Hircarrahs, this friendly letter, for the purpose of explaining to your Excellency the points above adverted to, and also communicating other circumstances which have occurred, together with my sentiments, with reference to time to come.

The particulars are as follows :—

1stly. After the conclusion of the two treaties, his Excellency General Lake gave the countries of Gohud and Gwalior, together with the fort of the latter, to the people of Bhootpongra. The case however is that the countries of Gohud and Gwalior, together with the fort of Gwalior, have for a long period of time been annexed to my territory.* At the time of the conclusion of the peace, I delivered to the honourable Major-General Wellesley a statement, under my own seal and signature, of all the countries and forts in Hindostan which I had ceded, together with a memorandum of their names and annual value. In that statement, however, the names of the countries of Gohud and Gwalior, with the fort of the latter, were not inserted. Had I ceded those countries, their names also would unquestionably have appeared in that statement. The delivery of that territory and fort to the people of Bhootpongra and their occupation of them, therefore, was in direct violation of the treaty of peace.

Secondly. Among the seven Rajahs named in the copy of the treaty transmitted to me by your Excellency, the name of the Rajah of Jodepore is inserted, which I was not prepared to expect, since the Rajah of Jodepore has during the last fifty or sixty years, stood in a tributary relation to me, and the greatest exertions were employed to

* For a complete explanation of the transactions relative to Gwalior and the Rana of Gohud, see letters of the 13th and 20th February, and the 30th April 1804. See also pages 130, 145, 148, 149, 173, 176. Marquess Wellesley's letters to Scindiah of 4th April 1805. Letter from the Governor-General in Council to Secret Committee of 7th June 1805, and enclosures, particularly the able letter of N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., dated 8th April 1804.—[ED.]

enforce the payment of the tribute from that country, by my ancestors, who fought and bled in the prosecution of that object.

It was not proper therefore to connect the name of the Rajah of Jodepore with the other six Rajahs above alluded to.

To illustrate the subject further, I will ask why the Rajah of Jodepore afforded an asylum to the family of Holkar, if he had concluded any engagements with the British Government; and why has he uniformly asserted to me, that he had not concluded engagements, or formed an alliance with any state, and that he still continued to stand in the same relation towards me as he has always done?

In the course of our conversations although both these points were insisted on, Mr. Webbe has pertinaciously refused to listen to what has been urged upon them.

Thirdly. The affair of the fifteen lacs of rupees on account of the territory in Hindostan,* which according to the provisions of treaty, is payable annually to me, and which your Excellency's vakeels engaged should be paid in three instalments in the year. At the period for the payment of each instalment, Mr. Webbe brings forward various objections, of a nature highly improper and unbecoming.

Fourthly. The Pergunnahs of Dholepore, Baree, and Rajah Kurra, the Jumna of which is five-and-a-half lacs of rupees per annum, were assigned to me by the provisions of the treaty. Those Pergunnahs have not yet been delivered up to me, nor has the amount of the collections from them, from the date of their treaty to the present time, been paid to me; no intention appears of delivering them over to me, nor in the event of their being retained by the British Government, does Mr. Webbe seemed inclined to the annual payment of the Jumna, but clearly evades that point.

Fifthly. The collections from Chumarcoonda, Jaumgaun Dahood, Pawunghur, &c. Mohauls which I am entitled to by treaty, from the date of the treaty, until that of the restitution of those places, have not yet been paid.

Sixthly. It is conditioned in the treaty, that many troops

* Meaning the Jagheers of his chieftains.

must not be stationed in the Pergunnahs of Chumarcoondah Jaumgaum, &c. There must be only Tehseeldars,* or if any Zemindar shall become refractory, or if any person shall excite disturbance within those Pergunnahs, the British troops (on the application of the Tehseeldars) will apply a remedy accordingly. In conformity to the obligations of treaty, Tehseeldars only have been stationed in those Pergunnahs, the whole of which have been destroyed by the violence of turbulent people, and by the Bheels, and continue subject to the same depredations. Although the Tehseeldars state the circumstances to the officers commanding British troops, and also to Killedar of Ahmednuggur, which place is in the vicinity of those Pergunnahs, no one attends to them, nor is any attempt made to suppress these disorders; and in consequence, the whole of these Pergunnahs are one continued scene of devastation (literally "made level with the earth") and not a trace of habitation or cultivation remains. If I propose to Mr. Webbe that I should despatch troops from hence to those Pergunnahs, he will not consent nor will he himself apply a remedy.

Seventhly. The Jagheers in Hindostan, estimated at two lacs of rupees per annum, which by treaty were to be relinquished by the British Government in favour of certain of my chiefs and relations, most of those now, at the expiration of ten months remain unrelinquished, and the Nazims and Aumils refuse to relinquish them on various pretexts.

Eighthly. In the second treaty it is provided, that in consideration of the union established between the two states; the officers of the Company's troops will attend to the protection of my territories in the same manner as to the protection of the Company's. But notwithstanding Colonel Murray's coming to Ougein, Jeswunt Rao Holkar invested the Fort of Mundesoor during full two months, and plundered, and laid waste the whole of that district, including that town; and in the same manner, while Colonel Murray was at Ougein, Meer Khaun, the Afghaun, a partisan of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's, invested the fortress of Bhelsa and plundered the whole of that district, and the town and fort which he captured; and yet no assistance or protection was afforded by the

* Collectors of the Revenues.

Colonel. What is to be thought of all these points which are contrary to the treaties? This however is certain, that the circumstances of this quarter are entirely unknown to your Excellency, else such a degree of procrastination on the part of the Company in fulfilling the obligations of friendship, and the conditions of treaty were impossible.

As the war with Holkar, in consequence of the officers of your Excellency's troops thinking too lightly of it, has now run to a great length, and my territory has been exposed to the last degree of devastation, and as Mr. Webbe neither fulfils the obligations of treaty or of friendship, nor returns any answers* to my plans of operation for the conduct of the war, against the enemy, and to my propositions, all which are conformable to the conditions of treaty, nor adjusts any of these points, therefore a pair of hircarrahs are sent with this letter to your Excellency, for the purpose of communicating all these circumstances; and with a view to the arrangement of the disordered state of the affairs of my government which hitherto, in consequence of the union subsisting between the two states, I have expected from the Company's officers, and which without my moving appears impracticable, nay, without that, the state of my affairs is daily becoming worse; I have, in whatever manner I was able, by loans raised funds for the provision of necessaries for my march, and for collecting my troops, and on the 20th of September marched from my encampment at Boorhanpore. I have also written to all the officers of my troops to join me from every quarter, and it is my intention to raise new troops. The friendship and union subsisting between us has induced me to write to your Excellency all circumstances past, present, and to come.

Where friendship has been established by treaties and engagements between princes and chiefs of high rank and power, it is incumbent on both parties to observe it on all occasions, and they consider the injuries and losses of friends and allies to be their own, and in the same manner the strength and power of friends and allies to be their own strength and power. My continuance during so long a period of time in the vicinity of Boorhanpore, has been owing entirely to my expectation, founded on the union of the two

* Meaning satisfactory answers.

states, of aid in all my affairs, on the part of your Excellency. As Mr. Webbe, who resides with me on the part of your Excellency, practices delay and evasion in every point, and avoids the advance of money in the form of pecuniary aid, of a loan or on account of that which is clearly and justly due by the conditions of treaty, I have deemed it necessary to communicate all circumstances to your Excellency.

My army having reached the banks of the Nerbuddah by successive marches, is beginning to cross. I shall now remain in expectation of an answer. Your Excellency is endowed with great wisdom and foresight, and is unequalled in the virtues of fulfilling the obligations of engagements and of friendship. I therefore request your Excellency to take into your deliberate consideration all that I have written, and adopt such measures as may most speedily both terminate the contest with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and fulfill the obligations of the treaties subsisting between us, and strengthen in the most perfect degree, and perpetuate the foundations of union and alliance between the two states. Let your Excellency further be pleased to consider, where is the advantage of suffering that which has been taken from friends to fall into the hands of enemies; undoubtedly your Excellency's provident wisdom and correct understanding will never approve such a thing, since the power and strength of one friend, must be considered to be the power and strength of another, and the weakness and defective resources of one, are also those of the other. If I acquire strength by territory and money, that strength (as the consequence of our union) becomes in truth the strength of the Company also. Having maturely weighed and considered all these points, let your Excellency be pleased to favour me with a speedy and favourable answer. If by the time of my arrival at Malwa, a full and detailed answer to all that I have written arrives, it will be extremely proper and advisable.

My determined resolution now is, after having collected a numerous army, consisting both of old troops and new levies, to proceed to chastise the enemy; for how can I be content to see a territory, which for a long time has been in my possession, and in the conquest of which crores of rupees have been expended and great battles have been fought, in the possession of another! It is no very difficult matter to

wrest the territory from the hands of the enemy. Nothing else is necessary but the open and cordial support of friends. I await your Excellency's favourable answer for the prosecution of my affairs, and the arrangement of my views.*

(A true translation.)

J. MONCKTON,
Dep. Persian Sec. to Gov.

No. LXXV.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

Head Quarters, Camp before Bhurtpore,

February 21, 1805.

MY LORD,

My despatch of the 20th will have informed your Lordship, of our failure on that day, in an attempt to carry Bhurtpore by assault.

I have now the honour to detail for your Lordship's information, the plans that were formed to ensure, if possible, the success of the attempt.

The storming party under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Don, was formed of the greatest part of the European force belonging to the Bengal army, and three battalions of Sepoys.

One column composed of 200 of his Majesty's 86th regiment, from the Bombay division, and the 1st battalion 8th regiment Bengal native infantry, under Captain Grant, of the former corps, was ordered to attack the enemy's trenches and guns outside the town, whilst a third column composed of 300 men of his Majesty's 65th regiment, and two battalions of Bombay Sepoys marched to attack the Beem Narain Gate, which from every report I had received was easy of access for guns, &c.

The signal for the storming party to move out was the commencement of Captain Grant's attack on the enemy's trenches which took place a little before four o'clock in the afternoon.

Captain Grant's column was completely successful, and got

* See the Governor-General's reply to this letter, dated 14th April 1805.—[ED.]

immediate possession of the enemy's guns, eleven in number, all of which have been brought into camp. The gallant conduct of Captain Grant and his party, merits every praise.

I am sorry to say, that neither of the other columns succeeded. Lieut.-Colonel Don's was unfortunately delayed by some unexpected circumstances, and on its arrival at the ditch, it was found to contain such a depth of water as to render it impossible to gain the breach. The troops immediately attempted to ascend by the bastion, but the obstacles they met with were of so serious a nature, that their utmost efforts were unsuccessful, though the colours of the 12th native infantry were planted within a short distance of the top.

The column from the Bombay division under Lieut.-Colonel Taylor, notwithstanding every exertion, could not effect their object. They were considerably delayed on their march by a large body of the enemy's horse; and, by a mistake on the part of their guide, were very early exposed to a most heavy and destructive fire from the town, which by destroying their ladders rendered the attempt on the gate impracticable, and obliged Lieut.-Colonel Taylor to draw his men under cover, until he received orders to return to camp.

I feel it my duty to assure your Lordship, that though unfortunately not crowned with success, the exertions of Colonel Don were meritorious and gallant in the extreme, and I feel under infinite obligations to this officer.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,

G. LAKE.

No. LXXVI.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

Head Quarters, Camp before Bhurtpore,

February 22, 1805.

MY LORD,

My despatch of yesterday's date will have conveyed to your Lordship intelligence of our want of success, in a fourth attempt made to carry this place by assault.

As it appeared that our failure on the 20th was to be

accounted for, in a great measure, by the occurrence of unexpected accidents and delays, as part of the corps who formed the storming party had surmounted the principal difficulty, and had nearly gained the summit of the bastion, where I was informed a few hours more battering would render the ascent perfectly easy, I determined to make another attempt yesterday.

The party for this service consisted of the whole European force, and two battalions of native infantry of the Bengal army, and the greater part of his Majesty's 65th and 86th regiments, and the grenadier battalion, and flank companies of the 1st battalion 3d regiment, from the Bombay division. The whole moved on to the attack about three o'clock in the afternoon, under the command of the honourable Brigadier Monson.

The troops, most confident of success, commenced the attack and persevered in it for a considerable length of time, with the most determined bravery, but their utmost exertions were not sufficient to enable them to gain the top of the breach. The bastion which was the point of attack was extremely steep, the resistance opposed to them was vigorous, and as our men could only mount by small parties at a time, the advantages were very great on the side of the enemy. Discharges of grape, logs of wood, and pots filled with combustible materials, immediately knocked down those who were ascending, and the whole party, after being engaged in an obstinate contest for two hours, and suffering very severe loss, were obliged to relinquish the attempt, and retire to our trenches.

I have to lament the loss of very many gallant officers and men, as will appear to your Lordship by the accompanying return of killed and wounded on this occasion.

It is with sincere grief I inform your Lordship, that among the killed is my aide-de-camp, Major Menzies, of his Majesty's 80th regiment, who proceeded with the storming party, and fell, whilst, among the foremost, he was making the most heroic exertions to ascend the breach. I feel sincere sorrow for his loss, no less on account of the great regard I entertained for his private worth, than from the high estimation in which I held his merits as an officer.

The Honourable Colonel Monson, to whom the conduct of

the attack was entrusted, made every possible exertion, and has received my best thanks for his uncommon gallantry and perseverance on that occasion.

Though the troops were unable to effect their object, I am happy to assure your Lordship that they have on no occasion displayed greater steadiness. Those of the Bengal army supported their former character, and the Bombay division displayed a degree of resolution and discipline which entitles them to my highest praise and approbation.

I have the honour to be,
my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,
G. LAKE.

No. LXXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Written 23d February, 1805.

Your Highness must be fully apprized of the nature of the communications which I have received from the representative of the British Government at your Highness's court, relative to the whole tenor of the conduct and proceedings of your Highness's government since your departure from Boorhanpore, your Highness therefore will be prepared to receive the declaration of the sincere regret with which I have beheld you involved in a course of conduct not only inconsistent with the obligations of the defensive alliance concluded between the British Government and your Highness at Boorhanpore, but with the stipulations of the treaty of peace concluded at Serji Angengaum, I am well apprized of the fatal counsels which have occasioned all these evils, and which have produced a disregard of those liberal propositions on the part of the British Government, which were intended and calculated to restore the declining resources, vigor, and prosperity of your Highness's government. The tendency of their evil counsels must ultimately lead to the sacrifice of your Highness's dearest interests and honour, in the prosecution of a course of policy exclusively adopted to the desperate views and profligate designs of interested and wicked men.

I am sincerely inclined to believe that your Highness is

really disposed to maintain your obligations with the British Government; but my opinion of your Highness's individual disposition, cannot exempt me from the duty of considering your Highness to be responsible for all the acts of your government, whatever be the source from whence those acts have originally proceeded.

If therefore, your Highness shall unfortunately permit your state to be ruled by counsels hostile to the British Government, your Highness cannot impute the necessary* consequences of such an injurious policy to me, or to your allies and friends. With whatever degree of reluctance and pain, we may be compelled to consider your state in any other capacity than that of an ally and friend, the sense of our own security will demand adequate precautions against the hostile proceedings of your Highness's government.

The information which I have recently received from Mr. Jenkins, the acting Resident, on the part of the British Government at your Highness's court, represents an outrage committed by persons in your Highness's immediate service, and within the limits of your immediate authority against the accredited minister of the British state, of which the history of civilized nations scarcely affords a parallel.* Your High-

* In consequence of the hostile measures pursued by Dowlut Rao Scindiah under the influence of his unprincipled father-in-law and minister Serjee Rao Ghautka, the Acting Resident, Mr. Jenkins had demanded his passport, which however, on various pretences was withheld; till at length the Acting Resident was reduced to the necessity of quitting the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah without it, and made a march accordingly; but was induced by a mission bringing the most solemn protestations on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to return. The Acting Resident immediately waited on Dowlut Rao Scindiah to receive a personal confirmation of his promises, and during his visit, the Acting Resident's camp was attacked by a large body of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's irregular troops, who plundered the whole of the baggage. Lieutenant Greene, who commanded the escort, and Dr. Wise, the Surgeon of the Residency, were severely wounded, and many of the sepoy of the escort and other persons attached to the Residency were also wounded. The Acting Resident was thus deprived of the means of quitting the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who however it was believed was not concerned in this gross outrage, although he took no steps to punish the offenders, to vindicate his own character, or to repair the injuries sustained by the Acting Resident and his attendants. For particulars see letter of 25th March 1805. Mr. Jenkins is now one of the most distinguished Directors of the East India Company.—[Ed.]

ness cannot have been concerned in the atrocious act of violating the sacred person of the British minister at your Highness's court. Satisfied that your Highness has not personally participated in the commission of this unprecedented violence, I am disposed to limit the measures to be adopted by the British Government upon this occasion, to a demand of such atonement as it may be practicable to afford for an act of such extreme violence and outrage.

Your Highness will probably be prepared to expect the immediate exertion of retributive justice on the part of the British Government; but, notwithstanding the provocations which the whole conduct of your Highness's government under the direction of wicked men, has afforded, especially in the commission of this extraordinary act of violence, the British Government is disposed to preserve with your Highness the relations of amity and peace, provided that your Highness will afford the most public testimony of your abhorrence of the crime which has been committed by your servants; that you will make every possible atonement by endeavouring to discover, and when discovered, by punishing the authors of the outrage, and by restoring the whole of the plundered property belonging to the gentlemen of the residency, and provided also that the conduct of your Highness's government shall hereafter be conformable to the obligations of the subsisting alliance. When I shall have been satisfied by Mr. Jenkins upon this point, no cause of dissension will exist between the allied states. Mr. Jenkins is authorized to renew the ties of amity and alliance; your Highness will proceed to your capital and you will settle your government, and occupy those possessions of the common enemy which have been conquered for your advantage by the British arms. Affairs will be conducted with you in amity and cordiality either by Mr. Jenkins, or by Colonel Close, (the Resident at Poona), who is arrived at Nagpore on his way to your Highness's camp, under the instructions which I communicated to you in my letter of the 4th of December, 1804, and who is ordered to continue his journey to your Highness's camp.

It is superfluous to apprise your Highness that if unfortunate counsels shall prevail; if the just atonement which have demanded shall be refused or evaded; and if the conduct

of your state shall be governed by a perverse spirit of hostility against the British Government and its allies, all the miseries of war, will be revived; the avenues to future pacification will be closed; and the noxious power which violates every sacred principle of public law, faith, and honour, will be utterly abolished.

But your Highness's wisdom, and the nature of your disposition afford a more auspicious hope.

The British Government entertains no view of demanding from your Highness any concession beyond the limits of established treaty, nor possesses any interest in aggravating your Highness's misfortune or distress.

Your prosperity and honour are combined with the British Government while your state shall observe the obligations of the alliance, and your Highness's degradation or loss of power and character, would be contemplated by this state with grief and pain. May then a due sense of your Highness's fame and real interests inspire a more just, wise, and honourable course of policy, avert the impending calamities of war, and confirm the bonds of peace and alliance for the mutual happiness, welfare, and glory of both states, and for the general tranquillity of India.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Lake.

(Private.).—Extract.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, February 25th, 1804.

Most cordially and affectionately I offer to you my warmest congratulations upon the justice of his Majesty, the delay of which has caused me such vexation, that I really have been unable to write a line to you for the last month.

The intelligence I now send to you is most grateful to my heart; at last I have obtained justice for those to whose services I and the country are most indebted. I have not yet received any official advices; but this is perfectly authentic, and you should assume the title immediately. It is

usual to do so upon seeing the gazette.* I acted in this manner when I was created a Marquess. I will write upon other matters in a day or two.

Ever my dear Lord,
yours most sincerely and affectionately,
WELLESLEY.

No. LXXIX.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

29th August, 1804.
[Received March 6th, 1805.]

It is with great satisfaction I now feel myself enabled to transmit under cover to your Lordship the expression of my personal congratulations to Generals Lake and Wellesley on those distinguished marks of the King's favour which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer upon them, and which will be announced to your Lordship through the regular official channel by the fleet now under despatch.†

It has been to me a sacrifice of some pain, the having so long withheld from them the expression of my individual applause and admiration of their conduct; but I could not reconcile it to my own feelings to do so, until I had the gratification of knowing that their services had been duly appreciated in the highest quarter, and until I was at liberty to express to them my satisfaction at their having been actually rewarded as they deserved.

Your Lordship will, I trust, assure them that the delay has not proceeded from insensibility to their just claims, but from causes which were explained to your Lordship in a former letter.

I have desired the warrant, authorizing your Lordship to invest General Wellesley with the Order of the Bath, to be so worded as to admit of delegation, in case he should be so

* The London Gazette of 1st September, 1804, containing the news, was received in India on the 25th of February, 1805, before the official letters on the subject reached the Governor-General.—[Ed.]

† Lord Camden's letter to the Marquess Wellesley on this subject, is given at the close of the Mahratta war, in Vol. III. p. 578.—[Ed.]

far removed from the seat of government as to make it inconvenient that he should attend your Lordship for this purpose.

I have the honour to be,
my dear Lord,
with great truth and respect,
very faithfully yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

No. LXXX.

Lord Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

before Bhurtpore, March 8th. 1805.

I have this moment received your most kind and affectionate letter, congratulating me upon the honours conferred by his Majesty upon me. I feel most truly grateful to the King for his marking his approbation of my conduct in so noble, distinguished, and honourable a style. At the same time, although I freely acknowledge it has ever been the first wish of my heart to leave a title to my family, believe me, my dear Lord, the value of it is enhanced tenfold by feeling that I stand powerfully indebted to you for arriving at this dignity, and from knowing how much interested you were upon the occasion. The thoughts of your mind being relieved from the anxiety you felt for those who acted under your orders has afforded me the greatest satisfaction possible. I beg leave to congratulate you upon General Wellesley having received the Order of the Bath, and sincerely hope that he may arrive at every honour you or he may desire.

I trust it will not be long before your King and country will know how to appreciate your merit and convince the world how they admire and esteem your wonderful abilities, zeal, and exertions, for the honour and advantage of the British Empire.

Be assured that I feel much more than words can express for your kindness upon this and every other occasion, and would write more upon the subject was not my mind and time so much occupied with a variety of important objects

which I flatter myself will be found productive of the desired effect.

I shall, as you advise, assume the title immediately.

I most sincerely lament our late disasters, which I own takes off much from the pleasure I should have received from the honours granted to me, but I trust before long to say I am in possession of this town.*

Believe me, my dear Lord,
ever most sincerely and affectionately yours,

LAKE.

No. LXXXI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lord Lake.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, March 9th, 1805.

In reading over my private communications to your Lordship, I fear that you may be impressed with an opinion that I feel too strong a desire for the early termination of the war, even on any terms. I certainly am most anxious for peace, but I wish your Lordship to understand distinctly that my first object is the vigorous and steady prosecution of the war. With this view I entreat your Lordship not to attempt to accelerate operations at Bhurtpore (if you should resume the siege of that place), in any manner which can expose us to the risk of failure. Time and regular proceeding must ensure the fall of the place if an adequate battering train sufficiently supplied be duly provided and properly directed, with the application also of regular means for taking off the defences of the place. I request your Lordship not to attempt to renew the siege without full and ample means for its prosecution; nor to attempt any assault while the least doubt exists of success. I fear that we have despised the place and enemy so much as to render both formidable.

The resumption of the siege of Bhurtpore previously to the pursuit of Holkar is also a point which I must seriously recommend to your attention. Unless the reduction of the place be absolutely necessary previously to that pursuit, or

* These disasters are detailed in the letter of the Governor-General in Council of the 24th of March, 1805, and in the previous letters of General Lake.—[ED.]

essential to our honour, I wish your Lordship to consider whether the risk of another failure, and the consequent loss (to say no more), ought to be hazarded. To your superior judgment I commit this important question. The health of the troops must also be most seriously and tenderly considered. A large army must be cantoned on the right bank of the Jumna, and a force must drive Holkar from our frontier.

My advices from Scindiah's camp of the 10th February still leave that chief's views in a painful state of doubt. If he should move towards our frontier your Lordship will march directly against him. His conduct is inexplicable and most vexatious. Your Lordship will judge of my sufferings amidst all the vexations which have fallen upon me in a manner so miraculous and distressing.

Ever, my dear Lord,
yours, most affectionately,
WELLESLEY.

No. LXXXII.

The Marquess Wellesley to His Royal Highness the Duke of York.

SIR,

Fort William, March 9th, 1805.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's most generous letter of the 12th May, 1804, received at Fort William on the 3rd December, 1804.*

* The letter of his Royal Highness to the Marquess Wellesley was as follows :—

MY LORD,

Horse Guards, May 12, 1804.

I have had the satisfaction of receiving by Lieut.-Colonel Nicolson your Lordship's letters of the 9th November, 22d and 25th December last; and I request your Lordship will accept my best thanks for those communications, and those which accompanied them, and that you will be assured how truly sensible I am of the obliging attention with which you have, amidst the pressure of other business, and your many important avocations, conveyed to me details and documents so interesting and so satisfactory, of the operations of a war which has been so ably conducted and so gloriously terminated by his Majesty's and the East India Company's forces in India, under your Lordship's auspices.

It is impossible for me to express in adequate terms of attachment, respect and gratitude, the deep sense which I entertain of your Royal Highness's benevolence and favour. The sentiments contained in your Royal Highness's letter of the 12th May, are truly worthy of your Royal mind, conformable to the hereditary spirit and character of your illustrious family, and calculated to inspire the unabated efforts of public zeal and attachment to his Majesty's person, family and government, and devotion to the honour and interests of our King and country in this remote branch of the British Empire.

I return your Royal Highness my dutiful and grateful acknowledgements for the personal honour which you have been pleased to confer upon me by noticing with approbation the services of my brother, Major-General Wellesley. The expression of your Royal Highness's sentiments on this subject is a most splendid augmentation of the honours with which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to reward the services of my brother.

It has afforded high satisfaction to my mind to perceive that my endeavours to furnish your Royal Highness with accurate and detailed information on the subject of the military opera-

It would be impossible for me to express in terms in any degree adequate to my feelings, the satisfaction which I have received from the manner in which the war has been prosecuted, from the wise and energetic arrangements which were made by your Lordship towards defeating the projects of enemies so powerful, and from the meritorious and almost unexampled conduct and exertions of General Lake, Major-General Wellesley, and the brave officers and men whose heroic perseverance has so essentially contributed to the splendid success with which the plan of operations has been so deservedly crowned, and by which the dignity of his Majesty's government has been so eminently supported, and the reputation of his Majesty's arms and the national character so gloriously upheld.

I have been much gratified by the perusal of the printed statement which your Lordship has been so good as to send me, and in which are so ably and so satisfactorily detailed the origin, progress and success of the war; and I request your Lordship will accept, with my thanks, my zealous and cordial congratulations upon the triumphant issue of a contest so important to his Majesty's interests and the public welfare, as also upon the distinguished share which your brother, Major-General Wellesley, has had in the achievements of the army in India.

I am, &c.

FREDERICK.

tions in India have been acceptable to your Royal Highness. Encouraged by your gracious approbation, I now have the honour to solicit your Royal Highness's favourable notice of the continuation of the Appendix to the Notes on Mahratta affairs, which is transmitted to your Royal Highness by this conveyance, and by several other opportunities, and which I have recorded at Fort William as an official document, illustrating the late transaction in India.

Although neither the objects nor general scale of the hostilities in which we have been engaged against Jeswunt Rao Holkar can be compared with the magnitude and lustre of the operations of the late war in India; yet, on reviewing the conduct of the army, your Royal Highness will perceive fresh cause to admire and applaud the skill, valour and activity, of Lord Lake, and of the officers and troops employed in Hindoostan and the Deccan.

Your Royal Highness will particularly distinguish the judicious and skilful operation by which Lord Lake in the course of a few days effected the reduction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's strong artillery and numerous cavalry by the separate operations of the British cavalry under his Lordship's personal command, and of the British infantry, under the command of that able and gallant officer, Major-General Fraser.

Your Royal Highness will not fail to admire the heroic and masterly conduct of Major-General Fraser against the infantry and artillery of Holkar in the decisive and brilliant action at Deeg on the 13th of November, 1804, and the glorious success of Lord Lake against the cavalry of Holkar under the walls of the city of Furrukhabad on the 10th of November, after a march of fifty-four miles performed in twenty-four hours.

A principal object of this letter is to solicit your Royal Highness's gracious attention to the memorable services rendered to his King and country by the late Major-General Fraser, of his Majesty's service, who, to the irreparable loss of the service, died amidst his triumphant army, in consequence of the wound which he received in atchieving the splendid and arduous victory over the enemy's infantry and artillery at Deeg on the 13th November, 1804.

It is unnecessary to recommend the widow and numerous family of this illustrious and deeply lamented officer to your Royal Highness's patronage, or to his Majesty's benevolent

protection, which has ever been extended to every object of similar calamity ; nor is it requisite to submit to your Royal Highness the propriety of conferring every mark of honour and distinction upon the memory of the late Major-General Fraser. But it is my duty to assure your Royal Highness that the exertion of your generous disposition in obtaining the extension of his Majesty's benevolence and gracious favour on this melancholy occasion, will prove highly grateful to the universal sentiment of the army, and of every description of his Majesty's subjects in India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXXIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, March 10th, 1805.

I cannot permit the present despatch to leave Fort William without expressing to your Lordship the high satisfaction which I derived from the receipt of your Lordship's letter marked "*private*, No. 8," and dated the 29th August, 1804.* I request your Lordship to be assured, that I am fully sensible of your kindness in communicating to me at so early a period of time, and in such honourable terms, the intelligence of the distinguished marks of the King's favour which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer on Lord Lake, and my brother, Sir A. Wellesley ; and I return your Lordship my most grateful acknowledgements for the obliging attention which you have manifested towards me on this truly interesting occasion. No event could have been more acceptable to me than this signal mark of his Majesty's just consideration for the merits of the illustrious officers employed under my orders in effecting the late glorious successes in India ; and although my solicitude for the honour of both those distinguished persons, rendered the long delay of justice towards their services a matter of deep concern to my mind, that painful sentiment is entirely removed by the honourable and gracious manner in which they have been ultimately rewarded.

* See p. 299.

I have forwarded to Lord Lake and Sir A. Wellesley the letters from your Lordship, transmitted in your despatch of the 29th August, 1804, and have communicated to them the kind sentiments with which your Lordship has announced to me the honour which the King has so justly bestowed on their brilliant and valuable services.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXXIV.

Rear Admiral Sir E. Pellew to the Marquess Wellesley.

H. M. S. *Culloden*, in Bombay Harbour, March 11, 1805.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

[Received April 30, 1805.]

Your Excellency's private letter of the 7th ultimo* reached me yesterday, from Fort St. George, and I lose no time in expressing to your Excellency my acknowledgements for your congratulations and good wishes, and the sincere desire I shall ever entertain to improve the assurances of cordiality which your Excellency so kindly expresses. Indeed I am so entirely satisfied of the benefit which must ever result from a cordial union of opinion and sentiment upon every subject of public communication, that I receive peculiar satisfaction from this testimony of your Excellency's disposition to co-operate with me in this view, and beg to assure you that I shall feel uniformly actuated by a similar confidence and cordiality, in the future intercourse which I shall have the honour to hold with your Excellency upon public service.

It is under this persuasion that I entirely concur in your Excellency's opinion of the advantage to be derived from a personal interview, as the only medium of that explicit and unreserved communication, which appears to me so essential to a thorough mutual understanding; and, I trust, should the public requisition of my personal services not forbid my temporary absence from the coast, that on my arrival at Fort St. George, towards the close of the ensuing month or the commencement of the following, I shall be enabled to make such an arrangement as will permit me

* See p. 272.

sufficient leisure to fulfil your Excellency's and my own immediate wishes in this respect, and which will afford me an opportunity of possessing myself fully of your Excellency's ideas in relation to those objects which may hereafter embrace the whole operative force of his Majesty's squadron under my command on this station.

The very alarming successes of the enemy's cruizers have of late occupied my most serious attention, and I have been for some time collecting every species of information, as to the situation and defences of the Island of Mauritius, from whence under the assistance of neutral and other clandestine intelligence, they issue, with every advantage, upon the defenceless vessels employed in the British trade, and very materially harass and interrupt the commerce of our Indian settlements.

I am in daily expectation of the arrival of Captain Osborn in his Majesty's ship *Tremendous* at this port, from whom as an officer of very distinguished zeal and experience, I shall doubtless obtain much valuable information, which his long and arduous blockade of Port Louis, will have enabled him to supply.

Under the present situation of the French naval force, it will be my anxious endeavour to make such an arrangement of the fleet under my command, with the assistance of the six ships proposed to be added to the squadron by purchase, as will enable me to equip two flying squadrons for the protection of the Bay of Bengal and its entrance, and secure the future tranquillity of the coast, and the safe conveyance of the commerce of these seas.

The Honourable Company's frigate *Cornwallis*, is still absent in pursuit of the *Fly* cruizer, and her arrival, with that of their ship the *Sir Edward Hughes* from Point de Galle, I look for with considerable anxiety as a part of that additional force.

The want of ships at this port, eligible for the service of the Royal Navy at present, will I fear prevent me from equipping the entire force so to be added to the squadron, but I am now in treaty for the purchase of two ships, and entertain hopes of getting them to sea at no very distant period.

Your Excellency's sentiments with respect to the pro-

vision of a convoy twice a year for the protection of the China trade, as suggested in your annexed paper, concur entirely with my opinion on that subject, and it will be my endeavour to meet your wishes on that point hereafter in the most ample manner.

I transmit to your Excellency the copies of a correspondence which has lately passed between the Governor in Council of this Presidency and myself, on a subject which cannot be altogether new to your Excellency, and I have only to regret that so early after my arrival on this command, a point of indispensable delicacy should compel me to deviate from the fixed resolution I had formed, of meeting the sentiments of the Honourable Company's Governments in the completest manner, from my inability to abandon that strict line of public duty pointed out for my guidance under the instructions of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I have already stated in my public letter of this date my best acknowledgements to your Excellency, for the communication of your correspondence with Vice Admiral Rainier, and I am desirous thus early to apprise your Excellency of my decided disapprobation of the former practice of impressing seamen from the cruizers of the Honourable Company, upon which subject, I have issued the strictest orders to the several captains and commanders of his Majesty's squadron, enjoining them to discontinue this prejudicial and impolitic practice in future.

The expediency of establishing a cartel for the exchange of prisoners of war appears to me highly necessary at this time, as well from the concurrence of public circumstances, as from the length of time which has now elapsed, since those who have had the misfortune to become prisoners of war, have suffered the privation of their liberty.

Your Excellency will doubtless unite with me in this opinion, and concur in my proposed intention of instructing Captain Osborn on his re-sumption of the blockading station off the Island of Mauritius, to open a communication with the French Government there, to obtain this most desirable object. His Majesty's sloop *Victor* will I trust by that time be at my disposal, and will prove an eligible ship for carrying that service into effect, upon my receiving your Excellency's communications on the subject.

By the detention of this despatch I am now enabled to offer my sincerest congratulations to your Excellency, upon the intelligence of the capture of the national frigate *La Psyché*, by his Majesty's ship *St. Fiorenzo*, the notification of which only reached this Presidency last evening. The distinguished valour and intrepidity displayed on that occasion, reflects the highest honour upon Captain Lambert, his officers and ship's company, and while the resolute defence of the enemy's frigate excites our admiration, it enhances the value of those persevering exertions, which have been finally crowned with the most complete and brilliant success,

I have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,
your Excellency's most obedient
and most faithful servant,
E. PELLEW.

No. LXXXV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Lake.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, March 12, 1805.

The accounts received this day and yesterday from Colonel Martindell, enclosing despatches to the Adjutant-General and from Mr. Jenkins, leave the intentions of Scindiah in a very doubtful state, although I still think that he does not mean to make war, nor to advance towards our frontier. The force, however, which Scindiah appears to have assembled is so considerable, that I am now inclined to think that its motions must be observed by Colonel Martindell's corps, and that corps cannot be drawn from the vicinity of its present position. I therefore strongly recommend it to your Lordship to strengthen Colonel Martindell's corps without delay, so as to make it equal to six battalions of native infantry, one regiment of European infantry, and two regiments of native cavalry, with a due proportion of artillery. The body guard and the cavalry now with Colonel Martindell, may probably be deemed equal to one regiment of native cavalry. Your Lordship therefore would add one

regiment of native cavalry to Colonel Martindell's present strength; I conclude also that you could draw the 22d regiment from Cawnpore, and add a native battalion to the five battalions now with Colonel Martindell. This force under a good officer, whom you will select, would be quite equal to Scindiah, I should hope. Colonel Martindell should be ordered not to suffer Jhansi to be plundered or approached, and to concert measures with the Jhansi man for that purpose. Your Lordship will judge of the best position for this force with the view of watching Scindiah's movements, and ultimately, if necessary, of repelling him from the frontier. I shall write to you officially on this and other topics tomorrow; in the meanwhile I would not delay this note, and I trust that you will instantly reinforce the Bundelcund army.

Ever yours, affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXXVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Luke.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, March 13, 1805.

This moment I have received an account of General Smith's highly meritorious conduct in overtaking and defeating Ameer Khan at Ufzulghur. I now trust that the effects of that incursion will prove favourable, and that the robber and assassin will meet his deserts. I conclude that General Smith, with the aid of one or two battalions, will hunt the tyger in the jungles unto destruction.

The state of Rohilcund is extremely creditable to Mr. Seton, of whose merits I entertain a full sense.

I cannot ascertain whence your Lordship is now obliged to draw your supplies for the renewal of the siege of Bhurtpore; if from Allahabad in any great degree, we cannot expect your operations to recommence before the beginning of April: I most anxiously hope that you will fix your mind rather upon the certainty than the celerity of your success against Bhurtpore, if it should appear to be necessary to resume the siege of that place. It is of more importance

that we should not *again* fail than that we should *soon* succeed.

Sir Arthur Wellesley returns to England with Admiral Rainier, and has probably sailed before this time from Madras.

Ever, my dear Lord,
yours, most affectionately,
WELLESLEY.

No. LXXXVII.

Lord Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

Head Quarters, Camp before Bhurtpore,
March 21, 1805.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to return your Lordship's notes, under date the 5th instant, with such observations annexed as appeared to me necessary.

My remarks on notes of a later date which I have received from your Lordship will be forwarded as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,
LAKE.

NOTES.

1. As it now appears evident that Scindiah entertains no notion of war, might not Colonel Martindell's corps be immediately brought into action against Holkar, while the Commander-in-Chief's army is recruiting its supplies for the renewal of operations against Bhurtpore.—*Wellesley.*

It does not appear by our latest accounts that Scindiah, who is said to have been at Sirhoondie on the 3d instant, is not hostilely inclined. It is therefore necessary that Colonel Martindell should remain in his present position, from whence he can protect Bundelcund, watch the motions of Scindiah, and be ready to hang upon his rear, should he advance into Hindostan.—Lake.

2. Might not a division of Europeans and cavalry from the Commander-in-Chief's army co-operate with Colonel Martindell's corps.—*Wellesley.*

3. If the Commander-in-Chief shall have renewed the operations against Bhurtpore before this paper shall reach him, might not his Excellency still endeavour to drive off Holkar with Colonel Martindell's corps, and a co-operating force from the side of Bhurtpore, even during the siege.—*Wellesley.*

4. While the Commander-in-Chief is preparing for the siege of Bhurt-pore, or actually engaged in it, might it not be advisable to endeavour to detach Runjeet Sing from Holkar? Although Bhurt-pore has not fallen, Runjeet Sing is certainly much reduced and alarmed, and Holkar would be hopeless if abandoned by Runjeet Sing.—*Wellesley.*

Every endeavour is making, and will be made to detach Runjeet Sing from Holkar.

Runjeet Sing is certainly much reduced in money and greatly alarmed. Holkar and his followers would have little hope if abandoned by Runjeet Sing.—*Lake.*

Might it not be stated to Runjeet Sing that, although his fate has been delayed, he must know it to be inevitable; that a few weeks more must destroy him altogether; that his only certainty of escape is to throw himself upon the clemency of the British Government, and renounce Holkar altogether, in which case he will be admitted to pardon, and restored to his possessions. As a symptom of this disposition he should be required to repair under an escort to the Commander-in-Chief's camp, to deliver up his fortress of Bhurt-pore to us, or to give some adequate security against that fortress being used hostilely, and to expel all Holkar's people from his country; in which case he should be restored to the protection of the British Government, his property in Bhurt-pore secured for him, and all his country and forts restored. Deig however, to be retained by our troops, until Holkar shall have been entirely driven away.—*Wellesley.*

Every means has been attempted to show Runjeet Sing how fruitless any attempts of his to oppose the British Government must prove.

A correspondence is now going on between me and Runjeet Sing, which I am in hopes will lead to an accommodation sufficiently favourable to the British Government, and prevent any future union of interests between that chief and Jeswunt Rao Holkar.—*Lake.*

No such offer should be made to Runjeet Sing, unless it appears probable or nearly certain, that he will accept it; and that he has power to fulfil it, and is not entirely in the hands of Holkar. Nor should any such offer be made if Lord Lake should apprehend any disgrace to the British character, or advantage to the enemy from the proposition. The Commander-in-Chief will decide this question with reference also to the following points.—*Wellesley.*

Holkar's sole dependence is at present on Runjeet Sing's funds, and when he is deprived of these, he will be without resource.

The desire to enter into negotiation originated entirely with Runjeet Sing, who expressed his earnest desire to be received into the favour of the British Government. I should therefore imagine that no disgrace could attach to the British character of which your Excellency may be assured I shall be most particularly tenacious.—*Lake.*

The chance of success without dreadful loss in any future assault of Bhurt-pore.—*Wellesley.*

I should hope if the town is attacked again that the army would not suffer much. If it cannot be got without severe loss, it will not be attempted.—*Lake.*

The prospect of being able soon to resume the siege of Bhurtpore.—*Wellesley.*

We shall be ready to renew the siege immediately.—Lake.

The probability of protecting our own territories, the fountain of all our resources during the siege.—*Wellesley.*

The protection of our own territories will be attended to most particularly.—Lake.

5. The two great objects now to be accomplished, are the expulsion of Holkar and the protection of our own territories; the reduction of Runjeet Sing, or of Bhurtpore, is only important as connected with those objects.—*Wellesley.*

Either an amicable accommodation with Runjeet Sing, or the reduction of Bhurtpore will enable me to expel Holkar and Ameer Khan, but their expulsion previously will not be possible.—Lake.

6. If Holkar can be expelled, might he not be pursued by the Bombay army with such reinforcement as might be deemed necessary. It is highly desirable that the Bombay army should return to the frontier of Guzerat to watch Scindiah, and if he should prove friendly, to enable him to settle his government. I wish to know accurately how the Bombay army is to be employed; what difficulties it is likely to meet on its return; what season is preferable for its return; and what has been the conduct of the Kotah Rajah and others on its march. The best service of the Bombay army would be to hunt Holkar.—*Wellesley.*

Holkar must be pursued and the Bombay army would be the best corps for this service, as it would carry them on their way to Guzerat. They will however require some of our cavalry to accompany them.

The greatest difficulty to the Bombay army pursuing Holkar, is the health of the Europeans who would suffer much during the hot winds. Besides this their cattle are excessively weak and bad in consequence of the long march they have already performed.

The Kotah Rajah in my opinion has no intention of being hostile to the British Government. He is much alarmed lest Scindiah should plunder his country and exact cash from him.—Lake.

7. A corps of infantry should act in Rohilcund under General Smith, and hunt Ameer Khan in the jungles. Might not one half at least of General Smith's cavalry now rejoin the Commander-in-Chief, which would enable his Lordship to re-commence active operations against Holkar. Surely one regiment European, one native cavalry, and two or three battalions of Sepoys would suffice for General Smith in Rohilcund.—*Wellesley.*

Colonel Grueber is left in Rohilcund with 1,800 Sepoys. Ameer Khan has re-crossed the Jumna, and is at Futtypore Sicri. The whole of my cavalry will, I suppose, join me to-morrow.

The cavalry under General Smith could not easily have been divided. The six regiments did not amount to more than 1,600 men and horses.—Lake.

8. Mr. Seton and General Smith should be authorized to offer a settlement of land to such of Ameer Khan's followers as would quit him. Even Ameer Khan himself might be offered a Jagheer, if he will quit Holkar's cause, submit to the British Government, and come into General Smith's

camp within a stated period of time. This proceeding however must be accompanied by vigorous hostilities against Ameer Khan, and his followers.—*Wellesley.*

A settlement in lands should certainly be offered to Ameer Khan's followers.

Ameer Khan is most exorbitant in his demands. He asks thirty-three lacs of rupees in the first instance, and a Jagheer for 10,000 horse. This was his proposal in Rohilcund, and I doubt much if he would now be more moderate, as his battalions and guns have joined Scindiah.—Lake.

9. Mr. Seton's zeal, integrity and personal courage are considerable. General Smith must not however be directed by him. Mr. Mercer might be sent to General Smith if necessary. Mr. Seton's measure of raising 4000 Rajepoots, is in the highest degree dangerous; I have countermanded it. These gentlemen must not raise corps in this fanciful manner.—*Wellesley.*

Mr. Seton is apt to be alarmed, but he has great merit in managing the natives in Rohilcund, who have a high respect and veneration for his character and integrity. I had cautioned General Smith not to be guided by him, or any one else, but to follow my directions.

I perfectly agree with your Lordship, that these gentlemen should not be allowed to raise corps in this fanciful manner.—Lake.

8 P.M. I have just received a despatch from Mr. Metcalfe dated 23d February, by which it appears that Ameer Khan was about to leave Rohilcund, and to cross the Ganges again. I therefore hope that your Lordship will soon have the use of the whole cavalry; in that event I trust that you will instantly pursue Holkar with the aid of both Martindell's and General Jones's army. This is the great object. I suppose you will endeavour to leave a regular battalion or two in Rohilcund.—*Wellesley.*

This paragraph has been answered in par. 7.—Lake.

Notes by the Marquess Wellesley dated 10th of March, 1805, with Lieut.-General Lord Lake's Observations thereon, dated 24th March, 1805.

1. The most attentive consideration has convinced me that an early attack and pursuit of Holkar's personal force is an object of the greatest importance, whether the siege of Bhurtpore be resumed or not.—*Wellesley.*

2. If the siege of Bhurtpore shall be resumed, and Holkar left unattacked, he will probably attempt some diversion, which will draw off our cavalry again. If he should even not be able to attempt any such diversion during the absence of Ameer Khan, yet Holkar's position in the vicinity of Bhurtpore during the siege, must tend to distress our troops occupied in that operation.—*Wellesley.*

It does not seem probable that it will be in the power of Holkar to attempt any diversion that can have the effect of again drawing off our cavalry.—Lake.

3. It would therefore be highly desirable to form a force, especially for the object of attacking Holkar during the siege. Such a force might

act as a kind of covering army during the siege. If it could not pursue Holkar to any great distance, at least it might alarm and distress him, and prevent any active operations on his part.—*Wellesley.*

No opportunity of attacking and distressing Holkar's force has or will be omitted.—Lake.

4. It would certainly be highly advantageous, if practicable, to drive off Holkar altogether, and to pursue him to extremity even during the siege.—*Wellesley.*

Until an accommodation has taken place with Runjeet Sing, or until we are actually in possession of the town of Bhurtpore, it will not be practicable to drive off Holkar altogether. Any infantry he has is within the town, and whilst his cavalry derive support from thence, they can only be pursued from place to place in the surrounding country.—Lake.

5. Perhaps this operation might be practicable, if our cavalry should soon return from the Doab, and if Colonel Martindell's corps could be brought to act against Holkar; a force might then be formed for the pursuit of Holkar, partly from the Bombay army, and partly from Colonel Martindell's corps. I have no objection to sending the body guard with the pursuing army, it might then proceed to Poonah, or Bombay, and thence to Calcutta.—*Wellesley.*

Colonel Martindell must remain in his present position.—Lake.

6. If the siege of Bhurtpore should not be resumed, I hope that an immediate attack will be made upon Holkar, and that he will be vigorously pursued to extremity, by a properly equipped force. (See my former notes.)—*Wellesley.*

Holkar will be pursued to extremity as soon as possible.—Lake.

7. It appears that in any event, the best use to make of Colonel Martindell's corps at present, is to bring it into effect against Holkar. Should Scindiah intend hostility, and mean to act against Bundelcund (both of which events are highly improbable) it would still be the most prudent step to employ Colonel Martindell's corps against Holkar, provided the application of that corps to the service against Holkar appeared likely to decide the fate of that freebooter. In the event of Scindiah's approach, it would be a great object to have already reduced Holkar to flight. In that case the ruin of Scindiah would be inevitable.—*Wellesley.*

It appears by Lord Wellesley's letter of the 12th instant, that his Lordship is perfectly convinced of the necessity of leaving Colonel Martindell's force in its present position.—Lake.

In the more probable case that Scindiah (not connected with Holkar) might be treacherous and rash enough to attempt to avail himself of our embarrassment with Holkar, for the purpose of seizing any part of our territory, the destruction of Holkar would probably, nay certainly, check Scindiah's advance. It is impossible to believe that Scindiah would wantonly rush upon our armies in Hindostan, if at liberty to direct their attention to him; or that he would enter Bundelcund in such a case. His destruction would not only be inevitable, but he must plainly perceive that such must be his fate. The great object therefore even with respect to Scindiah is the reduction of Holkar, and although Bundelcund, might be exposed

for a short time in the absence of Colonel Martindell's corps, the great object of the war being once accomplished, any intermediate mischief in Bundelcund might be remedied hereafter.—*Wellesley*.

8. If any of our corps should move in the vicinity of Ambajee's territory, it might be advisable to apprize that chief that we had no hostile intentions against him; this notification ought probably to be given in the event of any movement of Colonel Martindell's corps. Ambajee at the same time ought to be apprized, that if he shall venture to touch our territory, or that of our allies, (who should be named) he will be severely punished hereafter.—*Wellesley*.

It appears by a letter from Colonel Martindell, (copy of which has been forwarded for Lord Wellesley's information) that Ambajee intends to throw himself on the protection of the British Government. In that case his person will be protected, but from the relation in which he stands to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it will be impossible to give protection to his territory, unless we should be in a state of war with that chieftain.—Lake.

9. I am now convinced of the necessity of an increase of the native cavalry of Bengal to the extent of two more regiments the 7th and 8th, and I desire that your Lordship will take the necessary steps for this purpose; you shall receive official authority of the date of this day.—*Wellesley*.

The most speedy measures will be taken to raise two additional regiments of native cavalry.—Lake.

10. It has appeared to me, that a considerable increase of our horse artillery would be an useful measure, and I recommend it to your Lordship to commence that increase immediately, stating to me your plan for the purpose, if your Lordship should agree with me in the object.—*Wellesley*.

I agree entirely in opinion with Lord Wellesley, that a considerable increase of our horse artillery would be a measure in the highest degree beneficial. This measure will be commenced as soon as possible, and my plan for the purpose submitted to his Lordship.—Lake.

Three or four brigades of horse artillery would be serviceable; perhaps it would then be proper to reduce the gallopers of the regiments of cavalry; that a proportion of the field artillery also might be reduced, and converted into horse artillery.—*Wellesley*.

I have had so many proofs of the great utility of galloper guns attached to regiments of cavalry, that I should be extremely unwilling to reduce them. I would even consider it advantageous to increase their number to three instead of two as at present.—Lake.

11. I recommend most earnestly to your Lordship to settle the plan for stations and cantonments of the army, with a view to the approaching season.—*Wellesley*.

This subject will be particularly attended to.—Lake.

12. Rather for the purpose of facilitating the exercise of your Lordship's judgment than of urging any particular plan, I state the following outlines of a plan for the approaching season.

(a.) A force to be equipped for the pursuit of Holkar, suppose the Bombay army with the body guard, and one regiment of native cavalry,

with perhaps also the horse artillery, and if the 29th dragoons is to return to Europe, it might also proceed with this army, and be embarked from Bombay, or Surat.—*Wellesley.*

The season is so far advanced that I fear it will be impossible for the Bombay army to pursue Holkar. The experience of last year has shown us how unable Europeans are to march during the hot winds. The road to Malwa too does not, I am informed, afford water in sufficient quantity for a considerable detachment during the hot months, and as I before-mentioned to his Lordship the cattle of the Bombay division are so extremely reduced, that they are unable to convey their baggage and artillery.—Lake.

(b.) The remainder of the army to besiege Bhurtpore.—*Wellesley.*

When Holkar escapes from Bhurtpore, he will only be attended by a few followers whom it would be to no purpose to pursue with a considerable force, a small force must therefore be equipped for that purpose.—Lake.

(c.) When that siege shall be finished, or if it should not be undertaken, the army to be stationed in the following manner, and on the following general principles.—*Wellesley.*

(d.) The main force of the army to be always stationed on the right bank of the Jumna.—*Wellesley.*

The main force of the army must always be stationed on the right bank of the Jumna.—Lake.

(e.) The principal station to be between Agra and Muttra.—*Wellesley.*
The principal station must be at Agra or Muttra.—Lake.

(f.) A station at Delhj.

(g.) A station in Bundelcund.

(h.) A station in Gohud.

(i.) A station near Seharunpore, or on the Jumna in that direction. Your Lordship will judge on which bank of the river the station shall be established.—*Wellesley.*

There must be a military station at each of the places here mentioned.—Lake.

It is not necessary to add any further observations on the other stations of the army; but I wish your Lordship to consider the means of reducing all irregular and extra corps, including provincials, and to establish the army on a really efficient construction, and with the least practicable expence.—*Wellesley.*

The irregular and extra corps must be reduced, and the means of doing so and establishing the army on the most efficient construction will be taken into due consideration. My ideas upon these subjects will be forwarded to your Lordship as soon as possible.—Lake.

(k.) It would be desirable that every great station, cantonment, and especially magazine, should be fortified by works sufficient to resist cavalry; it would also be desirable that troops should be established at all such chief civil stations as may be in any degree exposed, and that works should be constructed at each of those stations sufficient to protect the property of the civil officers against predatory horse.—*Wellesley.*

All magazine stations must have works sufficient to resist cavalry.

In the present state of civil stations it is impossible to afford a military force sufficient for their protection. The houses of the civil servants, on

account of the enclosures by which they are surrounded, are in general four or five miles apart. By this means a space is occupied too extensive to be defended by any moderate force. Until therefore they are obliged to build their houses contiguous to each other, they will remain liable to be plundered by every body of predatory horse or foot that chooses to attack them.—Lake.

On these points I shall send further intimations to your Lordship.—*Wellesley.*

No. LXXXVIII.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, March 22, 1805.

1. From the appendix to the notes on the late transactions in the Mahratta empire transmitted to your Secretary by the last despatch, your honourable Court will have been apprized of the military operations which have been employed against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in consequence of the disturbances excited by that adventurer.

2. In renewing those operations your honourable Court will particularly lament (amidst the loss of many gallant officers and men) the severe loss sustained by the honourable Company and by the nation from the death of that distinguished officer, Major-General Frazer, in consequence of wounds received whilst leading the British troops to victory in the glorious and memorable battle of Deig.

3. Major-General Frazer manifested the greatest prudence, activity and judgment from the period of time when he was entrusted by the right honourable the Commander-in-chief with the charge of the division of the army destined to pursue the infantry and artillery of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, until he brought that force to action under the walls of the fortress of Deig; and the enterprize, skill and intrepidity, which distinguished Major-General Frazer's conduct in the field are justly commemorated by your illustrious Commander-in-chief in terms which cannot be enforced: "Advancing in front of the troops his example animated them to the arduous enterprize; he continued to encourage them long after he had been wounded, and his voice impelled them until a complete and glorious victory crowned and rewarded his exertions."

4. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to enclose a copy of the Commander-in-chief's letter on the melancholy occasion, and to recommend its contents to the particular attention of your honourable Court.

5. The Governor-General in Council has learnt with sentiments of deep concern that this invaluable officer has left a widow with a numerous family of young children almost entirely dependent upon the justice and benevolence of his country. His Excellency in Council entertains a confident persuasion however that their claims on the nation will be justly appreciated, and he discharges an indispensable public duty in recommending them in the most earnest manner to the liberality and gratitude of your honourable Court.

6. The provision which may be made by your honourable Court for the afflicted family of Major-General Frazer, whilst it will mark the sense entertained by the East India Company of the value and importance of his eminent services, will afford an animating excitement to other officers to imitate his illustrious example, in the confidence that the gratitude of the honourable Court will be commensurate with their exertions in the cause of their country, and that the surviving families of officers fallen in the public service will be relieved from distress by the public benevolence.

7. To commemorate the glorious achievements of Major-General Frazer, the Governor-General in Council considers it to be his further duty to suggest that a monument shall be erected to his memory in whatever place shall be deemed most proper.

8. On this occasion the Governor-General in Council has the honour to submit to the notice of your honourable Court the services and heroic death of the late Major-General Ware at the memorable battle of Laswaree. Major-General Ware had served the honourable Company with reputation during a period of nearly forty years, and the testimony borne by the Commander-in-chief to his gallantry and public services in the campaign of 1803 in Hindostan was highly honourable to his character as an officer. His Excellency in Council therefore recommends that a public mark of honour may be conferred on the memory of Major-General Ware. The Governor-General in Council is satisfied that the case of the late Major-General Ware has accidentally escaped the notice of your honourable Court and of other public authorities in

England. The services of Major-General Ware and his death are particularly distinguished in the Commander-in-chief's orders and in the Governor-General's notes upon the late war.

We have the honour to be,
honourable Sirs,
your most faithful humble servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

Enclosure.

Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Head Quarters, Camp Mindoo, Nov. 7, 1804.

1. The enclosed note has just conveyed to me the afflicting intelligence of the death of the gallant Major-General Frazer, in consequence of the severe wound he received in the ever memorable action of the 13th instant.

2. Your Lordship will partake in my feelings of sincere sorrow for the loss of an esteemed friend, and a brave officer; and his country will mourn the death of a hero, to whom she is indebted for the most signal services.

3. His plan of attacking the enemy in the glorious battle of Deig evinces the highest military genius; his mode of carrying this into effect displays the greatest judgment and sagacity, and his conduct at the head of his army proves the most deliberate courage and determined resolution.

4. Advancing in front of his troops, his example animated them to the arduous enterprize; he continued to encourage them long after he had fallen, and his voice impelled them, till a complete and glorious victory crowned and rewarded his exertions.

5. In lamenting the loss of this brave officer, I have the consoling reflection that his memory will remain dear in the breast of every soldier, that his splendid example will animate to future deeds of heroism, and that his fame and glory will be consecrated and preserved by a grateful and admiring country.

6. The remains of Major-General Frazer were interred at Muttra on the evening of the 25th, and the last sad honours due to his rank were paid by part of that army, which he so lately led to victory and glory.

I have the honour to be,
my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,

G. LAKE.

A true Copy.

J. LUMSDEN,

Chief Sec. to the Govt.

No. LXXXIX.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable Court of Directors of the Honourable the East India Company.

HONOURABLE SIRs,

Fort William, March 22, 1805.

1. Major-General the Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. having obtained the permission of the Governor-General and of the Commander-in-Chief to proceed to Europe, the Governor-General in Council deems it to be his duty to submit to your honourable Court a copy of a letter, under date the 24th ultimo, from the Governor-General in Council to Sir Arthur Wellesley* on the occasion of the resignation by that officer of the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor General's instructions of the 26th of June, 1803, and the 9th of November, 1804.

2. The Governor-General in Council, in recommending the eminent public services of Sir Arthur Wellesley to the distinguished favour and notice of your honourable Court, request you to consider the letter from the Governor-General in Council, under date the 24th ultimo, to Sir Arthur Wellesley, as containing the expression of the sentiments of your supreme government in India with regard to the conduct of that distinguished officer in the service of the honourable Company and of the nation, in India.

We have the honour to be,

Honourable Sirs,

with the greatest respect,

your most obedient and faithful

humble servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

* See general orders by the Marquess Wellesley, 8th April, 1805.

No. XC.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee
of the Honourable the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, March. 24, 1805.

In our despatch of the 15th of June, 1804,* the Governor-General in Council had the honour to submit to your honourable Committee a statement of the circumstances and considerations which had compelled the British Government to adopt measures for the reduction of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, within such limits as might be consistent with the security of the rights and interests of the British Government and its allies, and of the successful commencement of hostile operations against the troops of that chieftain.

In that despatch the Governor-General in Council communicated to your honourable Committee the general plan of operations originally intended to be pursued for the reduction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power. Your honourable Committee will have observed that the basis of that plan was a combination of the movements and operations of the British troops and those of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Guickwar, acting against the forces and territories of Holkar from Guzerat, Malwa, and the Deccan, while the main army under the personal direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief pursued the enemy from Hindostan.

It was not expected that the whole of this plan of operations could be immediately carried into effect, and we apprized your honourable Committee in our despatch of the 15th of June, of the insurmountable obstacles opposed to the immediate advance of the army of the Deccan which was destined to occupy the forts and territory of Holkar, south of the Nerbudda, by the desolated state of the country through which that army would have occasion to pass. Until those obstacles, however, should have been removed by the return of the rainy season, we had reason to expect that the operations of the British troops on the side of Hindostan, combined with those of the allied forces from Malwah and Guzerat, would either effect the destruction of Jeswunt

* See p. 99.

Rao Holkar's force, or would circumscribe the movements of the enemy in such a manner as to occasion the dispersion of his forces, or at least to prevent his return to Hindostan after the army of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief should have compelled him to retire from the position which he occupied within the territory of the Rajah of Jyenagur.

Your honourable Committee has been apprized by our despatch of the 15th of June, that the detachment under the command of Colonel Monson had compelled the enemy to retire from that position. The Governor-General in Council further apprized your honourable Committee of the circumstances, which in the judgment of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief rendered it expedient to withdraw the main body of the British army from the advanced position which it occupied, and to confine the plan of operations on the side of Hindostan, to the adoption of measures for the effectual exclusion of Holkar from that quarter, until the return of a season more favourable for active operations.

Your honourable Committee will have observed that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief judged the strength of the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Monson to be sufficient for that purpose, and accordingly directed Lieut.-Colonel Monson to form such a disposition of his force as should completely obstruct the return of Holkar into Hindostan.

This arrangement was founded on the following suppositions. 1st. That the army and resources of Jeswunt Rao Holkar had been greatly reduced and were daily diminishing, and that his military reputation had suffered from his precipitate flight. 2ndly. That the British force in Guzerat would be enabled to act offensively against the force of Jeswunt Rao Holkar according to the original plan of operations. 3rdly. That the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were prepared to co-operate with the British troops on the side of Malwah and Guzerat.

The information which had been communicated to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, relative to the reduced condition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power and resources, was entitled to every degree of credit. The expectation, however, which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief entertained that the British force in Guzerat would be enabled to

carry on offensive operations against Holkar, was not consistent with the information which the Governor-General had received relative to the obstacles opposed to the advance of that force by the general distress of the country in which it would be required to act. Although the Governor-General was not disposed to place any implicit confidence in the aid of Dowlut Rao Scindiah his Excellency had no reason to doubt either the disposition or the ability of that chieftain to prosecute with energy and effect offensive operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

In our despatch of the 15th of June, the Governor-General in Council apprized your honourable Committee that this state of circumstances appeared to the Governor-General to afford a favourable opportunity for withdrawing the British troops in every quarter of India to their usual stations, with the exception of the subsidiary forces which the British Government was bound to furnish to the Peishwa and the Guickwar, to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rana of Gohud, and for framing a disposition of those subsidiary forces which would enable the British Government at the close of the rainy season to reduce the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar within due bounds, without incurring any considerable expence.

Your honourable Committee has already been furnished with a copy of the Governor General's notes of the 25th of May, prescribing the detail of these proposed arrangements, and your honourable Committee will not fail to observe that those arrangements were not limited to the object of providing for the supposed situation of affairs, but were calculated to meet the exigency of any probable occurrence, or future state of circumstances. Those arrangements were framed on principles calculated to provide not only for the contingency of an erroneous estimate of the reduced power and resources of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's inactivity, but even for the possible event of a combination of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's forces with those of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

No doubt whatever can be entertained that the completion of the proposed arrangements would have secured the accomplishment of the expectation announced to your honourable Committee in our despatch of the 15th of June, of

effecting the reduction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power at the close of the rains, without any considerable expence, since the stipulated strength of each of the subsidiary forces, combined with their assigned positions, was such as to render them irresistible by the troops of any native power, and to afford the certain means of pressing with success upon the enemy to whatever point he might direct his forces.

The reports which the Governor-General in Council originally received of the nature and extent of the incursion into the province of Bundelcund, of which the substance is stated in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 15th of June, rendered it necessary in the Governor General's judgment to direct the suspension of the arrangements prescribed by the notes of the 25th of May, and the vigorous prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and accordingly the Governor-General in an official letter, addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, under date the 8th of June, 1804, stating the sentiments of the Governor-General relative to the possible consequences of the irruption into Bundelcund, and to the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett, who commanded the troops stationed in that province, authorized the Commander-in-Chief to postpone the prescribed arrangements, and to employ every effort to reduce Jeswunt Rao Holkar and the predatory chiefs connected with him or acting upon our frontiers, or within the territories of our allies, in the pursuit of separate schemes of plunder.

Although it appeared by subsequent information that the reports which the Governor-General had originally received with regard to the extent of the force, which had invaded Bundelcund, were greatly exaggerated, that the number of the predatory horse which had entered Bundelcund did not exceed 5000, and that the invaders had abandoned the province, the Governor-General did not think proper to revoke his orders for the prosecution of active measures against Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his adherents, because the success of that predatory force in destroying a detachment of British troops, and in accomplishing its objects of plunder and devastation, and especially the retreat of the British troops, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Fawcett, might encourage similar attempts on a more extended scale on the

part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or of other predatory chiefs, and because in the actual positions of the several branches of our military force, the operation of the orders for the prosecution of active measures against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and other predatory chiefs to a certain extent, was not calculated to prevent or even to retard the ultimate accomplishment of the arrangements prescribed by the notes of the 25th of May, if circumstances should render the immediate prosecution of active measures of hostility unnecessary or inexpedient.

The causes which have protracted the existing disturbances beyond the expected period of time, will be traced in the ensuing narrative of transactions and occurrences.

Your honourable Committee was informed by our despatch of the 15th of June, 1804, that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with the army under his personal command, had commenced his march on his return from the vicinity of Jyenagur to the British possessions for the purpose of cantoning the troops at their usual stations, and in the 101st paragraph of that despatch it is stated, that on the day after his Excellency's receipt of the intelligence of the incursion of a body of predatory horse into the province of Bundelcund, the Commander-in-Chief marched from the position which he then occupied with the whole of the Cavalry, with the intention of crossing the Jumna, and of proceeding through the Doab to the south-east for the protection of that territory from the eventual incursions of the predatory horse.

The repulse and retreat of the banditti, however, which had entered Bundelcund, rendered unnecessary the adoption of any extraordinary measures for the protection of the Doab, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief pursued his march to Cawnpore, where the whole of the European cavalry and infantry had arrived before the middle of the month of June. On his march, the Commander-in-Chief cantoned the native troops in different positions on the right bank of the Jumna, and at such stations within the territory of the Doab, as appeared to be best calculated to provide for the security and tranquillity of our possessions in that quarter.

Our despatch of the 15th of June, contained a narrative

of the operations of the detachment commanded by the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson from the period of its formation until the close of the month of May, the date of the latest advices which had been received at Fort William, relative to the operations of that detachment.

After the capture of the Fort of Rampoorah by a detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Don on the 16th of May, as stated in the 78th paragraph of the same despatch, Lieut.-Colonel Don leaving in that fort a sufficient garrison, joined the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Monson, with the remainder of his force.

With this re-inforcement Lieut.-Colonel Monson moved to the southward in the direction of Kotah, near which place he arrived early in the month of June. Colonel Monson was joined at Kotah by a body of troops in the service of the Rajah of Kotah, who had on many occasions, expressed a decided inclination to obtain the friendship of the British Government, and whose overtures to the Commander-in-Chief for the establishment of a more intimate connection with the British Government were stated to your Honourable Committee in our despatch of the 12th of April, together with the reasons which induced the Governor-General to suspend the negotiation.

Colonel Monson having advanced from Kotah, arrived at the strong pass of Mokundra, situated about 30 miles to the southward of Kotah, and having halted a few days at the pass for the purpose of collecting supplies, he resumed his march on the 28th of June, and on the 1st of July, arrived in the vicinity of the fortress of Hinglairsgruh; this fort which is represented to be a place of considerable strength, is an ancient possession of the Holkar family, and was at this time, occupied by a garrison in the interest of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, consisting of 800 foot and 300 horse. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who is said to have attached considerable importance to the possession of Hinglairsgruh, was at this time, encamped about forty-four miles from that fort with his whole force. Lieut.-Colonel Monson states, that these considerations induced him to attack the fort without delay: accordingly on the evening of the 1st of July, Lieut.-

Colonel Monson detached a party of the troops under his command against the fort. The party (which was placed under the command of Major Sinclair) consisted of 9 companies of the 2d battalion 2d regiment of native infantry, with 6 six pounders, and of a party of Hindostanee cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Lucan.

On the 2d of July, Major Sinclair, with the force under his command, arrived within a short distance of the fort, which was assaulted on the evening of that day, and carried by the British troops with the greatest gallantry and rapidity, and with inconsiderable loss on our part.

After the capture of Hinglaisgurh, Lieut.-Colonel Monson advanced his position about fifty miles from the Mokundra pass, in which position he was informed that he would be able to procure supplies. Lieut.-Colonel Monson also expected to be able to communicate with Colonel Murray, at that time, on his march, with a considerable detachment of troops, from Guzerat, towards Ougein.

The corps under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Monson at this period, consisted of five battalions of sepoys, with a proportion of artillery, and of two bodies of irregular horse, under the command of Lieutenant Lucan, and of Bapojee Scindiah, amounting to about 3000 men.

On the 7th of July 1804, Lieut.-Colonel Monson received intelligence, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar, (who, since his retreat before the army of the Commander-in-Chief, had occupied a position in Malwa, having the Chumbul river between him and Lieut.-Colonel Monson's corps) had crossed the Chumbul river with the whole of his army and guns. Lieut.-Colonel Monson was desirous of attacking Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and moved towards the place at which it was stated that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had crossed the Chumbul river. It appears, however, that Lieut.-Colonel Monson found, that he had only two days grain in his camp; part of his corps had been detached to bring up grain; one battalion of his force was on its march to join him from Hinglaisgurh, and he expected to be joined by an escort, with treasure for the use of his detachment. Lieut.-Colonel Monson had also received accounts from Colonel Murray, of that officer's intention to fall back on the Myhie river. This movement

and the causes stated to justify it, are subsequently described in this despatch.

Lieut.-Colonel Monson also received information, that the extent of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force was such as to render it imprudent to hazard a general engagement. Under these circumstances, Lieut.-Colonel Monson determined to retire to the Mokundra pass. Accordingly, the whole of the baggage and stores, belonging to Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, was sent off at four at A. M. on the morning of the 8th of July 1804, to Soonarah, and Lieut.-Colonel Monson remained on the ground of encampment, with his detachment formed in order of battle, until half-past nine. At that hour Lieut.-Colonel Monson, commenced his retreat, leaving Lieutenant Lucan and Bappojee Scindiah with the irregular cavalry on the ground, with orders to follow in half an hour, and to send to Lieut.-Colonel Monson the earliest intelligence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's motions.

The detachment had marched nearly twelve miles, when Lieut.-Colonel Monson received intelligence, that Lieutenant Lucan's party had been attacked, at a considerable distance, in the rear of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's division, by the whole of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's cavalry. On the receipt of this intelligence, Lieut.-Colonel Monson formed his troops in order of battle, and was proceeding to the support of Lieutenant Lucan's detachment, when Bappojee Scindiah joined Lieut.-Colonel Monson's division, bringing intelligence, that the rear guard had been defeated, that many chiefs had been either killed or wounded, and that Lieutenant Lucan, with several chiefs, were taken prisoners. In consequence of this information, Lieut.-Colonel Monson resumed his march in the direction of the Mokundra Pass, where he arrived at noon on the 9th of July, without having been molested by the enemy.

The intelligence of the commencement of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's retreat reached the Commander-in-chief at Cawnpore on the 18th of July. His Excellency immediately adopted measures for re-inforcing Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, and for supplying it with grain, in the hope of enabling that detachment to maintain its ground against the enemy. His Excellency also made such arrangements as appeared to be best calculated for the security of the British

territories against any incursion which the continued retreat or defeat of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment might eventually encourage and enable the enemy to attempt.

Our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 15th of June 1804, represented the condition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force, according to the information then before us, to be in the utmost degree wretched and distressed, and his troops to be deserting in great numbers. Upon the ground of this information were partly founded instructions to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under date the 30th June 1804, on the subject of effecting an accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, through the agency of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the substance of which will be found stated in that part of this despatch which relates to the transactions at the Court of that chieftain. Before the close of the month of July, however, the Governor-General in Council received information, that in the early part of that month, Jeswunt Rao Holkar had found means probably from the remains of Scindiah's disbanded forces, to collect a large body of cavalry and infantry, with a large train of artillery, and was posted with the whole of his force in the vicinity of the Mokundra Pass.

The Governor-General in Council is not yet sufficiently informed with regard to the detail of transactions and events in the southern and western provinces of Hindostan, which immediately followed the retreat of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, to be able to explain, with accuracy and precision, the means by which Jeswunt Rao Holkar was enabled so considerably to augment the number, and to revive the spirit of his troops, notwithstanding the precipitation of his flight, the real distress of his army, and the apparently desperate condition of his affairs. The investigation of the conduct and movements of the British detachments employed against the army of Jeswunt Rao Holkar may be expected to elucidate this subject, and to afford the means of explaining in a satisfactory manner the causes of that change in the situation of affairs which produced the necessity of adopting a system of measures and arrangements entirely different from those by which the Governor-General in Council confidently hoped to accomplish the effectual reduction of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper in this place to state to your honourable Committee, the substance of the instructions which the Governor-General issued to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on a consideration of this change in the situation of affairs, and the sentiments on which those instructions were founded.

It did not appear probable that Holkar would again separate the extensive force which he had been enabled to assemble, unless the necessity of his affairs should compel him to adopt that measure. A division of his force would evidently expose some part of it to the hazard of being destroyed by either of the detachments under Colonel Murray, or Lieut.-Colonel Monson, or by the troops of Scindiah, or of some other of the native chiefs.

This state of circumstances therefore, appeared to the Governor-General to present a favourable opportunity of effecting a decisive blow against Holkar's army.

No expectation could be entertained of effecting an accommodation with Holkar, consistent with the honour and interests of the British Government, while he should remain in force, and our perseverance in a system of defensive arrangements, under actual circumstances, was manifestly calculated to injure the reputation of the British power, and to encourage the hopes of the enemy.

Neither of the corps under Colonel Murray, or Lieut.-Colonel Monson acting separately, appeared to be of sufficient strength to contend with success against the whole of Holkar's force; nor while Holkar maintained a superiority in the field, could those two detachments effect a junction. No aid could be expected from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who had entirely failed in performing the obligation of the alliance, (as stated in a subsequent part of this despatch.)

The immediate attack of Jeswunt Rao Holkar appeared, under these circumstances, to be obviously the most expedient course of policy. It appeared to the Governor-General that this object might be accomplished with most expedition and facility, by re-inforcing the detachment under the command of Colonel Murray, or of Lieut.-Colonel Monson, to such an extent as to enable it to contend singly against Holkar's whole force. It was obvious that when this object

should have been effected, the two detachments would be able to effect a junction, or to undertake any other operation which might appear to be advisable.

The distance of Colonel Murray's corps from the station of the British troops in the Deccan, and the necessity of retaining in Guzerat the force stationed in that province precluded the practicability of strengthening the detachment under the command of Colonel Murray in any material degree. The attention of the Commander-in-Chief was therefore directed to the means of re-inforcing Colonel Monson's detachment with a sufficient body of European and native cavalry, infantry, and artillery. The Commander-in-Chief was directed to exercise his discretion with regard to the expediency of placing this force under the orders of an officer of superior rank to either of those who commanded the separate detachments, and of investing the officer so appointed with powers to conclude under favourable circumstances, a pacific arrangement with Holkar. The Governor-General in Council was still of opinion that great advantage would be derived from an accommodation with Holkar on the terms proposed in the instructions to the Resident with Scindiah of the 30th of June, but the Commander-in-Chief was directed to consider an early and vigorous attack on Holkar's force, and if necessary, the reduction of his power and resources, to be the main object of his attention.

The instructions of which the substance is stated in the preceding paragraphs were prepared before the Governor-General had received information of Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's retreat before the army of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Previously however to the actual despatch of those instructions, the Governor-General received the intelligence of that event.

Although the retreat of Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's detachment rendered it probable that a necessity might arise for more extended preparations against Holkar than those prescribed by the Governor-General's instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General did not deem it necessary at that moment to issue further orders founded on the tenor of that intelligence. The Governor-General was satisfied that every exertion would be employed by his Excellency

the Commander-in-Chief for the relief of Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's detachment ; and that every necessary precaution would be adopted by his Excellency to provide against the effects of Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's retreat until his Excellency should receive the Governor-General's instructions, founded on the further information which might speedily be expected with regard to the operations of Colonel Monson's detachment.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of the proceedings of Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's detachment.

On the morning of the 10th July, a large body of the enemy's cavalry, under the personal command of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, approached the position of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, and continued to increase in number until noon of the next day, when Jeswunt Rao Holkar dispatched a letter to Lieut.-Colonel Monson, demanding the surrender of the guns and small arms of the British detachment. This demand being rejected with becoming spirit, Jeswunt Rao Holkar divided his force into three bodies, which at the same point of time attacked the front and flanks of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's corps. The judicious position occupied by Lieut.-Colonel Monson, and the valour and discipline displayed by the troops under his command, enabled the detachment to repel this attack ; and after various unsuccessful attempts which continued until evening, Jeswunt Rao Holkar drew off his troops to a position about four miles distant from Lieut.-Colonel Monson's corps, where he was joined by his infantry and guns, and where he encamped with the supposed intention of attacking Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment the following morning. The loss sustained by the British troops on this occasion was very inconsiderable.

Lieut.-Colonel Monson in his narrative of the proceedings of the detachment, states that in the position which his detachment occupied at this period of time, he apprehended that the enemy might pass his rear, and cut off his communication with the Mokundra Pass, and with the town of Kotah, which was the only place from which he could expect to derive supplies. Adverting also to the circumscribed nature of his own position, to the reputed strength of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force, and to the supposed weight and number

of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's guns, Lieut.-Colonel Monson did not consider his post at Mokundra to be tenable, and accordingly resolved to retire to Kotah, which place the detachment reached on the 12th July in the morning, after experiencing extreme fatigue from the inclemency of the season, and the inundated state of the country. The conduct of all the troops both in the contest with the force of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and under the pressure of the difficulties which impeded their retreat, is stated by Lieut.-Colonel Monson to have been distinguished by an invincible spirit of gallantry and firmness.

The Rajah of Kotah, alarmed at the near approach of Holkar's force, and fearful of the consequences of affording succour to the English detachment, was unwilling to admit Lieut.-Colonel Monson into the town, and declared his inability to supply the detachment with provisions. Lieut.-Colonel Monson was therefore compelled to continue his march the same day in the direction of a ford on the river Chumbul, distant about seven miles from Kotah; such however was the severity of the weather and the state of the road, that this short march could not be accomplished until the following day.

On the 14th July the detachment halted for the purpose of endeavouring to procure supplies.

On the 15th the detachment attempted to proceed, but the progress of the guns being prevented by the severity of the rain, it became necessary to halt.

On the morning of the 16th July, the guns had sunk so deep into the mud, that it was impracticable with every degree of exertion to extricate them. All the supplies of the detachment being expended, and the neighbouring villages being exhausted, Lieut.-Colonel Monson was induced to spike his guns, and to order the ammunition to be destroyed: at the same time, he wrote to the Rajah of Boondee, desiring him to dispatch people to extricate the guns and to deposit them in a place of security. Lieut.-Colonel Monson then prosecuted his march, and with the utmost difficulty reached the Chumbulee rivulet on the 17th of July. The rivulet was not fordable on the 17th, but on the 18th July the European artillery-men crossed the rivulet on elephants, and proceeded to Rampoorah.

On the 19th of July the rivulet began to rise; at this time the troops were absolutely destitute of provisions, but their immediate distress was relieved by a supply of grain, sufficient for the consumption of the detachment for two days, which was obtained from a village at a short distance by a party detached for that purpose. That party was attacked on its return to camp by a body of the enemy's horse, which was however repulsed with inconsiderable loss on our side.

In the evening of the 21st July, Lieut.-Colonel Monson detached a body of troops, under the command of Captain O'Donnell, to attack a body of the enemy's cavalry encamped at some distance. In this attempt the British detachment was completely successful; having destroyed the enemy's camp, captured several camels and 200 horses, and killed a great number of the enemy's troops.

By means of rafts, which Lieut.-Colonel Monson procured, two of the battalions crossed the rivulet in the course of the 23d and the 24th of July, and Lieut.-Colonel Don, with one battalion, was detached to a ford, a few miles lower down the rivulet, with a view to expedite the passage of the detachment. During the 24th of July, a large body of the enemy's cavalry having approached, Lieut.-Colonel Monson drew up the remainder of his detachment, amounting to about seven hundred men, and maintained a contest with the enemy until sun-set, when the enemy retired with the loss of several men and horses. Of the British troops, about twenty men were killed and wounded.

On the 25th of July, Lieut.-Colonel Monson detached another battalion to join the detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Don; and the rivulet having on that day become fordable, Lieut.-Colonel Monson crossed the remainder of his force, which at this time was totally destitute of provisions. Lieut.-Colonel Monson therefore proceeded with the division which had crossed the rivulet to the fort of Rampoorah, where he arrived on the 27th of July. Lieut.-Colonel Monson immediately adopted measures for supplying the two remaining corps under Lieut.-Colonel Don, with provisions, and Lieut.-Colonel Don joined him at Rampoorah on the 29th of July.

At the period of time when the Governor-General in Council received the intelligence of the continued retreat of Colonel Monson's detachment, under circumstances of the

utmost distress, and with the loss of guns, camp equipage, and baggage—the Governor-General in Council had also received information with regard to the state of Colonel Murray's detachment at Ougein, and to the conduct of the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government in Malwa (the details of which will be stated in a subsequent part of this despatch) which precluded the hope of deriving any immediate benefit from the services of Lieut.-Colonel Murray's detachment. In this state of affairs, the Governor-General deemed it necessary to consider, without delay, the most effectual means of resisting the force of Holkar, and of preventing the evils which might be expected to flow from the retreat of the detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Monson. The Governor-General accordingly prepared and transmitted to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, on the 17th of August, a paper of notes, containing his sentiments and instructions on the course of measures to be adopted in the actual crisis of affairs, and comprising a general view of the objects to be pursued, and the means of attaining them with the greatest practicable degree of certainty and dispatch.

The judgment of the Governor-General was decided, that those objects could not be attained by any system of operations which should be limited to the measure of opposing the force of Jeswunt Rao Holkar by small detachments, neither possessing the component parts of an army, nor the power of moving with celerity. It was obvious, that detachments of this description, unless strongly posted and secure of an ample and constant supply of provisions, would be exposed to the hazard of being compelled to retire before an army of such strength as that which was then commanded by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that any partial success on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar would increase his reputation, and by the numbers which that success would induce to join his cause, considerably augment his strength, whilst a continuation of the enemy's success might be expected to depress the spirits of our own troops.

The first point stated in the Governor-General's notes of instructions was the immediate preparation of an army in Hindostan, equipped for light movements and of sufficient strength to defeat the main body of Holkar's force, to be commanded by the Commander-in-chief in person, and to be

joined by a party of irregular horse, to be furnished by our native allies. The Governor-General suggested that the operations of this army should be directed immediately against the army under the personal command of Holkar, and should pursue Jeswunt Rao Holkar to the last extremity, if it should not be possible to compel him to risk an action; a necessity which it might be expected that he would endeavour by every means in his power to avoid.

It appeared to the Governor-General to be proper that a detachment should be stationed in the neighbourhood of the passes into the British territories in Hindostan, at some position between Agra and Delhi, for the purposes of defending those passes; and that the detachment should be of sufficient strength, both to preserve tranquillity in those territories, and to defeat any part of Holkar's force which might pass in the rear of the Commander-in-chief. The Governor-General observed, that a detachment thus formed and posted, might act as a body of reserve to the army of the Commander-in-chief, and might be strengthened from the garrisons of Agra, Delhi, Muttra, and other places.

The defence of Delhi against an attack from the enemy was stated to the Commander-in-chief to be an object of the greatest importance.

The position of an efficient detachment in Bundelcund was considered and stated by the Governor-General to form an important branch of the general plan of operations.

The Governor-General observed, that the situation of affairs in Malwa and Guzerat appeared to render it desirable that the corps under the command of Colonel Murray should retire from Ougein towards the frontier of Guzerat, where it might occupy a position for the protection of that province, and co-operate with the main army acting against Holkar, if his march should be directed to that quarter, provided a force could be furnished to supply the place of Colonel Murray's detachment at Ougein.

For this purpose, it appeared to be desirable that the subsidiary force for Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be prepared in Hindostan, and should form a part of the army of the Commander-in-chief; and on his Excellency's advance into Malwa, should march to Ougein to remain in that position prepared to act as the events of the campaign might render advisable.

According to this plan, Holkar would have been placed between five separate British armies.

1st. The army under the personal command of the Commander-in-chief.

2d. The detachment to be posted between Delhi and Agra, near the passes.

3d. The detachment in Bundelcund.

4th. The subsidiary force to be stationed at Ougein.

5th. The corps under the command of Colonel Murray to be posted on the frontier of Guzerat.

It appeared to be highly improbable that Holkar should be able to evade the attack of all these detachments; and it was the Governor-General's decided opinion, that the proposed plan of operations was preferable to any system merely defensive.

The speedy conclusion of the war appeared to be of the highest importance in every view of the question, and a vigorous and early attack on the enemy's main force offered the fairest prospect of such a result.

The Governor-General also communicated to the Commander-in-chief some suggestions respecting the mode of supplying his army, under the eventual necessity of pursuing Holkar into Malwa, and of drawing the British army to a distance from the countries from whence it was to derive its supplies.

A copy of these instructions which, with a view to despatch, were prepared in the form of notes, is annexed for your honourable Committee's information.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of the proceedings of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, which has been interrupted for the purpose of stating in the regular order of transactions, the substance of the instructions issued by the Governor-General to the Commander-in-chief, under the information possessed by the Governor-General at the date of those instructions with regard to the situation of affairs in Hindostan.

On his arrival at Rampoorah, Lieut.-Colonel Monson was joined by two battalions of sepoys, with four 6-pounders, and two howitzers, and a body of Hindoostanee cavalry, under the command of Major Frith, together with a supply of grain, which had been despatched from Agra by the orders of the

Commander-in-chief, after his Excellency received the intelligence of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's situation at the Mokundra Pass.

Every practicable exertion was, at the same time, employed by Lieut.-Colonel Monson to obtain additional supplies, but the state of the country, and the vicinity of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force, precluded all hope of collecting supplies to the extent necessary to enable the detachment to continue at Rampoorah. Lieut.-Colonel Monson therefore determined to prosecute his retreat to Khooshaul Ghur, where he expected to be joined by six battalions and twenty-one guns, under the command of a native commander, named Suddasheo Bhow Bukshee, in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and where he also hoped to obtain a sufficient supply of provisions, to enable him to keep the field against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Before his departure from Rampoorah, Lieut.-Colonel Monson made the necessary arrangements for its security. A garrison was left in the fort of Rampoorah, under the command of Captain Hutchinson, of the Bengal artillery, consisting of the 2d battalion 8th regiment, and four companies of the 21st regiment, with four 6-pounders, and a considerable stock of provisions.

On the 22d of August, the remainder of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, consisting of five battalions and six companies of sepoys, with two howitzers, marched from Rampoorah, and on the morning of the 23d August 1804, reached the Bannas river. That river had risen in consequence of a heavy fall of rain, and was so deep as to be scarcely fordable for the largest elephants.

Three boats were found at the Bannas river, and Lieut.-Colonel Monson perceiving that the river did not fall so rapidly as might be expected, ordered Captain Nicholls, with the six companies of the 2d battalion 21st regiment to cross the river, and to proceed to Khooshaul Ghur, in charge of the treasure of the detachment.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar's cavalry appeared in large bodies in front of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment on the morning of the 23d of August 1804, and encamped at the distance of about four miles from the British detachment.

On the morning of the 24th of August, the river having been found fordable, Lieut.-Colonel Monson began to cross

the baggage, and one of the battalions. At the same time the enemy took possession of a large village on the right of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's position; but Lieut.-Colonel Monson attacked this post, and carried it with the loss of a few men. The river having become fordable in many places, the enemy's cavalry began to cross in great numbers, at different places to the right and left of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's position. The greater part of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's baggage had crossed, and Lieut.-Colonel Monson despatched three more battalions and one howitzer for its protection, intending to follow with the remainder of the detachment, when the whole of the baggage and camp followers should have crossed the river.

At four P. M. however, the enemy's infantry and guns arrived, and opened a heavy cannonade on the 2d battalion 2d regiment, and the picquets posted on the south side of the Bannas river. Lieut.-Colonel Monson immediately charged the enemy with this small body of men, and succeeded in carrying some guns. The troops of the enemy, however, encouraged by their superiority of numbers, rallied; and advancing with great celerity in different directions, the picquets and the 2d battalion 2d regiment were overpowered, and compelled to retire, and to abandon the remaining howitzer. Our troops suffered severely in this operation, and with difficulty effected a retreat under cover of the 1st battalion 14th regiment, which advanced to the bank of the river for their support.

The enemy prosecuted the advantage which he had obtained, and Lieut.-Colonel Monson was compelled to abandon his baggage, and to continue his retreat to Khooshaul Ghur, which he reached on the night of the 25th of August.

During the march to Khooshaul Ghur, the enemy's cavalry, supported by guns, made several attacks on Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, but without success; Captain Nicholl, with the treasure placed under his charge, had arrived at that place on the preceding day.

It has been already stated that on his arrival at Khooshaul Ghur, Lieut.-Colonel Monson expected to be joined by a considerable force under the command of Suddasheo Bhow Bukshee, in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Immediately after the arrival of Captain Nicholl however at

Khooshaul Ghur, Suddasheo Bhow Bukshee, with the force under his command, attacked Captain Nicholl's detachment, but was repulsed with considerable loss.

On the morning of the 26th of August, the whole of the enemy's cavalry encamped in separate bodies, surrounding Lieut.-General Monson's detachment. A correspondence was at this period detected between some of the native officers of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's corps and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the object of which was to encourage among our troops a spirit of desertion. The most vigorous measures were immediately adopted to render these attempts abortive, but notwithstanding every effort on the part of Lieut.-Colonel Monson, and of his officers, nearly two companies from the 1st battalion 14th regiment, and a large proportion of the Hindoostanee cavalry deserted to the enemy.

Disappointed in his expectation of receiving support from the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of obtaining supplies at Khooshaul Ghur, and destitute of every species of equipment necessary to enable the detachment to continue at Khooshaul Ghur; Lieut.-Colonel Monson was compelled to prosecute his retreat, and accordingly, on the 26th of August, at seven p. m. Lieut.-Colonel Monson moved from the Fort of Khooshaul Ghur, and formed his detachment into an oblong square, having previously spiked the remaining howitzer.

During the night of the 26th of August, and the greater part of the 27th, the enemy's cavalry, supported as before by guns, attempted several times to penetrate the detachment, but could not make the least impression on this compact body of men. On the night of the 27th of August, Lieut.-Colonel Monson took possession of the ruined fort of Hindown, and at one A. M. on the 28th continued his retreat towards Agra. As soon as the detachment had cleared the ravines near Hindown, the enemy's cavalry charged the detachment with extreme violence in three separate bodies, but was received by the sepoy with determined coolness and bravery. The sepoy reserved their fire until the enemy's cavalry had come almost within reach of the bayonet, and then gave their fire with such signal effect, as to compel the enemy to retire in every direction.

Lieut.-Colonel Monson reached the Biana Pass about sunset on the 28th August. The troops were almost exhausted

with fatigue and hunger, and Lieut.-Colonel Monson halted, with an intention to remain during the night at the entrance of the Pass. The enemy however succeeded in bringing up some guns and opened a heavy fire, which compelled Lieut.-Colonel Monson to continue his retreat towards Agra. The detachment reached the town of Biana at nine P. M. on the 28th of August. The night was dark, and the camp followers, with such baggage as remained with the detachment having mixed with the line, the troops were thrown into confusion. It was impossible to restore order, and the different corps retreated in great disorder to Agra, which they all reached by the 31st August. The enemy followed as far as Futtypoor, in straggling parties for the purpose of plundering, but made no united attack after the 28th. During the whole of this unfortunate retreat the officers and troops of the detachment displayed the greatest perseverance, fortitude and gallantry; and in the different engagements with the enemy they manifested a degree of courage and determined resolution which, under less adverse circumstances, would have ensured the most distinguished success.

To the retreat of the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Monson, under circumstances of extreme difficulty and distress, occasioned partly by the state of the country and the unusual inclemency of the season, and partly by the failure of supplies, must be attributed both the necessity of suspending the establishment of the subsidiary forces prescribed by the Governor-General's notes of the 25th of May,* and the means which Jeswunt Rao Holkar acquired of maintaining a contest with the British power.

Your honourable Committee will observe from the tenor of those notes, that the security of the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Monson was a peculiar object of the Governor-General's solicitude; the Governor-General having suggested the necessity either of withdrawing that detachment; or of adding to its strength by a corps of Europeans and a proportion of cavalry. The Governor-General at the same time stated his opinion in favour of the former measure, because no hope could reasonably be entertained of employing that detachment in active operations against the

* See p. 69.

force of Jeswunt Rao Holkar until the close of the rainy season.

The Governor-General in Council is not yet enabled to state the precise causes which precluded the adoption of one or other of those measures. It is the intention however of the Commander-in-Chief to furnish the Governor-General with detailed information upon this point at the earliest practicable period of time. The Governor-General in Council is also unable at this time distinctly to explain the causes of the retreat of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment under circumstances of difficulty and distress. Those causes must be sought in the conduct and operations of the several detachments actively employed against the forces of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which the Governor-General in Council is not yet enabled to state with accuracy and precision; the distance of the scene of action, and the necessity of accelerating the operations of the main body of the army, having precluded the possibility of completing any satisfactory investigation of the movements of those detachments. Every effort, however, will be employed to submit to your honourable Committee with the least practicable delay, all the details connected with such transactions as may now appear to be imperfectly related.

If circumstances had admitted the reinforcement of the detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Monson, or its immediate recal in the manner suggested by the Governor-General on the 25th of May, either the return of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force to the north of Hindostan would have been prevented, or his force would have returned under circumstances which would have facilitated the early reduction of his power. But the retreat of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, and the disasters which attended it, enabled Jeswunt Rao Holkar to return with the whole body of his forces to Hindostan under circumstances of advantage.

Although no apprehension could reasonably be entertained of any incursion into the provinces of Benares, Behar, Bengal, or Cuttack, the retreat of Colonel Monson's detachment under such disastrous circumstances, and the approach of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's army to the Jumna, rendered it expedient in the Governor-General's judgment upon general principles of prudence, to provide by every practicable

arrangement for the protection of the western frontier of those provinces.

With this view, instructions were issued on the 12th of September 1804, to the magistrates of the several districts, extending from Midnapore to Mirzapore, and to the officers commanding at Midnapore, in Ramgurh, and at Benares, renewing the measures of precaution which were adopted during the late war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of preventing the irruption of marauders into the Company's possessions, as described in the 618th and following paragraphs of our despatch of the 12th of April 1804. The defence of the province of Cuttack was entrusted to Colonel Harcourt, the officer commanding the forces in that province, and instructions were issued to Colonel Harcourt, under date the 19th of September 1804, directing him to regulate his conduct by the principles stated in the orders which were issued to the officers entrusted with the defence of the frontier during the late war, as far as those principles were applicable to the protection of the province of Cuttack.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar continued to advance with the whole of his cavalry, and having halted some days at Biana, prosecuted his march toward the Jumna, and encamped with the whole of his force at a short distance from Muttra. His cavalry being posted in numerous divisions over the whole of the adjacent territory.

The continued retreat of Colonel Monson's detachment, and the advance of the main body of Holkar's army towards the banks of the Jumna, necessarily occasioned a deviation from the plan of operations prescribed in the Governor-General's notes.

Under the Governor-General's instructions, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief issued orders for assembling near Agra a large force of native infantry and cavalry, and for placing that force in a state of equipment to take the field. His Excellency also made preparations at Cawnpore for enabling the European cavalry and infantry to move at the earliest practicable period of time.

The march of these corps, however, was unavoidably retarded by the inclemency of the season, but no inconvenience was occasioned by this delay; the state of the Jumna pre-

cluding any attempt on the part of the enemy to molest our possessions in the Doab. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief commenced his march from Cawnpore, with the whole of the European cavalry and infantry on the 3d of September, and on the 22d of that month arrived at Agra. His Excellency immediately proceeded to Secundra, about six miles from Agra, where the troops which had been assembled at the latter place were encamped. The force assembled at Secundra consisted of three regiments of European light dragoons, five regiments of native cavalry, and the horse artillery, his Majesty's 76th regiment of foot, the flank companies of his Majesty's 22d regiment of foot, and ten battalions of native infantry, and the usual proportion of artillery, &c.

The necessity of waiting for supplies prevented the Commander-in-Chief from marching from Secundra until the 1st of October, on which day the army advanced towards the enemy who had remained in the vicinity of Muttra, and had at different periods appeared to entertain the opposite designs of hazarding an engagement in the field, and of retiring from the banks of the Jumna.

On the approach of the British army, the enemy drew off to the north-west along the bank of the Jumna. His infantry and guns appeared to take the direction of Delhi, and his cavalry which remained in the rear, attempted to obstruct the march of the British troops and to cut off the baggage. They did not, however, succeed in effecting any object of importance. The Commander-in-Chief made three different attempts to engage the cavalry of the enemy, commanded by Holkar in person, on the 2d, 7th, and 10th of October, but the dispersed position of the enemy's cavalry, and the celerity of the enemy's retreat on the approach of the British troops, rendered ineffectual his Excellency's utmost endeavours to compel the enemy to maintain an action.

The manifest determination of the enemy's Cavalry to avoid an action with the British troops, induced the Commander-in-Chief to suspend his operations against the enemy's cavalry, until by the defeat of the infantry and guns, the cavalry should become the only object of pursuit.

Previously to his march from Secundra, the Commander-in-Chief had detached a force under the command of Captain

Worsley into the Doab, for the purpose of preserving tranquillity and of expelling a party of predatory horse which had crossed the Jumna at Muttra and plundered the neighbouring country. On the approach of our troops, the enemy re-crossed the river. Captain Worsley's corps was afterwards stationed at Muttra, where that officer was employed in collecting and forwarding supplies, in maintaining the tranquillity of the neighbouring country, and in protecting the important post of Muttra and the passage of the Jumna against any attempt of the enemy.

In the mean while the infantry and artillery of Holkar continued to advance to Delhi, before which city they arrived on the morning of the 8th of October.

The city of Delhi is of great extent, and its defences consist merely of a high wall, in many places in a ruinous condition. The garrison consisted of only one battalion and four companies of regular sepoy, a battalion of irregulars, and a corps of matchlockmen.

On the day of the enemy's arrival at the city of Delhi, a heavy cannonade was opened upon the walls, but the distance of the batteries rendered it of no effect. On the 9th, the enemy having approached nearer to the walls, opened a battery with considerable effect. Lieut.-Colonel Burn, the officer commanding the garrison, finding that the enemy's fire would soon effect a practicable breach in the walls, resolved to interrupt the operations of the besiegers by a sally from the garrison. Colonel Burn accordingly prepared a party, consisting of 200 men of the battalion under his command, and 150 men of the irregular troops, and placed the whole under the command of Lieutenant Rose.

This party proceeded on the evening of the 10th to storm the enemy's battery, and completely succeeded in obtaining possession of it, and having spiked the guns, returned with little loss; the loss of the enemy is supposed to have been considerable. The enemy's fire was renewed the next morning, but without much effect, being soon silenced by the fire from a battery which had been erected on one of the bastions of the city. The enemy subsequently changed the point of attack, and opened batteries on another part of the wall, in which they speedily effected a breach. By the exer-

tions of the garrison, however, the enemy was prevented from taking advantage of the breach. On the 14th, in the morning, a general assault was made by the whole force of the enemy, but without success, the enemy being repulsed with heavy loss.

On the following day, the enemy despairing of success in his attempts to carry the place, and intimidated by the approach of the Commander-in-Chief, who, on receiving intelligence of the design of the enemy to attack the city of Delhi, advanced with the utmost rapidity to the relief of the garrison, drew off the whole of his infantry and guns, and retired from the vicinity of Delhi.

The Governor-General in Council reflects with sentiments of the highest admiration and applause, on the skill, activity, judgment, and gallantry, which distinguished the conduct of the officers and men of the garrison of Delhi in defending that city under circumstances of such extreme disadvantage, difficulty, and danger, against the efforts of the enemy's whole force of infantry and guns, continued with unremitted exertion during a period of seven days.

On the 18th of October, the Commander-in-Chief, with the army under his personal command, arrived at Delhi. His Excellency entertained a confident expectation of being enabled to pursue the enemy without delay. An unexpected delay in the arrival of supplies, however, compelled the Commander-in-Chief to halt at Delhi for a few days; during this period, the infantry and artillery of Holkar continued their retreat from Delhi, and proceeded by a circuitous route through the hills towards Deig, a strong fort belonging to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and situated about twenty-five miles in a westerly direction from Muttra.

On the 31st of October, the Commander-in-Chief having received information that Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with the whole body of his cavalry had crossed the Jumna at a ford a short distance above Delhi, determined to divide his force, to detach the infantry and artillery of the army, with two regiments of native cavalry, under the command of Major-General Frazer, the second in command, in the direction of the enemy's infantry and guns, and to proceed in person with the whole of the European dragoons, and three regiments of native cavalry, the horse and artillery and the reserve of the

army, consisting of two companies of European and three battalions of native infantry in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry which had entered the Doab.

The object of the Commander-in-Chief by this combined and judicious movement, was, to compel both Holkar's infantry and cavalry to risk an action with the British troops, or to fly from Hindostan, under such circumstances of ignominy and distress as must be attended with the most fatal consequences to the cause of the enemy.

In pursuance of this plan, his Excellency crossed the Jumna on the 1st of November, with the force above described, and followed the direction of the enemy's cavalry. Holkar's first object appeared to be, to cut off a battalion of native infantry, commanded by Colonel Burn, which had been detached into Sehaurunpore after the retreat of the enemy from Delhi, for the purpose of suppressing the disturbances which had been occasioned in that quarter of the Doab, partly by the insurrection of refractory Zemindars, and partly by the incursions of several petty chieftains of the tribe of Seiks, instigated by the intrigues of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and allured by the hopes of plunder. Holkar attacked the battalion, but was unable to make any impression on it, and was obliged to desist after having sustained considerable loss.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar proceeded for a few days in a northerly direction, with the supposed intention of crossing the Ganges into Rohilcund, at a ford on that river not far distant from Hurdwar. But being closely pressed by the Commander-in-Chief, he suddenly changed his route and proceeded by rapid marches down the Doab. The Commander-in-Chief continued to pursue the enemy with a degree of unexampled rapidity and vigour which prevented the enemy from extending his ravages beyond the narrow limits of his immediate track.

Holkar continued to fly down the Doab by rapid marches, until his arrival at Furruckabad on the 16th of November. On the same day, the Commander-in-Chief who had followed Holkar daily at the distance of one march, in his rear, arrived at Alligunge, distant from Futtyghur thirty-four miles, after a march of more than twenty miles.

The Commander-in-Chief being apprized of Holkar's march in the direction of Furruckabad, resolved to pursue him

without delay in the hope of preventing the plunder of that city, and of the cantonments of Futtehghurh, and of compelling the enemy to risk an engagement. His Excellency therefore, after halting at Alligunge only a few hours to refresh his men and horses, resumed his march at nine o'clock in the evening of the same day. The success of this most active, able, and enterprizing operation was complete and decisive. The British cavalry arrived in the vicinity of Holkar's camp at day-break on the 17th of November, after a march of fifty-eight miles performed within twenty-four hours, and completely surprized the enemy. After the discharge of a few rounds of grape from the horse artillery, the British cavalry charged the enemy's troops in every direction, and routed them with great slaughter. The British cavalry pursued the enemy for many miles, destroying great numbers, and compelling the survivors to disperse in all directions. The whole of the enemy's cattle and supplies were captured by the British troops. Holkar himself narrowly escaped by an early flight at the first approach of the British troops. Our loss was very small, and no officer was either killed or wounded. Holkar with the remains of his cavalry fled with the utmost precipitation and apparent consternation towards the Jumna, which he forded at Mahoba and proceeded towards Dieg.

Including the pursuit of the enemy on the 17th of November, the British troops marched a distance of seventy miles from their movement on the morning of the 16th, until they took up their ground on the 17th, and had it not been for the accidental explosion of a tumbril, belonging to the British troops, within a few moments before the approach of the Commander-in-Chief to Holkar's position, no doubt can be entertained that Holkar himself would either have been killed, or taken prisoner.

The Commander-in-Chief having halted two days to refresh his men and horses, resumed his march in pursuit of the enemy on the 20th of November. Holkar, however enabled, escaped across the Jumna.

The Governor-General in Council is convinced, that your honourable Committee will contemplate with satisfaction, this decisive proof of the progressive improvement of our cavalry, and of its great superiority to that of the enemy. The result of this extraordinary and successful pursuit has proved, that

the most rapid movements, even of the Mahratta horse, cannot avail against the celerity and discipline of our cavalry under its present improved construction. The utmost degree of credit is due to the Commander-in-Chief for his unremitting attention to the improvement of the cavalry of Bengal, and his Excellency's complete success in attaining this important object, has been distinguished with splendour and honour on every occasion under his personal command, during the late operations against the Mahratta horse.

While these events were passing in the Doab, Major-General Frazer having been joined at Delhi by the expected convoys of supplies, commenced his march from that city towards the main body of the enemy. On the 11th of November, he arrived at Goberdun, about fourteen miles from Deig, under the walls of which fort, the whole of the enemy's infantry and artillery, were strongly posted. On the following day, Major-General Frazer marched to within six miles of Deig. Having ascertained exactly in the course of the night, the nature of the enemy's position, Major-General Frazer with the greatest judgment and spirit, determined to attack the enemy's force on the following day.

On the 13th in the morning, the British army advanced to the enemy's position, which was of uncommon strength and defended by numerous batteries of guns, which extended over a space of nearly two miles almost to the walls of the fort.

Led by Major-General Frazer, the British troops attacked the enemy's forces with the utmost gallantry, and after a most severe and arduous contest, completely defeated them, and drove them from their guns into the town of Deig with heavy loss; eighty-seven pieces of cannon, and almost the whole of the ammunition belonging to the enemy, were taken or destroyed on the field of battle on this memorable day. This brilliant, glorious and important victory was not obtained without considerable loss both in officers and men on our part.

The Governor-General in Council laments with the deepest concern the irreparable loss of that gallant and distinguished officer Major-General Frazer, to whose eminent judgment and military skill, and exemplary valour, is principally to be ascribed the signal success of the British arms on this memorable occasion. Major-General Frazer received a severe wound

in the leg while in the act of leading his troops to the attack of the enemy's batteries. Even after he had received the wound, Major-General Frazer continued by his voice and action to animate and encourage the exertions of the troops. Having suffered amputation, Major-General Frazer after languishing some days, expired at Muttra, on the 24th of November.

The applause and gratitude of the British Government in India, and of the nation, must ever be connected with sentiments of the deepest regret for the loss of that heroic officer. The established reputation of Major-General Frazer for professional knowledge, gallantry, activity and public zeal, justified the expectation which the Governor-General in Council confidently entertained of deriving from the talents and exertions of Major-General Frazer, the most essential advantages in the prosecution of the war, and the Governor-General in Council deems it a subject of public sorrow, that the British Government in India should have been deprived of the services of that valuable officer at the commencement of his career of glory in Asia, and in the moment of victory.

After Major-General Frazer had been wounded, the command of the army devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Monson, who displayed the utmost activity and courage during the whole of the engagement.

The force of the enemy in this action is stated to have been twenty-four battalions of infantry, with 160 pieces of cannon, and a large body of horse; and a party of the Rajah of Bhurtpore's horse, and three battalions of his infantry were engaged on the side of the enemy, and the British troops suffered greatly by the fire of the guns from the fort of Deig which opened on their approach. After the action, the British army encamped near the field of battle.

It is remarkable that in this glorious action most of the artillery lost by Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, were retaken at the point of the bayonet by the troops, of whom the command had devolved to Lieut.-Colonel Monson.

The Commander-in-Chief having re-crossed the Jumna at Muttra, on the 28th of November, joined the British infantry which had retired to that place from Deig, a few days after the battle. The reasons assigned by Lieut.-Colonel Monson for this movement, are stated in the annexed despatch from

his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to which the Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee.

On the 4th of December, the Commander-in-Chief arrived at Keerasamy, about four miles from Deig, and remained at this position until he was joined by the battering train which his Excellency had ordered from Agra for the purpose of commencing the siege of Deig, at which fortress the remains of Holkar's force continued to encamp. This fortress belongs to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, with whom a treaty of alliance had been concluded by the Commander-in-Chief, under the authority of the Governor-General, as is stated in our despatch to your honourable Committee, under date the 31st of October 1803.

The Governor-General deems it proper in this place to state to your honourable Committee, the conduct and proceedings of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, who, with an unparalleled degree of treachery and ingratitude, has employed the utmost exertion of his power and resources for the support of the enemy's cause, not only without any actual or alleged provocation, on the part of the British Government, but with a declared sense of obligation to the British power, for an important accession of territory granted to him by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, under the authority of the Governor-General, as a testimony of our confidence in the sincerity of his professed attachment, and as an inducement to that chieftain to adhere to the faith of the engagements which he had contracted with the British power.

Your honourable Committee has been apprized by our despatch of the 12th of April 1804, that soon after the conclusion of the treaty with the Rajah of Bhurtpore, the army of the Commander-in-Chief was joined by a party of horse belonging to that chieftain. This auxiliary corps continued to serve with the British army until the close of the campaign. After the conclusion of peace with the confederated chieftains, the flight of Holkar, and the return of the British army within our provinces, the Rajah continued to profess the sincerest disposition to maintain the amicable relation which had been established between him and the Company, and manifested every degree of confidence in the justice and favour of the British Government.

The conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpore at that time was such as to justify a confidence in the sincerity of his professions, and with a view to confirm this disposition, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief under the Governor-General's authority, actually conferred on the Rajah a voluntary grant of lands, yielding an annual revenue of four lacs of rupees contiguous to the Rajah of Bhurtpore's former possessions.

About the period of the unfortunate retreat of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, some circumstances in the Rajah of Bhurtpore's conduct excited suspicions of his fidelity in the mind of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

In conformity to instructions from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, issued under the suspicion of a correspondence between the Rajah of Bhurtpore and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Nerunjun Lall, an agent despatched by Holkar to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, was apprehended in the town of Muttra, where he was discovered to reside, by persons employed for the purpose of tracing the channel of the suspected correspondence. From the examination of this person, it appeared that he had been employed during a considerable period of time, as the channel of communication between Jeswunt Rao Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and several Zemindars in the Doab, and that the object of this communication was of a nature hostile to the British power.

About the period of the apprehension of Nerunjun Lall, the Commander-in-Chief received from Colonel Monson, then at Rampoorah several intercepted letters from the Rajah of Bhurtpore, from his eldest son Koower Rundhere Sing, and their confidential servants, and from Nerunjun Lall to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to persons in the confidence of that chieftain.

The contents of these letters fully confirmed the deposition of Nerunjun Lall with respect to the existence of the correspondence, to the objects to which it was directed, and to the channels through which it was conducted. Although the evidence of these papers satisfied the mind of the Commander-in-Chief of the guilt of the Rajah of Bhurtpore and of his son, yet the character of those two persons who were represented to be indolent and devoid of talent, induced his

Excellency to believe that these treacherous designs originated in the councils of their profligate adherents.

From the dates of the intercepted letters it appears, that this treacherous correspondence commenced within a short period of time after the conclusion of the treaty of alliance between the British Government and the Rajah of Bhurtpore, by which he was entirely relieved from his dependence on Scindiah and M. Perron, and secured in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges of an independent prince; and at the moment when he was actually receiving at the hands of the Commander-in-Chief the most substantial proofs of the disinterested friendship of the British Government.

The information communicated by the Commander-in-Chief appeared to the Governor-General to require the early notification of his Excellency's sentiments, and instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, respecting the conduct and designs of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and the mode of proceeding to be adopted towards that chieftain under the actual situation of affairs.

The Governor-General accordingly addressed instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, under date the 22d of August 1804. On that occasion the Governor-General expressed his approbation of the Commander-in-Chief's proceedings with respect to the intercepted letters, and to the apprehension and examination of Nerunjun Lall, and his conviction of the existence of a conspiracy for the objects described in those documents.

The Governor-General however stated, that in his judgment Runjeet Sing and his son were only instruments in the hands of others, and that the Commander-in-Chief had justly ascribed the guilt of the conspiracy to their counsellors and servants.

The Governor-General therefore expressed his opinion, that the just principles of policy as well as the characteristic lenity and mercy of the British Government required that some indulgence should be shown to the weakness and incapacity of the two chieftains; while justice and policy equally required that a severe example should be made of the actual authors of the conspiracy.

The Governor-General accordingly directed the Comman-

der-in-Chief immediately to assure the Rajah of Bhurtpore in the most distinct terms of the determination of the British Government to adhere with undeviating faith to the existing treaty, and to declare to him the injustice of the imputations which, as appeared from the intercepted correspondence had been alleged against the British Government of a design to interfere in the Rajah's internal government, or to introduce into his territories the laws and regulations of the British courts of justice, or in any manner to interpose the authority of the Company in his civil or military government. The Commander-in-Chief was desired at the same time to communicate to Rajah Runjeet Sing, copies of all the intercepted letters addressed to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, under the seals of the Rajah and his son; to warn the Rajah of the ruin in which he and his family would inevitably be involved by the continuance of the detected intercourse between the state of Bhurtpore and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to require the Rajah and his family to relinquish all communication with Holkar, and every other enemy of the British Government under pain of being considered and treated as a public enemy.

The Commander-in-Chief was also directed to apprise the Rajah of his determination to seize and bring to justice all the agents concerned in this traitorous correspondence wherever they might be found, and to inform him that the indulgence and consideration which had been manifested towards him and his son, would not be extended to the inferior agents of the conspiracy; and the Commander-in-Chief was accordingly directed to proceed without delay, to seize all the agents and instruments of this conspiracy, although they should take refuge within the territories of our allies and dependents, and particularly to seize all those who might remain within the territory of Bhurtpore; informing the Rajah that the British Government was resolved not to admit of any asylum for criminals of this description.

In conformity to the spirit of this communication, the Commander-in-Chief was authorized and directed to bring to trial before a court martial, all persons concerned in the conspiracy who might be arrested within the territories of our allies, or dependents, and in such parts of our possessions as might not have been rendered subject to the laws and

regulations of the British Government, and to inflict such punishment as might be awarded by the court martial. His Excellency was directed to proceed according to the regulations of government against such of the conspirators as might be apprehended within the jurisdiction of the Company's Criminal Courts.

In those instructions the Governor-General stated to the Commander-in-Chief, the great importance of employing every exertion for the speedy destruction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power, and his Excellency expressed his hope, that the formation of a detachment between Delhi and Agra in the manner suggested in the notes of the 17th of August, of which the substance is stated in the preceding paragraphs of this despatch, would provide a sufficient restraint upon the turbulent and disaffected within the limits of our own possessions, as well as upon the conduct of the Rajah of Bhurt-pore, while the main army should act without interruption against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The Governor-General stated his opinion that an early pressure upon Jeswunt Rao Holkar's force, would have the effect of securing the tranquillity of our possessions and the peace of Hindostan, whilst any delay in the movement of the force destined to act against Holkar, would tend to encourage that freebooter, and to raise the hopes of the disaffected within our own dominions.

On the 21st of October the Commander-in-Chief transmitted to the Governor-General further information with respect to the conduct of the Rajah of Bhurt-pore, and copies of all the correspondence which had passed between his Excellency and the Rajah since the period of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's arrival in Hindostan. It appears from the Commander-in-Chief's information, that the Rajah of Bhurt-pore had constantly supplied the army of Jeswunt Rao Holkar with provisions, and (it is was supposed) with money, since the arrival of that force within his territory; that he had afforded protection to the baggage and bazaars attached to the enemy's force, and that he had endeavoured through the means of an agent, who had been despatched to the British camp for the ostensible purpose of conferring with the Commander-in-Chief respecting the junction of the Bhurt-pore troops, and other subjects on which the Rajah had expressed his desire to communicate, to excite disturb-

ance among our subjects in the Doab, and to prevail on certain of our Zemindars in that country to exert themselves in intercepting the supplies proceeding to the British army.

It was the general opinion, which the subsequent conduct of the Rajah has confirmed, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar was encouraged to advance to the Jumna, principally by the promises of support which he received from the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and that the supplies provided by the Rajah had alone enabled him to maintain his position in that country, until the arrival of the British army. The disturbances in the Doab, were also justly ascribed in a considerable degree to the countenance and support afforded to Holkar by the Rajah of Bhurtpore, whose hereditary reputation, supposed wealth, and extensive resources rendered his alliance in the general estimation a great accession of strength to Holkar; whilst the falsehoods industriously propagated throughout India by the agents of that chieftain, with respect to his successes against the British arms, encouraged the turbulent and disaffected within our provinces to rebel.

The letters of Rajah Runjeet Sing to the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of his Excellency's demand for the junction of the troops, which the Rajah was bound by treaty to furnish, afforded evident indications of a spirit of duplicity and evasion, and of a resolution to avoid a compliance with that demand. The troops which the Rajah declared to be assembled for the purpose of co-operating with the British army against the enemy, were actually engaged on the side of the enemy at the battle of Deig on the 13th of November.

Under these circumstances the Governor-General deemed it necessary to issue further instructions to the Commander-in-Chief with regard to the conduct to be pursued for the purpose of securing the public interests from the inconvenience and hazard to which they might be exposed by the defection of the Rajah of Bhurtpore.

The information which the Governor-General possessed with respect to the conduct and proceedings of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, afforded sufficient evidence of his hostility against the British Government, and was consequently of a nature to absolve us from the obligations of the alliance. It was clear, that whether those acts of hostility were committed by the Rajah himself, or by his advisers, they must be considered as

the acts of his government, and that we should be justified in adopting such a system of conduct towards the state of Bhurtpore, as we might consider to be most conducive to the interests and security of the British Government.

The Governor-General was of opinion, that if considerations of security should not require the punishment of the Rajah's treachery, considerations of policy suggested the expediency of forbearance, notwithstanding the provocation which we had received.

The expediency of attacking the Rajah of Bhurtpore, or of overlooking his conduct, appeared to depend in a material degree upon the operations which it might become necessary to adopt against Holkar. If it should become necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to pursue Holkar in such a direction, and to such a distance as would place Bhurtpore between his army and the British possessions, it would be necessary to decide—

First. Whether it would be prudent to leave the state of Bhurtpore in full possession of its power and resources in the rear of our army.

Secondly. Whether in the event of the above question being decided in the negative, it might not be practicable to leave a force adequate to the reduction of the Rajah's territories, or at least of sufficient strength to impose a restraint upon the forces of the Rajah, although unequal to the operation above described while the main army should act against Holkar.

Thirdly. Whether in the event of neither of these two modes being practicable, it would be more hazardous to suspend the pursuit of Holkar until the Rajah of Bhurtpore's power should be reduced, or to leave that state in possession of its power and resources in the rear of our army.

The Governor-General was of opinion that these questions should be decided by the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief, and accordingly desired that his Excellency would exercise his discretion with respect to the adoption of one or other of these plans.

The expediency of resuming the lands granted to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, was considered by the Governor-General to depend on the decision of the general question

respecting the conduct to be pursued towards the state of Bhurtpore, and on the means of offence against the British Government, which the Rajah might derive from the possession of them.

The Governor-General desired that these questions also might be decided by the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief, whose local situation would enable him to form the most just opinion on the subject; and in whose judgment, ability and military skill, the Governor-General reposed the utmost confidence.

Instructions founded on the preceding observations were accordingly transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief in the form of notes, under date 13th November.

Your honourable Committee will observe from the date of these notes, that previously to their receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, the hostile conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpore in the battle of Deig, when his guns opened upon our troops, and his cavalry acted with the enemy, had precluded the practicability of continuing on terms of amity with that chief, and rendered indispensably necessary the vigorous prosecution of measures for the punishment of his gross and flagrant violation of every principle of public faith and honour.

Independently however of these considerations, the change of the condition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar produced by the complete identification of his interests with those of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, rendered the prosecution of hostile operations against the possessions of the Rajah, the most effectual means of extinguishing the remnant of Holkar's military power.

The territorial resources of that chieftain were not at any period of the war applicable to the support of his army, and were at this time completely reduced. Holkar never had ranked among the states of India; he had never risen above the character of an adventurer and freebooter, whose success in some attacks upon detachments of the forces of Scindiah had gained a reputation of military enterprize. Holkar's force was now however greatly reduced by the defeats which his troops had sustained at Furruckabad and Deig. His hopes of support from the native states of India declined with his

declining fortune, and he was compelled to depend exclusively upon the Rajah of Bhurtpore for the supply of every branch of military resource.

Under these circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief resolved on the immediate attack of the forts in the Rajah of Bhurtpore's country, upon which the strength and resources of that chieftain principally depended.

On the 20th of December, the Governor-General having reviewed the whole of the Commander-in-Chief's communications on the subject of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and having taken into consideration the whole tenor of that chieftain's conduct, addressed a despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, approving and confirming his Excellency's proceedings with respect to the Rajah, and containing the expression of the Governor-General's sentiments and instructions on the measures necessary to be pursued against that chieftain, and on other points connected with the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his confederates.

The Commander-in-Chief was authorized and directed by those instructions to proceed immediately to reduce the whole of the territories of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and to annex them to the British dominions.

The Commander-in-Chief was at the same time informed that the Governor-General still considered the destruction of the force attached to the person of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to be the main object of the war, and that the prosecution of operations against the territory of Bhurtpore was to be considered as subordinate to that important object.

The Governor-General also stated his opinion that the subjugation of the territory and power of the Rajah of Bhurtpore was essential to the reduction of Holkar's hostile force, the entire subversion of which the Governor-General considered to be indispensably requisite for the tranquillity of India.

The Commander-in-Chief was further directed to introduce into whatever part of the territory of Bhurtpore which might be conquered, a civil authority for the collection of the revenues, and the administration of civil and criminal justice.

The proceedings to be adopted against the Rajah of

Bhurtpore being calculated to serve as an example to all the other petty chiefs and states in that quarter of India, the Governor-General directed the Commander-in-chief to address letters to all those chiefs, explaining the principles of his conduct towards the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and assuring them of the determination of the British Government to respect the independence of all contiguous states.

The Commander-in-chief was also directed to circulate a declaration, warning all persons of the consequences of assisting the enemies of the British Government.

The Governor-General took this occasion to furnish the Commander-in-chief with instructions for the guidance of his conduct towards Bapoojee Scindiah, who commanded the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Malwa, and on the retreat of Lieut.-Colonel Monson's detachment, deserted with his force to the enemy, as is related in a subsequent paragraph of this despatch. Bapoojee Scindiah being not only an officer of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, sent expressly to co-operate with the Commander-in-chief against Jeswunt Rao Holkar under the stipulations of the defensive alliance, but also included in the list of chieftains entitled to jaggeers or pensions from the British Government under the 7th article of the treaty of peace, could not be considered to possess any claim to the rights of war.

The Governor-General therefore desired the Commander-in-chief to issue a proclamation, ordering Bapoojee Scindiah and his followers to repair to the British camp within a certain time, under the penalty of being considered and treated as rebels and traitors to the cause of the allies, and in the event of their neglecting to appear to bring such of them as might be seized to trial before a court martial, and to carry into effect such punishment as might be awarded by the Court.

A similar course was directed to be pursued towards Sudasheo Bhow and his followers, whose defection is stated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch.

On the 12th of December the Commander-in-chief having been joined by his battering train from Agra, took up the position before Deig, which he intended to occupy during the siege. On the 17th December batteries were opened against a strong out-work, which entirely commanded the

town and the works of the fort, and which was flanked by batteries in which was planted all the artillery of Holkar, that remained in his possession after the battle of the 13th November.

On the 23d of December, a practicable breach having been effected in the wall of the out-work, the Commander-in-chief determined to storm it on that night. This attack was combined with two separate attacks to be made on the enemy's batteries to the right and left of the principal work. The conduct of these combined attacks was committed to Lieut.-Colonel Macrae, of his Majesty's 76th regiment. At the appointed hour, the parties destined to these several attacks advanced, under a heavy fire from the whole of the enemy's batteries, and after a severe and arduous contest, each party completely succeeded in effecting the object of its attack.

Our loss on this occasion was considerable, but not more than the strength of the works to be stormed, and the nature of the attack, rendered probable. The conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Macrae, and of the officers to whose charge the conduct of the attacks on the enemy's batteries were entrusted, and of every officer and soldier engaged in this arduous enterprize, reflects on them the highest honour, and entitles them to the warmest admiration and applause.

In consequence of the success of the attack on the out-works, the garrison abandoned the fort on the night of the 24th, and retired in the direction of Bhurtpore, another strong fortress, situated at the distance of about thirty miles in a southern direction, from Deig.

The number of guns captured from the enemy in the lines before Deig, and in the town and the fort, amounted to one hundred.

The Governor-General in Council suspends the narrative of the proceedings of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of communicating to your honourable Committee the operations against the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which have been conducted on the western side of India.

Your honourable Committee was apprized by the 64th paragraph of our despatch, under date the 15th June, that the desolate and exhausted state of the country to the northward of Poonah, would probably compel the Honourable Major-General Wellesley to suspend active operations against

the possessions occupied by the partizans of Holkar, under that usurper's authority in the Deccan, until the return of the rainy season should afford the means of subsisting an army in that quarter. Major-General Wellesley, however, placed his army in a complete state of equipment, and was prepared to move against Chandore, and the other forts and possessions of Holkar in the Deccan at the earliest opportunity.

About the middle of June, Major-General Wellesley received the notes of the Governor-General, under date the 25th of May, of which a copy was enclosed in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 15th June. Immediately, on the receipt of those instructions, Major-General Wellesley proceeded to establish the subsidiary force at Poonah, and to withdraw within the Company's territories the remaining corps of British troops (with the exception hereafter stated), which had been assembled at that station, and concerted arrangements with the Government of Bombay for immediately commencing the relief of the corps on the establishment of fort St. George, stationed in the Peishwa's territories.

Major-General Wellesley deemed it to be proper to suspend the execution of the Governor-General's orders contained in the notes of the 25th May, for withdrawing the detachment under the command of Colonel Murray from Malwa, into which province Colonel Murray had been directed to conduct his detachment, as is stated in the 67th paragraph of our despatch of the 15th of June.

At the period of General Wellesley's receipt of these orders, he had reason to suppose that Colonel Murray had actually entered that province. Major-General Wellesley was also apprized that the main body of Holkar's force was at an inconsiderable distance from Oojein, and threatened that capital, for the safety of which the greatest anxiety was expressed by Scindiah, who had been led to expect that Colonel Murray would immediately advance for its protection.

The safety of Guzerat against any incursion of the enemy was secured by the presence of a body of reserve, which had been established within that province by Colonel Murray, under the instructions of Major-General Wellesley, dated the 7th of May (of which a copy formed an enclosure in our letter to your honourable Committee of the 15th of June). Under these circumstances, Major-General Wellesley was of

opinion that Colonel Murray's detachment should proceed on the service for which it was originally destined, and he accordingly stated that opinion to the honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay, with a recommendation that the execution of the Governor-General's instructions as far as they related to the detachment under the command of Colonel Murray, might be suspended until the receipt of his Excellency's further orders.

Major-General Wellesley deemed it however to be an object of importance that as great a number of the British troops in the Peishwa's territories should be withdrawn to their usual stations as could be withdrawn, consistently with the exigencies of the public service in that quarter; and Major-General Wellesley accordingly issued orders as above stated for the return to their respective stations of all the British troops, excepting those destined to form the subsidiary force at Poonah, and also his Majesty's 74th regiment, and one regiment of native cavalry, which two corps were directed to remain at Poonah for the purpose of forming a part of the force to be employed against the possessions of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the Deccan.

After having adopted the necessary measures for carrying these arrangements into effect, Major-General Wellesley, who had received orders to proceed to Fort William on the public service, resigned the political control and military command in the Deccan, with which he had been vested under the orders of the Governor-General of the 26th of June, 1803, and on the 25th June, 1804, departed from Poonah on his way to this Presidency. Previously however to the resignation of his authority in the Deccan, Major-General Wellesley deemed it to be proper to communicate to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, a plan of operations to be conducted against Chandore and the other possessions of Holkar and his partizans in the Deccan, when the season for military operations should return.

The troops destined for this service were to consist of detachments from the subsidiary forces serving respectively with the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, including the two corps supernumerary to the subsidiary force at Poonah, amounting together to four regiments of native cavalry, and six battalions of native infantry, with a large proportion of artillery, to be joined by the contingent of troops to be fur-

nished by those two powers respectively, according to the stipulations of treaty. Major-General Wellesley had prepared a battering train at Poonah for the service of this force. The portion of the subsidiary force of Hyderabad destined for this service was posted on the banks of the Godavery, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton.

Major-General Wellesley proposed that the battering train should be sent in advance to Aurungabad as soon as the weather should permit, and that Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton should advance from his position on the Godavery, and proceed towards Aurungabad as soon after his receipt of the intelligence of the movement of the battering train from Poonah, as the state of the equipments might admit. As soon as information should be received at Poonah of Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton being prepared to move, it was proposed that Lieut.-Colonel Wallace should march from Poonah with the detachment of the subsidiary force serving with the Peishwa, and that the whole should join in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad. Arrangements were made by Major-General Wellesley for securing supplies of money and provisions for the use of the detachments, and large supplies were to be collected at different stations, principally at Hyderabad and Ahmednagur, for the purpose of being despatched to the army in the field as occasion might require.

The detachments from the subsidiary forces at Poonah and Hyderabad, being destined to act in concert, Major-General Wellesley deemed it to be proper that those combined detachments should be subject to one undivided authority. The local situation of the Resident at Poonah being nearer to the scene of the intended operations of the detachments than that of any other competent British authority, Major-General Wellesley recommended that during the continuance of this service, the detachment from the subsidiary force at Hyderabad should be placed under the orders of the Resident at Poonah.

In conformity to these suggestions, preparations were made by the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad for carrying into effect the branches of the general arrangement which depended on their respective exertions.

The exhausted state of the countries through which the detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton was destined

to march, rendered it necessary that large convoys of grain should be advanced from Hyderabad, for the purpose of securing supplies for the troops, before they should actually commence their march.

The Resident at Hyderabad despatched a large supply of rice for the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton, which was expected to arrive at that officer's camp before the close of the month of August.

Colonel Close being apprized that by the arrival of that supply, Colonel Haliburton's detachment would be enabled to march, directed Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, the officer commanding the subsidiary force at Poonah, to march from Poonah, agreeably to the instructions of Major-General Wellesley, for the purpose of forming a junction with Colonel Haliburton, and of prosecuting the prescribed plan of operations. Lieut.-Colonel Wallace accordingly commenced his march from Poonah on the 1st of September, 1804, having received from Colonel Close instructions for the regulation of his conduct, founded on the suggestions contained in Major-General Wellesley's letter of the 24th of June to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, referred to in a preceding paragraph of this despatch.

In the interval which elapsed between the date of Major-General Wellesley's resignation of the civil and military powers vested in him by the Governor-General, and the march of Lieut.-Colonel Wallace's detachment from Poonah, the attention of the Resident at that court with relation to the progress of the war against Holkar, was principally directed to the object of inducing the Peishwa to perform the obligations of the alliance by furnishing his contingent of troops for the service of the war, agreeably to the Governor-General's instructions issued to the Resident for that purpose, under date the 17th of June; it was the wish of the Resident that the Peishwa's contingent of troops should be ready to march from Poonah at the same time with the detachment under the command of Colonel Wallace.

In reply to his urgent application upon this subject, the Resident received the most favourable assurances of the sincere disposition of the Peishwa to fulfil the obligations of the alliance, and to employ every exertion for the equipment of a body of troops to serve with Colonel Wallace.

The Resident had previously apprized the Peishwa of the intention of the Governor-General in Council, to allot to his Highness the possessions which might be conquered from Holkar, situated between the rivers Tapti and Godavary, provided his Highness should exert himself in the prosecution of the war; and the Resident on this occasion reminded the Peishwa of the conditions on which those lands were to be annexed to his dominions.

The ministers of the Peishwa stated the means by which they proposed to provide the number of troops required to form the Peishwa's contingent, and expressed a confident expectation of being able to provide a considerable force for efficient service in the field. At the period of Colonel Wallace's march, the number of the Peishwa's troops assembled at Poonah, amounted to about 4000 horse and 1000 infantry, under the command of the Vinchoor Jaggeerdar, an old and faithful servant of the Peishwa's family.

Colonel Close and the ministers of the Peishwa expected that the force above stated would be augmented by the junction of the troops of Bapoojee Goklah, who had served with General Wellesley in the late campaign. This expectation was however disappointed. That Chieftain who had retired to the southward after the late war, was involved in disputes with the officers of the Peishwa and with the neighbouring chiefs. The points of dispute which had existed between Goklah and the Peishwa were however in a favourable train of adjustment under a general plan adopted by Major-General Wellesley for concluding an arrangement between the Peishwa and the southern chiefs, and Goklah had engaged to employ his troops in the service of the Peishwa. Colonel Close therefore still entertained some expectation that Goklah might join Colonel Wallace.

The force assembled under the Vinchoor Jaggeerdar, marched from Poonah the day after Lieut.-Colonel Wallace's departure. This detachment was accompanied by an officer on the part of the Peishwa, authorized to receive charge of such of the possessions of Holkar as might be conquered by the allied troops, and delivered to his charge by Lieut.-Colonel Wallace.

Another subject connected with the prosecution of the war against Holkar, which occupied the attention of the

Resident at Poonah at this time, was the Resident's receipt of a communication from a person who was stated to be in the confidence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, of which the object appeared to be to ascertain the views of the British Government with respect to that chieftain.

This agent intimated to Colonel Close a wish to be informed whether the British Government would receive proposals of accommodation from Holkar. In reply to this communication, Colonel Close remarked in substance, that if Holkar were inclined to effect an accommodation with the British Government, he should apply either to the Resident with Scindiah, who had the charge of the British interests in Malwa, or to General Lake, who possessed full powers to negotiate on the part of the Governor-General in Council.

From this agent, Colonel Close received a letter from Holkar, addressed to the Governor-General, but evidently intended for the honourable Major-General Wellesley, in which Holkar asserted that he was compelled by the aggressions of General Lake to have recourse to arms, and attempted to vindicate his conduct in his intercourse with the British Government. The letter is written in the same stile of arrogance and haughtiness which characterize his former correspondence.

At the same period Colonel Close received information that Anund Rao Holkar, an uncle of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who had long resided at Poonah, had been lately admitted to many secret interviews with Suddasheo Munkessur, one of the Peishwa's ministers.

This circumstance having excited some suspicion in Colonel Close's mind, he required from the Durbar an explanation of this part of the conduct of Suddasheo Munkessur. In reply, the Resident was informed on the part of the Peishwa, by his Highness's principal minister, Anund Rao Mulhar, that Anund Rao Holkar had never been considered as an adherent of Jeswunt Rao, that his late conferences had for their object the solicitation of pecuniary assistance, and that Anund Rao had always expressed great dissatisfaction at Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and professed himself an advocate for the claims of Cashey Rao, opposed to those of his illegitimate brother. The minister added, that the Peishwa had expressed his displeasure at Suddhasheo Munkessur for

admitting him to an interview, without apprizing the British Resident, and that his Highness would either send Anund Rao from Poonah, or place him in confinement, as Colonel Close might deem necessary. In reply to this message, Colonel Close expressed his satisfaction at the Peishwa's conduct, and stated, that he did not require either the confinement or expulsion of Anund Rao, but that he was of opinion that no communication should be held with him by any person connected with the Durbar.

The Governor-General in Council expressed his approbation of Colonel Close's conduct, but directed him to observe the proceedings of Anund Rao, and of every other branch of the Holkar family with attention. The Governor-General in Council also directed Colonel Close to abstain from any conduct which might manifest a suspicion of the fidelity of the Peishwa.

With respect to the claims of Cashee Rao, Colonel Close was directed to discourage any expectation of the interference of the British Government in favour of that person.

The British Government is not pledged to secure a suitable provision for Cashee Rao Holkar, nor does the admission of his hereditary right to the possessions occupied by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, impose upon us any obligation to assign to Cashee Rao the whole, or any part of those possessions which our arms may conquer from Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Cashee Rao has been completely dispossessed of his territory by Jeswunt Rao, and is utterly incapable of any effort for its recovery.

The contest in which the British Government is engaged with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, has not originated in any engagement on our part to restore to Cashee Rao Holkar any portion of his rights; it has originated in the unprovoked aggressions of the former, resulting from the nature of his predatory habits, from his inordinate demands, and from his barbarous system of exaction and rapacity. It cannot be considered to be a just and equitable principle that territories conquered from an usurper in the course of a war originating in the aggressions of that usurper, should be transferred by the state which has acquired them, to the chieftain from whom those territories were originally wrested. The British Government therefore must be considered to

possess a right of disposing of the acquisitions of the contest with Holkar, in such manner as may be most beneficial to our interests.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the progress of the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Wallace.

Lieut.-Colonel Wallace marched from Poonah, as has been stated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, on the 22d of August.

Lieut.-Colonel Wallace crossed the Godavery with his infantry, at Peytun, about the 18th of September, and on the 27th was joined at Forkabad by Lieut.-Colonel Hali-burton, whose march as well as that of Colonel Wallace, had been impeded by the severity of the weather; and on the 30th Lieut.-Colonel Wallace was joined by his cavalry, which had proceeded higher up the Godavery than Peytun in search of a ford.

Lieut.-Colonel Wallace was joined by the Peishwa's contingent early in the month of October.

On the 8th of October, Colonel Wallace detached a party for the purpose of taking possession of a small fort belonging to Holkar, called Lasselgong, about twelve miles from Chandore. The party which was despatched on this service, failed in an attempt to storm the fort, and was compelled to retire to the Pettah, or town, which had been previously occupied by the British troops, until a re-inforcement arrived from Colonel Wallace, when the place was stormed with complete success. In accomplishing this service, forty-four men of the British detachment were killed and wounded, and two officers were also wounded.

On the same day, Colonel Wallace arrived before the town and fortress of Chandore, and took possession of the former without opposition. Preparations were immediately made for the siege of the fort, and a battery was nearly ready to open, when proposals of capitulation were received from the garrison, which were accepted by Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, and the fort was immediately surrendered to the British troops on the 12th. The conditions on which the garrison surrendered were the safety of private property, and permission to the troops composing the garrison, to proceed whither they pleased. Our loss during the siege, was inconsiderable.

After the capture of Chandore, Lieut.-Colonel Wallace detached a party against another fort, situated in the same range of hills and occupied by a garrison in the interest of Holkar, called Dhoorb, which surrendered on the 14th of October, and several other small forts in the vicinity having been evacuated by the enemy's troops, and occupied by those of the Peishwa, Lieut.-Colonel Wallace marched from Chandore on the 17th.

On the 21st of October, he arrived before Galna, a strong fort belonging to Holkar, and took possession of the Pettah without opposition. On the 23d two practicable breaches having been effected, the garrison surrendered on the conditions of being allowed to march out with their arms and private property; which conditions being accepted by Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, the British troops took possession of the fort.

The possession of these forts deprived Holkar of all his possessions to the southward of the Tapti. The conduct of the troops is represented by Colonel Wallace to have been highly meritorious, and the manner in which these operations have been conducted by Colonel Wallace, entitles that officer to considerable praise.

After having made the necessary arrangements for maintaining these fortresses, and for establishing the authority of his Highness the Peishwa in the country which had been reduced by the success of our operations, Lieut.-Colonel Wallace proceeded to Borenaire, a position from whence he should be able to move in whatever direction the services of his detachment might be required; and in the neighbourhood of which he proposed to remain until he should receive further orders, or until circumstance should require the march of the detachment.

The subsequent movements of this detachment being connected with transactions at the Court of Nagpore, will be stated in another part of this despatch.

Destitute of any other resources than such as he derived from the habits of indiscriminate plunder and exaction, the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar has been preserved from entire destruction, exclusively by the seasonable application of the military resources of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, with whom the British Government, previously to the conclusion

of the late war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, concluded an alliance as has been reported to your honourable Committee in our despatch of the 31st of October 1803.

Events have incontrovertibly demonstrated that the arrangements suggested for the speedy and successful termination of the war, which the British Government was compelled to undertake against Jeswunt Rao Holkar were more than adequate to the accomplishment of that object under any occurrences, or any situation of affairs which could reasonably be contemplated; since the British forces acting under circumstances much less favourable than those to which the proscribed arrangements refer, have succeeded in accomplishing the reduction of all the forts and territories of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in completely defeating his whole assembled army of infantry and artillery, and his entire force of cavalry at the memorable battles of Deig and Furruckabad, and in capturing the whole of Holkar's numerous artillery.

The complete success of our arms in every contest with the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar must have produced the entire destruction of his power, if the resources of the Rajah of Bhurtpore's territory, the aid of his forces and the protection of his forts had not supported the cause of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and compelled the British Government to direct its arms against the possessions of the Rajah of Bhurtpore.

No events of any importance connected with the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, have occurred at Hyderabad. The attention of the Resident was principally occupied in collecting, and despatching money and provisions for the use of the army of the Deccan, and in the performance of this important duty, the Resident manifested a great degree of zeal and exertion. The Resident was also employed in urging the Soubahdar of the Deccan to a due performance of the obligations of the alliance, by bringing into the field as large a force as could be assembled for the purposes of the war. The conduct of the Court of Hyderabad on this occasion, as on the occasion of the preceding war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, was distinguished by a characteristic spirit of evasion and delay, and became the source of earnest and repeated complaints on the part of the Resident. After considerable delay however, a force of infantry and cavalry inferior to the strength of the force which

the Soubahdar is bound by treaty to furnish, was assembled and joined Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton's detachment, while encamped on the Godavery as above stated, and has continued to act with the British troops in their operations against Holkar's possessions in the Deccan. The Soubahdar's contingent of troops was placed under the orders of the Resident at Poonah, in the same manner as the detachment from the subsidiary force, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton.

With our despatch to your honourable Committee, under date the 15th of June, the Governor-General in Council had the honour to transmit a copy of instructions issued by the honourable Major-General Wellesley to Colonel Murray, the officer commanding the British troops in the province of Guzerat, for the co-operation of a considerable detachment under the command of that officer, with the army under the immediate direction of his Excellency General Lake, against the forces of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the proceedings of that detachment.

After providing for the protection of Surat and Baroda, in the manner suggested by the honourable Major-General Wellesley, the force under the personal command of Colonel Murray amounted to two regiments of European infantry, and five battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery.

Arrangements were also made for the co-operation of a body of troops in the service of the Guikwar; but those troops did not join the army of Colonel Murray until after its arrival at Ougein.

In the supposition that Jeswunt Rao Holkar (who was then at Ajmere) if pressed by the army of the Commander-in-Chief, might retire in a south-western direction, Colonel Murray was directed by the instructions of the honourable Major-General Wellesley to place his detachment in such a position as would enable it to embarrass and impede Jeswunt Rao Holkar's retreat.

But, in the event (which was deemed more probable) of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's proceeding towards Ougein, Lieut.-Colonel Murray was instructed to endeavour to effect an

early junction with Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army; and under any circumstances, to proceed with the utmost practicable expedition in the direction of Holkar's force and to take advantage of any opportunity of attacking it.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar's troops having subsequently moved in the direction of Ougein, Colonel Murray determined in conformity to the spirit of his instructions, as well as in compliance with the urgent solicitations of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to proceed with the utmost practicable expedition for the protection of that capital. The advance of Colonel Murray's detachment however, from Baroda to the frontier of Guzerat, was considerably retarded by the difficulty of procuring conveyance in Guzerat; by the exhausted condition of the country, and the consequent difficulty of procuring forage, and by the necessity of previously securing ample supplies of provisions. About the middle of the month of June however, Colonel Murray arrived with the detachment under his command in the vicinity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Fort of Dohud.

At the suggestion of Major-General Wellesley, the transmission of orders to the Commandant of that fortress for the reception of the heavy ordnance and stores of the detachment under Colonel Murray's command, had been a subject of repeated urgency on the part of the Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with that chieftain and his ministers, who explained the delay which occurred in the transmission of those orders, by asserting that the Commandant of that fort was in the service of Ambajee, and that orders addressed to him would be of no effect. This subject will be stated more in detail in that part of the present despatch, which relates to the transactions at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. It appears however, that ultimately the Commandant not only consented that the heavy ordnance should be deposited in the fort, but proposed that a British guard should be stationed in it.

On the 30th of June, the detachment under the command of Colonel Murray, arrived at Budnawar on its route to Ougein. At that station Colonel Murray received intelligence which induced him to suspend his advance to Ougein, and to retire to a position behind the river Myhee.

The causes which influenced Colonel Murray's resolution

to retire behind the Myhee, appeared to have been principally the information which he received from Lieut.-Colonel Monson of the return of the army under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief into cantonments, and of the intention of Lieut.-Colonel Monson to halt with his detachment at the Mokundra pass, until he should receive further orders from General Lake, combined with intelligence which Colonel Murray received at the same time, of the intention of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to direct the whole of his force against the detachment advancing from Guzerat.

Colonel Murray stated it to be his opinion, that the detachment under his command was unequal to oppose the whole force of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, without the assistance of the cavalry, with which he expected to be furnished by the Guikwar, and by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that by advancing into Malwa, he might not only endanger the safety of his detachment, but afford to Jeswunt Rao Holkar a favourable opportunity for the invasion of Guzerat. In addition to these causes of retreat, Colonel Murray considered his position at Budnawar to be unfavourable to the operations of a body of infantry against a superior force, while the position to which Colonel Murray proposed to retire in the rear of the Myhee, appeared to that officer to possess advantages which would enable his detachment to resist the attack of the whole of Holkar's force. Colonel Murray accordingly on the 1st of July, commenced his retreat towards the Myhee.

On the 5th of that month however, Colonel Murray received intelligence that Holkar had detached a considerable body of his troops towards Hinglaisghur, (the assault and capture of which place by the British troops has already been described,) and that the main body of Holkar's force had marched in a direction north-east of Mundasere. These movements appear to have relieved Colonel Murray from the apprehensions which he entertained with respect to the safety of his detachment, and accordingly on the 5th of July, Colonel Murray resumed his march towards Ougein, at which city he arrived on the 8th of the same month without having encountered any opposition.

At an early period of time after the march of Colonel Murray from Guzerat, that officer communicated to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, his anxious desire to be

furnished with a body of Scindiah's cavalry, to co-operate with the detachment under his command. Before the arrival of Colonel Murray at Ougein, a vakeel on the part of Antajee Geerdur, the principal officer of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at that capital, had arrived in the camp of Colonel Murray, in consequence of orders issued by Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers, in conformity to the urgent application of the Resident (as described in a subsequent part of this despatch.) Colonel Murray transmitted through this vakeel also, repeated applications to Antajee Geerdur, urging his immediate advance with a body of Scindiah's cavalry. But this re-inforcement though frequently promised, was never despatched, and even after Colonel Murray's arrival at Ougein, every endeavour to obtain the services of an efficient body of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's forces proved unavailing. The expectation also of being joined by Scindiah's forces under the command of Bapoojee Scindiah, having been disappointed by the defection of that chieftain, Colonel Murray submitted to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, a plan for securing the services of a considerable body of Pindarree horse, which had formerly been in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and was then in the neighbourhood of Bopaul. Colonel Murray also proposed to raise a body of Sillehdar horse in Malwa, for the purpose of co-operating with his detachment.

The Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in reply to Colonel Murray's propositions, explained the various objections to the employment of Pindarries in the service of the British Government, but submitted the decision of the question to the authority of the Governor-General in Council.

The Governor-General in Council concurred entirely in the sentiments expressed by the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and signified to Colonel Murray, his Excellency in Council's disapprobation of the employment of troops of that description.

Colonel Murray having submitted to the Governor-General several questions relative to the extent to which he might be permitted to encourage desertion among the adherents of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to offer to them employment in the service of the allies, and to what extent he might make pecuniary advances to the servants of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the purpose of enabling them to act with vigour and ex-

ertion, the Governor-General in Council deemed it to be advisable to furnish Colonel Murray with instructions on those several questions. On the first point, the Governor-General in Council stated his opinion to be, that the advantages to be derived by the employment of a large number of deserters from the cause of Holkar would not be adequate to the expence and inconvenience attending that measure. On the question regarding the advance of money to the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, Colonel Murray was referred entirely to the judgment of the Resident at that chieftain's court.

To the disordered condition of the whole frame of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government must be ascribed the conduct of his officers in Malwa, in failing to supply an efficient force for the purpose of co-operating with Colonel Murray's detachment; and to the same cause must be ascribed the difficulty which Colonel Murray experienced in obtaining supplies or necessaries for his troops, and in restoring his establishments of carriage-cattle and other equipments which had suffered by the severity of the monsoon, and Colonel Murray was apprized at an early period of time by the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of the necessity of acting without reference to any expectation of useful assistance from the government of that chieftain in the operations of the war.

During the continuance of Colonel Murray's detachment at Ougein, that officer took possession, without any resistance, of the whole of the territory in the occupation of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, situated in that quarter, and of Indore, the capital of the possessions of the family of Holkar. These places were immediately delivered over to the charge of the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

It has been stated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, that the troops which had been furnished by the Guickwar to co-operate with Colonel Murray's detachment, did not form a junction with that detachment until after its arrival at Ougein. The body of troops selected by the government of the Guickwar for this service, consisting of 3600 horse and 800 foot, was assembled at Ahmedabad in Guzerat, soon after the Resident at Baroda notified the desire of the British Government, that such a force should

be prepared in conformity to the plan of operations prescribed by the honourable Major-General Wellesley.

The disordered state of the Guickwar's finances, compelled the British Government to provide for the pay and subsistence of the troops composing the Guickwar's contingent while in the field, and the Resident at Baroda accordingly, under the authority of the Governor-General in Council of Bombay, adopted an arrangement for that purpose. A British officer was appointed to reside in the camp of the Guickwar's contingent for the purpose of conducting communications between the commanders of the troops of the Guickwar and the Resident at Baroda and Colonel Murray, and of superintending the payment of those troops. Considerable delay occurred before the troops commenced their march, occasioned by the extravagant demands of the officers commanding the different bodies of men composing the contingent. These difficulties having been at length overcome, the contingent commenced its march, and on the 7th of July arrived at Godra, a possession of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, near the frontier of Guzerat. At this station, the progress of the troops was delayed by the same cause which had retarded the commencement of their march. This obstruction was at length removed by an advance of money on account of the pay of the troops which was made by Captain Williams (the British officer, residing in the camp of the Guickwar's contingent) under authority which he had received for that purpose from the Resident at Baroda. The troops of the Guickwar then resumed their march, but their progress was extremely slow. The disorderly and turbulent habits of the troops and of the commanders of the different parties, were not less conspicuous on their march from Godra than they had been before. The repeated orders of Colonel Murray to the commander on the subject of expediting the march of the troops and on other points of duty connected with the public service, were entirely disregarded.

Being of opinion that these troops might be usefully employed in the protection of a convoy, which was advancing from Guzerat, with a small detachment of British troops, Colonel Murray instructed Captain Williams to require the commander of the Guickwar troops to join the convoy for

the purpose above stated, and in the event of his refusal, to leave the camp and to inform the commander that the services of his corps would not be required. The demand of Captain Williams's being refused, he quitted the camp of the Guickwar. The progress of the convoy, however, being accidentally retarded, the Guickwar's contingent joined the convoy a few days after Captain Williams's departure, and advanced to Ougein, at which city the contingent arrived on the 16th of August.

The causes which had unhappily produced a disagreement between Colonel Murray and the officer commanding the troops of the Guickwar, did not cease to operate after the junction of the contingent with the British detachment. With a view to remedy the evils occasioned by the disagreement existing between Colonel Murray and the commander of the Guickwar's contingent, it was determined in concert with the Government of the Guickwar (which had, on all occasions, manifested a sincere disposition to promote the common cause) to supercede the commanding officer of the contingent and the principal member of the Guickwar's Government, prepared to assume the command in person. This arrangement, however, was subsequently abandoned.

In the mean time, the Guickwar's contingent remained at Ougein, and was employed by Colonel Murray in the reduction or occupation of some of the possessions of Holkar, situated in that vicinity. No cordiality however appears to have been established between Colonel Murray and the commander of the Guickwar's contingent, and Colonel Murray continued to transmit to the government of Bombay, and to the Resident at Baroda, complaints of the misconduct of that officer.

On the 18th of October, Colonel Murray having completed the equipments of his troops, which had been nearly destroyed by the violence of the Monsoon, and having collected a sufficient number of cattle, advanced from Ougein, in compliance with the urgent and repeated orders of the Commander-in-Chief, who considered the early advance of this detachment to be an object of the utmost importance in the prosecution of the war; especially in the event of Holkar being compelled to retire towards Malwa on the approach of the army under his Excellency's personal command. Co-

lonel Murray was accompanied on his march by the Guickwar's contingent.

On the 11th of November, Colonel Murray arrived at Mundasere, having occupied the Pergunnahs of Burrowda and Jowrah, belonging to Holkar, through which he had directed his march. Advancing from Mundasere, Colonel Murray took possession of the forts of Narrayn-Gurh and Mulhar-Gurh, which were held by the adherents of Holkar. The next operation performed by the detachment under the command of Colonel Murray, was the attack of Rampoorah, a fortress of some strength, belonging to Holkar, and distinct from the fort of Rampoorah, the assault and capture of which, is stated in a preceding paragraph of our despatch of the 15th of June, and which is still occupied by a British garrison.

This fort was occupied by a party of British troops on the 19th of November, after an able resistance on the part of the enemy. The possession of Rampoorah completed the conquest of the whole of Holkar's territories on the west of the river Chumbul.

On the same date, a large party of the enemy's troops which had passed to the rear of the British detachment, and was proceeding towards Mundasere for the purpose of plundering a valuable convoy on its advance to join Colonel Murray's detachment, was attacked by the Guickwar's contingent, and defeated with considerable loss; the conduct of the Guickwar's troops on this occasion appears to have been highly meritorious.

At Rampoorah, Colonel Murray received information of the appointment of Major-General Jones to the staff of Bombay, and to the command of the forces in Guzerat, with orders to assume the command of the detachment which had advanced from that province under Colonel Murray.

The appointment of Major-General Jones to the staff of Bombay, formed a part of the general arrangements of the military establishments of that Presidency, which will be communicated to the honourable the Court of Directors from the military department. Major-General Jones proceeded on his march without delay to join the detachment, in conformity to the orders which he had received. In the meanwhile Colonel Murray continued to advance in pur-

suance of the Commander-in-Chief's orders, and arrived at the Mokundra Pass on the 30th of November. Continuing to advance, Colonel Murray arrived near Shahabad, about forty miles west of Narwar on the 25th of December, where the detachment was joined by Major-General Jones, who assumed the command.

The Governor-General in Council deems it necessary in this stage of the despatch, to communicate to your honourable Committee, a narrative of transactions and negotiations at the courts of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, connected with the general subject of the contest with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

In our despatch of the 15th of June, the Governor-General in Council had the honour to apprise your honourable Committee, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had received the notification of the Governor-General's resolution to reduce the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with every demonstration of satisfaction, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had ultimately consented to adopt the measures recommended by the honourable Major-General Wellesley for Scindiah's co-operation in the war. Those measures were—1st. That Dowlut Rao Scindiah should despatch an officer on his part, to join the army under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Murray, for the purpose of securing the application of the resources of Scindiah's territory to the exigencies of the British troops, and of taking possession of such of the districts in the occupation of Holkar, within the province of Malwa, as Lieut.-Colonel Murray might subdue and might think proper to surrender to the charge of that officer. 2dly. That Scindiah should provide at Ougein, battering guns for the eventual use of Lieut.-Colonel Murray's army, and 3dly, that Scindiah should employ his troops, without delay, in the reduction of Chuly Meyheysur and Indore, the principal places in the possession of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Major-General Wellesley also recommended that Scindiah's army should be joined by a detachment of British troops, distinct from the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Murray, and should be separately employed in offensive operations against the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Major-General Wellesley was not at that time aware that a considerable force had been actually despatched by Scindiah to the northward of

Ougein, for the purpose of co-operating with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief (as stated in our despatch of the 15th of June.) That force which was commanded by Bapoojee Scindiah, an officer of high rank in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, was subsequently directed at the desire of the Commander-in-Chief, to form a junction with the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Murray.

In addition to the points which the Resident had been requested by Major-General Wellesley to urge with Dowlut Rao Scindiah as above described, the Resident, at the desire of Colonel Murray, applied to Dowlut Rao Scindiah for orders to the commandant of his fortress of Dohud, directing him to receive such ordnance and stores as Lieut.-Colonel Murray might desire to deposit in that fortress. The Resident also deemed it to be his duty to require that a vakeel from Holkar, who at that time resided in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, should be dismissed.

To enable your honourable Committee to form a judgment of the disposition and conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, since the commencement of hostilities with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, it appears to the Governor-General in Council to be necessary to trace the progress of the Resident's negotiations in considerable detail.

Most of the preceding requisitions were at first verbally communicated by the Resident to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers. In reply to that communication a memorandum was delivered by Dowlut Rao Scindiah's confidential Moon-shee on the 16th of May, entitled "A Memorandum of answers to the points."

This memorandum commenced by objecting to the route proposed for the advance of Lieut.-Colonel Murray's army to Ougein, on the plea that the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Malwa, would thereby be exposed to danger, and proposing that Lieut.-Colonel Murray should proceed to Rampoorah, there to be joined by the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under Bapoojee Scindiah and Suddasheo Mahadeo. In reply to the application for the despatch of a public officer to the camp of Lieut.-Colonel Murray, the memorandum conveyed a promise of speedily despatching an officer to that camp for the purposes required.

With respect to the provision of ordnance at Ougein, it was stated in the memorandum that none were deposited at that capital of the description required ; but that guns of that description, captured by the British army from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, if returned, should be prepared to join Lieut.-Colonel Murray's detachment.

In that memorandum the ministers objected to the immediate occupation of Chuly-Meyheysur and Indore, on the plea that in that event the troops of Holkar, then at Kotah, and of his partizan, Meer Khaun, who occupied a position near Bhelsa, would ravage Dowlut Rao Scindiah's defenceless territories in Malwa, whilst his troops would be employed in retaining possession of the captured places ; and proposed that this measure should be postponed until the armies of Colonel Murray, and Bapojee Scindiah and Suddasheo Mahadeo (another of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's commanders), should have been established at Rampoorah in the manner in which it had been suggested.

In reply to the requisition for the dismissal of Holkar's vakeel, it was stated in the memorandum that orders had been sent for the recal of Scindiah's vakeel with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. That with regard to the latter's vakeel stationed with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, he was not upon good terms with Jeswunt Rao Holkar ; that he transacted no business for Holkar, and that his knowledge of the affairs of Holkar's government rendered his continuance in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah advantageous. The memorandum concluded by expressing an expectation founded on the Governor-General's declared intention of assigning to Scindiah a portion of the territory which should be conquered from Jeswunt Rao Holkar, that the British Government would not only restore the territory and forts of Gohud and Gwalior, but would grant to Dowlut Rao Scindiah compensation for the loss which he had sustained by the temporary alienation of that portion of his ancient possessions.

The Resident in his reply to these observations, explained the impracticability and unreasonableness of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's expectation that the plan prescribed by Major-General Wellesley for the operations of the army under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Murray, should be changed on the grounds stated by Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers. He urged

the necessity of the immediate despatch of a proper officer to the camp of Colonel Murray, and the importance of providing ordnance at Ougein as desired by Major-General Wellesley; and requested that every exertion might be employed for that purpose. The Resident reminded the ministers of the refusal which the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had received from Major-General Wellesley to their application for the restitution of a part of the captured ordnance in the course of the conferences which preceded the conclusion of the treaty of Serjee Angengaum, and adverted to the inutility of renewing that demand. The Resident resisted the plea urged by Scindiah's ministers for suspending the proposed occupation of Chuly-Meyheysur and Indore; observing, that the war having been undertaken, the fear of injury constituted no reason for postponing to attack the enemy, and urging the immediate prosecution of the proposed enterprise.

The Resident again urged the dismissal of Holkar's vakeel on obvious grounds of propriety, as a measure indispensably necessary, with a view to manifest the part which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had adopted in the war with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

The Resident concluded by remarking the impropriety of blending the liberal proposition of the British Government to assign to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a portion of the conquered territories, with the question of the restitution of Gohud and Gwalior, with which it was wholly unconnected, and which had been already completely and finally decided.

These points were discussed between the Resident and Scindiah's ministers at a conference holden on the 18th of May, on the occasion of a visit which the Resident, accompanied by Major Malcolm, paid to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, when Major Malcolm took leave of that chieftain.

The minister commenced the conference by remarking that the Resident appeared to entertain some doubts of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intentions, because of the delay which had occurred in carrying into effect the measures which had been suggested, observing however that the delay was unimportant. The Resident stated in reply, that measures connected with a state of war, were not of a nature to admit of delay. That Colonel Murray must at that time have commenced his march in the direction prescribed by Major-General Wellesley, and

that the Commander-in-Chief was engaged in active operations against the forces of Holkar. That, at such a time, it was highly necessary that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should manifest by his acts the resolution which he had formed. The minister replied by asserting the sincerity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's disposition to discharge the obligations of the alliance, observing, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had a much greater interest than the British Government in the early commencement and termination of the war, and promising that orders should be immediately issued in conformity to the Resident's application. That a person should be immediately appointed to join Colonel Murray. That orders had been issued, and should be repeated, for preparing such ordnance as could be provided at Ougein, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's troops would immediately proceed to occupy to the extent of their power, the possessions of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The Resident then urged the necessity of the advance of the force under Bapoojee Scindiah, agreeably to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, and the Minister assured the Resident that orders to that effect had actually been transmitted, and would be repeated. The Resident then urged the immediate dismissal of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's vakeel, to which the minister assented.

At this conference the Resident took occasion to require a formal renunciation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's claim to the fort and territory of Gwalior and Gohud, and the minister in reply authorized the Resident to assure the Governor-General that the claim had been completely relinquished by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. On the ground of this assurance, the Resident requested and obtained the signature of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the list of treaties confirmed by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. At this conference the minister took occasion to express the expectation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that the British Government would take into consideration the heavy losses which had been sustained by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the means of elevating his Government and of relieving his embarrassments. The minister proceeded to describe the pecuniary distresses of the state, and expressed a hope, that with a view to a partial relief of those distresses, and especially to enable Dowlut Rao Scindiah to co-operate

effectually in the war, the British Government would authorize a second payment on account of the stipends provided for by the 7th article of the treaty of peace.

The Governor-General in Council has deemed it proper, in this place, to advert to the pecuniary embarrassments of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government, because the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah as an ally in the war, must, in a considerable degree, be referred to the effect of those embarrassments—the instructions of the Governor-General upon this point will be stated in a subsequent part of this despatch.

On the 30th of May Dowlut Rao Scindiah invited the Resident to a conference,—the principal object of which was, to solicit the Resident's advice in consequence of information which had been received of the arrival of a considerable body of Holkar's force within a short distance of Ougein. This intelligence had excited great alarm in the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the safety of Ougein, and induced him to suggest the expediency of the recal of his forces, under the command of Bapoojee Scindiah, which was then within a short distance of Kotah, for the protection of Ougein. The Resident remonstrated in strong terms against the adoption of this measure, as tending to disturb the general arrangements for the conduct of the war. The Resident observed, that by the junction of Bapoojee Scindiah's force with the detachment under Colonel Monson, a confident expectation might be entertained of the success of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief's plan of operations for the destruction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar; that the speedy advance of Colonel Murray's army from Guzerat might be expected to afford protection to Malwa, but that, under any circumstances, the protection of that province must be considered to be an object of a nature secondary and subordinate to the prosecution of active operations against the main body of Holkar's force, according to the plan prescribed by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief. These remarks appeared to satisfy the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Resident then renewed his application for orders to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's principal officer in Malwa, directing him to assist Colonel Murray with the resources of that province and to the Commandant of Dohud for the purpose of ena-

bling Colonel Murray eventually to deposit ordnance and stores in that fortress. The Resident was assured that orders had actually been despatched to the principal officer in Malwa, but that with respect to Dohud, a difficulty had occurred which had occasioned a delay in the despatch of the orders to the Commandant of that fortress, and which the minister proceeded to explain, by stating that the fortress of Dohud had been entrusted to the charge of an officer in the service of Rajah Ambajee, in whom Dowlut Rao Scindiah reposed no confidence, and the minister expressed a doubt of that officer's obedience to the proposed orders. The Resident expressed the utmost degree of astonishment that so important a fort as Dohud should have been committed to the authority of a person so totally unworthy of confidence as Rajah Ambajee. The minister observed in reply, that the fort of Dohud had been confided to Ambajee previously to the publication of his treachery, which assertion was refuted by the Resident's remark, that the fort had not been surrendered to Scindiah according to the provisions of the peace, until after Ambajee's treachery had been long and notoriously published to the world. This circumstance appeared to the Resident to be of so extraordinary a nature as to justify a suspicion of deception on the part of the minister, the Resident however did not deem it expedient at that time to pursue the subject.

By a former paragraph of this despatch your honourable Committee has been informed, that the Commandant of the fort of Dohud subsequently consented to admit the heavy ordnance into his fort, and desired that a British garrison might be stationed in it.

At this conference Dowlut Rao Scindiah informed the Resident of his having dismissed the vakeel of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of his own intention to march from Boorhaunpoor on the 2d of June.

The importunities of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the recall of Bapoojee Scindiah's force were subsequently renewed, and were answered by the Resident in terms similar to those which he had before employed. On the 12th of June, however, the Resident received a letter from the Commander-in-chief, expressing his Excellency's desire that the force under the command of Bapoojee Scindiah might be directed to re-

turn to the southward, and to form a junction with Colonel Murray's detachment, to which effect the Commander-in-chief had previously transmitted instructions to Bapoojee Scindiah. This suggestion was founded principally on the conduct of Bapoojee Scindiah, who disregarded or evaded the repeated orders of the Commander-in-chief directing him to advance. The minister of Dowlut Rao Scindiah ascribed the conduct of Bapoojee Scindiah's troops entirely to the pecuniary difficulties which obstructed every branch of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's administration, and precluded the practicability of providing the funds necessary to enable the troops to advance in conformity to the Commander-in-chief's requisition.

The minister was anxious to impress upon the mind of the Resident a confidence in the sincerity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's disposition to fulfil the obligations of the defensive alliance, by co-operating with the British Government in the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and added, that if it was the wish of the British Government, Bapoojee Scindiah should be removed from the command of the army. This offer, the minister was informed, would be communicated to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief.

The Resident subsequently received despatches from Colonel Monson, by which it appeared that Bapoojee Scindiah, after receiving instructions to retire with his force towards Ougein for the purpose of co-operating with Colonel Murray's detachment, had actually advanced across the river Chumbul, had desolated the territory of Boondi and other districts, from which Colonel Monson derived a proportion of his supplies, had seized eighty of Colonel Monson's camels, and had impeded the post of the British Government.

The Resident at the same time received a despatch from Colonel Murray, containing complaints of the utter inattention of the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government to the orders stated to have been repeatedly issued to them on the subject of aiding the progress of the British troops.

The Resident having communicated to the Durbar in a memorial the misconduct of Bapoojee Scindiah, and of the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government in Malwa, received a visit from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's principal minister, who expressed much concern and regret at the improper

proceedings of those officers, which however he stated to originate in causes beyond Dowlut Rao Scindiah's power to control. The minister then proceeded to detail the severe losses which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had incurred in the late war with the British Government, and the subsequent suspension of his ordinary resources, while the charges of his government were augmented in an insupportable degree by the effects of famine, and by the commencement of hostilities with Holkar, whose operations had necessarily proved extremely injurious to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's territorial revenue.

The minister observed that these causes precluded the possibility of providing for the charges of the army in Malwa, and that unless those charges were regularly defrayed, the army could not be retained in a state of subordination. The Resident admitted the justice of the minister's observation with regard to the reduced condition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's resources, and to the general inference deduced from that fact, but stated that the acts of Bapoojee Scindiah constituted acts of direct hostility against the British Government, and that it was the express duty of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to provide a remedy for this evil. The discussion of that subject was closed with an intimation on the part of the minister, that an entirely new arrangement of the troops in Malwa should be framed and submitted in a detailed form to the Resident.

In reply to the Resident's remonstrances, relative to the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's officers in Malwa, the minister informed the Resident that intelligence had actually been received of the departure from Ougein of the principal civil officer at that capital who had been directed to join and attend Colonel Murray's detachment, until the person who had been selected for that express duty, could reach the camp of Colonel Murray, and that orders to the officers in Malwa had been repeated, enjoining them to afford every practicable aid to the British troops from the resources of that province.

At this conference, the minister having taken occasion to consult the opinion of the Resident relative to the return of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Ougein, the Resident earnestly recommended that measure as affording the only prospect of

restoring efficiency to his government, and of enabling him to assist in the prosecution of the objects of the war. In reply, the minister admitted the justice of those observations, but asserted the absolute impracticability of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's return without pecuniary aid. The minister declared that every endeavour to obtain supplies of money from the bankers upon loan had entirely failed, and concluded by proposing that the British Government should advance to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a sum of money on loan on the mortgage of the provinces of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah (situated near the northern frontier of Gohud, and assigned to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under a special article of the treaty of Serjee Anjengaum) or any other districts belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, during a term of years. It is unnecessary to detail the discussions of this subject between the Resident and the minister; it is sufficient to state that the Resident, without affording to the minister any encouragement to expect the acquiescence of the British Government in his proposition for a loan, promised to submit that proposition to the consideration of the Governor-General.

With the view to maintain connection in the narrative of transactions and negotiations at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper, in this place, to state to your honourable Committee the substance of the instructions issued to the Resident under date the 11th June, on the receipt of his despatch, containing the report of his conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 18th of May, the substance of which is stated in former paragraphs of this despatch.

In reply to the Resident's communication of the desire of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for a second payment on account of the stipends, provided for by the 7th article of the treaty of Serjee Anjengaum, the Resident was authorized to grant bills to the amount of the payment which had been made on the same account by Major Malcolm. The Resident was also apprized that the Governor-General would be prepared to consider with a sincere desire of relieving the distresses of Dowlut Rao Scindiah the means of affording pecuniary assistance to his finances to the utmost practicable extent, and the Resident was accordingly directed to state with all convenient

despatch, the amount of the aid which might be required, and the nature of the security to be obtained for the recovery of the amount, in the event of a failure on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to repay the sum, which might be advanced to him by the British Government, and the Governor-General suggested as a means of providing that security, the transfer of the districts of Dholepore, Barree and Rajah Kerrah, to the honourable Company either in perpetual sovereignty, or for a term of years; observing that the acquisition of those districts with reference to their local situation, was an object of considerable political importance. The Governor-General at the same time observed to the Resident, that all the revenue derived from those districts since the peace, must be considered to belong to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Under any arrangement which the Resident might recommend for the purpose of assisting the exigencies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, the Resident was directed to advert to the pressure upon the finances of the British Government, and to stipulate that the payments to Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be made in such proportions and at such periods of time, as should enable the British Government to fulfil its engagements with Scindiah, without exposing the public interests to the hazard of suffering any material inconvenience from the necessity of making large advances of money at a season when no adequate provision should have been made for that purpose.

The Governor-General deems it expedient to transcribe in this place, the concluding part of the Governor-General's instructions, as being explanatory of the general principles by which the British Government resolved to regulate its conduct toward Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

“His Excellency wishes to consult the feelings, and to promote the interests of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the spirit of the treaty of peace, and of the defensive alliance, and accordingly, the Governor-General will be disposed to consider with a cordial sentiment of amity, the means of establishing order and peace within the dominions of the Maha Rajah, and of improving his resources, and of reviving such a portion of his military power as may be necessary for the internal purposes of his government and for his external security, under the protection of the British Government; but his Excellency will not sacrifice to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or to his ministers, any portion of the British power, or resources, nor any of the bulwarks of that power, which have been acquired or fortified by the success of war, or by the terms of the peace. Nor will the Governor-General

consent to infringe any article of our obligations to our allies in the war for the advantage or gratification of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Our friendship with that chief must rest on the basis of our power, and of our general good faith, exercised towards himself with every degree of generosity, which can be indulged without hazard to our security, and without injuries to our allies in the war."

On the receipt of these instructions, the Resident obtained an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and having communicated to that chieftain the resolution of the British Government to authorize a second payment on account of the stipends, the Resident apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah that he had received the further authority of Government, to afford to his Government eventually the pecuniary aid which his ministers had repeatedly solicited, and that the Resident was accordingly prepared to enter into a full discussion of the subject. Having in consequence retired with Dowlut Rao Scindiah's principal ministers to a separate place, the Resident stated to them, that it was the intention of the British Government to prosecute the most active operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and at the same time to afford to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government the pecuniary aid necessary to the efficient co-operation of its armies, that it was necessary therefore, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should afford some reasonable security, that the object would be obtained by the proposed pecuniary aid. The Resident then proceeded to state, that in the actual management of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's affairs, no such assurance could exist, because none of the orders which had been issued by Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government at the requisition of the Resident with a view to the prosecution of hostilities against Holkar, had been carried into effect, and because the persons principally concerned in the execution of those orders, had acted in direct contradiction to the tenor of them. The Resident therefore desired to be apprized of the remedy which the ministers proposed to apply to this important evil.

The ministers in reply acknowledged the justice of the charge, but ascribed the disregard and violation of Scindiah's orders to the deficiency of his pecuniary resources. Scindiah's principal minister repeated the assurance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's desire to co-operate in the war and adverted to an advantage, which had been obtained by the commander of a body of troops in the service of a partizan of Holkar's,

and to the plunder of a place called Mundasore, belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, by the troops under the immediate command of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as proofs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's sincerity, as well as of his actual participation in the war, and the minister concluded by stating, that when Dowlut Rao Scindiah should possess the means of discharging the pay of his troops, the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be recalled to subordination, and every degree of confidence might be reposed in its exertions. The Resident however remarked that while the authority of Scindiah's government was required to be exercised in a quarter of his dominion so remote from the capital as Burhanpore, no expectation could reasonably be entertained of its efficiency. That the Resident had expressly stated the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, with respect to the necessity of placing Bapoojee Scindiah's army under the immediate control of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as the only practicable means of rendering it useful, and that, with a view to prevent the recurrence of past failures, it appeared to be indispensably requisite that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should immediately proceed to the seat of his government at Ougein, where his authority might be applied with due effect to the events which might be expected to occur in the vicinity of that capital.

After some intermediate discussion on the subject of this proposition, the chief minister of Dowlut Rao Scindiah stated two points to be indispensably requisite. First. That funds should be supplied to defray the expence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march to his capital, and secondly, That in the event of a junction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army with a British force, Dowlut Rao Scindiah should exercise the command over both. To these demands the Resident replied, that whenever Dowlut Rao Scindiah might be desirous of having the disposal of a British force, he might apply for the subsidiary force, agreeably to the provisions of the treaty of defensive alliance, but that the subjection of a British army to the command of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of his officers was utterly inadmissible. With regard to the first proposition, the Resident observed, that the British Government had sufficiently manifested its disposition to relieve the immediate exigencies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government, but that it could not be the intention of the British Govern-

ment to provide for the continued disbursements of the state. That the latter object must be secured by the persons entrusted with the administration of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's finances, and that with regard to the former, the Resident considered it to be his duty to require from the ministers, some reasonable ground of confidence in the attainment of the object, before he could submit to the British Government any plan for the purpose of aiding the resources of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

After a detailed discussion resulting from the preceding observations, the Resident finally required from the ministers, first, That the doubts which the Resident had stated with regard to the attainment of the object of the proposed pecuniary aid, should be satisfactorily removed; and secondly, That security should be afforded by the transfer of territory, for the repayment of such money as the British Government might be induced to advance for the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The minister assured the Resident that satisfactory arrangements should be made on both points.

Subsequently to the date of this conference, the Resident received despatches from Colonels Monson and Murray. The former communicating additional circumstances of misconduct on the part of Bapoojee Scindiah, and the latter stating the inefficient condition of the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who had joined Colonel Murray at Ougein, and urging the necessity of providing for the junction of a body of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's cavalry, with the detachment under Colonel Murray's command. The Resident addressed memorials to Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon both these subjects. With regard to Bapoojee Scindiah, Dowlut Rao Scindiah replied, that orders of recall had already been issued to that officer, and that in consequence of these additional complaints, he had despatched a person for the express purpose of conveying him to Boorhanpore. On the subject of the inefficiency of his forces at Ougein, Dowlut Rao Scindiah replied, by ascribing it to the insubordination prevailing throughout his army, and by assuring the Resident that "he had required a plan for establishing subordination, and for the attainment of the object in contemplation," meaning the efficient co-operation of his troops with those of the British Government.

Subsequently to the interchange of these communications (on the 16th of July) Dowlut Rao Scindiah's principal minister attended the Resident, and opened the conference by a repetition of former observations relative to the plan of operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the object of which appeared to be to impress upon the mind of the Resident a conviction of the efficiency of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army, provided funds could be furnished for the payment of it. The minister then proceeded to complain of the Resident's want of confidence in the sincerity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to repeat the assurance of his determination to adhere to the obligations of the alliance. The Resident, however, interrupted the minister by observing that the intentions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be judged by his actions, and not by his professions. That the orders of Dowlut Rao Scindiah having been invariably disobeyed, it was impossible to preserve confidence. The Resident therefore desired to be informed of the nature of the arrangements which at the last conference the minister had engaged to prepare.

The minister produced a paper containing four plans for the co-operation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's forces with the British troops. The first plan related to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's taking the field in person, which required an army of 25,000 horse, with a proportion of infantry and artillery, and the total expence of which was computed at twenty-five lacs of rupees per mensem. The second related to a plan formerly suggested by the minister of proceeding himself with a smaller force, the expence of which was computed at fifteen lacs of rupees per mensem. The third related to the employment of a force under another commander, consisting of the troops required by the treaty as the contingent of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the expence of which was computed at ten or twelve lacs of rupees per mensem, and the fourth related to the junction of a small body of the troops actually in Malwa, with the division under the command of Colonel Murray, the expence of which would depend on the number of troops to be employed.

The minister stated that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be ready to carry into effect whichever of these plans should be approved by the Resident.

The Resident having inquired by what means the minister

proposed to provide the funds stated to be requisite for the accomplishment of any of those plans, the minister replied by referring to the pecuniary aid expected from the British Government.

The Resident observed in answer, that he had suggested the expediency of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's proceeding in person, upon the acknowledged ground of the utter inefficiency of his orders to his officers, and upon the opinion stated by the Commander-in-Chief, that to render the army in Malwa useful, it must be placed under the immediate control of Dowlut Rao Scindiah himself, but that every expectation of that advantage had been frustrated by the extravagance of a plan so manifestly impracticable as to require no further consideration. The Resident further observed that under these circumstances, no hope could reasonably be entertained that any orders which Dowlut Rao Scindiah might continue to despatch from his remote position of Boorhanpore, would be obeyed with more promptitude than those which had already been transmitted; and that therefore the Resident considered the whole of the plans proposed by the minister to be equally objectionable, and to be destitute of any grounds of confidence in the exertions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government.

The discussions which ensued, satisfied the Resident, that whatever might be the means which Dowlut Rao Scindiah possessed of returning to his capital, the apprehension of danger in the event of his crossing the Nerbuddah, induced Dowlut Rao Scindiah to prefer the distress and embarrassment attending his actual encampment in the vicinity of Boorhanpore.

The result of the preceding discussion having manifested the improbability of any co-operation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's troops upon an extensive scale, the Resident desired to be informed of the precise nature of the orders which had been transmitted to the several bodies of troops in Malwa on the subject of supplying the contingent of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's troops intended to serve with the division under the command of Colonel Murray; but no satisfactory answer could be obtained upon that point. Adverting however to the solicitude expressed by Colonel Murray for the junction of a body of cavalry, the Resident continued to press the

question, and the Resident was assured by the minister in the name of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that Bapoojee Scindiah and another officer of Scindiah had been positively ordered to join the division under the command of Colonel Murray, with their respective quotas of troops, the number of which was stated to be about 10,000 horse and eight battalions of infantry. The experience of the past however, precluded any confident reliance on the services of those troops. Anxious therefore to secure the aid of a body of cavalry in conformity to Colonel Murray's urgent application, the Resident desired to be informed of the number of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's cavalry which could be attached to Colonel Murray's division, if a sum of money was advanced by the British Government. The minister replied, that the extent of the force would depend upon the amount advanced, and proceeded to demand the extent of the pecuniary aid which the British Government intended to afford.

The Resident replied, that the Governor-General had not determined the amount to be eventually advanced, and that the Governor-General's determination would probably be regulated by the degree of confidence which the British Government might repose in the useful application of the money to the prosecution of the objects of the war. The Resident added however, that the nett revenue of the districts of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah Kerra, being actually the property of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Resident would be disposed to anticipate the orders of the British Government, and advance a moderate sum of money on that account, provided any satisfactory assurance could be afforded, that effectual means would be employed for the purpose of furnishing a body of cavalry to co-operate with Colonel Murray. After some discussion relative to the revenue of those districts, the minister stated that six lacs of rupees would enable Dowlut Rao Scindiah to provide for the efficient co-operation of 5,000 horse.

After some further discussion upon this point, the Resident stated that, estimating the revenue of the districts in question at four lacs of rupees, he would grant bills to the amount of two lacs upon the minister's assurance, that active measures should be immediately employed to furnish a body of cavalry

to serve with the division under the command of Colonel Murray.

The discussion which ensued upon this subject, was finally closed by a promise on the part of the minister to furnish the Resident with information regarding the actual disposition of the troops in Malwa, and the arrangement which might be found practicable for the effectual co-operation of a small body of cavalry on an advance of two lacs of rupees.

The Resident then proceeded to enquire what arrangement the minister proposed for the repayment of such sums of money as might be eventually advanced for the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; and the conference upon this subject, which involved a discussion of various arrangements unnecessary to detail, terminated by the consent of the minister to assign the districts of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah in perpetuity to the Honourable Company, provided the British Government relinquished its claim to repayment, or to assign any of the districts to be acquired by Dowlut Rao Scindiah contiguous to the British frontier in mortgage for the repayment of the proposed loan, if the British Government should require the cession of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah, on the ground of our relinquishing our right to an equal participation of the territories subject to the authority of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

The state of Scindiah's affairs at this period of time, with reference to the means of co-operating in the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will be sufficiently explained to your Honourable Committee by the following extract from the Resident's despatch of the 17th of July containing the detail of the conference of which the substance is stated in the preceding paragraphs.

“ In reviewing the several circumstances which have occurred at this Durbar and at Malwa, no doubt can be entertained that every object proposed to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with a view to the prosecution of the war, has failed ; and your Excellency will observe from the recent despatches of Colonel Murray, that his situation at Ougein has been rendered critical by an entire failure of the means, or of the disposition on the part of the officers of this government, to discharge the obligations of the alliance. The universal excuse opposed to all my representations is the absolute want of the pecuniary resources to maintain not only any vigour of administration, but the common obedience due to the authority of government ; and I believe the derangement of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's finances to be as great

as can be supposed to consist with the existence of his state; but if the ministers should, or should not, have stated with sincerity the extent of pecuniary aid requisite to the immediate co-operation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's armies, it is manifest, I fear, that the loan of no moderate sum of money by your Excellency can establish a reasonable confidence of adequate exertions being directed on the part of this government to the vigorous prosecution of the war. Under these circumstances it appears to be impossible for me to suggest to your Excellency any plan for the advance of money upon loan to this government until your Lordship shall have determined under the present aspect of Scindiah's affairs, and under a consideration of the degree of use to be expected from his co-operation in the present war, the extent to which it may be advisable for the British Government to incur the expense of contributing to the restoration of his military power and resources in the spirit of the defensive alliance.

If your Excellency should deem it proper to afford pecuniary aid to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it will be indispensably necessary, in my judgment, to obtain territorial security for the recovery of the amount, for I have no doubt that the Maharajah is absolutely destitute of all other resource, nor do I expect from the wisdom of his present ministers such an improvement of his affairs as might justify your Excellency's reliance on any other guarantee."

It has appeared to the Governor-General in Council unnecessary to state in the body of this despatch the detail of the misconduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's affairs in Malwa, of the inconvenience to which the British troops, under the command of Colonel Murray, were exposed by the inattention of the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government to the order of their sovereign, or their inability to carry those orders into effect, and of the repeated disappointment of the assurances and professions of that chieftain and his ministers with regard to the application of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's resources in the province of Malwa, to the exigencies of the British detachment under Colonel Murray's command.

These details however are stated in a memorial which the Resident transmitted to the minister of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under date the 19th of July, two days after the conference, of which the substance is contained in the preceding paragraphs. A copy of that memorial is therefore annexed to this despatch for your honourable Committee's information. It is proper to observe that this memorial produced no beneficial effect, nor was any answer ever returned to it.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper in this place to state the conviction of his mind, that at this period of

time, the disordered condition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's affairs, the weakness of his authority, and the deficiency of his resources, constituted exclusively the causes of his own inactivity in the prosecution of the war. Every motive of interest, ambition and resentment, conspired to excite and to animate Dowlut Rao Scindiah's disposition to co-operate in the war; and no circumstances or considerations could, at that time, be supposed to exist of a nature to counteract those powerful motives.

Previously to the resumption of the narrative of transactions at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it appears proper to state to your honourable Committee, the expectation which at the close of the month of June, the Governor-General in Council entertained of effecting an amicable accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar through the agency of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the general grounds of that expectation, together with the substance of the instructions issued with that view to the Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

At that period of time the state of the Governor-General's intelligence warranted a belief that Jeswunt Rao Holkar's precipitate retreat before the army of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, was attended with circumstances of the utmost distress. That the conduct of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in rejecting the advantageous propositions offered to his acceptance by the Commander-in-Chief, and in urging his own extravagant demands (as noticed in the 20th and following paragraph of our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 15th of June) had been influenced in a great degree by the clamours of his indigent and turbulent adherents, whose subsistence depended upon plunder, and who consequently desired the continuation of hostilities. That the detachment under Colonel Monson was of sufficient strength to overawe the army of Holkar, and that the positions of our several armies and detachments were calculated to preclude any operations on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from which he could derive any advantage to his reputation or his arms, or even the means of subsisting his troops, who might consequently be expected to desert in great numbers. At the period of time above-mentioned also, the Governor-General in Council had no cause to doubt the ability or the resolution of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to co-operate effectually in the pro-

secution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and the Governor-General had at that time, received information from the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the positive intention of that chieftain to proceed to Ougein, for the purpose of taking the command of the forces serving under Bapoojee Scindiah.

Under these circumstances the Governor-General in Council deemed it probable that Holkar might be disposed to accede to terms of accommodation which should combine with a suitable provision for his subsistence, an equitable arrangement in favour of Cashee Rao Holkar (the legitimate heir to the possessions usurped by Jeswunt Rao Holkar) an improvement of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's territorial resources and security against Jeswunt Rao Holkar's resumption of his predatory habits.

The most eligible mode of accomplishing the proposed arrangement, appeared to be the conclusion of an engagement between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar to be guaranteed by the British Government, and instructions were accordingly issued for that purpose to the Resident at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's court. The general principles of the proposed arrangement were, to assign to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, a pension, or a jagheer similar to that which has been assigned to Amrut Rao, the brother of his Highness the Peishwa, under the guarantee of the British Government, (as described in our despatch to your honourable Committee, of the 12th of April 1804.) To make a suitable provision for Cashee Rao Holkar from the territories of the Holkar family, and to assign the remainder of those territories to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The security to be provided against Jeswunt Rao Holkar's resumption of his predatory habits, was to be sought in the conditions annexed to the proposed jagheer or pension; and the best security appeared to be the residence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar within the limits of the British authority in the enjoyment of a pension payable by the British Government for the amount of which, an adequate proportion of the territories of the Holkar family might be assigned, and under engagements limiting the number of his followers, and precluding the revival of all claims on his own part, or on that of his nephew Khundeh

Rao Holkar, to any part of the hereditary dominions of Tuckoojee Holkar.

These instructions reached the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 6th of August. At that time however, a state of circumstances had occurred entirely different from those on the supposed existence of which the Governor-General in Council's instructions of the 30th of June were founded. After his retreat before the army of the Commander-in-Chief, Jeswunt Rao Holkar had been enabled to form a junction with the main body of his infantry and guns, under the command of one of his principal officers, by name Hernaut Sing, at a short distance from Ougein, and to collect other divisions of his troops, whilst his partizan Meer Khan, with a considerable body of troops, was employed in ravaging the province of Bhelsa belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The detachment under the command of Colonel Monson, had been compelled by the want of provisions and the inclemency of the weather to retreat, followed by the whole body of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's augmented army in the manner already related, and intelligence of these events had been received by the Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The expectation also which had originally been entertained of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ability, as well as of his resolution to co-operate with activity and effect in the prosecution of the war, had been intermediately disappointed, as described in the preceding part of this narrative.

Under this change of circumstances, the Resident justly concluded that no proposals of peace could be offered to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, through the channel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with any expectation of their being received with the respect due to the British power, and the Resident therefore properly determined to suspend the execution of the Governor-General in Council's instructions upon that subject.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of transactions at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Under the impression produced by the actual condition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's affairs, as described in a preceding paragraph, the Resident deemed it unnecessary to continue his urgency upon any of those points which he had so often but without success, pressed upon the attention of Dowlut

Rao Scindiah's Durbar : a new subject of remonstrance however subsequently originated in the arrival at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's court, on the 11th of August, of his father-in-law Serjie Rao Ghautka, the profligacy and wickedness of whose character are not more notorious than is the hostility of his disposition towards the British power.

The relation in which that person stood towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah, his talents for intrigue and a spirit of ambition unrestrained by any principle of honour, justice, or humanity, enabled him some years since, to obtain the entire ascendancy in the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The whole course of his administration was distinguished and disgraced by inordinate rapacity, violence and unbounded cruelty, and was terminated by the necessary effects of that general horror and detestation which his crimes had excited. He was compelled to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and subsequently retired to Poonah.

It does not appear that Serjie Rao Ghautka received any invitation from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or any encouragement from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's officers to return to that chieftain's Durbar. His presence however was not prohibited, and he immediately employed every effort to regain his former influence over the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. His endeavours appear to have been attended with early success, and the Resident having received information that Serjie Rao Ghautka was admitted to frequent conferences and consultations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah of a secret nature, and that, during those conferences, he had actually been visited by the vakeel of Jeswunt Rao Holkar (who although dismissed from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Durbar had returned to Boorhanpore) and had received that Vakeel with the usual marks of civility and distinction, the Resident deemed it proper to convey to the minister, a remonstrance upon this subject. In reply to that remonstrance, the minister stated the most solemn assurances of the determination of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of his ministers to adhere to the engagements concluded with the British Government, and expressed his own conviction of the impossibility of the renewal of cordiality between Holkar and Scindiah. He urged Dowlut Rao Scindiah's resolution of relinquishing his claim to Gwalior and Gohud, as a proof of Dowlut Rao

Scindiah's intention to adhere to the obligation of his engagements, and to rely exclusively on the friendship of the British Government; and the minister adverted to the murder of Mulhar Rao Holkar, and to the subsequent treachery of Jeswunt Rao Holkar as insuperable barriers to an union of interests between that chief and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. With regard to the vakeel of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, that minister observed that he had been dismissed from the Durbar according to the Resident's desire and to the minister's knowledge had actually commenced his journey to the camp of Holkar. The minister added that since that time he had received no information regarding that vakeel, and was absolutely ignorant of his residence in Boorhanpore. With regard to Serjie Rao Ghautka, the minister stated that he was notoriously a man of bad character and that he might be expected with the aid of some ill-disposed persons attending the Durbar, to enter into secret intrigues; but that those intrigues would never influence the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. That his arrival in the camp was uninvited and principally the consequence of pecuniary embarrassments, and that, although the family connection between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Serjie Rao Ghautka rendered it difficult to interfere, the minister entertained no doubt of effecting the removal of that obnoxious personage if desired by the Resident. In reply the Resident intimated that the communication which he had conveyed to the minister, involved considerations of great magnitude, affecting, in some respects, the personal conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; that the general assurances which he had received from the ministers, were not calculated to satisfy the Governor-General's mind on the two facts of the concealment of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's vakeel, and the frequent consultations secretly held between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Serjie Rao Ghautka. The Resident therefore desired, that the subject might be stated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in order that the Resident's Report to the British Government might be accompanied by the explanation and sentiments of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The subject being accordingly stated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in presence of the Resident's native secretary, who attended by the minister's desire for the purpose of hearing Dowlut Rao Scindiah's

remarks and declarations, that chieftain confirmed the assurances afforded by his minister of the sincerity of his intention to adhere to the obligations of the alliance. With regard to Jeswunt Rao Holkar's vakeel, Dowlut Rao Scindiah stated that he had certainly heard of his return to Boorhanpore on account of indisposition, and that he might therefore be still in the city; but that no other difficulty opposed his departure. With regard to Serjie Rao Ghautka, he observed that the bad qualities of that personage were notorious, and that he could have no hesitation in issuing orders for restraining the improper proceedings of Serjie Rao Ghautka, adding the expression of his determination to avoid a change of his ministers, and his resolution of continuing to repose entire confidence in Bappoo Wittul. In conclusion, Dowlut Rao Scindiah desired that the Resident should be assured of his disposition to afford satisfaction both with regard to Jeswunt Rao Holkar's vakeel and to the conduct of Serjie Rao Ghautka, and for that purpose Dowlut Rao Scindiah expressed his wish of seeing the Resident.

On the 8th of September, the Resident was invited to a conference. The minister signified to the Resident, on his arrival at the Durbar, that the object of desiring his attendance was to communicate Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intention of commencing his march in the course of a short time, and to express Dowlut Rao Scindiah's desire that some arrangement should be adopted for the protection of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's possessions in Candeish in his absence by means of the army of the Deccan. In reply, the Resident having expressed his satisfaction at this determination, observed that the army of the Deccan had already commenced its march, accompanied by the troops of the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan. That its immediate object was the reduction of Chandore, and that, after the capture of that fortress, the services of the army would probably be directed to the main object of the war, the effectual reduction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The minister then proceeded to state that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intention of marching, required the renewal of the subject of pecuniary aid, and to enquire what arrangement was proposed for that purpose. The Resident in reply, stated the necessity of his receiving satisfaction on the two points under discussion previously to the re-agitation of the subject of the proposed loan.

The minister having expressed a desire, that those points should be distinctly declared, the Resident directed a memorandum to be read, containing the substance of his official message to the Durbar, as described in a preceding paragraph. The ministers endeavoured to justify the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in permitting the continuance of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's vakeel at Boorhanpore, and to invalidate any inferences from that fact of a nature unfavourable to the credit of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fidelity. The minister repeated the assurances of that chieftain's determination to fulfil the engagements which he had concluded, and to maintain the obligations of his public faith, adding, that such being the resolution of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the conduct of inferior persons constituted no just ground of suspicion. The minister then proceeded to repeat that the enmity subsisting between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, did not admit of reconciliation; supporting that position, by a reference to the murder of Mulhar Rao.

The Resident observed that this ground of enmity had yielded to considerations of convenience, when Dowlut Rao Scindiah concluded with Holkar an offensive alliance against the British Government. The minister in reply appealed to that fact as a corroboration of his first assertion; observing that the unsuccessful endeavours of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to purchase a reconciliation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar by the most important concessions had precluded every expectation of accomplishing that object. The Resident answered that this inference might be just with regard to Holkar, but was not so with reference to Scindiah, observing however, that the discussion was unnecessary, since the doubts which existed in the Resident's mind had been excited by overt acts, and could not be removed by mere professions and assurances.

Before the date of this conference, the Resident had received from Colonel Monson, and had formally communicated to Scindiah's minister the intelligence of the defection of Bapoojee Scindiah, who, after having joined that officer's detachment, deserted with the whole of his force to the enemy. At this conference the Resident took occasion to observe, that he had received no explanation from Scindiah's ministers relative to the defection of Bapoojee Scindiah, and expressed

a wish to be apprized of the means intended for remedying that misfortune. The minister in reply stated the substance of letters received from Bapoojee, which represented his submission to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as a measure of necessity, and expressed the resolution of Bapoojee Scindiah to return immediately to the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Resident having ascertained that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his ministers gave credit to this explanation, produced a letter from Colonel Monson, stating in a detailed manner the treacherous conduct of Bapoojee Scindiah. When the contents of that letter had been explained, Dowlut Rao Scindiah desired a copy of it, and informed the Resident that he should receive a further explanation on the subject, when the facts stated in that letter should have been compared with those described in the letters from Bapoojee Scindiah. The minister closed the discussion by observing that the mind of the Resident had manifestly received an impression of distrust, which he was anxious to remove, and by requesting the Resident to suggest any mode by which his doubts might be dispelled. The Resident replied, that the impressions which he entertained with regard to the conduct and designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were of no importance, that he had submitted all the facts of the case to the Governor-General, whose judgment would be founded on a consideration of those facts, and that any doubts which the Governor-General might be led to entertain, could alone be removed by the measures which Dowlut Rao Scindiah might subsequently pursue. The minister replied by assuring the Resident that the most satisfactory explanation should be speedily afforded.

With reference to the subsequent conduct of the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it is proper in this place to state to your honourable Committee some circumstances relative to the Nabob of Bhopaul, a Patan chieftain possessing an independent territory situated on the north bank of the river Nerbuddah in a northern direction from Nagpore. The possession of the fort of Hosheingabad with its dependent territory which belongs to the Nabob of Bhopaul, has uniformly been an object of the Rajah of Berar's desire, and his endeavours to obtain and secure that possession have occasioned repeated contests between those chieftains. About ten years ago the Rajah of Berar obtained possession of that

fort by the treachery of the persons to whose charge it was committed; but shortly before the conclusion of peace between the British Government and the Rajah of Berar, the Nabob of Bhopaul taking advantage of the adverse condition of the Rajah of Berar's affairs, recovered the fort and territory of Hosheingabad, and has since retained possession against the efforts of a considerable force of the Rajah of Berar. Subsequently to the date of the conference of which the substance is conveyed in the preceding paragraphs, an agent from the Nabob of Bhopaul arrived in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with letters from the Nabob addressed to the honourable Major-General Wellesley and to the British Resident at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Court. The object of this mission appeared to be founded on a report, that in consideration of a sum of money Dowlut Rao Scindiah was disposed to grant military aid to the Rajah of Berar for the recovery of the fort and territory of Hosheingabad, and under an apprehension that Dowlut Rao Scindiah might be aided in the prosecution of that measure by the British troops, the Nabob of Bhopaul signified to the Resident, through the channel of his agent, his desire of placing himself under the protection of the British Government on the foundation of the engagements formerly concluded by him with Brigadier-General Goddard.* To this overture the Resident replied in terms of civility by explaining those principles of British policy which preclude the interposition of our power to aid the purposes of conquest, or to influence the result of any contest between states with which the British Government is connected by the ties of amity.

The actual conclusion of any engagement between the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the nature above described, has not been satisfactorily established, but the subsequent march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the vicinity of Hosheingabad, and his proceedings in that quarter warrant a belief that either such an engagement was actually concluded, or that the expedition was undertaken (probably at the suggestion of Serjie Rao Ghautka) with views of plunder or extortion, or lastly, that the pretext of such an engage-

* The officer who commanded the detachment which marched across the Peninsula from Bengal to reinforce the Bombay army in the Mahratta war of 1779-80.

ment was intended eventually to cover the execution of a plan of general combination against the British power, which by every artifice of indefatigable intrigue, Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his partizans had endeavoured to excite, and which there is some reason to suspect was at one period of time a matter of deliberation at the Courts of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

In consequence of what passed at the conference of the 8th of September, the substance of which is described in former paragraphs,* the Resident deemed it necessary to send a message to the minister requiring a reply to the memorial which the Resident had addressed to him on the 19th of July (of which a copy is annexed to this despatch, as noticed in a former paragraph) stating the utter failure of the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to afford any assistance to the division of British troops under the command of Colonel Murray, and formally demanding an explanation of the means and the mode by which Dowlut Rao Scindiah proposed to execute that article of his defensive engagements which imposes upon him an obligation to aid the common cause by the efficient employment of his military power and the resources of his country. This message produced a request on the part of the minister (then confined by illness) that the Resident's native Secretary should be directed to attend him. The Resident's native Secretary accordingly attended the minister on the 14th of September. On that occasion the conversation of the minister was principally composed of assurances of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's sincere determination to adhere to the faith of his engagements; of a description of the pecuniary embarrassments which interrupted the active execution of those engagements; of complaints of the delay which had occurred in affording the pecuniary aid expected from the British Government; of a demand for the immediate payment of the revenue collected from the provinces of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah Kerra, and of the minister's surprize at the unnecessary anxiety which the Resident had expressed on a point so immaterial as the continuance of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's vakeel in the city of Boorhanpoor. Having stated these points in general terms, the minister proceeded to ob-

* P. 405.

serve, that although the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah might afford occasional cause of dissatisfaction, the minister pledged himself for the security of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's adherence to the faith of the alliance. The minister added that he had employed the influence which he still maintained over Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to impress upon his mind a just sense of the policy of maintaining his engagements with the British power. That he considered the interests of his sovereign to be inseparable from the preservation of the alliance, and finally that the principal object of requesting the attendance of the Resident's native Secretary, was to communicate a secret assurance, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah should meditate plans repugnant to the essential principles of the alliance, the minister would himself expose them to the Resident.

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the minister Bappoojee Wittul's disposition to secure and promote the interests of the alliance, as affording the only prospect of restoring any degree of dignity, vigour and prosperity to the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and under the continued operation of that minister's influence it is probable that the conduct of that chieftain would have corresponded with the obvious dictates of his interest and honour, but the protracted illness of the minister Bappoo Wittul, which unhappily terminated in his death, favoured the success of the intrigues which Serjie Rao Ghautka employed with indefatigable ardour, for the purpose of regaining his ascendancy over the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; he gradually assumed the control over the chief departments of the government, and before the decease of the nominal chief minister Bappoo Wittul the actual administration of affairs appeared to be completely settled in the hands of Serjie Rao Ghautka.

In the meantime Dowlut Rao Scindiah, accompanied by his family and by all his ministers, with the exception of Bappoo Wittul, marched from his encampment near Boorhanpore.

After his conference of the 8th of September, the Resident continued to expect the promised explanation relative to the intercourse between Serjie Rao Ghautka and the vakeel of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. But Dowlut Rao Scindiah

having commenced his march without affording any explanation upon that subject, or any communication of his intended route, whilst general report assigned to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the intention of proceeding by regular marches to Hosheingabad; the Resident deemed it proper to address a memorial to the minister upon this subject. In that memorial the Resident stated, that, if Dowlut Rao Scindiah should proceed into Malwa by the direct route, it would be practicable for the force under the command of Colonel Murray to join Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the Nerbuddah, and having established his Highness's authority in Chuly Myhessur to accompany him to his capital, but that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah had resolved to march by the route of Hosheingabad, those advantages must be relinquished; that the march by the direct route of Chuly Myhessur would be conducive to many objects of the war, and of the alliance, but that the circuitous route by Hosheingabad appeared to be unattended with any benefit whatever.

The increasing illness of the minister having precluded all communication with him on points of business, the Resident transmitted this memorial directly to Scindiah's Durbar; but the Resident received no communication in reply, and was compelled to abandon every hope of obtaining satisfaction upon any of the points which had so long been the subject of representation and remonstrance to the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

In this state of circumstances, the Resident deemed it advisable to refrain from the further agitation of any of those points, and to await the sentiments and instructions of the Governor-General on the facts submitted to his judgment.

The progress of transactions at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as connected with the subjects of the Resident's negotiations, and the actual condition of that chieftain's affairs are reviewed by the Resident, Mr. Webbe, with so much ability and precision, in a despatch to the Governor-General, under date the 1st of October, that the Governor-General deems it expedient to transcribe the following extract from that despatch, as well as to transmit a copy of it as an enclosure in this address.

“The continued and severe illness of Bappoo Wittul Punt may be an ostensible cause of withholding from me the explanations which I have

lately had occasion to demand from the Durbar, but in the mean time, the actual administration of affairs has apparently been so much settled in the hands of Serjie Rao Ghautka, as to afford a reasonable doubt that in the event of his recovery, the present minister would be able to re-establish his influence and power. Under these circumstances, it seems to be requisite to seek the explanations in questions from the overt conduct of the Government.

“ These points may be reduced, 1st. to the conduct of Scindiah on the subject of Holkar's vakeel ; and, 2nd. to the means proposed to be adopted for repairing the evils produced by the distraction of the civil government in Malwa, and by the defection of Bapoojee Scindiah. 1st. Your Excellency will have observed that the ministers and Scindiah himself were not only acquainted with the residence of Holkar's vakeel in Burhanpore; but that the right of detaining that person has been formally justified. Notwithstanding my public demand for the dismissal of that vakeel, that one of the first acts of Serjie Rao Ghautka, after his arrival in this camp, was to hold communication with the enemy's vakeel, which communication was avowedly known to the ministers ; that I had made that transaction the public ground of my determination to hold no intercourse even with a person so nearly connected with Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; that notwithstanding my formal demand of satisfactory explanations on that point, combined with my declaration that these explanations could only be rendered satisfactory by the overt measures of the government, Serjie Rao Ghautka has gradually been advanced to power, and now possesses the supreme direction of the government. It only remains to add (what may perhaps be considered the natural consequences of such a procedure), that in contempt of the assurances I have received that such explanations would be afforded, as to remove all doubt from your Excellency's mind relative to the intentions of this Government, Cundo Punt, the vakeel of Holkar, has accompanied our march from Burhanpore, and is now actually in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

2nd. Your Excellency will have observed that my most urgent applications for the removal of the seat of government into Malwa, for the purpose of enabling Dowlut Rao Scindiah to perform his engagements, and of remedying the injurious consequences of Bapoojee Scindiah's conduct, have been uniformly resisted on the ground of the impossibility of the Maharajah's moving without pecuniary aid from the British Government ; that notwithstanding the continuance of the stated objection, Dowlut Rao Scindiah has actually marched ; that instead of connecting that movement with the operations of the British force at Ougein, in conformity to a formal suggestion from me, he has finally resolved to pursue the circuitous route of Hosheingabad, in consequence of which all improvement of the civil or military affairs in Malwa must continue suspended for a further time of at least six weeks, at the critical period of renewing hostilities ; and in consequence of which the arrival of the Maharajah in Malwa, is rendered extremely uncertain by the position now occupied by the force under Meer Khaun in Bilsa.

The inference from these circumstances is, 1st. that this government

does not intend to afford me any satisfaction on the subject of Holkar's vakeel ; and 2nd. That Dowlut Rao Scindiah does not entertain a serious intention of marching to Ougein, or perhaps into Malwa.

If Dowlut Rao Scindiah intends to persist in maintaining an avowed agent of Jeswunt Rao Holkar in his camp, or to refrain from all co-operation with the British Government in the prosecution of the present war, the case will require such measures to be adopted at this Court as may appear to be proper to your Excellency's wisdom ; in the meantime I hope that your Lordship will consider me to have omitted no practicable mode of impressing on the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of his ministers, the sentiments which may be excited in your Excellency's breast by this maintenance of a public intercourse with the enemy's vakeel, or by Scindiah's failure to discharge any part of the obligations of the defensive alliance ; it appears to me therefore to be improbable that by persisting to agitate these important points, I can expect to produce any change in the plans which Dowlut Rao Scindiah seems distinctly by his conduct to have adopted. But on the contrary, it is probable, I think, that by urging these points further, I may precipitate questions of the greatest magnitude, and involve our affairs at this Court in circumstances which might embarrass the judgment to be formed by your Excellency eventually on the facts I have related."

On the receipt of this despatch, the Governor-General deemed it necessary to issue without delay instructions to the Resident on the subject, of the measures to be pursued in the actual condition of affairs, as described in the Resident's despatch of the 1st of October, and in his despatches of anterior dates.

The Governor-General concurred generally in the opinion stated by the Resident in that despatch, with regard to the views and intentions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of his father-in-law, Serjie Rao Ghautka. The Governor-General was not disposed to deduce from the general conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, or from any of the circumstances stated by the Resident, conclusions unfavourable to the credit of that chieftain's fidelity to his alliance with the British Government. It appeared to his Excellency that the continuance of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's vakeel in Scindiah's camp, however repugnant to the maxims of public faith which regulate the conduct of European states, might be justly ascribed to that extraordinary combination of the forms of pacific intercourse with actual hostility which usually distinguishes the conduct of a Mahratta court in its contests with any branches of the general confederacy. It was obvious however, that this vakeel might be rendered the instrument of

dangerous intrigues on the part of the enemy at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; the Governor-General therefore determined to direct the Resident to urge the dismissal of the vakeel, but not to proceed to the extent of declaring the alternative of his continuance in camp, to be a dissolution of the alliance. The Governor-General was also of opinion, that the object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intended march to Hosheingabad, was to acquire some pecuniary profit, or to provide means of satisfying his troops by interfering in the contest between the Rajah of Berar, and the Nabob of Bhopaul, and that the prospect of plunder or of pay might have induced the troops of Scindiah to march in the direction of Hosheingabad, although they might not have consented to proceed directly to the capital without that degree of relief from the pressure of their immediate wants, which could only be afforded by the aid of the British Government. It was obvious at the same time, that the march of Scindiah with his army to Hosheingabad, was favourable to the renewal of a confederacy between the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, especially under the actual existence of circumstances which had a tendency to that effect. The latest information from the Resident at Nagpore, justified a belief that the Rajah of Berar was disposed to take advantage of any opportunity favourable to the prosecution of hostilities against the British power, and a body of his troops actually occupied a position not far distant from Hosheingabad. It appeared to be probable that Vincajee Bhouslah the brother of the Rajah of Berar, whose personal interests had materially suffered by the operation of the treaty of Deogaum,* and whose counsels are known to be hostile to the British Government, might take advantage of the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Hosheingabad to accomplish a meeting with that chieftain, and in concert with Serjie Rao Ghautka, might succeed in overcoming Dowlut Rao Scindiah's reluctance to any combination of his interests with those of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. For these reasons, the Governor-General deemed it extremely desirable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be dissuaded from prosecuting his march to Hosheingabad, or at least that all communication between Scindiah's army

* The Treaty of Peace concluded with the Rajah of Berar in 1803.

and that of the Rajah of Berar, and especially a meeting between Scindiah and Vincajee Bhouslah should be prevented.

The Governor-General was however satisfied that in the actual condition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's affairs, remonstrances alone could not be expected to influence his determination with respect to the proposed expedition to Hosheingabad, and that any severity and importunity of remonstrance would tend to irritate his mind and dispose him to listen to the evil counsels of those among his ministers, who were adverse to the British interests. It became necessary therefore to consider what measures could be adopted by the British Government of a nature calculated to dispose and to enable the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to act according to the true spirit and interest of the alliance.

It was evident that whatever might be the disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, he was unable in the actual condition of his affairs, to render to the British Government any effectual aid in the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and hence the question arose, whether any pecuniary aid on the part of the British Government would afford to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the means of co-operation, and what security existed for the application of such pecuniary aid to the objects of the alliance. It was obvious, that a considerable period of time must elapse before the amount of the pecuniary aid which the British Government might afford, could be realized in the treasury of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; that an additional interval would be occupied in equipping a force capable of active and efficient service in the field, (especially in the weak and defective state of that chieftain's military power and resources) and that a further space of time must be calculated for the arrival of that force at the point where its operations against the enemy might be destined to commence.

Admitting therefore the faithful application of the proposed pecuniary aid to its intended purposes, it might reasonably be expected that before the military force of Dowlut Rao Scindiah could be brought into efficient action, the power of the enemy would have been completely subdued by the operations of the British troops. In the actual constitution of Scindiah's government, and in the personal character of that

chieftain however, no ground of security was discernible for the application of the proposed pecuniary aid to its intended purposes; and under any circumstances, while Serjie Rao Ghautka continued to maintain his influence in the councils of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General considered any advance of money to that government to be equally hazardous and unprofitable, unless by some arrangement its application could be rendered independent of the power or counsels of Serjie Rao Ghautka.

The British Government was entitled to expect that some certain and considerable advantage to the common cause should counterbalance the inconvenience of affording to Dowlut Rao Scindiah such an extent of pecuniary aid, as would under any circumstances be necessary to enable that chieftain to co-operate effectually in the war. Such an advantage in the actual situation of Scindiah's affairs was manifestly unattainable; his Excellency therefore resolved to abandon all thought of supplying Dowlut Rao Scindiah with pecuniary funds in the expectation of deriving any assistance in the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar from Scindiah's co-operation.

The Governor-General however deemed it an object of policy to assist the pecuniary resources of Dowlut Rao Scindiah with other views, and under other circumstances.

His Excellency was decidedly of opinion, that for the purpose of disposing and enabling the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to act in conformity to the true spirit and intent of the alliance to the extent of the means which it possessed, it was indispensably necessary that the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be established in the province of Malwa in such a state of efficiency as might enable him to derive from it resources for the support of his government; and that the military power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be invigorated to the extent necessary for the preservation of that authority, and for the purpose of enforcing payment of his just claims of tribute from such of the chieftains of Hindostan as had not been absolved from their connection with Scindiah's government by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of Serjie Anjengaum.

It seemed probable that the prospect of such an improvement in the state of his government would induce Scindiah

to abandon any partial and temporary benefit which he might have been led to expect from the proposed expedition to Hosheingabad, and that, therefore, when apprized of the intentions of the Governor-General in his favour, Dowlu Rao Scindiah would readily consent to proceed to his capital. Until Scindiah's arrival at Ougein, however, the Governor-General did not deem it to be advisable to afford him any pecuniary relief, unless it should be absolutely necessary to a certain extent, to enable him to proceed thither.

It appeared to the Governor-General that with the proposed pecuniary aid, and with the declared intention of the British Government to support Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the establishment of his authority throughout the province of Malwa, and in the realization of his just demands upon his tributary Chieftains and Rajahs, the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah would speedily acquire a sufficient degree of vigour, whilst the prospect of its improvement, and the employment which would be afforded to his civil and military officers, and to a large body of the military class of people, would probably engage the attention of the State, and exclude from Scindiah's Durbar all plans and counsels of a tendency injurious to the British interests.

On the foundation of these sentiments and resolutions instructions were issued to the Resident at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Court. In those instructions the Governor-General suggested to the Resident's attention the measure of rendering the proposed arrangement in favour of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, an instrument for the suppression of Serjie Rao Ghautka's ascendancy and the revival of that of Bappoo Wittul. It seemed probable that Serjie Rao Ghautka owed his ascendancy in the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the confidence with which he had undertaken to provide resources, however oppressive or injudicious, for the immediate exigencies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, and that therefore the agitation of the proposal to afford to Dowlut Rao Scindiah pecuniary aid for the establishment of his authority in Malwa, exclusively through the channel of Bappoo Wittul, would have the effect of restoring that minister's influence. Bappoo Wittul, however, died before these instructions could have reached the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

It did not appear to the Governor-General, that unconnected with acts of positive hostility on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, the dismissal of Serjie Rao Ghautka could be justly demanded; but no obligation of our engagements could be considered to preclude the British Government from rendering the removal of Serjie Rao Ghautka, the condition of the pecuniary aid to be afforded to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Although the Governor-General had resolved to render that pecuniary aid dependent on Dowlut Rao Scindiah's return to Ougein, and eventually on the dismissal of Serjie Rao Ghautka, his Excellency signified to the Resident, that he considered Dowlut Rao Scindiah to possess a claim to the immediate and unconditional payment of all the net revenue of the districts of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah, which had been collected by the British officers; and that the amount, when ascertained, should be immediately paid into the treasury of Scindiah.

The Governor-General also signified to the Resident his disposition to authorize a further advance of money to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, provided it should appear to be absolutely necessary to enable him to return to his capital, and that the Resident should be satisfied of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intention to proceed to Ougein, and of the just application of the money when advanced. The Governor-General at the same time furnished the Resident with instructions relative to the mode of raising funds for the payment of the sums due to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on account of the districts of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah, and for the eventual relief of the exigencies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government after his return to Ougein.

The proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, immediately after his departure from Boorhaunpore, produced an additional ground of indispensable remonstrance with the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Previously to the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it had been officially signified to the Resident, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah intended to proceed to Jellode, a place situated within his own territory, from whence it was his intention to settle the future direction of his march. On the morning of the day however, on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had resolved to march to Jellode, and after both he and the Resident had

actually marched, Dowlut Rao Scindiah, without any communication to the Resident, changed his route, and subsequently proceeded to the borders of Bhopaul. Severe illness prevented the Resident from overtaking Scindiah's army during three days; and on the Resident's arrival in camp, Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army was in motion to invade the territory of Bhopaul. The Resident followed Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Cheonee, a small fortified village within the territory of Bhopaul, which his troops were employed in attacking under the conduct of Serjie Rao Ghautka. The Resident availed himself of the earliest opportunity of making a representation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah through Mr. Jenkins, the Secretary to the Residency on the subject of his proceedings, Mr. Jenkins accordingly repaired to the Durbar, and after having adverted to the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as described above, proceeded to remark its inconsistency with the obligations of the defensive alliance. Mr. Jenkins observed to his Highness, that in reply to the Resident's repeated applications, the Resident had been informed, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was unable to march without receiving pecuniary aid from the British Government, but that although no such aid had been afforded, Dowlut Rao Scindiah had already marched a distance, which in the direction recommended by the Resident, would have enabled him to have formed a junction with the British forces under Colonel Murray. That the late movement of his Highness's army, instead of being connected with any single object of the contest with Holkar, was directed to the execution of hostile designs against the Nabob of Bhopaul, who had maintained the relations of amity and peace both with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the British Government. That this procedure constituted a violation of the principles of the defensive alliance, which were directly adverse to aggressive war and conquest. That an attack therefore upon the independent territory of Bhopaul was contrary to the provisions of the subsidiary treaty, and that war having been provoked by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the obligations of that treaty were equally violated by the employment of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's forces in the accomplishment of designs utterly unconnected with the war, and calculated to augment the number of the enemies of both states. Mr. Jenkins concluded this remonstrance by exhorting Dowlut

Rao Scindiah to adopt a system of conduct more conformable to the honour and advantage of the allied states.

In reply to this representation, after many attempts to evade the subject, Dowlut Rao Scindiah began by justifying his conduct towards the Nabob of Bhopaul, by asserting that the Nabob of Bhopaul was a tributary to his government. In answer to the Resident's remarks upon his Highness's conduct, as connected with the war, his Highness repeated his former declaration, that he was destitute of the means of co-operating with the British forces, that a force of at least 30,000 horse would be necessary to enable him to render any service against Holkar. That Colonel Murray had no cavalry, and that Holkar's army was principally composed of cavalry. That under these circumstances Dowlut Rao Scindiah had resolved to pursue the route of Bhopaul, which enabled him to collect an army. That accordingly having moved to that quarter, his officers were disposed to join him, from which measure they would otherwise have been withheld, by the defect of pecuniary resources. That his Highness's march to Bhopaul was not as the Resident alleged, unconnected with the objects of the war, but that the design of his Highness was, by levying contributions from the Nabob of that territory, to place his army in a condition to act with effect against the enemy.

With a view to supply the means of forming a judgment of the sincerity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the preceding explanation, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to insert in this place the Resident's remarks upon it.

“ The answer of Dowlut Rao Scindiah appears to me to have been delivered in a spirit of the utmost insincerity and unfriendliness.

“ The Nabob of Bhopaul is not a tributary state to Scindiah, so considered, although it is true that he has been subjected to such exactions as the superior force of Scindiah has occasionally rendered it convenient for him to enforce, but the true object of Scindiah's march to this place was founded on a plan concerted between him and the Rajah of Nagpore, for the purpose of assisting Raggoojee Bhouslah, in wresting the fort and territory of Hosheingabad from the Nabob of Bhopaul. This plan has long been mentioned as an object of notoriety, but I did not consider myself at liberty to make a formal representation on the subject either to the Durbar or to your Excellency; but I have this morning been furnished with such proofs as leave no doubt of the fact in my mind, and I am accordingly informed, that the troops of Nagpore, stationed at the distance of about thirty coss from Hosheingabad, have been ordered to

resume their march towards that place, since the invasion of the Bhopaul territory by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Whatever interpretation, therefore, may be given to the condition of the Nabob of Bhopaul, in relation to the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it is my opinion that the Maharajah has violated the 8th article of the treaty of defensive alliance, by commencing and pursuing a negotiation with the Rajah of Nagpore, without giving previous notice, and entering into mutual consultation with the British Government, and this violation of his engagements, by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, appears to me to be the more aggravated at the present crisis, as its obvious consequence is to detach from the objects of the war against Holkar, whatever power the Maharajah may be supposed to command, as well as to augment the number of our enemies by precipitating the Nabob of Bhopaul into an intimate alliance with Meer Khan."

The opinion that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had actually engaged to assist the Rajah of Berar in his designs upon Hosheingabad is corroborated by information contained in a letter from the Resident at Nagpore, dated the 30th of September, that about three weeks before that date, a letter had been received at Nagpore from Ballajee Eshwunt, a person who had been despatched by the Rajah of Berar on a mission to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, purporting, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had agreed to the Rajah of Berar's proposal respecting Hosheingabad.

The Governor-General in Council suspends the narrative of transactions at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to announce to your honourable Committee, the melancholy event of the death of Mr. Josiah Webbe, the Resident at that chieftain's court, which happened on the 9th of November near Hosheingabad after a severe illness.

The grief and concern with which the Governor-General in Council received the intelligence of this unhappy event, was proportioned to the high sense which the Governor-General in Council entertained of the eminent zeal, knowledge, talents, and public virtue of that invaluable officer, manifested during a long course of arduous and important public duty in the honourable and successful discharge of which, his indefatigable exertions, incorruptible integrity, and distinguished services, have established a claim to the continued applause and gratitude of his country.

The arrangements by which Mr. Webbe was removed from the high executive office of Chief Secretary to that government, enabled the Governor-General to employ that able

officer in the diplomatic situation of Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to which Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm had been provisionally appointed. Mr. Webbe arrived at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, near Boorhanpore, and assumed the duties of Resident at that chieftain's court in the beginning of the month of May. The ability and judgment with which Mr. Webbe conducted the arduous negotiations at the court of that chieftain, have uniformly claimed the highest approbation of this government.

The loss of the distinguished services of the late Mr. Webbe, was peculiarly regretted by the Governor-General in Council, with reference to the critical situation of affairs at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as connected with the interests of the British Government at the period of Mr. Webbe's decease.

Independently of those sources of suspicion relative to the nature of the designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under the pernicious influence of Serjie Rao Ghautka, which appear in the preceding narrative, the Governor-General received intelligence from the Secretary to the late Resident, in a private letter addressed to the Secretary in the Secret Department, dated on the day following that of Mr. Webbe's death, that Serjie Rao Ghautka had actually addressed letters to Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his partizan Meer Khaun, proposing and promising the active co-operation of Scindiah's military force in the prosecution of hostilities against the British power.

With a view therefore to supply the defect of Mr. Webbe's eminent services in the actual crisis of affairs with the least practicable delay, the Governor-General in Council deemed it expedient to direct Colonel Close, the Resident at Poonah, to proceed with the utmost practicable expedition to the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of assuming the temporary charge of our affairs at that court. In the meantime, the duties of that Residency devolved upon Mr. Richard Jenkins, a writer of the year 1798, on the establishment of Bombay, who in the month of February was appointed to be Assistant Secretary to the Residency.

The distinguished talents and acquirements of Mr. Jenkins, added to the extensive knowledge of the languages of India which he had attained, and the exemplary conduct of that gentleman during his residence in Bengal, induced the Go-

vernor-General to appoint him to the office of Assistant Secretary to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for which situation also Mr. Jenkins had an opportunity of acquiring additional qualifications by his previous appointment to be an acting Assistant in the Governor-General's office. The confidence which the Governor-General reposed in Mr. Jenkins' judgment, knowledge and abilities, precluded all apprehension of hazard to the public interests by that gentleman's continuance in charge of the duties of Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. In so delicate and important a crisis of affairs however, as that which existed at the period of Mr. Webbe's decease, the Governor-General considered it to be his duty to assign the temporary discharge of the duties of that arduous situation to a more experienced public officer.

In conformity to the arrangement proposed for the temporary conduct of negotiations at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, instructions were issued to Colonel Close, directing that officer to commence his journey to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at the earliest practicable period of time after the receipt of those instructions. On that occasion, copies of such of the late Resident's despatches as were calculated to afford distinct and accurate information with regard to the late proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to the condition of the British interests at that chieftain's court, were transmitted to Colonel Close. The Governor-General also communicated to Colonel Close, the information which his Excellency had received of Serjie Rao Ghautka's having addressed letters to Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Meer Khaun, assuring them of the aid of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's forces. The Governor-General intimated to the Resident his belief of that information, as being consistent with the known principles and character of Serjie Rao Ghautka; observing, that although his Excellency deemed it highly improbable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had authorized, or was even apprized of this traitorous proceeding, or that Scindiah was disposed to enter into any confederacy with Holkar, or with the Rajah of Berar for purposes hostile to the British Government, or that the Rajah of Berar intended any such act of treachery, the inconvenience of such a confederacy, required serious and

immediate attention, and that his Excellency therefore deemed it expedient, that the army under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Wallace should proceed with the least practicable delay consistent with other indispensable objects of military service, to occupy a position calculated to restrain or counteract any hostile attempt which Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar might actually meditate against the British possessions, or those of our allies. Colonel Close was at the same time apprized that it was the wish and intention of the Governor-General to use every endeavour by amicable negotiation, to remove these causes of insecurity and alarm, and that the conduct of that negotiation was the immediate object of Colonel Close's mission to the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Colonel Close was informed that the detail of the representations which he would be required to make to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on his arrival at his camp, would form the subject of a separate despatch. In the meantime however, Colonel Close was apprized that it was the Governor-General's intention to urge the immediate return of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to his capital, and eventually the dismissal of Serjie Rao Ghautka from the counsels of that chieftain. Colonel Close was directed to proceed in the first instance to the camp of the combined subsidiary forces of Poonah and Hyderabad then occupying a position near Bornair, as stated in a former paragraph, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, and after having concerted with that officer a disposition of the forces under his command best calculated to check Scindiah's operations, and for the eventual prosecution of military operations both against that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar, to proceed to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and assume the temporary charge of the residency at that court. The honourable Major-General Wellesley having returned to the Deccan, vested with the same extensive military and political powers, which were delegated to that officer during the late war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, the Governor-General deemed it expedient to desire that if practicable, Colonel Close should carry these instructions into effect, under the immediate guidance of Major General Wellesley's authority.

Corresponding instructions were at the same time issued

to Mr. Jenkins, and a letter was also addressed by the Governor-General to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, apprizing him of this arrangement.

Until the arrival of Colonel Close however, Mr. Jenkins was authorized to conduct the duties of the Residency, as the officiating representative of the British Government, and in that capacity of Mr. Jenkins was further authorized to commence the negotiations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah prescribed by the Governor-General's instructions to the late Resident, under date the 5th of November, the substance of which is stated in former paragraphs of this despatch.

With a view to provide for the due discharge of the duties of the Residency at Poonah during the absence of Colonel Close, the Governor-General deemed it necessary to appoint some officer duly qualified to the temporary charge of that situation, and the Governor-General in Council was glad to be enabled by the return of Captain T. Sydenham from Europe, to employ the services of that officer on this occasion.

During a considerable period of time Captain Sydenham held the office of Secretary to the Residency of Hyderabad, and officiated as Resident at that court; and for many years Captain Sydenham's attention has been assiduously directed to the political affairs of India. These advantages, combined with distinguished abilities, and extensive general and local knowledge, rendered Captain Sydenham, in the Governor-General's judgment peculiarly qualified for the discharge of the duties of Resident at Poonah.

The Governor-General accordingly directed Captain Sydenham to proceed with the utmost expedition to Poonah for the purpose of assuming charge of that office during the absence of Colonel Close.

Previously to the resumption of the narrative of transactions at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to communicate to your honourable Committee the origin and progress of such proceedings at the court of Nagpore as are connected with the general subject of this despatch.

In the preceding part of this despatch the Governor-General in Council has had occasion to advert generally to a suspected renewal of the confederacy between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, directed to the objects of

an united co-operation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the prosecution of hostilities against the British power and possessions. Abundant proof exists of the indefatigable endeavours of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his partizans to produce that combination, and with a view to excite and encourage a spirit of revolt and hostility amongst the subjects, dependants and allies, of the British Government to disseminate throughout India a belief that such a combination had actually been formed; that the army of Jeswunt Rao Holkar had been eminently successful, and that a favourable opportunity was afforded for the accomplishment of every object of ambition, rapine and revenge, of which the gratification might be considered to depend upon the decline of the British power and influence in India. To the operation of those endeavours must be referred the ground of those suspicions which the Governor-General in Council has been induced to entertain of the Rajah of Berar's designs.

The first intimation which the Governor-General received of circumstances which justified any suspicion of the Rajah of Berar's disposition to support the cause of the enemy was contained in a despatch from the Resident at Nagpore, dated the 28th of August, in which the Resident apprized the Governor-General in Council that very exaggerated accounts of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's supposed successes had been received at Nagpore, and excited general attention; that the intention of the Rajah of Berar to take advantage of the supposed state of affairs by an effort to retrieve the losses of the past war was a topic of general discourse; and that the Resident had received intelligence of various plans for that purpose, said to be in the contemplation of the Rajah, and that the Rajah held frequent and most secret consultations with his ministers.

This information was in some degree corroborated by another despatch from the Resident at Nagpore, dated the 3rd September, 1804, communicating the substance of letters addressed to the Rajah of Berar by his chief civil officer in Ruttenpore, and by an officer of the Rajah's, in his province of Ryepore, and of the Rajah's answer. The letter from Ruttenpore contained a proposition to seize the province of Sumbulpore (the independance of which had been guaranteed by the operation of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum), and the letter from Ryepore suggested the co-operation of the

Rajah of Berar in a projected attempt on the part of the principal Zemindars and Rajahs of Cuttack, especially the Rajah of Khoordah (one of the chief tributary Rajahs of the province of Cuttack, whose territory forms its southern frontier) to subvert the British authority in that province. The letter from the Rajah of Berar expressed his approbation of their plans, and contained instructions with regard to the mode of carrying them into effect, and an earnest recommendation of secrecy and caution.

On the receipt of this despatch, the Governor-General deemed it expedient to issue instructions to the Resident at Nagpore, directing him to take a proper opportunity of apprizing the Rajah of Berar in the most public manner of the information which the British Government had received with regard to his proceedings; that the Governor-General had deemed it necessary, without awaiting any explanation, to make preparatory arrangements for the eventual purpose of repelling aggression and punishing treachery on the part of the Rajah; that accordingly Major-General Wellesley had returned to the army of the Deccan, with orders to march directly to Nagpore in the event of any unquestionable indication which the Rajah might manifest of a design to commit acts of hostility against the British Government or its allies, or of any proceeding of the Rajah in favour of our enemies. That the Governor-General was also prepared to take further measures for the just punishment of the Rajah of Berar in such an event; and that if the Rajah of Berar, after the lenity and moderation manifested towards him in the late peace, should by his treachery and incurable spirit of restless intrigue, compel the British Government to renew the war, the Governor-General resolved to call forth the whole power and resources of the Company against a state so devoid of every principle of good faith, and not to desist until the government of the Rajah should have been effectually reduced.

The Resident, however, was directed to suspend these representations until he should have learned the result of the Commander-in-Chief's first operations against Holkar, unless circumstances should render an immediate statement of them useful and necessary.

The Resident was at the same time instructed to assure the Rajah of the most amicable disposition of the British

Government towards him while he should continue to abide by his engagements under the late peace; and to suggest to his consideration the danger of a connection with Holkar, or any other desperate adventurer, at the hazard of renewing the war with the British power. The Resident was further directed to apprise the Rajah that the Governor-General would consider him to be responsible for the conduct of his officers in Ruttenpore and Ryepore with relation to the independent province of Sumbulpore, and that any proceedings on the part of those officers of the nature described in the intelligence conveyed in the Resident's despatch of the 3rd ultimo, would be considered by the British Government to constitute a positive proof of the authenticity of that intelligence as it respected the conduct of the Rajah himself, as well as that of his officers, and to justify an immediate appeal to arms.

Instructions were at this time issued to Colonel Harcourt commanding the British troops in Cuttack, authorizing the adoption of measures for suppressing the execution of the designs imputed to the Rajah of Khoordah. The proceedings of Colonel Harcourt under these instructions, will be found detailed in a subsequent part of this despatch.

Instructions were also issued to Lieut.-Colonel Broughton prescribing the measures to be adopted for the eventual protection of the province of Sumbulpore against the supposed designs of the officers of the Rajah of Berar, and a re-inforcement was subsequently dispatched from Fort William for the purpose of enabling Lieut.-Colonel Broughton to provide for this object, as well as for the defence of our western frontier, as will be found detailed in preceding paragraphs.

In the course of the month of September, the Resident received through various channels, secret intelligence, corroborating the suspicion of the Rajah of Berar's designs. The substance of that intelligence was, that the Rajah was earnestly engaged in devising the means of raising extraordinary funds. That he held frequent consultations with his confidential officers on that subject; that he had determined with their advice to augment his army for the eventual purpose of supporting the cause of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from whom he was represented to have received

letters urging his co-operation; and that his ultimate resolution appeared to be, to place his army in a position, which without exciting suspicion, might enable him to take advantage of circumstances favourable to the prosecution of his views of co-operation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The general tenor of this intelligence, combined with the Rajah of Berar's covert proceedings, indicated that the Rajah hesitated between his disposition to assist the enemy, and his dread of the consequences of that measure.

The Governor-General in Council deems it expedient to interrupt the narrative of transactions at the Court of Nagpore, immediately connected with the subject of the war with Jeswunt Rao Holkar for the purpose of stating in general terms, the progress of the discussion relative to the grant of compensation for the loss which the Rajah had sustained by the alienation of the provinces of Sumbulpore, Patna, &c. from his dominion under the operation of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum. The circumstances of this subject of negotiation are explained in the 126 and following paragraphs of our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 13th of July, 1804. Your honourable Committee was informed by that despatch that the Rajah of Berar had accepted the list of chieftains and zemindars rendered independent of his government by the operation of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum; and had delivered a written recognition of the engagements concluded by the British Government with those chieftains and Zemindars, but had refused to accept the proposed articles of agreement, additional to that treaty, which provided a compensation to the Rajah for his loss of the revenues of the provinces above mentioned.

It manifestly appeared not merely by the Rajah's rejection of those beneficial articles, but by the general tenor of his declarations and those of his ministers, that the Rajah still considered the alienation of the provinces in question to be an act of injustice and a violation of faith on the part of the British Government.

The Governor-General in Council therefore in his instructions to the Resident, (of the 5th of September) in reply to a reference from that officer on the subject of the compensation to be eventually granted to the Rajah of Berar, and which the Rajah, after accepting the list of feudatories, had

distinctly solicited, notwithstanding his refusal to accept the proposed additional articles, stated the following observations on that subject for the regulation of the Resident's conduct. That if the Rajah of Berar were capable of understanding the principles of public faith and honour, he must be satisfied of the obligations imposed upon the British Government to maintain the independence of the provinces alienated from the dominions of the Rajah by the operation of the treaty of Deogaum. That the Rajah must be satisfied that the British Government had no intention to establish its authority within those provinces, or to derive any tribute or revenue from them; and that consequently the British Government had no other interest in refusing to place those provinces under the authority of the Rajah of Berar, than such as was absolutely involved in a due adherence to the obligations of public faith. That while the Rajah of Berar continued to entertain such erroneous sentiments with regard to the faith and justice of the British Government, the Governor-General in Council could not consent to grant any compensation whatever. That the Governor-General would not permit that, which was offered as compensation for involuntary injury to the Rajah of Berar proceeding from the necessary operation of our public engagements with a third party, to be received as a compensation for a deliberate act of injustice on the part of the British Government, and that to grant compensation to the Rajah of Berar under such circumstances, would be an acknowledgement of the justice of his accusation. Finally, that the British Government would be disposed to relieve the Rajah from the difficulties to which he might be exposed on account of the alienation of the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna by an equitable compensation, whenever the Rajah should be disposed to abandon his claim to the possession of those provinces, and to receive such compensation with the sentiments due to the moderation, justice and liberality of the British Government.

After the receipt of these instructions, the Resident availed himself of an early opportunity of stating to the Rajah's minister, the substance of the preceding observations; the minister's reply to this communication being a distinct and candid admission of the justice and equity of the proceedings

of the British Government with respect to the question under consideration, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to insert that reply in this place, in the terms of the Resident's Report.

“Sreedur Pundit (the Rajah of Berar's chief minister) then said that the Rajah admitted the justice of your Excellency's proceedings on that article; that what his Highness had alledged to the contrary, was merely brought forward to serve his argument which he had maintained to please his brother. He said that the Rajah had desired him to make this declaration, and would repeat it himself when he saw me, that he was sent with orders to use every expression that could satisfy my mind on the subject, and enable me to remove any idea that your Lordship might have of the Rajah's entertaining the least doubt of the spirit of justice and disinterestedness which influenced your Excellency's decision. He said, he hoped that after this declaration, the Rajah might expect your Lordship would grant him the advantages you had at first proposed “as a mark of your friendship.” He asked me whether I thought your Lordship would admit his Highness to the benefits of your original offer; to which, I answered, that as the Rajah had now withdrawn the unjust and groundless complaints with which your Excellency had been displeased, I thought he had every thing to hope from the friendship of the British Government.”

The Resident concluded the report of his conference with the minister by stating that the whole of the minister's discourse was remarkable for the unusual earnestness with which he asserted the Rajah's fidelity to his engagements, and his attachment to the British Government.

The tenor of this despatch tended considerably to weaken the suspicions which the Governor-General in Council had entertained of the hostile intentions of the Rajah of Berar, and although the Governor-General in Council still deemed it probable that under the belief of a great and extraordinary success on the part of Holkar, and of a proportionate depression of the British power, the Rajah of Berar would join the enemy, the Governor-General in Council was of opinion that the information which the Rajah would speedily receive of the defeat of Holkar's troops by the army under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief in the commencement of October would counteract any extravagant expectations of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's future success, and would satisfy his Highness's mind of the folly and the danger of blending his interests and safety with the fortune of that lawless plunderer. The Rajah of Berar therefore having distinctly admitted the

justice and liberality of the British Government in its proceedings with regard to the provinces alienated from the Rajah's dominions by the operation of the treaty of Deogaum, and having manifested a disposition to receive, with a proper sense of obligation, the proposed compensation for his loss of revenue and dominion, the Governor-General deemed it expedient on receipt of the Resident's despatch, to furnish him with instructions regarding the specific nature and extent of such compensation, and to authorise him to commence a negotiation upon that subject with the Rajah of Berar. Instructions to that effect were accordingly despatched to the Resident under date the 2nd of November in the form of notes.

In those notes the Governor-General stated the resolution of the British Government to declare the provinces which had been alienated from the dominion of the Rajah of Berar by the operation of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum, to be placed under the protection of the British Government, in conformity to the tenor of the engagements concluded with the persons exercising the authority in those provinces. This resolution however was unconnected with any design to introduce into those provinces the laws and regulations of the British Government, or interfere in the internal management of them.

Agreeably to this resolution, the Governor-General also subsequently issued instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, directing him to apprise those persons with whom he contracted engagements, confirmed by the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum, that they were to be considered subjects of the British Government, and that their territory was to be considered as annexed to the British dominion, that it was not however the intention of the British Government to introduce into their territories the British laws and regulations, nor to require from them the payment of any revenue, nor to interfere in any respect with the internal management of their territories. Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was further directed to apprise those persons that this arrangement was adopted with a view to enable the British Government to discharge with the greater efficacy, the obligation of protecting the persons and territories in question, from the authority of the Mahratta government. Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was at the same time informed, that under the

arrangement by which the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna were placed under the British authority, it was the intention of the Governor-General to station a force at Sumbulpore, both for the protection of that province and of Patna, against the reported designs of the officers of the Rajah of Berar in Ruttenpore (as described in a preceding paragraph), and for the better security of the frontier of Cuttack in the possible event of the renewal of hostilities with the Rajah of Berar.

With a view to the accomplishment of these objects, without disturbing the arrangements for the defence of our western frontier (referred to in former paragraphs of this despatch) and for the preservation of internal tranquillity, the Governor-General deemed it proper to order the 20th regiment of sepoys, consisting of 596 rank and file, to march with the utmost expedition, for the purpose of re-inforcing the troops under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Broughton; and that regiment accordingly marched on the 18th of November. An additional force of 194 volunteers, and a detachment of artillery also marched on the same day.

Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was at the same time directed to state his opinion with regard to the disposition of the whole force under his command, the most effectual for the accomplishment of the several objects to which his attention had been directed.

The arrangements proposed by Lieut.-Colonel Broughton, in conformity to the instruction of which the substance is above stated, were entirely approved by the Governor-General, and have correspondingly been carried into effect by Lieut.-Colonel Broughton; and at the date of our latest advices, that officer was at Sumbulpore, with the proportion of his force which he was authorized to station in that province; no attempt has been made to disturb the internal tranquillity of the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna, or of any of our western and southern possessions.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of transactions at the Court of Nagpore.

About the middle of October a vakeel, named Hybut Rao, despatched by Meer Khaun (who with his army, occupied a position near Saugur), arrived at Nagpore. He was immediately accommodated at the house of one of the principal

officers of government, and was subsequently admitted to several interviews with the Rajah both public and private. Nearly at the same time, the person stated, in a preceding paragraph, to have been despatched on a mission to Dowlut Rao Scindiah returned to Nagpore; and on his arrival had an interview with the Rajah, who immediately after proceeded to the house of the chief minister, with whom he held a long conference; and on his return to his palace, the Rajah issued orders for the march of his troops at Nagpore, under the command of his principal military officer, who accordingly proceeded in the course of two hours with the troops under his command, to a position near the town where he encamped. On the same night the Rajah directed as many of his chiefs as happened to be present, to collect their troops with the least possible delay. The object of the mission of the vakeel of Meer Khaun, as reported to the Resident, was to induce the Rajah of Berar by promises and menaces, to unite with Meer Khaun in an invasion of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and the vakeel was said to have brought letters both from Holkar and Meer Khaun. The opinion of the Resident with regard to the Rajah's intentions founded on the uncertain basis of private intelligence was that the Rajah of Berar continued to be unwilling to adopt any decided course with relation to Holkar and Meer Khaun, but that he had resolved to prosecute his operations against Hosheingabad, and ultimately to join the cause of Holkar, if Holkar should appear to be successful.

These circumstances, added to the continued dissemination of reports of a nature most unfavourable to the credit of the British arms, rendered it necessary in the judgment of the Resident to confer with the ministers of the Rajah upon the subject, and to warn his Highness of the danger of yielding to the solicitations of the enemy of the British power. The Resident took that occasion to expose the falsehood of the exaggerated accounts which had been received of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's pretended successes, and to explain the real state and nature of the contest with that chieftain.

In reply to this representation, the minister assured the Resident that the Rajah was well informed of the actual state of affairs, and would never be induced by any artifices or persuasions to hazard the prosperity of his own government by a junction with the enemy. The minister then proceeded to

state that Hybut Rao who had been despatched, not by Holkar, but by Meer Khaun, had brought a letter from the latter chieftain, purporting that Meer Khaun was prepared to oppose any attempt on the part of the Rajah of Berar to molest the territory of the Nabob of Bhopaul. The minister added that the Rajah had nevertheless determined to prosecute the expedition against Hosheingabad, and that Succaram Buckshee, the Rajah's principal military officer, had taken the field with that intention.

The intelligence however communicated by the Resident in a subsequent despatch of the 28th of October, was of a nature to corroborate the doubts which the conduct of the Rajah had already excited. The Resident reported in that despatch that the Rajah's army under the command of Succaram Buckshee, had marched to a distance of twenty-five miles from Nagpore, in the direction of Hosheingabad; that the Rajah was employed in entertaining both cavalry and infantry; that he had proceeded to the camp for the purpose of making arrangements for the payment of his troops; that the Governor of the province of Ruttenpore, had assembled a force of much greater extent than the established proportion of troops in that province, the object of which was stated to be the suppression of some refractory Zemindar. That the chief of Gurry Mundela was employed in augmenting the military force under his authority, and in other military preparations, for the ostensible purpose of opposing a body of troops under one of the independent chieftains of the province of Bundelcund, and that the number of troops stationed at Chanda, (a principal town, situated near the bank of the Wurdah, and about eighty miles south of Nagpore), had also been encreased under the plea of preventing an apprehended revolt in that quarter. The Resident justly considered these various military preparations to indicate a disposition, if not an absolute determination on the part of the Rajah to join the enemy, notwithstanding the specious reasons which were assigned for those preparations.

The hostility of the Rajah's designs was further corroborated in the judgment of the Resident, by a communication which he received from the ministers, who by the Rajah's direction waited on the Resident, and stated to him that the Rajah had proceeded to the camp for the purpose of satisfy-

ing his troops on the subject of their pay, and of prevailing upon them to march. That the object of Hybut Rao's mission was not merely to dissuade the Rajah from his intended designs against the territory of Bhopaul, but also to exact from the Rajah a sum of money by a menace of invasion. That under these circumstances the Rajah was compelled to order the advance of his army to the frontier for the protection of his dominions against the menaced hostility of Meer Khaun. The Resident therefore deemed it necessary to remonstrate with the Rajah on this proposed movement of his troops; and for that purpose solicited and obtained a conference with the Rajah immediately after his return from the camp to Nagpore. On this occasion the Resident, after adverting to the communication which he had received from the Rajah, stated to his Highness the obvious improbability of any attempt on the part of Meer Khaun to invade the Rajah's territory, observing, that his highness was on terms of amity both with Holkar and Meer Khaun; and that vakeels from both those chieftains were actually residing at his Highness's court, and that neither the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, nor the extent of Meer Khaun's force was such as to render it compatible with their interest to augment the number of their opponents by an invasion of the Rajah's territories; and the Resident concluded by intimating to the Rajah that the British Government would deduce conclusions with regard to his Highness's designs by a comparison of the movements of the troops of Meer Khaun with those of his Highness's army. In reply the Rajah declared that the destination of his army was to Hoshingabad, and that unless Meer Khaun actually invaded his country, he had no intention of employing his troops in any other direction. The Rajah and his ministers asserted, in the most positive terms the truth of their statement relative to the object of Hybut Rao's mission, and proposed to send for the Resident's inspection the letter which had been received from Meer Khaun.

The Rajah denied the existence of any amicable intercourse or connection with Holkar; observing, that the perfidy of that chieftain in the war with the British Government, had interrupted the relations of amity which formerly subsisted between his Highness and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that the residence of a vakeel on his part was no indication

of friendship. The remaining part of the conference consisted of representations on the part of the Resident, calculated to deter the Rajah from the rash policy of uniting his interests with the desperate fortunes of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of protestations of amity on the part of the Rajah, in the course of which the Rajah submitted to the judgment of the Resident, whether the Resident could suppose that after his Highness's experience of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's perfidy, and of the British power, he could be induced to combine his interests with those of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The Resident concluded his report of this conference by observing that as it appeared that the Rajah's troops were not assembling in a position menacing to the British Government, or to any of its allies, it was not his intention to repeat his remonstrances to the Rajah on the subject of the movements of his troops, unless some additional causes of suspicion should arise. Subsequently to this conference, the Resident was engaged in discussions with the Rajah's ministers on the subject of the interpretation of the letters from Meer Khaun (to the Rajah and his principal minister) which were shewn to the Resident, and of the inferences deducible from the tenor of those letters.

The Resident maintained that although the letters contained no specific or distinct proposition, but referred to the verbal communications of the vakeel, the general tenor of them combined with actual circumstances, manifestly indicated that the object of Hybut Rao's mission was to induce the Rajah to unite with Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the prosecution of hostilities against the British power, and that the denunciation of ruin to the Rajah's power which the letters expressed, referred to Meer Khaun's menace of invasion, in the event of the Rajah's refusal to join the cause of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

The ministers on the other hand maintained their original declaration with regard to the object of Hybut Rao's mission, and asserted, that the designs of Meer Khaun were hostile to the Rajah. It is unnecessary to state the detail of these discussions, the result of which was wholly inconclusive, and justified a suspicion that whatever might be the real object of the mission, the Rajah and his ministers were anxious to conceal it from the British Government. The Resident

therefore resolved to demand a conference with the Rajah, with a view to obtain some satisfactory explanation of this doubtful subject. In the course of these discussions however, intelligence was received at Nagpore of the actual approach of a considerable body of horse under a leader named Nago Jewajee in the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, towards the frontier of the Rajah's province of Gurry Mundela, and that some of his pindarries (or plundering horse) had entered the Rajah's country.

The Resident was admitted to a conference with the Rajah on the 11th of November, and commenced the discourse by apprizing the Rajah that he had communicated to the Governor-General the letters from Meer Khaun, and the explanations which he had received on the subject of them from the Rajah and his ministers; but that some points connected with that subject, yet remained to be explained, for the satisfaction of the Governor-General. The Resident then proceeded to remind the Rajah, that under a natural suspicion that the object of Hybut Rao's mission was hostile to the British interests, the Resident had warned his Highness of the danger of yielding to Ameer Khaun's solicitations; that the minister had on that occasion solemnly assured the Resident that the object of the mission was not to invite the Rajah to a confederacy against the British power, but to apprise him that if his Highness's troops should invade the territory of Bhopaul, they would be opposed by the forces of Meer Khaun. That a few days after, the minister had attended the Resident by the Rajah's direction for the purpose of apprising him that Meer Khaun had demanded a contribution from his Highness, and had menaced his Highness's dominions, for the protection of which his Highness had been compelled to equip his army. That the Resident was induced to believe that the mission of Hybut Rao was directed to no other object, until he had examined the letters brought by that vakeel, from which it manifestly appeared that the object of Hybut Rao's mission was such as the Resident had originally supposed, but which his Highness had so often denied.

The minister replied by stating, that the menace of resisting the invasion of Bhopaul had been declared by Meer Khaun many months past, and that the object of Hybut

Rao's mission was merely to demand from the Rajah the aid of a sum of money.

A protracted discussion then ensued respecting the just interpretation of the terms of Meer Khaun's letters, in the course of which the ministers admitted that the terms of the letters did not correspond with Hybut Rao's verbal declaration of the object of his mission. The Resident noticed the improbability of any such inconsistency between the real object of the mission and the terms of the letters which announced it, and observed that the distinguished reception and accommodation of Hybut Rao, and his long continuance at Nagpore, did not correspond with a mission of which the object was a demand of money, to be supported by a menace of invasion. The ministers appealed to the actual incursion of Meer Khaun's pindarries, in proof of the truth of their assertions, and expressed a desire that the designs of the Rajah might be judged by events alone.

The Governor-General in Council deems it sufficient to have stated in the preceding paragraphs the leading points of this discussion, at the close of which the Resident again warned the Rajah of the danger of confederating against the British power, apprising him that any unequivocal indication of the Rajah's design to aid the enemies of the British power would be followed by the immediate commencement of hostilities against the Rajah's possessions.

It is proper to state in this place that the Governor-General's instructions of the 4th of October (the substance of which is stated in former paragraphs) were received by the Resident near the close of that month, when the conduct of the Rajah manifested peculiar indications of designs hostile to the British Government. The Resident however, not having received at that time information of the proceedings of the Commander-in-chief, until his receipt of which, the Resident was authorized, under certain reservations, to suspend the execution of the Governor-General's instructions, the Resident deemed it advisable to withhold the prescribed remonstrance,—a resolution which the Governor-General entirely disapproved. Subsequently, however, to the conference above described, the information of the Commander-in-chief's successes against Jeswunt Rao Holkar in the commencement of the month of October, having reached Nagpore, the Resi-

dent deemed it expedient to carry into effect the Governor-General's instructions of the 4th of October. At that time the Resident had received intelligence of the actual approach to the frontier of the Rajah of Berar's dominions, of the army under the personal command of Meer Khaun; and of the retreat of the division of the Rajah's forces stationed at Chowraghur (an advanced position whence the operations against Hosheingabad were to have commenced) towards the army of his Highness, under the command of Succaram Buckshee, which had halted at a position about thirty miles from Nagpore in the direction of Hosheingabad. The Resident also received at the same time information of the advance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army towards Chowraghur. Various inferences were deducible from this alteration in the positions and movements of the armies of these chieftains, but they afforded no conviction of the pacific nature of the Rajah of Berar's designs, opposed to those indications of a hostile spirit which the conduct of his Highness had so recently manifested. The Resident therefore demanded an audience of the Rajah for the purpose of conveying to the Rajah the representations and remonstrances prescribed by the Governor-General's instructions of the 4th of October.

On the 23d of November the Resident was admitted to an audience of the Rajah at Ramteg, a town situated at the distance of about twenty miles from Nagpore, where the Rajah had resided since the 14th of that month.

The Resident having addressed the Rajah in terms conformable to the spirit of the Governor-General's instructions, the Rajah denied in the most positive manner, all participation in the alledged intrigues of the officers in Ruttenpore and Ryepore and of the tributaries or zemindars in Cuttack. With regard to his military preparations, the Rajah asserted that they were adopted exclusively with reference to the hostile designs of Meer Khaun; in proof of which, the Rajah proceeded to detail acts of hostility committed by the troops of Meer Khaun, who had actually invaded his Highness's province of Gurry Mundela, where they had been joined by the zemindars of that province, in conjunction with whom, the troops of Meer Khaun had displaced the Rajah's garrisons, destroyed several villages, and plundered one of the principal towns in the province. The Rajah added that

he had equipped the army under the command of Succaram Bukshee for the purpose of opposing that invasion. That this army had been detained in consequence of the Resident's representations, but that its immediate advance now afforded the only prospect of preserving the dominion of the invaded province. The Resident in reply, admitted the propriety of arming for the defence of his Highness's possessions, but observed that his Highness's military preparations had long preceded any apprehension of Meer Khaun's invasion; that his Highness's armament was first stated to be intended against Hosheingabad, and subsequently, for the defence of his Highness's possessions; but that its movements had not corresponded with either of those objects. The Rajah having adverted to the proposed expedition against Hosheingabad, as a measure of which the Resident had himself admitted the propriety, the Resident observed that the Governor-General entertained no design to interfere in the concerns of his Highness with other independent states, but that his Highness's preparations did not appear to be directed to the conquest of Hosheingabad, and that it was the duty of the Governor-General to provide by vigilance and precaution for the safety of the honourable Company's territories and those of our allies. The Resident observed that Dowlut Rao Scindiah also had advanced for the ostensible purpose of employing his troops against Hosheingabad, but that Scindiah had left that place in the rear, and had actually entered the territories of the Rajah; and the Resident requested his Highness to explain the object of that movement. In reply, however, the Rajah positively denied all knowledge of the advance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army within the limits of his Highness's possessions, and expressed his disbelief of it. The Resident having apprized the Rajah of his receipt of advices of that fact from the acting representative of the British Government, who accompanied the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Rajah replied that he had received no information on the subject, and could furnish no explanation of the causes which influenced the alledged movement of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army in the direction of Nagpore. After a further discussion of this subject, without any satisfactory conclusion, the minister proceeded to repeat the professions of the Rajah's

resolution to adhere to the faith of his engagements, and to express his Highness's desire that the Governor-General would believe him to be the firm friend and ally of the British Government, and that the Resident from the knowledge which he had acquired of the Rajah's character would frame his Report of transactions in such a manner as to impress the mind of the Governor-General with a favourable opinion of his Highness; to which the Resident replied by assuring the minister that he should transmit to the Governor-General a just statement of the Rajah's explanations and professions, and by observing that the Rajah was master of his own actions, and if they were of a nature hostile to the British Government, no representations would avail. In the course of this conference of which the principal topics only have been stated, the Resident took occasion to intimate to the Rajah his receipt of instructions relative to the alienated provinces, of a nature calculated to afford his Highness's great satisfaction. The Resident however apprized the Rajah at the same time, that whilst his Highness's conduct should continue to afford reason to doubt the purity of his designs, the Resident was not at liberty to act under those instructions.

The instructions to which the Resident referred on this occasion, are those contained in the Notes of the 2nd of November, adverted to in a preceding paragraph of this despatch.

Subsequently to the date of that conference, intelligence was received of the plunder of Chuppurrah (a place situated about sixty miles north of Nagpore) by Meer Khaun's pindarries; of their having burned a village within thirty miles of Ramteg on the preceding night, and of their intention to advance towards Nagpore. That the Rajah had in consequence commenced his return to Nagpore, and had dispatched several parties of horse to oppose the pindarries.

On the 26th of November, the Rajah's chief executive minister visited the Resident, for the express purpose of communicating the detail of these transactions. The object of this communication was to establish in the Resident's mind, a conviction of the hostility of Meer Khaun, and of the truth of the explanation which the Rajah had originally afforded with respect to the object of Hybut Rao's mission.

The minister earnestly endeavoured to demonstrate that the movements of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army were wholly unconnected with any plan of operations connected with the Rajah; asserting that the army had proceeded through the Rajah's territory without his permission, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's intentions were utterly unknown to his Highness. The minister observed that under the influence of a counsellor, so wicked and abandoned as Serjie Rao Ghautka, Scindiah might be induced to prosecute the most desperate projects. He described Serjie Rao Ghautka to be a sanguinary and ferocious ruffian, who had established an ascendancy over Scindiah's mind by the most profligate arts, and who applied that ascendancy to the most flagitious purposes. The minister added that Serjie Rao Ghautka "was known to have formed connections the most unbecoming his situation, and it was much to be feared, that the most deplorable events might be produced by his pernicious influence." The Resident endeavoured to obtain from the minister an explanation of the nature of the projects and designs to which he appeared to allude. The minister however, merely observed in reply, that various conjectures were formed with regard to the designs of Scindiah, under the guidance of Serjie Rao Ghautka, but that he was certainly augmenting the number of his troops "and that all prudent people were disposed to expect every thing that was daring and unprincipled from counsels that were under the guidance of Serjie Rao Ghautka."

Your honourable Committee will not fail to observe the coincidence of these sentiments with the character and conduct of Serjie Rao Ghautka, and with the proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under the influence of that pernicious minister, as described in a preceding part of this despatch.

The minister subsequently adverted to the supposed intentions of Meer Khaun, intimating that it was generally believed to be his intention (when furnished with supplies of money and grain) to make an attack on Mirzapore. This intimation corresponds with the intelligence which the Governor-General received from Bundelcund and from other quarters with regard to the designs of Meer Khaun. The minister took occasion to advert to the state of the Soubahdar of the Deccan's portion of the province of Berar, with re-

ference to its means of defence against the predatory incursions of the troops of Meer Khaun or Scindiah. The object of the several topics of discourse, introduced by the minister on this occasion appeared to be to produce on the Resident's mind a conviction of the pacific and amicable nature of the Rajah of Berar's disposition and designs. In reply to the Resident's enquiries, the minister subsequently proceeded to explain the disposition of the Rajah's troops, and the arrangements adopted by the Rajah for the purpose of repelling the incursions of Meer Khaun's predatory troops. He declared to the Resident in the most solemn terms, that there was no collusion or deception in the hostile proceedings of that chieftain with respect to the Rajah of Berar; observing that the actual invasion of his Highness's territories by the troops of Meer Khaun, was sufficient to convince the Resident of the truth of his Highness's assertions relative to the object of Hybut Rao's mission.

The Resident in his reply to this discourse observed, that the hostility of Meer Khaun's proceedings had not changed his opinion, with regard to the object of Hybut Rao's mission, which he still believed to have been to induce the Rajah of Berar to unite with Jeswunt Rao Holkar against the British power; that if the Rajah had originally declared that such was the object of the mission, and that his Highness had rejected the proposal, no doubt could have been entertained of his sincerity. But that his Highness had assumed a system of reserve, which combined with his Highness's military preparations, with the movements of his troops, and of the armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Meer Khaun, and with other circumstances, justified the doubts which the Resident had expressed. A firm and active resistance however on the part of the Rajah (the Resident added) would tend greatly to remove his apprehension of any immediate design on the part of the Rajah to adopt the desperate policy of combining his arms with those of the enemies of the British power, and the Resident concluded his discourse by stating various considerations calculated to manifest the danger to which the existence of his dominion would be exposed by a vain and treacherous attempt to support the declining fortunes of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The minister replied to these observations, by expressing his sense of the clemency and

moderation of the British Government manifested at the close of the late war, and his conviction of the just and certain destruction of the Rajah's government and dominion, if by an imprudent and unprofitable combination of his Highness's interests with those of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the relations of peace and amity now subsisting between his Highness and the British Government, should unhappily be dissolved.

The assertions of the minister with regard to the real hostility of Meer Khaun's proceedings and designs against the Rajah of Berar, were corroborated by the information subsequently received of the number, progress and depredations of the troops of that chieftain which had entered the Rajah's territory, and of the active exertions of the Rajah's military Commander in the province of Gurry Mundela, who had defeated the troops of Meer Khaun in that province with considerable slaughter. The conduct of the Rajah also at that time, tended to support the credit of his declarations. His Highness was described by the Resident to have manifested unequivocal indications of apprehension and alarm, which had spread throughout the town of Nagpore; to have had in contemplation the removal of his family to a place of greater safety, and to be employed in raising men for his army, without the care and selection which were observable in the progress of his former levies.

At the period of time when the Governor-General received the Resident's report upon this stage of the transactions at the court of Nagpore, the Governor-General deemed it proper to issue instructions both to the Resident at Nagpore, and to the acting Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, applicable to the state of affairs at those courts respectively. Previously however, to a statement of the nature of those instructions, it is necessary to revert to the narrative of transactions at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

A preceding paragraph adverts to the information received by the Resident at Nagpore of the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's forces in the direction of Chowraghur, in the territories of the Rajah of Berar. That intelligence was also communicated to the Governor-General in Council, by a despatch from the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah dated the 14th of November.

A preceding paragraph adverts to the Governor-General's

receipt of intelligence from the Acting Resident in a letter dated on the 10th of November, that Serjie Rao Ghautka had addressed letters to Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Meer Khaun, proposing and promising the active co-operation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's military force in the prosecution of hostilities against the British Government.

In a despatch of the 15th of November, the Acting Resident stated that the result of his enquiries on the latter subject, had tended to establish in his belief the following positions.

First. That Serjie Rao Ghautka had invited Meer Khaun to unite with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the invasion of Bundelcund.

Secondly. That the object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march in the direction of Chowraghur, was to cross the Nerbuddah in a position calculated to effect a junction with Meer Khaun at Saugur, and

Thirdly. That orders had been despatched to the officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's Government in Malwa, and to the pindarries, to proceed towards Saugur for the purpose of joining the army under Dowlut Rao Scindiah's personal command.

With regard to the first of these articles of charge, the Governor-General in Council has intimated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, his belief that Serjie Rao Ghautka had actually addressed letters to Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Meer Khaun, offering the aid of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's forces, and it was consistent with that impression to believe, that Serjie Rao Ghautka had also suggested to Meer Khaun the project of invading Bundelcund.

The Governor-General had already received the information contained in the third article of charge in a letter from Colonel Murray to his Excellency's Military Secretary, dated the 7th of October, in which it was stated that the principal officers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at Ougein, had apprized Colonel Murray of their receipt of orders from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, directing them to withdraw his Highness's troops from Indore, and generally from all the possessions of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, where his Highness's authority had been established by the force under Colonel Murray's command; and, that the whole of the cavalry of Dowlut Rao Scindiah

in Malwa had been ordered to proceed to his Highness's camp; and that the actual transmission of these orders was subsequently avowed and justified by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as will be found in a succeeding paragraph of this narrative.

On the 17th of November, the Acting Resident addressed a memorial to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which the Acting Resident demanded on the ground of the 8th article of defensive alliance, an explanation of the nature of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's late intercourse with the Rajah of Berar, and of the object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's advance through the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

After various artifices apparently intended to procrastinate a reply to the Acting Resident's demands, Dowlut Rao Scindiah appointed a day for his attendance at Durbar, signifying at the same time, his Highness's intention of affording to the Acting Resident on that occasion every necessary explanation.

According to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's appointment, the Acting Resident attended the Durbar on the 20th November. Dowlut Rao Scindiah opened the conference by anxious enquiries with regard to the operations of the army of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; the probable time of the honourable Major-General Wellesley's arrival at the station of the army in the Deccan, and the future destination of that army. When the Acting Resident had stated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the information which he possessed upon those points, Dowlut Rao Scindiah adverted to the subjects on which the Acting Resident had demanded an explanation.

With regard to the first point, the nature of his intercourse with the Rajah of Berar, Dowlut Rao Scindiah affirmed that this charge was founded on a mistake, and must have originated in a proposal which, on his arrival near Hosheingabad, had been received through the Rajah of Berar's vakeel, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should afford the assistance of his troops in placing the fortresses of Cheonee and Hosheingabad in the possession of the Rajah of Berar; that he had not answered this application, and did not intend to interfere in the prosecution of an object which did not concern his interests. The Acting Resident opposed to these assertions, the notoriety of the object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march

towards Hosheingabad, which he stated to be, to perform engagements contracted with the Rajah of Berar in a manner contrary to the provisions of the 8th article of the treaty of defensive alliance.

With regard to the second point, the object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's advance through the territories of the Rajah of Berar, Dowlut Rao Scindiah urged the extreme scarcity of grain in the country through which his army must have marched in proceeding directly to Ougein, as the cause of his marching in the direction which he had pursued.

The Acting Resident in reply noticed the futility of this plea, and adverted in general terms, to the just grounds of doubt and suspicion with regard to the nature of his designs which his Highness's late conduct had afforded. The Acting Resident then proceeded to enquire why Dowlut Rao Scindiah had sent for his troops from Malwa; why he had required the junction of his pindarries, and what was the destination of his march?

To these questions Dowlut Rao Scindiah replied, that he had withdrawn his troops from Malwa, for the purpose of collecting his army in a country more plentiful than that which he had quitted; that he was marching through the territory of the Rajah of Berar for the purpose of crossing the Nerbudda, at a ford which would enable him to proceed to Saugur, and that the general object of his march in the direction which he had pursued, was to render his army efficient against Jeswunt Rao Holkar; an object which could not be accomplished (as he had stated to the late Resident) by pursuing the direct route to Ougein. Dowlut Rao Scindiah concluded by assurances of his adherence to the obligation of his engagements with the British Government.

It may be proper to state, that in the course of this conference, the Acting Resident purposely avoided the subject of the alledged correspondence with the enemy, and of the supposed object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march. The Acting Resident apprehended that an immediate disclosure of the information which he had received upon those points, might confirm Dowlut Rao Scindiah in an hostile course of proceeding, from which the early receipt of the intelligence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's defeat might be expected to deter him. The Acting Resident closed the discussion by

apprizing Dowlut Rao Scindiah that he should submit the explanations which he had received, to the judgment of the Governor-General.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah then expressed his anxiety to know whether any reply had been received from the Governor-General to his Highness's application on the subject of pecuniary aid. To this intimation, the Acting Resident replied by a reference to the answer which his Highness had already received on that subject from the late Resident.

The Governor-General-in-Council deems it proper to state in this place, that before the receipt of the acting Resident's despatch, communicating the substance of the conference described in the preceding paragraphs, the Governor-General received from Captain Baillie, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's agent in Bundelcund, the copy of a letter under date the 12th November, addressed by Rajah Ambajee to the Rajah of Dutteah, (a nominal dependant of the Peishwa, whose territory is situated within the province of Bundelcund,) stating the actual combination of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar against the British power, and intimating that Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with his army, was on his march to the northward, for the purpose of forming a junction with Meer Khaun, that it was the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to direct his march towards Calpee on the Jumna, while the Rajah of Berar invaded the province of Bengal; that Ambajee himself should proceed to meet Meer Khaun and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that he had actually dispatched a force into the Ranah of Gohud's territory, for the purpose of recovering that possession. The letter also contained the most exaggerated account of the successes of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The object of this letter was, to induce the Rajah of Dutteah to unite his force with the troops of Ambajee, stated to have been dispatched into the territory of the Ranah of Gohud. By advices subsequently received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, it appeared, that a considerably body of troops belonging to Ambajee had actually invaded the province of Gohud and laid siege to a fort in that province, at a short distance from Gwalior. Ambajee at the same time dismissed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's news-writer, stationed in his camp, in a manner which unequivocally mani-

fested the hostility of his designs; and information was subsequently received of the prosecution of his hostile operations in the province of Gohud, by the attack and defeat of a body of the Ranah of Gohud's troops.

Your honourable Committee is informed, that before the commencement of the late Mahratta war, Rajah Ambajee who was one of the principal feudatory chieftains attached to the government of the late Mahajee Scindiah and on his decease stood in the same relation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, held the farm of a considerable portion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's territory in Hindostan, comprizing the whole of the country, now in the possession of the Rana Gohud, and that by a deceitful negociation with the British Government, he endeavoured to preserve for Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the possession of the territory under his authority. Although the reduction of Scindiah's power and the loose and undefined system of the relations subsisting among Mahratta chieftains, may have enabled and encouraged Ambajee to act independently of the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it appeared to be probable, that the system of conduct pursued by Ambajee, had been adopted in concert with Dowlut Rao Scindiah or at least with his unprincipled minister Serjie Rao Ghautka. The Governor-General-in-Council therefore deemed it proper to issue instructions to the acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, directing him to communicate to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the intelligence of the hostile incursions of Ambajee's troops into the territory of the Ranah of Gohud, together with a copy of Ambajee's letter to the Rajah of Dutteah, and to observe to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that the actual invasion of the territory of Gohud, combined with the relation in which Ambajee had long stood towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah, tended to corroborate the suspicions which the late equivocal conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had excited in the Governor-General's mind, and that, it was incumbent upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah to satisfy the Governor-General, that the assertions of Ambajee with regard to the existence of a combination of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, Meer Khaun, and his own, against the British Government, were without foundation, and that, Dowlut Rao Scindiah had no concern in the unwarrantable proceedings of Rajah Ambajee; as a

proof of which, the Acting Resident was further instructed to require from Dowlut Rao Scindiah a positive order to Ambajee, directing him to withdraw his troops from the territory of the Ranah of Gohud, together with a formal declaration from Dowlut Rao Scindiah of his entire concurrence in the punishment of that chieftain.

A few days before the date of these instructions the Governor-General-in-Council received, from the Resident at Hyderabad, information of the arrival at the court of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, of a person named Succaram Pundit in the capacity of vakeel, on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This person was employed many years since, in the conduct of clandestine intrigues at the court of Hyderabad, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, the object of which was to detach his late Highness the Nizam from his alliance with the British Government. In the year 1803, this person was dispatched by Serjie Rao Ghautka to Hyderabad, with a letter to the Resident at that court, in which Serjie Rao Ghautka offered to aid the British Government in the subversion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's power. This person brought letters from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and Serjie Rao Ghautka addressed to a Mahratta chieftain of note, a subject of the government of Hyderabad who resides in that city, and is nearly connected with the family of Scindiah.

The Resident having sent a message to the minister of his Highness the Soubahdar, desiring to be informed of the contents of those letters, the minister communicated the letters (which were merely introductory) and stated the substance of a conversation, which he had held with Succaram Pundit, in the course of which that agent had greatly exaggerated the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar; had described his successes against the British Government to have been of the most important nature, and had asserted that Jeswunt Rao Holkar was confederated with the King of Cabul and with the Sic chiefs, and intimated at the same time, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar would be immediately joined by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

The Governor-General-in-Council is disposed to believe, that Succaram Pundit was employed upon this mission under

the exclusive guidance and instruction of Serjie Rao Ghautka. The Governor-General-in-Council, however, deemed it proper to direct the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to communicate to that chieftain, the proceedings of Succaram Pundit, and to state to him the necessity of his disavowing those proceedings, and of his supporting that disavowal in the most satisfactory manner.

The Governor-General-in-Council now deems it proper to state to your honourable Committee, the substance of the instructions which, on a deliberate consideration of the progress of transactions, and of affairs at the courts of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, as described in the preceding narrative, the Governor-General deemed it necessary to issue to the representatives of the British Government at those courts respectively.

The reports contained in the despatches from those courts, combined with the information received from other quarters, had manifestly justified at different times different and even opposite conclusions with regard to the designs of those chieftains. Without entering therefore into any speculative discussion of the nature of their actual designs, the Governor-General-in-Council deemed it proper to contemplate and provide for every case which under the state of our information with regard to the proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar and Meer Khaun, could reasonably be supposed to arise, and to furnish the representatives of the British Government at these courts, with instructions for the regulation of their conduct under any contingency. The cases which it appeared necessary to contemplate were,

First. The junction of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for purposes hostile to the British Government or its ally, the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

Secondly. The junction of the forces of those chieftains for the purpose of opposing Meer Khaun.

Thirdly. The combination of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Meer Khaun for the purpose of acting against the British power or the state of Hyderabad.

Fourthly. The combination of the forces of those chieftains, for the purpose of attacking the Rajah of Berar's dominions.

Fifthly. The prosecution of hostilities against the Rajah of Berar's dominions by Meer Khaun, independently of Scindiah's co-operation.

Sixthly. The combination of the Rajah of Berar with Meer Khaun independently of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The Governor-General in Council was inclined to disbelieve the existence of any combination between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar against the British government or its ally, rather by the tenor of the late reports of the Resident at Nagpore with respect to the conduct of the Rajah of Berar, and the state of affairs in that chieftain's country, than by any confidence in the amicable tendency of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's counsels.

The report suggested to his Excellency's mind the probability that a junction of the forces of those chieftains might be concerted for the purpose of opposing Meer Khaun, whose Pindarries had actually ravaged a part of the Rajah of Berar's territory. Such a pretext however might obviously be assumed with a view to cover designs of an hostile nature. Under any other circumstances therefore than a firm and well founded persuasion that the object of a proposed junction of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah with those of the Rajah of Berar was to oppose the troops of Meer Khaun, the British representatives at the Courts of those chieftains were respectively directed to remonstrate in the strongest terms against the junction of their forces.

The acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah was directed to state to that chieftain distinctly the grounds on which the suspicion of his hostile designs were founded, adverting at the same time to the intelligence which the acting Resident had received of the correspondence of Serjie Rao Ghautka with the enemy, and to the obvious concurrence of the movements of Scindiah's forces, with the tenor of that intelligence; and to observe to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that under actual circumstances the junction of his forces with those of the Rajah of Berar, and even his continuance within the territory of the Rajah of Berar or near its frontier, could only be ascribed to the intended prosecution of objects incompatible with the preservation of amity and alliance with the British Government. That therefore the British Government possessed an undoubted right to require that Dowlut Rao

Scindiah should afford the only demonstration of a pacific spirit which could be considered satisfactory, by retiring with his troops within the limits of his own territories. That the British Government would not be induced by promises and professions alone to abandon the effectual means which the state and position of our armies at that time afforded of immediately repressing and avenging any hostile attempt on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, nor consent to be exposed to the inconvenience and expence of a constant state of military preparation against hostile designs on the part of those chieftains for the prosecution of which they had already provided by a combination of their respective forces. The acting Resident was further directed to take that occasion to remind Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the assistance which the British Government had voluntarily offered for the re-establishment of his government; informing him that notwithstanding his total inactivity in the war, and the doubtful tenor of his late conduct, the British Government was still disposed to afford that assistance, and to perform its promise of placing in his hands a considerable portion of the territory conquered from Jeswunt Rao Holkar, provided that the counsels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah be regulated by a corresponding spirit of amity and alliance. The acting Resident was at the same time directed to assure Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the sincere disposition of the British Government to maintain the relations of amity and alliance, which could only be dissolved by a course of conduct on his part inconsistent with those relations, and involving an unprecedented degree of public treachery and ingratitude.

In the Governor-General in Council's corresponding instructions to the Resident at Nagpore, that officer was directed in the supposed case of the actual junction of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for purposes hostile to the British Government or its ally, to regulate his representations to the Rajah by the spirit of those which the acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah was directed to address to that chieftain as far as might be applicable to the conduct and circumstances of the Rajah, and to the position of his forces.

The second supposed case, namely the junction of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, for

the purpose of opposing Meer Khaun, did not appear to the Governor-General to require any special instruction to the acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Resident at Nagpore however was directed in that event to act according to any instructions which he might receive from Major-General Wellesley, who would judge how far it might be expedient to co-operate with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar against Meer Khaun.

In the 3rd supposed case, a proposed combination of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Meer Khaun for purposes hostile to the British power or its ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the acting Resident was directed to regulate his conduct by the spirit of the instructions applicable to the case of a similar combination of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

The 3rd case being inapplicable to the Rajah of Berar, no instructions upon the subject of it to the Resident at that chieftain's court appeared to be necessary.

With regard to the 4th supposed event, namely, the combination of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Meer Khaun, for the purpose of attacking the possessions of the Rajah of Berar, the Governor-General in Council observed, that whilst Meer Khaun continued in the condition of an enemy of the British Government, any combination of the forces of those chieftains, constituted an act of positive hostility on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The acting Resident therefore was directed to address the necessary remonstrances to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the event of an expected union of the forces of those chieftains, whatever might be the object of such union.

With respect to the Rajah of Berar, it was evident that in the event of a combination of the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Meer Khaun for the purpose of attacking the possessions of the Rajah of Berar, the cause of the Rajah of Berar would be the same as that of the British Government, and accordingly in that event the Resident at Nagpore was directed to encourage the Rajah to employ every exertion for the defence of his dominions; apprizing him, that such an event had been anticipated and provided for by the British Government, and that under the orders of the Governor-General the British troops were prepared to co-operate with

those of the Rajah of Berar in resisting the combined forces of his enemies by a movement in the direction of his territory; and that every practicable exertion would be employed by the British Government for his relief.

The same observations and instructions were applicable to the case of the prosecution of hostilities against the Rajah of Berar's dominions by Meer Khaun, independently of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as stated under the 5th head of supposed cases, and the general instructions prescribed for the regulation of the Resident's conduct in the event of a junction of the forces of the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah for purposes hostile to the British Government or its ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan, were applicable to the combination of the Rajah of Berar with Meer Khaun, as stated in the 6th supposed case.

No special instructions to the acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah were requisite with reference to the prosecution of hostilities against the Rajah of Berar's possessions by Meer Khaun, independently of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; or to the combination of the Rajah of Berar with Meer Khaun, as stated under the 5th and 6th heads of supposed cases.

The Governor-General next proceeded to furnish the acting Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah with instructions for the regulation of his conduct with reference both to the continuance of the same ambiguous state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's views and proceedings as that which existed at the date of his latest despatches, and to the success of his remonstrances in dissuading Dowlut Rao Scindiah from the adoption of any of the plans of hostility described in the preceding paragraphs, which, under the pernicious influence of Serjie Rao Ghautka, Dowlut Rao Scindiah might actually have resolved to undertake.

The Governor-General in Council stated it to be his opinion, founded on the information which he already possessed with regard to the proceedings of Scindiah's Durbar, and to the character and disposition of Serjie Rao Ghautka, that the views of that minister were decidedly hostile to the British Government; that he had maintained a traitorous correspondence with the enemy, and that by his ascendancy over the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, he had regulated the movements of that chieftain's

troops, and the proceedings of his government, with a view to the accomplishment of his plans of hostility against the British power; and that Scindiah's actual violation of his defensive engagements, and his prosecution of any of the projects of hostility above described, must be ascribed entirely to the pernicious counsels of Serjie Rao Ghautka.

The Governor-General in Council therefore apprized the Acting Resident that he had resolved to render the conduct of Serjie Rao Ghautka the ground of a distinct proposition for the removal of that pernicious minister, unless such a change of circumstances should occur as would satisfy the Governor-General that the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah would in future be conducted on principles more consistent with the interests and security of the British Government, and with the relations of amity and alliance between the two states.

The Governor-General in Council however signified to the Resident, that unconnected with acts of positive hostility, Dowlut Rao Scindiah's refusal to dismiss Serjie Rao Ghautka from his counsels, would not be considered by the Governor-General in Council to constitute a justifiable ground of war; but that if Scindiah, subsequently to the remonstrance of the British Government, should retain Ghautka at the head of affairs, Scindiah must be held responsible for all Ghautka's acts, and that in such case, any hostility provoked by Ghautka against the British Government, would be retaliated upon Scindiah; or in other words, that the British Government must be indemnified at the expense of Scindiah's government, for every act of his minister which should be injurious to our rights, interests, or security.

The Acting Resident was accordingly directed, in the cases prescribed, to demand a private audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to address to him a representation founded on the spirit of the sentiments and resolutions described in the preceding paragraphs.

The Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee to the annexed copy of his instructions to the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the detail of the representations which he was directed to address to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on this occasion, your

honourable Committee will observe from the tenor of those instructions, that the Acting Resident was directed to carry them into effect under the immediate guidance of Major-General Wellesley's authority.

Your honourable Committee will also observe from the postscript of those instructions, that they comprize the detailed directions which the Governor-General in his orders of the 4th December addressed to Colonel Close, as stated in a former paragraph of this letter, and that the Acting Resident was charged with the execution of those orders, only in the absence of Colonel Close.

The Governor-General in Council now resumes the narrative of transactions at the Court of the Rajah of Berar.

In a despatch dated the 5th of December, and received at Fort William subsequently to the despatch of the instructions above described, the Resident at Nagpore communicated to the government the information of the actual invasion of the territory of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan by the troops of Vincajee Bhooslah, commonly called Nana-Sahab, the brother of the Rajah of Berar. This intelligence was carried to the Resident by the principal executive minister of the Rajah's government, who was despatched by the Rajah of Berar for that express purpose, and who stated to the Resident that Vincajee Bhooslah had sometime before been collecting troops; that the Rajah had discovered it, and had interrogated his brother on the subject; Vincajee Bhooslah had denied the charge, and by artful representations, had removed the Rajah of Berar's suspicions; but that a party of troops in the service of Vincajee had actually invaded the Nizam's province of Berar.

The Resident on being apprized of this intelligence signified to the minister that the Rajah of Berar must be responsible for this outrage, which constituted a positive act of hostility against the British Government; and the Resident proceeded immediately to wait upon the Rajah. Being admitted to an audience, the Resident commenced the conversation by adverting, in forcible terms, to the clemency and moderation manifested by the British Government at the termination of the last war, and to the good faith observed by the British Government since the conclusion of the peace.

The Resident then recapitulated to the Rajah the various causes of suspicion and mistrust which the conduct of the Rajah had afforded, and concluded by stating the outrage lately committed by the troops of his government on the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

The Rajah replied in considerable detail and with great earnestness. He admitted the clemency and moderation of the British Government, and acknowledged the advantages which he had derived from the conditions of the peace. He added, that he had been misinformed with regard to the proceedings of his brother, as described by the minister; having since learned that the outrage had been perpetrated by a corps consisting of 500 horse and 900 infantry, not in the service of any chieftain, which had plundered a village in the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

The Rajah added that he was in the utmost degree surprised and distressed at this occurrence, and that he was ready to exert his power for the punishment of its authors. The Rajah observed, that his troops were not in a menacing position; that in consequence of the retreat of Meer Khaun, Nagoo Jewagee, and the Pindarries, his troops had been withdrawn from the frontier and were assembled within forty miles of Nagpore. The Rajah expressed in strong terms, his dread of a renewal of war with the British Government, which he observed, was alone sufficient to deter him from any act of aggression, even if he were not restrained by a due sense of the principles of public faith and honour.

The Resident in reply again described the several acts and proceedings of the Rajah which had justified a doubt of the sincerity of his amicable professions; adverted to the means which the British Government possessed of immediately avenging his treachery, and to the utter inability of the Rajah to oppose the force which in the event of hostilities would be directed against his country, and his capital, or to avoid the impending destruction of his government and dominion, and concluded by describing in the most forcible terms, the treachery and ingratitude of a deliberate violation of the relations of amity and peace on the part of the Rajah.

The Rajah admitted the justice of the Resident's observations, but denied the justice of their application to his actions

or to his designs. The Resident replied by observing, that if the doubts which his Highness's conduct on so many occasions had apparently justified were really unfounded, and if the actual violation of the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan had been committed without his Highness's previous knowledge and concurrence, the Rajah would undoubtedly be disposed to afford some proof of the sincerity of his declared solicitude for the maintenance of peace, and that after so many apparent indications of a hostile spirit, his Highness could not reasonably expect that the Governor-General should be satisfied by mere professions of amity and public faith.

A discussion then ensued with regard to the nature of the proposed proofs, which terminated by a declaration on the part of the Resident, that he must consider the invasion of the Soubahdar's dominions to have proceeded from the authority of the Rajah, unless his Highness consented immediately to disband his new levies, and to distribute the remainder of his army in remote cantonments in different parts of his Highness's territory. That if his Highness consented to that arrangement, the Resident would await the result of an enquiry into the circumstances of the invasion. The Resident concluded by apprizing the Rajah, that in the mean time, the army of the Deccan which had already commenced its march in the direction of Nagpore, would continue to approach his Highness's dominions.

The Rajah endeavoured to prove that he had not augmented his army, and that the number of the troops actually on the military establishment of his government, was indispensably necessary for the defence of his dominions, an assertion which the Resident opposed, by adverting to the retreat of the enemy from his Highness's frontier. The Resident further observed that the augmentation of his Highness's army by new levies, was a fact certain and notorious, and that his Highness's minister had even admitted that Vincajee Bhouslah had levied considerable numbers. This discussion finally terminated with the declared consent of the Rajah of Berar to disband his new levies, and to canton his army in separate divisions.

The Resident then apprized the Rajah, that during the

proposed enquiry, his Highness must be responsible for the conduct of his brother, and that if his Highness was unable to control his brother, or his subjects, a British force must be employed for that purpose, as a measure necessarily connected with the duty of protecting the dominions of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan. The Rajah desired some time to reflect upon this suggestion; to which, after some further discussion, the Resident assented, and the Resident concluded the conference, by again warning the Rajah of the destruction which awaited his violation of his public faith.

The indication of hostility on the part of the Rajah of Berar, manifested by the invasion of the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, was apparently corroborated by the actual junction of the Rajah of Berar's advanced army with the army under the command of Succaram Bukshee, in a position menacing the dominions of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and by the circumstance of the Rajah of Berar's brother having entered his tents in the direction of the Rajah of Berar's army.

On the 6th of December, the Resident again waited on the Rajah, and on the renewal of the subject of the violation of the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the minister acknowledged on the part of the Rajah, that the troops which had been plundering the Soubahdar's territory, were in the service of Vincajee Bhouslah. The Resident observed that the acts of the Rajah's brother, were the acts of his Highness's government, and that his Highness must be responsible for them. In reply to the Resident's enquiry, the Rajah declared in the most positive terms, that he had no cause of complaint against the British Government; and acknowledged that the treaty of Deogaum had been fulfilled by the British Government, with the most scrupulous fidelity. That he had never entertained a desire to violate that treaty. That he was ready to punish the authors of the invasion, but that if the Governor-General would pardon his brother's conduct, he would endeavour to afford satisfactory proof of his sincere determination to maintain peace and amity with the British Government. The Resident observed, that the conduct of the Rajah's brother appeared to be either authorized or approved by the Rajah, since his brother remained

unpunished; and that, under such circumstances, the British army must continue to advance, and the Resident must quit the Rajah's capital, unless satisfactory proofs of his Highness's pacific designs should be immediately afforded.

The Rajah replied that he knew it was in vain to oppose the British troops if they advanced, and that he should make no resistance, but submit to the mercy of the British Government. The Resident then observed to the Rajah, that as a proof of these sentiments, his Highness should not only disband his new levies and canton his army as before required, but should also publicly manifest his displeasure against his brother, by securing his person and by sequestering his jagheer; and the Resident signified to the Rajah, that on those conditions he would await at Nagpore the receipt of the Governor-General's instructions.

After some further discussion, in the course of which, the Rajah endeavoured to prevail on the Resident to recede from his demand respecting Vincajee Bhouslah, the Rajah signified his assent to the Resident's demand; declaring that he would be careful that his brother should neither leave Nagpore nor carry on any intrigues. That his brother's officers should be removed from his jagheer, and the jagheer should be placed under his Highness's immediate dependants.

A discussion then ensued with regard to the Resident's remaining demands; the Rajah objecting to the cantonment of his army in numerous divisions, and in distant places, on the ground of the hazard to which his dominion and capital would consequently be exposed. It was however finally determined, that the Rajah's infantry and guns should be recalled to Nagpore, and that one division of his Highness's ancient establishment of cavalry should be despatched towards Hosheingabad, and another towards the quarter where the Pindarries had lately committed depredations.

A further discussion then arose respecting the troops of the Rajah's Government, which had invaded the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and were still within the limits of that territory; and it was finally resolved, that the Rajah's brother should recal them.

When these points had been decided, the Resident deemed it proper to state distinctly to the Rajah, that this arrange-

ment would not preclude the British Government from adopting such measures as might appear to be equitable and expedient, on a review of all the circumstances of the case; that the Resident pledged himself to nothing more in return for the Rajah's concessions, than to await at Nagpore the receipt of the Governor-General's instructions, and that, he did not possess authority to engage that the late aggression should not be resented by an appeal to arms, or even to suspend the advance of the British army.

This declaration, which at first was received with some degree of surprize and alarm by the Rajah, was ultimately admitted by his Highness to be just; and his Highness concluded by expressing a request that the Resident would transmit to the Governor-General such representations as were conformable to friendship; to which the Resident replied, that he should transmit such representations as were conformable to truth. That he should state to the Governor-General the Rajah's explanations and professions, but that, it was foreign to the duty of the Resident to offer any suggestions to the Governor-General with regard to the measures to be adopted on this occasion.

The order to Succaram Bakshee, directing the separation of the army under his command, was despatched on the evening of the 6th of December, and a duplicate was carried to the Resident; but neither the despatch of the infantry and guns to Nagpore, nor the discharge of the new levies being mentioned in the order, the Resident remonstrated on that subject with the minister, who asserted that orders had been despatched on both those points, and that the Resident should be immediately furnished with duplicates of them; but the transmission of those documents being delayed, the Resident addressed a note to the minister, stating, that this delay had excited doubts in his mind of the Rajah's sincerity. The reply which the Resident received being expressed in evasive and equivocal terms, the Resident deemed it proper to signify to the minister his resolution to depart the following morning, unless previously satisfied of the Rajah's sincerity.

In consequence of the Resident's intimation of his eventual resolution to leave Nagpore, the Resident was visited on the night of the 7th of December by two of the Rajah's minis-

ters, who began by assuring the Resident of the Rajah's disapprobation of his brother's proceedings, and of his determination to afford to the Resident the satisfaction which he required.

The Resident replied, by stating the grounds on which he had founded his belief, that the invasion of the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan originated with the Rajah. He observed, that the troops which had committed that outrage had been levied at Nagpore; he specified bodies of troops which had been stationed in districts immediately under the authority of the Rajah, and under the command of persons in the Rajah's service; he adverted to the great augmentation of the Rajah's military force under various pretences, and observed that his Highness's main army at that moment, occupied a position favourable to no other purpose than to an invasion of the Soubahdar's dominions. That the Rajah's concealment of these circumstances justified a suspicion of the hostility of his designs, which was corroborated by the detection of his Highnesses's intrigues in the province of Cuttack, and might be considered to be confirmed by the late invasion of the territories of our ally. The Resident further observed, that even if those grounds of suspicion had no existence, the Rajah's participation in the acts ascribed to his brother, might justly be inferred from other facts. That the Rajah and his brother resided in the same house; and that, in their conduct, they manifested a mutual and unreserved confidence, and must be well acquainted with each other's designs. The Resident contrasted the open and decisive measures which could alone afford a conviction of the sincerity of the Rajah's professions, with the reluctant and evasive manner in which his Highness had proceeded to fulfil the conditions to which he had assented; and concluded by expressing an apprehension of being exposed to censure by having too readily consented to protract his continuance at Nagpore, on the faith of the Rajah's doubtful professions.

The ministers replied by denying the Rajah's participation in his brother's acts. They stated that his brother had taken advantage of the Rajah's absence, to levy troops clandestinely, both in his own and in the Rajah's country, and denied that any troops, immediately in the service of the

Rajah, had been employed on the frontier. They maintained that no real confidence existed between the brothers, and stated several facts in support of that assertion, and they referred the conduct of Vincajee Bhooslah in the invasion of the Soubahdar's dominions, to a malignant design of accomplishing his brother's ruin. The ministers proceeded to express, in the most forcible terms, the apprehensions which his Highness entertained of the consequences of his brother's conduct. They described his determined resolution never to engage in another war with the British power, and declared to the Resident that his Highness would proceed to join the British army, if he could not prevent its advance. They proposed various modes of discharging the new levies, and stated the measures which had actually been commenced for that purpose, and concluded by urgently entreating the Resident to postpone his departure a few days, in the course of which, his Highness would be enabled to satisfy the Resident of the sincerity of his professions.

After some further discussion at the close of which the ministers expressed with additional earnestness the distress and apprehension of the Rajah, declaring that his Highness would consent to any terms however humiliating, the Resident agreed to continue at Nagpore, adding that he would fix the period for the execution of the prescribed conditions on the following day.

The ministers then endeavoured to learn the opinion of the Resident with regard to the nature of the compensation which would be required by the British Government for the outrage committed by the troops of Vincajee Bhooslah, and at the close of the conversation which ensued upon that topic, one of the ministers expressed a desire to know whether the Governor-General would consent to station a British force within the Rajah of Berar's dominions. The minister observed however that he had merely proposed that question for his own information. The Resident replied that he could not discuss public subjects on the ground of private communication, nor would he, at that time, confer on the subject which the minister had proposed in any form whatever. But if the Rajah would afford to the Resident the satisfactory proofs which he had demanded of his Highness's

disposition to atone for the aggression committed against our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Resident would submit to the Governor-General any proposal which might be officially stated in the name of the Rajah of Berar.

On the 8th of December the minister again attended the Resident with a list of the chiefs of parties whom the Rajah had discharged, and after some discussion relative to the time necessary for the transmission of orders to the several divisions of his Highness's military establishment, it was finally determined that all the prescribed conditions should be fulfilled within the space of fifteen days, and that the Resident should remain at Nagpore until the expiration of that period of time, provided that the Resident should observe the gradual execution of those conditions.

On the night of the 8th, the Resident received information that a large body of Pindaries was assembled in a position north west from Nagpore within the limits of the Rajah of Berar's dominions, and at the distance of fifty miles from Elichpore (a principal town near the north eastern frontier of the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan) with the supposed intention of invading the Soubahdar's territory.

On the receipt of this intelligence, the Resident desired the attendance of the minister on the following day. On his arrival, the Resident communicated to him the information which he had received, and observed that it could not be supposed that this body of troops had proceeded through the Rajah's territory to occupy a position on the frontier, without his Highness's knowledge. The Resident then proceeded to remark, that the positions of various bodies of troops relatively to the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, justified a suspicion that a plan had been deliberately framed for the invasion of that territory in various quarters at the same point of time.

The minister endeavoured by various arguments to convince the Resident that his suspicions were unfounded; and the conversation upon that topic was terminated by a declaration on the part of the Resident that the Rajah must be considered to be responsible for any injury which the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan might sustain by the incursion of those Pindaries.

On the 9th of December the Resident received intelligence

that Haim Geer, an officer in the Rajah's service, who commanded a body of 800 horse and 200 infantry which (as the Resident was informed) had been recalled to Nagpore, was employed in augmenting that force by daily levies, and instead of returning towards Nagpore, had marched to the eastern bank of the Wurdah (the boundary of the Soubahdar of the Deccan) and had interrupted and searched the persons employed by the Resident in the conveyance of despatches. The Resident considering these circumstances to constitute strong presumptive evidence of deception on the part of the Rajah, addressed a note to the minister, stating the intelligence which he had received, and declaring his resolution to leave Nagpore in the event of any further delay in the recal of the troops. The Resident's note was delivered to the minister at the house of the Dewan where the Rajah was present at an entertainment. The Resident's note being communicated to the Rajah, his Highness immediately resolved to proceed in person to the Resident's house.

On his arrival at the Resident's house, the Rajah renewed, in the most solemn manner, his professions of amity and public faith. He denied all knowledge of the march of the troops under Haim Geer to the Wurdah, and added, that he had brought with him written orders for the recal of Haim Geer, and camel men to carry them. The Rajah then proceeded to explain his intentions with regard to the British Government and advertng to the late war, and to the experience which he had derived from it, he said, that he would candidly acknowledge that on that occasion he had been the aggressor. He admitted that on the present occasion also, he must be considered to be the aggressor, but he asserted in the most solemn terms the sincerity of his intention to restore and to preserve tranquillity. The Rajah acknowledged that he could not expect from the Resident an implicit reliance upon the faith of his professions, but observed, that the Resident would be convinced of his sincerity, when a sufficient time should have elapsed for the operation of his orders, and the fulfilment of his promises.

The Resident having inquired whether in admitting that he was the aggressor on the present occasion, his Highness intended to avow that he had authorized the invasion of the

territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, both the Rajah and his chief minister replied, that such was not his Highness's intention; that in the acknowledgement to which the Resident had adverted, it was his intention to admit, that although unconcerned in the commission of that outrage, he must incur the infamy and must be responsible for the consequences of it.

The Rajah then renewed the assurances of his pacific intentions which the Resident interrupted by intimating to the Rajah, that acts alone could convince him of the sincerity of his professions, and that the British Government would judge of his Highness's disposition and intentions by the same criterion. This topic of discourse was closed by expressions and assurances on the part of the Rajah, which the Resident described to be in the utmost degree submissive and earnest, and by repeated promises to adopt such measures as might tend to remove the unfavourable impression which the late proceedings of his Highness's government must necessarily produce upon the Governor-General's mind with regard to the nature of his Highness's designs.

For the detail of these conferences, of which the most material points alone are included in the body of this despatch, the Governor-General in Council refers your honourable Committee to the annexed copy of a despatch from the Resident at Nagpore under date the 20th of December 1804.

Immediately on receipt of the intelligence of the invasion of the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, by the troops of the Rajah of Berar, the Resident had communicated that intelligence to the officer commanding the British army in Candeish, and recommended the speedy advance of that army in the direction of Nagpore, if consistent with other indispensable exigencies of the public service.

During these discussions, the Resident at Nagpore maintained a correspondence with the principal officer of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan at Elichpore, on the subject of the invasion of his Highness's dominions by the troops of the Rajah of Berar; communicating to that officer general information of the progress of his negotiations on that subject at the court of Nagpore. The letters of his Highness the Soubahdar's officer, contained the detail of the

depredations committed by the Rajah of Berar's troops, which appear to have been considerable, and also of the measures adopted by him for the protection of his Highness's territory against the further incursions of those predatory troops.

On the 10th of December, the Resident received information that a merchant who had been travelling from Nagpore into the territory of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, had been pursued across the Wurdah by the troops under Haim Geer, and had been plundered by them at a village within the limits of his Highness's frontier. The Resident deeming this outrage to be strongly indicative of deceit on the part of the Rajah of Berar, immediately required the attendance of the Rajah's principal minister, and on his arrival, stated to him the circumstances of the case, and accused the Rajah of Berar of deliberate insincerity and deceit.

The minister, who was apprized of the transaction, communicated to the Resident the following explanation of it—he stated, that the troops under Haim Geer had lately arrived in the Rajah of Berar's country, and had been entertained by the Rajah's brother for the projected invasion of the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan. That they had accordingly been despatched to the frontier, and that although the intelligence of their destination was communicated to the Rajah in time to enable his Highness to prevent the accomplishment of their design, his endeavours to induce them to return, had proved ineffectual. That they were rendered desperate by the fear of punishment, and were under no controul. That their attack on the merchant was a spontaneous act, and unauthorized even by Vincajee Bhooslah. That the merchant was an inhabitant of Nagpore, and had personally complained of this outrage to the Rajah, who had directed the restitution of the plundered property. The minister offered to obtain from the merchant a writing, acknowledging that he had received entire satisfaction.

The Resident in reply observed, that the restitution of the property constituted no atonement for the violation of the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and declared his resolution of quitting Nagpore, if the conditions which he had prescribed, were not carried into effect within the space of the two following days.

The minister, in his answer, explained the earnest and re-

peated endeavours of the Rajah to accomplish the return of the troops under Haim Geer; described the distress and anxiety of the Rajah's mind at the conduct of his brother's troops, and his Highness's apprehension of its consequence; and affirmed, that the Rajah had actually fulfilled the prescribed conditions to the extent in which the execution of them had been practicable within the period of time which had elapsed. The minister reported the measures and proceedings of the Rajah for the accomplishment of those conditions, and assured the Resident, that within the prescribed period of fifteen days, every arrangement which the Resident had proposed should be carried into complete effect. The Resident however refused to abandon his intention of quitting Nagpore within two days, unless he should intermediately receive some satisfactory proofs of the sincerity of the Rajah's professions.

On the following day, the minister again attended the Resident to report to him, that the person who had been despatched expressly to Haim Geer to persuade him to return with his troops, had endeavoured without success, to induce him to proceed to Nagpore, but that he had prevailed on many of Haim Geer's followers to desert, and had persuaded Haim Geer to retire from the frontier towards a village named Arvee. The Resident however asserted, that the village towards which the troops of Haim Geer were said to have retired, was in the direct road to Omrauty, a town of note, belonging to the Soubahdar of the Deccan; the Resident therefore observed, that this statement of the minister far from affording satisfaction, merely tended to confirm the Resident's resolution of leaving Nagpore immediately. The conference which ensued, consisted principally of the same arguments on the part both of the Resident and the minister, as those which had been employed in preceeding discussions, and terminated without producing any alteration in the Resident's declared intention of leaving Nagpore.

Subsequently however, the Resident received intelligence, which appeared to afford some satisfactory indications of the sincerity of the Rajah's professions and assurances. The Resident was informed that several of the parties of troops which had been assembled near the frontier of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, had been withdrawn; that several

corps in the service of the Rajah, had actually been discharged, and that the Rajah "had made a public vow that he would perform certain religious ceremonies when the prospect of tranquillity should be restored."

The Resident observed on this subject, that although the Rajah's characteristic insincerity and deceit precluded an implicit confidence in these pacific appearances, the public avowal of his submissions and promises, constituted some proof of their sincerity; as it must tend to weaken any alliances which he might have formed for purposes hostile to the British power.

The Resident's opinion was corroborated by the conduct of the Rajah on receiving from the Resident the communication of the brilliant and decisive victory obtained by the British troops at the battle of Deig. On receiving that communication, the Rajah ordered a salute to be fired, and despatched a person of rank, attended by many other chieftains, to the Resident, for the purpose of congratulating him publicly on this signal triumph of the British arms.

The Resident detained the minister with whom he had conversed on the preceding day, and who accompanied the deputation, for the purpose of stating to him, that whatever satisfaction the Resident might have derived from such attentions on the part of the Rajah under a belief of his Highness's sincerity; in the actual state of affairs, the Resident could admit no evidence but the evidence of facts, and that, consequently he adhered to his resolution of quitting Nagpore, unless he received information of the retreat of Haim Geer from the frontier of the Soubahdar of the Deccan before the expiration of the day.

On the minister's departure, the Resident received a visit from a person on whose information the Resident reposed considerable confidence, who apprized him that he had received authentic intelligence of the evacuation of a post within the territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, which had been seized by the troops who invaded that territory. He also stated to the Resident that the Rajah had actually employed the greatest exertions for the purpose of prevailing on Haim Geer to return to Nagpore, and he intimated to the Resident the general belief and his own conviction, that the Rajah was much alarmed, and was sincerely desirous of

affording to the Resident every practicable degree of satisfaction. He added, that the Rajah had declared in public, his determination to refrain from opposing any resistance to the British army, although it should march to Nagpore, and had sworn by the life of his son (an oath peculiarly respected by the Hindoos) that if the Resident departed, his Highness would follow him unattended.

In the afternoon two of the Rajah's ministers visited the Resident for the express purpose of entreating him to continue at Nagpore until the receipt of the Governor-General's orders; observing, that the Resident's compliance with their entreaty "would confer an eternal obligation on the Rajah, and would be consistent with the clemency and generosity which was shewn him at the last peace."

The Resident repeated to the ministers all the circumstances which justified a distrust of the Rajah's professions however solemn. The ministers acknowledged the justice of the inference, but proceeded to state such facts and explanations as appeared calculated to afford substantial evidence of the sincerity of the Rajah's declarations, and concluded by stating, that the Rajah himself would not request the Resident to remain at Nagpore beyond the 16th of December, if by that time the Resident should not have received satisfactory proofs of the sincerity of his Highness's professions. To the proposition of remaining until the 16th, in the confidence of receiving such proofs of his Highness's sincerity, the Resident at length consented; but warned the ministers in the most impressive terms of the consequences of any evasion or deception on the part of the Rajah.

On the 14th the Resident visited the Rajah by invitation. His Highness commenced the conversation by expressing his satisfaction at the glorious successes of the British arms in Hindostan, and by enquiring into the circumstances of the battle of Furruckabad which the Resident had some days before communicated to his Highness. His Highness received the Resident's relation of the details of the victory of Furruckabad with animated congratulation, and did not endeavour to conceal the surprize and admiration excited in his Highness's mind by that memorable atchievement.

The Resident then proceeded to enquire respecting the movements of the Rajah's troops; and was informed that the

several advanced parties were on their march to Nagpore; and the Rajah expressed to the Resident his hope, that when the troops should actually have returned to Nagpore, the Resident would believe that his Highness had not entertained the design of provoking hostilities. The Resident having manifested some hesitation in admitting his belief of this assertion, the Rajah pointed to his own and his brother's children (who were present) and observed, that his whole family being at Nagpore, (which in the event of war, afforded no protection,) his pacific intentions might justly be inferred from his neglecting to remove his family, and place it in a state of security. The Resident in reply represented to the Rajah the calamities to which his Highness would be exposed in the event of war, and observed, that the certainty of their occurrence disposed him to believe, that his Highness's intentions were pacific. The Resident however, reminded his Highness of his own proposition, that he would not even request the Resident to remain at Nagpore beyond the 16th if intermediately the Resident should have reason to doubt the sincerity of his Highness's professions. The Rajah replied, by declaring, that if the Resident should withdraw from Nagpore, his Highness would immediately follow, and the conference closed by the Resident's repetition of his determination eventually to withdraw at the expiration of the prescribed period of time.

The daily information which the Resident received subsequently to the date of this conference, tended to establish the sincerity of the Rajah's declarations and assurances; and although the actual continuance of several parties of troops along the frontier of the Soubahdar's territory, together with other circumstances, compelled the Resident to repeat to the Rajah's ministers, his warnings and remonstrances, those appearances were satisfactorily explained; and since that period of time, up to the date of our latest advices from Nagpore, the Resident has no reason to doubt the Rajah of Berar's resolution to maintain inviolate, the relations of amity and peace with the British power.

The division and distribution of the Rajah's troops, which the Resident prescribed, and to which the Rajah consented, was not carried into effect; and the cause which his Highness's ministers assigned, the deficiency of resources for the

payment of the troops, was considered by the Resident to be consistent with truth. The menacing position of the Rajah's troops was however abandoned, and the principal force of the Rajah was withdrawn to Nagpore. The Rajah's new levies were entirely disbanded. The territory of the Soubahdar of the Deccan was evacuated by the Rajah's troops, and the Jaggeer of Vincajee Bhooslah, the Rajah's brother, was actually sequestered by his Highness.

Your honourable Committee will observe, that the Resident entertained a suspicion that Amrut Rao, his Highness the Peishwa's brother, who about the beginning of December arrived at Omrauty on his way to Benares (under the permission granted to him to reside at that city), was concerned in the hostile designs ascribed to the Rajah of Berar; and that, under the influence of that suspicion the Resident had persuaded Amrut Rao to postpone his advance. The Governor-General in Council is however satisfied that whatever may have been the designs of the Rajah of Berar, the suspicion of Amrut Rao's participation in them was unfounded.

The Resident's official report of transactions at Nagpore, and of his proceedings at that court between the 7th and the 10th of December, of which the substance is stated in former paragraphs of this letter, was contained in the Resident's despatch of the 20th of December, which was received at Fort William on the 10th January 1805.

The constant employment of the Resident's time and attention precluded the practicability of preparing an official and detailed report at an earlier period of time, but the progress of those transactions and proceedings was regularly communicated by the Resident in general terms, and in a private form, to the secretary to Government in the Secret Department; and on receipt of the Resident's private report, of the 20th December on the 31st of that month, the Governor-General deemed it proper to issue instructions to the Resident applicable to the state of affairs at Nagpore, according to the information in the Governor-General's possession at that date. The private letters of the Resident, to which this paragraph refers, had apprized the Governor-General of the consent of the Rajah to the Resident's demands; of his Highness's submissive acknowledgements and solemn protestations; of the renewal of the Resident's doubts and sus-

pitions on the ground of the march of the party of troops under Haim Geer to the Wurdah, and of its continuance on the frontier of the Soubahdar of the Deccan in a menacing position; and of the Resident's provisional limitation of the term of his continuance at Nagpore to the 16th of December, as stated in preceding paragraphs.

It appeared to the Governor-General that the Resident had manifested a laudable degree of energy and firmness in his remonstrances to the Rajah of Berar on the occasion of the invasion of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and of the various indications manifested by the Rajah of a disposition to hostility against the British Government. That the demands, with one exception, which the Resident had pressed upon the Rajah, and his declared resolution to quit the Rajah's court unless those demands should be complied with, were perfectly proper. The Governor-General was decidedly of opinion that the Rajah of Berar had entertained designs of an hostile nature against the British Government; that the troops which he had embodied, and those which he levied, were eventually intended to co-operate with Holkar, and that the proceedings of his brother, Nana Saheb, were secretly abetted by the Rajah. The Governor-General however was satisfied by the tenor of the Resident's late despatches that the Rajah of Berar had relinquished all intention of engaging in a contest with the British power. The circumstances stated in those despatches, constituted in his Excellency's judgment, satisfactory proof that the Rajah of Berar at length entertained a just sense of the folly of engaging in a contest with the British Government, and that he had become sincerely disposed to maintain the relations of amity and peace with us. The actual discharge of the Rajah's new levies; the march of the troops under Succaram Bukhshee from the menacing position which they occupied, combined with the general conduct of the Rajah; his humility, his concessions, and manifest alarm, superceded in the Governor-General's decided judgment any inferences unfavourable to the credit of these pacific indications, deducible from the continuance of the party of troops on the banks of the Wurdah, which did not exceed 1000 men. After adopting measures which deprived the Rajah of much more ample means of offence, he could not, in the Governor-General's opinion, reasonably be

supposed to encourage the hostile proceedings of that force. His Excellency therefore was disposed to credit the Rajah's declaration of his inability to controul the proceedings of its commander.

Entertaining this view of the subject, the Governor-General did not altogether approve the Resident's resolution to quit the Rajah's court unless that force should be withdrawn. At the same time his Excellency was satisfied of the rectitude of the Resident's intention, and ascribed that resolution exclusively to the excess of a meritorious and honourable zeal for the public interests committed to his charge.

These observations were stated to the Resident in a letter of instructions addressed to him by the Governor-General's authority on this occasion; and in conformity to the spirit of the Governor-General's sentiments the Resident was apprized in that despatch of the Governor-General's desire, that in the event of his having actually quitted the Rajah's Court without any additional and positive indication of hostility on the part of the Rajah, he should return to Nagpore, unless his departure should have been attended by circumstances which would render his return incompatible with the dignity of the British Government, and that every measure should be pursued for the purpose of satisfying the Rajah of the amicable and pacific intentions of the British Government. The Resident was therefore directed to apprise the Rajah that the information which the Governor-General had received both from the Resident's report and from other quarters with regard to the Rajah's conduct and proceedings, had convinced his Excellency of the Rajah's original intention to co-operate eventually against the British power or its ally; that the satisfactory demonstrations however which the Rajah had subsequently manifested of a returning sense of his errors, had induced the Governor-General to refrain from the adoption of measures for the punishment of his aggression, and that his Excellency was disposed to renew and corroborate the bonds of peace and alliance with the Rajah, and to forget the past, if assured of the Rajah's future adherence to the obligations of amity and public faith.

The Resident was further directed to signify to the Rajah, that with a view to manifest the amicable intentions of the British Government, and its disposition to conciliate his at-

tachment and promote his interests, he was authorized to renew the negotiation on the subject of a compensation for the losses which the Rajah had sustained by the operation of the 10th article of the treaty of Deogaum; and the Resident was accordingly directed actually to commence a negotiation with the Rajah of Berar on that subject, in conformity to the instructions of the Governor-General conveyed in the notes addressed to the Resident under date the 2d November, of which a copy forms an enclosure in this despatch, and to which a preceding paragraph refers. The Resident was, at the same time, apprized of the Governor-General's anxious desire to combine with that negotiation an arrangement for establishing a subsidiary force at Nagpore or at any other station within the Rajah's dominions, more convenient for the purposes of its appointment, as affording the most ample security for the future pacific conduct of the Rajah of Berar, and the most effectual protection to the whole of our western frontier from the Soane to Cuttack.

These instructions which were dated and despatched on the 31st of December, were prepared in the form of a private letter from the Secretary in the Secret Department for the greater expedition.

The Governor-General further directed the Secretary to communicate to the Resident his Excellency's sentiments on the subject of the suspicions which the Resident had been induced to entertain of the designs of Amrut Rao.

Agreeably to the intimation conveyed by the Resident to the officer commanding the army of the Deccan (as has been stated in a preceding paragraph) that army advanced towards the territory of the Rajah of Berar, and arrived in the vicinity of Omrauty about the middle of the month of January. On the arrival of Colonel Close at that place, however, on the 23d of January, on his way to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that officer having received from the Resident at Nagpore information of the result of his negotiations, and being satisfied that the Rajah of Berar had abandoned every project hostile to the British Government or its ally, was of opinion that the advance of the British army towards Nagpore, or its continuance near Omrauty, was unnecessary. Colonel Close therefore, under the general power of control over that army, provisionally vested in him by the Governor-

General's instructions, recommended the return of the army to Mulkapore, a station from whence the services of the army might be directed with equal facility and despatch, in every exigency to which its services could under any circumstances, be considered to be applicable.

The suggestion of Colonel Close, on the subject of withdrawing the army under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton, from its advanced position at Omrauty, corresponded with the instructions which, under a conviction of the pacific intentions both of the Rajah of Berar and of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General issued upon that subject to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, under date the 24th of January.

The following statement of the substance of those instructions will apprise your honourable Committee of the grounds on which the Governor-General formed his judgment of the expediency of withdrawing Colonel Haliburton's army, and of the mode in which his Excellency proposed to carry that arrangement into effect.

Although the concurrent testimony of facts from every quarter of India had satisfied the Governor-General of the eventual intentions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to aid the cause of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, his Excellency was, at this time, disposed to believe that those chieftains had abandoned the designs which they had formed in consequence of the exaggerated reports of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's progress and success, and that the events of the war in Hindostan and the Deccan had compelled them to return to a proper sense of their obligations towards the British Government. No questions were depending either at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of the Rajah of Berar, which appeared to menace any interruption of the subsisting relations with those powers, and the period appeared to the Governor-General to be arrived at which the British Government might with safety extend to those chiefs, the additional benefits by which it was proposed to cement our connection with them.

The only point with regard to Scindiah which appeared to require consideration was the re-establishment of his government in the province of Malwa, and the transfer to Scindiah of the territories in that province which had been conquered

from Jeswunt Rao Holkar. It was certainly desirable in the opinion of the Governor-General to induce Scindiah to return to Ougein and to occupy the conquests from Holkar in Malwa; but it neither appeared to be necessary to compel Scindiah to adopt those measures, nor to abandon the defensive alliance, if he should refuse to comply with the amicable representations of the British Government for the purpose of improving the condition of his government under his existing connection with the British power.

At the court of Nagpore, the only question likely to require discussion, was the invasion of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan by the troops of the Rajah, but this appeared to be a question capable of being adjusted by amicable negotiation, through the Resident at those courts.

On the other hand, the state of the war with Holkar, did not appear to create a necessity for the maintenance of Colonel Haliburton's army in its advanced position, with a view to the prosecution of hostilities against that chief. The Governor-General was of opinion, that Scindiah and the Peishwa should be required to occupy and provide for the defence of the conquests in Malwa and the Deccan respectively, and his Excellency considered it to be inexpedient to employ the British forces, in the protection of territories which having been conquered by the British arms, had been gratuitously ceded to our allies.

Influenced by these considerations, and adverting to the state of the season when these instructions would reach their destination, the Governor-General directed Major-General Wellesley to issue immediate orders to Colonel Haliburton for the final destination of the troops under his command, including the separation of the subsidiary forces attached respectively to the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and the Peishwa; the reduction of all existing expences and establishments, which might not appear essential to the efficiency of the subsidiary forces, and the return within the territories subject to Bombay and Fort St. George, of all corps belonging to those Presidencies, which might be in the Deccan beyond the establishments of the subsidiary forces.

With a view to accelerate the completion of this arrangement, the Governor-General deemed it to be proper to issue instructions directly to Colonel Haliburton, ordering that

officer to return without delay from the advanced position which he had taken up to the Godavery. Colonel Haliburton was directed to occupy a position at or near Peepulgaong, on the left bank of that river, and there to await the orders of Major-General Wellesley with respect to the final separation and distribution of his army. Colonel Haliburton was instructed to adopt immediate arrangements for carrying into effect the orders which he might receive from Major-General Wellesley, in conformity to the instructions of the Governor-General above stated.

In withdrawing his troops from their advanced position, Colonel Haliburton was instructed to provide for the security of the fortresses which had been captured from Holkar, and to be careful that the detachments necessary for this service, should not be exposed to risk either from the enemy, or from want of provisions after the return to the southward of the main body of the troops under his command.

Colonel Haliburton was instructed to communicate on the subject of these orders with the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, and with the Residents at Hyderabad, Poonah, Nagpore and with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

In considering the positions which it might be most advisable to select for the subsidiary forces serving with the Peishwa and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Governor-General adverted to a plan which had been submitted to his Excellency's consideration, in a despatch received from the honourable Major-General Wellesley, under date the 26th of January 1804.

It was proposed by General Wellesley in that letter, that the main bodies of the subsidiary forces should be posted in two different positions on the north bank of the river Godavery, and that two battalions from each of those forces should be stationed at Hyderabad and Poonah. The Governor-General entirely concurred in the reasoning by which General Wellesley supported the proposed distribution, which appeared to the Governor-General to be the best calculated to meet every contingency of peace or war, and to be the most beneficial arrangement which could be adopted with a view to derive every possible advantage from the services of those forces respectively. Major-General Wellesley was therefore instructed to adopt in concert with the Residents at,

Hyderabad and Poonah, such arrangements as he might deem to be necessary for effecting the distribution of the subsidiary forces in the manner proposed at the earliest period of time consistent with the security and advantage of the public interests in the Deccan.

It occurred to the Governor-General, that objections founded on the state of affairs at the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah might exist to preclude the proposed distribution; and General Wellesley was instructed in that case to direct the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar to return to Hyderabad, and that serving with the Peishwa to return either to Poonah or to Ahmednuggur according to his discretion. The Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah were directed to communicate their sentiments to General Wellesley on the subject.

Copies of these instructions, and of the instructions to Colonel Haliburton, were transmitted to the Governors of Fort Saint George and Bombay, and Lord William Bentinck was informed of the Governor-General's opinion that under any state of circumstances it would be advisable to withdraw from the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, within the Company's territories, a considerable detachment of cavalry and of European and native infantry which was proceeding to re-inforce the army under Colonel Haliburton.

Copies were also transmitted to the Residents at Poonah, Hyderabad, Nagpore, and with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Those instructions were also communicated to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India.

The Governor-General in Council now proceeds to communicate to your honourable Committee, the proceedings of the Resident at Nagpore, under the instructions of the 31st of December, 1804, to which a preceding paragraph of this despatch refers. After his receipt of those instructions the Resident took an early opportunity of apprizing the Rajah of Berar of the resolutions which the Governor-General had adopted under a knowledge of the whole of his highness's late conduct.

On receiving this communication, the Rajah expressed in animated terms, the sentiments of gratitude and satisfaction impressed upon his mind by the favorable decision and liberal intentions of the British Government.

The Resident stated that it was evident from the Rajah's unusual cheerfulness on that occasion, that his mind was greatly relieved by the Resident's communication.

On the following day the Resident desired the attendance of one of the Rajah's principal ministers for the purpose of conversing with him on the several topics connected with the Governor-General's recent instructions. Having expressed his intention of discussing the subject of the compensation to be granted to the Rajah for the losses which his Highness had sustained by the alienation of the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna, the Resident proceeded to advert to the questions which the minister had stated at a former conference, respecting the Rajah's acceptance of a subsidiary force of British troops and encouraged the discussion of that subject, the minister having evaded a renewal of his former proposition.

The Resident proceeded to state to him the advantages which the Rajah might be expected to derive from his admission to the benefits of the general defensive alliance.

The arguments employed by the Resident to convince the minister of the advantages of the proposed arrangement were founded principally on the dangers to which the government and the dominions of the Rajah would be exposed under the circumstances in which the several states of India might be expected to be placed by the successful issue of the contest with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, observing that the hordes of freebooters, whom our success would deprive of immediate employment would direct their depredations against the territories of those states which possessed the least efficient means of defence; that the principal states of India being connected by terms of the most intimate alliance with the British Government, which was bound to protect them, these freebooters would probably seek subsistence by plundering the territories of the Rajah of Berar, and that his highness must be sensible of the inadequacy of his own military resources to protect his country against the ravages to which it would thus be exposed.

The Resident concluded by contrasting the dangers and embarrassments of the Rajah's future situation with the security and prosperity of those states which were connected with the British Government by the relations of a defensive

alliance, and the Resident having desired to communicate to the Rajah the substance of the conversation, the minister withdrew.

In the course of the conference the minister assured the Resident that the proposition relative to a British subsidiary force had originated with himself, and had never been communicated to the Rajah, for which reason the minister neglected to apprize the Rajah of the conference which he had holden with the Resident upon that subject. The Resident therefore deemed it proper to obtain an audience of the Rajah for the purpose of conversing personally with his highness on the subject of establishing a subsidiary force of British troops within his Highness's dominions, and of endeavouring by a just representation of the advantages of that arrangement to induce the Rajah to propose its adoption.

At this conference the Resident repeated the arguments which he had employed in his conference with the minister. The Rajah acknowledged his sense of the danger to which his country would be exposed at the conclusion of the war, but expressed a confidence in the adequacy of his resources for the defence of his dominions against common attacks, and stated his conviction that in a case of imminent danger he might depend upon the support of the British Government.

The Resident did not discourage the expectation of eventual aid on the part of the British Government, but observed to the Rajah, that however well-disposed the British Government might be to afford him that assistance, it would be unreasonable to expect that the British Government would equip an army and involve the Company in a war solely on account of the Rajah, with whom the British Government had no further connection than that which arose out of the treaty of peace.

The Rajah however continuing to manifest his reluctance to the adoption of the proposed arrangement, the Resident deemed it inconsistent with the spirit of his instructions to pursue the subject with additional urgency, and concluded the conversation by observing that although the Governor-General was disposed to grant a subsidiary force to the Rajah's solicitations, it was by no means an arrangement so advantageous to the Company as to induce his Excellency to

demand it on the ground of security, and that, he trusted, his Highness's future conduct would satisfy the Governor-General of his amicable disposition.

The Governor-General, in Council, considered the conduct of the Resident in the course of those discussions to have been distinguished by an extraordinary degree of ability, address and discretion. Under the circumstances of the Rajah's reluctance to solicit admission to the benefits of the defensive alliance, the Governor-General in Council deemed it improper to authorize the renewal of the proposition.

It appeared to be more advisable to leave the Rajah to the operation of future events on his mind, and to trust exclusively to that influence for the means of effecting the object of obtaining the accession of the Rajah to the alliance; with this view, the Resident was directed to refrain from any further agitation of the question, unless it should be revived by the Rajah himself, and the Resident was informed, that in the event of a renewal of the subject by the Rajah at a future period of time, he would receive such instructions on the subject as might be applicable to the circumstances of the case.

The Governor-General deemed it proper at the same time to apprise the Resident, that his Excellency did not consider the accession of the Rajah to the alliance to be an object of material importance to the British Government in the present state of the political affairs of India, yet that his Excellency would be disposed to receive with cordiality any overtures from the Rajah to that effect, provided they should undoubtedly originate in the Rajah's conviction of the importance of such an arrangement to his own security and advantage, and not be considered by him as a concession to the British Government.

No other transaction of importance has occurred at the Court of Nagpore up to the period of our latest advices from Mr. Elphinstone.

The Governor-General in Council, however deems it to be proper to state to your honourable Committee that in consequence of the desire expressed by the Rajah that the British Government would consent to the restoration of the Jaggeer of Vincajee Bhooslah, which had been sequestrated by his Highness, as stated in a former paragraph of this despatch.

His Excellency issued orders to the Resident, directing him to communicate to the Rajah the consent of the British Government to the restoration of the Jaggeer.

It did not appear to the Governor-General to be desirable or expedient to pursue measures of severity with respect to Vincajee Bhooslah, or the Rajah of Berar, beyond the extent necessary for the security and dignity of the British Government. The proofs which the Rajah of Berar ultimately afforded of his disposition to maintain the relations of amity and peace with the British Government, suggested the policy of gratifying his Highness's wishes in every mode consistent with the security of the interests of the British Government. It did not appear to the Governor-General that either our security or dignity required the permanent confiscation of Vincajee Bhooslah's Jaggeer, the Governor-General therefore directed the Resident to signify to the Rajah the Governor-General's consent to the restoration of the Jaggeer.

* * * * *

[As the introduction of the remaining part of this despatch, which necessarily extends to a considerable length, would swell the volume to too great a bulk, it is deemed expedient to omit the remainder with the exception of the two concluding paragraphs. Those which are omitted relate,—1st. To the hostile proceedings of the Rajahs of Khoordah and Kunkha in Cuttack, instigated, there was reason to believe, by the Rajah of Berar, and the consequent operations of the British troops under the command of Colonel Harcourt, which terminated in the gallant attack and capture by assault of the fortress of Khoordah, and the consequent submission of the Rajah, as well as the complete subjection of the Rajah of Kunkha, and the restoration of tranquillity in the province of Cuttack.

2d. To the transactions at the Court of Scindiah subsequently to the 21st of November, comprising Mr. Jenkins's report of his negotiations on the subject of the requisition for Scindiah's return to his capital; the grant of pecuniary aid on the part of the British Government, and the dismissal of his profligate minister, Serjie Rao Ghautka, and a narrative of the outrageous attack on the Residency, and the plunder of the Resident's baggage by a party of irregular troops in the service of that chief, which has already been adverted to in a former part of this volume.

3d. *To the military operations of the troops under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Martindel, in suppressing the turbulence of the refractory chiefs of Bundelcund, and reducing them to obedience, and the subsequent movements of the troops adapted to the combined object of checking the supposed hostile designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of co-operating with the forces employed under the immediate direction of the Commander-in-chief.*

4th. *To the operations of those forces, including the details of several gallant actions with the troops of the enemy; a narrative of the several unsuccessful attacks on the fortress of Bhurtpore (the accounts of which are contained in letters from the Commander-in-chief, inserted in a former part of this volume*); the Rajah of Bhurtpore's ultimate submission on the terms dictated by his Excellency under the Marquess Wellesley's instructions. The incursion of Meer Khaun with a body of 15,000 horse into the province of Rohilcund. His abortive attack on the civil station of Moradabad, and the pursuit of the invaders, and their total defeat and dispersion by a detachment under the command of Major-General Smith. The despatch thus concludes.—ED.]*

On a consideration of all the transactions which have been recorded in the preceding narrative combined with the actual condition of our internal and external relations, the Governor-General in Council has no reason to doubt the accomplishment of the expectations which in our despatch of the 13th of July, the Governor-General in Council has expressed with regard to the benefits to be derived from the general arrangements of the peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. The fundamental principles of that policy which regulated the measures of the British Government in framing those arrangements, which must constitute the basis of the power and security of the British Empire in India cannot be considered to be affected by the circumstances of the existing contest with Holkar and his partizans. The immediate effect of that intended system of political connection which is indisputably requisite for the permanent establishment of general peace and tranquillity throughout India, must necessarily be to deprive of employment that numerous class of military adventurers, who have

* See p. 292 et seq.

hitherto derived subsistence from the wars and contests of the various discordant and unconnected powers of India. To the operation of this cause must be ascribed the facility with which Holkar and his partizans have been enabled without any pecuniary or territorial resource to assemble and maintain a numerous horde of freebooters. But the gradual and certain operation of those principles on which is founded the existing system of our political relations must ultimately tend to subdue the characteristic habits and dispositions of those rude and predatory classes, and to encourage the cultivation of the arts of peace and industry throughout every state in India.

The power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar is destitute of any solid foundation, and of every element of an established government, and although under actual circumstances the British Government is still under the necessity of maintaining our armies in the field during an unexpected period of time, no conclusions can be deduced from the present situation of affairs, of a nature to justify a doubt of the ultimate establishment of that system of general peace and security throughout India, to which the views and measures of this government have been uniformly directed.

We have the honour to be,

Honourable Sirs,

Your most faithful humble servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

No. XCI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, March 25th, 1805.

The despatches containing the details of the negotiations for peace in India, together with the explanatory remarks respecting the stipulations of the treaties of Deogaum and of Serjee Anjengaum, have been addressed by the Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee of your honourable Court in conformity to your established orders, and to the ordinary practice of this government.

Under the same rule the Governor-General in Council

has addressed to your Secret Committee, the despatches relative to the disturbances occasioned by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to the operations of our armies against that adventurer and his adherents.

The disturbances occasioned by Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his adherents, have proved a vexatious and painful interruption of tranquillity in this quarter of India, and have demanded the active exertion of our arms on parts of our north-western frontier in Hindostan. But the reduction which has been effected of the power of that lawless adventurer, by the general success of our operations against him, must tend to confirm the security of our interests, and those of our allies, and to furnish additional grounds of stability to the system of alliance founded on the recent treaties of peace, partition and subsidy.

The inordinate demands of Jeswunt Rao Holkar extended not only to a violation of the rights and territories of our allies, but to the cession of large tracts of territory in the Doab of the Jumna and Ganges, which had been in the possession of the Nabob Vizier for a long period of years, and were by that prince ceded to the British Government in the year 1801, under the treaty of Lucknow.

Your honourable Court will remark, that the demands of Holkar were urged immediately after the close of the last glorious war, and attempted to be enforced by a predatory incursion upon the territory of our ally. From this circumstance may be estimated the danger to which your interests would have been exposed, if, in the year 1802, Jeswunt Rao Holkar had been permitted to prosecute his success against his Highness the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to unite in his own person, by the reduction of their power, all the resources of the two principal branches of the Mahratta state, in addition to the resources of the family of Holkar, which he had usurped in the province of Malwa and in the Deccan.

That danger was averted by the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein and by the success of the late war.

The most perfect cordiality and confidence subsists between the British Government and his Highness the Peishwa, as well as with the Guikwar state; and our alliances with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and with Mysore, continue with unabated efficiency and strength.

The peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar has not been interrupted by the recent disturbances, and although the conduct of those Durbars has occasionally betrayed symptoms of the spirit of intrigue and duplicity, inseparable from the Mahratta character, no reason exists to justify any apprehension of danger to the stability of the peace subsisting with those powers. The tranquillity of the Deccan is consequently restored, and the army of Fort St. George has been ordered to return to its ordinary stations.

The conduct of some detachments of the army in Hindostan, and the difficulties which have occurred in the reduction of Bhurtpore, will demand further explanation, founded upon due enquiry at the close of the campaign.

The general success of the campaign, however, has been great and decisive, and a considerable progress has been accomplished towards the entire reduction of the mischievous power of Holkar, which had been applied to the ruinous purpose of impairing the foundations of general peace, of seducing the faith of our allies, of alienating the allegiance of our subjects, and of erecting upon the destruction of our resources and alliances a new state in India, composed exclusively of lawless freebooters, actuated by interests and views incompatible with the security of any of the established powers, and urged by desperate necessity, and by an adventurous spirit of rapine and plunder, to pursue a general system of depredation upon the possessions of all contiguous states.

Every circumstance now justifies a confident persuasion that the projects of Holkar have been effectually frustrated; that the army in Hindostan may speedily be established at the stations which may be assigned to it for the preservation of peace; and that the heavy charges of an establishment for war, may cease in all quarters of India.

Although neither the objects nor general scale of the hostilities in which we have been engaged against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, can be compared with the magnitude and lustre of the operations of the late war in India, yet in reviewing the conduct of the army, your honourable Court will perceive fresh cause to admire and applaud the skill, valour and activity of Lord Lake, and of the officers and troops employed in Hindostan and the Deccan.

Your honourable Court will particularly distinguish the judicious and skilful operation by which Lord Lake in the

course of a few days effected the reduction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's strong artillery and numerous cavalry, by the separate operations of the British cavalry under his Lordship's personal command, and of the British infantry under the command of that able and gallant officer Major-General Frazer. Your honourable Court will not fail to admire the heroic and masterly conduct of Major-General Frazer against the infantry and artillery of Holkar, in the decisive and brilliant action at Deig, on the 13th of November 1804, and the glorious success of Lord Lake against the cavalry of Holkar, under the walls of the city of Furruckabad, after a march of fifty-four miles performed in twenty-four hours.

A principal object of this letter is to solicit the favourable attention of your honourable Court to the memorable services rendered to his king and country, by the late Major-General Frazer of his Majesty's service, who to the irreparable loss of the service, died, amidst his triumphant army, in consequence of the wound which he received in atchieving the splendid and arduous victory over the enemy's infantry and artillery, at Deig, on the 13th of November 1804.

It is unnecessary to recommend the widow and numerous family of this illustrious and deeply lamented officer, to your honourable Court's benevolent protection, which has ever been extended to every object of similar calamity; nor is it requisite to submit to your honourable Court the propriety of conferring every mark of honour and distinction upon the memory of the late Major-General Frazer; but it is my duty to assure your honourable Court, that the extension of your benevolence and favour on this melancholy occasion, will prove highly grateful to the universal sentiments of the army, and of every description of British subjects in India.

I have the honour to be, honourable Sirs,

Your most obedient, obliged
and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. XCII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, March 25th, 1805.

In conformity to the notification which I had the honour to submit to your honourable Court, in my letter of the 14th of

March 1804, it was my intention to have embarked for Europe during the present season, and by the obliging attention of Admiral Rainier, I had provided accommodation for my voyage on board of his Majesty's ship the *San Fiorenzo*, and had proposed to request Captain Lambert to afford the protection of that ship to the honourable Company's fleet of regular ships, now proceeding from this port to England.

2. But the interruption of the tranquillity of Hindostan, occasioned by the disturbances which Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his adherents have excited upon the banks of the Jumna, prevented me from proceeding to the north-western provinces in the last season, according to my intention submitted to your honourable Court, on the 14th of March 1804, and the same cause has delayed the conclusion of many extensive arrangements connected with the stability of the peace, and requisite to secure the benefits of that settlement, and to establish good order and regular governments within the conquered provinces on our north-western frontier. The continuance of those disturbances has also compelled me to employ a considerable army in active operations, under circumstances which have occasioned a heavy expence, disturbed the public investment, and again postponed the period of return to that state of finance, which had been attained previously to the rupture with the confederate Mahratta chieftains.

3. It has been impracticable under the vexatious and unexpected hostilities which have embarrassed the operations of this government, to enter upon a general revision of the whole system of our establishments, connected with the permanent situation and circumstances of the British empire in India in all its actual relations. It is my anxious desire to undertake and to conclude such a revision, previously to my departure from India.

4. Every reason exists to justify an expectation of the early and successful termination of hostilities on the banks of the Jumna; tranquillity is restored in the Deccan, and within all the provinces and dependencies of the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay; and the whole army of Fort St. George is ordered to return to its usual stations. In the meanwhile I have commenced a general revision of establishments, with a view to a fixed and settled state of peace, embracing every branch of our possessions, dependencies and alliances throughout the whole extent of India.

5. But hostilities have not ceased on the north-western frontier of provinces subject to this government, nor can I expect to accomplish the important objects to which I have adverted until the existing disturbances shall have been composed, our resources rendered available, and our expences reduced by the restoration of order and tranquillity on the banks of the Jumna, and by the establishment of the armies of Bengal and Bombay, in the stations appointed for the maintenance of peace.

6. In this crisis of affairs I cannot attempt to abandon my station without a dereliction of the uniform principles which have regulated my conduct in maintaining the interests and honour of the Company, and of the nation in India, and in discharging my great and anxious public trust to the satisfaction of my conscientious sense of public duty, and of gratitude towards your honourable Court, the honourable Court of Proprietors, my King and my country.

7. My health is considerably impaired, by the continual fatigues incident to the weighty charge which I have exercised for nearly seven years, in this severe climate, under much anxiety of mind, under various exigencies of arduous service, and many difficulties and dangers. My solicitude to return to England is greatly increased by the actual condition of my health; and I trust that I shall meet the approbation of your honourable Court in embarking by the earliest opportunity, which shall occur during the present year, after tranquillity shall have been restored in Hindostan, and the general regulations and arrangements requisite for a final settlement of your affairs in India, under the enlarged frame of this empire, shall have been placed on a secure foundation.

8. It appears to be probable, that I shall not be disappointed in my expectation of availing myself of such an opportunity at an early period of the season; with this hope, I shall request Sir Edward Pellew to enable me to command the means of convoy to England, which I will endeavour to apply to the combined purpose of my homeward voyage, and of protecting any ships of the honourable Company which may be prepared for the same destination.

9. Your honourable Court however, may be assured that I will not attempt to abandon the charge of this government, (unless absolutely compelled by the state of my health) until

affairs in Hindostan shall have assumed a more settled aspect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XCIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, March 28, 1805.

1. I have the honour to communicate to your honourable Court a request which I have received from the Nabob Vizier, that I would solicit the permission of your honourable Court for the exportation from England of certain articles which his Highness is desirous of obtaining, free of freight, on the honourable Company's regular ships. I understand that his Highness, whose principal amusement consists in hunting, is particularly anxious to obtain from England a number of dogs and horses. I confidently trust that your honourable Court will be disposed to afford an additional testimony of your satisfaction at the conduct of his Highness the Vizier, by granting this indulgence.

2. His Highness's aide-de-camp, Major Ouseley, who has proceeded to England on the honourable Company's ship, *Lady Jane Dundas*, is in possession of his Highness's commission, and on his arrival in London, will attend your honourable Court for the purpose of receiving your commands upon this point, and of communicating the details of the commission with which he is entrusted.

3. I deem it proper to state to your honourable Court on this occasion, that Mr. Ouseley has resided many years as a merchant within the Nabob Vizier's dominions, and by his talents and his manners, and by his extensive knowledge of the languages of the country, acquired the confidence and esteem of his Highness the Vizier, who during my residence at Lucknow in the commencement of the year 1802, requested my permission to appoint Mr. Ouseley to be his Highness's aide-de-camp, with the rank of Major in his Highness's army. The uniform propriety of Mr. Ouseley's conduct during his residence in India, and the high estimation in which his character was justly held, precluded in my judgment all objection to a compliance with his Highness's request. I deemed it proper, however, to annex to my consent a condition, that Mr. Ouseley should not be employed as a channel for the

transaction of any public business whatever, between his Highness and the British Government, a condition to which his Highness readily assented, and Mr. Ouseley was accordingly appointed aide-de-camp to his Highness, with the rank of Major in his Highness's service.*

4. The conduct of Major Ouseley in that capacity has been in the highest degree honourable and proper, and such as to conciliate the Nabob Vizier's utmost confidence and esteem. I am induced therefore, by motives of respect for his Highness, as well as of justice towards Major Ouseley, to express my hope that your honourable Court will be pleased to manifest towards him every practicable degree of consideration and favour, and also in the event of Major Ouseley being hereafter desirous of returning to India for the purpose of resuming his situation of aide-de-camp to his Highness the Vizier, that your honourable Court will grant him permission for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XCIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Written 4th April, 1805.†

I have had the honour to receive your Highness's letter containing a detailed statement of the representation which your Highness is pleased to make of the transactions of your Highness's Durbar from the period of the commencement of the war with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, until the date of that letter, (vide that received the 18th of February.)

Your Highness's letter was delivered by Bugwunt Rao, your vakeel, to whom it was dispatched by hircarrahs from your Highness's camp; and your vakeel, agreeably to your directions, proceeded from Benares to Calcutta, for the express purpose of delivering your letter. This dilatory mode of conveying your Highness's letter prevented its arrival at

* Now the Right Honourable Sir Gore Ouseley, Bart., G. C. H. and K. S. L. of Persia; for a particular account of his public services in Oude, and afterwards in Persia, see Appendix.

† This is a reply to the letter of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 18th Oct. 1804. See p. 281.—[Ed.]

Calcutta until four months after the date which it bears. It is a subject of surprize and concern that your Highness should not have adopted the most expeditious mode of conveying to me a letter involving such important considerations. The mode of conveyance which your Highness adopted appears to be inconsistent with a desire of receiving my early reply to the several points which you have been pleased to state; a conscious sense of the justice and equity of the statements and demands contained in your Highness's letter, would probably have been manifested by a more direct and expeditious communication of your Highness's sentiments.

Your Highness has been pleased to state your conviction, that the late Mr. Webbe neglected to report to me an account of all the transactions at your Highness's Court, and that he never made any communication to me of your reiterated proposals, counsel or advice.

I assure your Highness that Mr. Webbe regularly communicated to me all the transactions at your Highness's Court, stating to me the substance of all the arguments, observations and propositions of your Highness and your ministers, during the various conferences between Mr. Webbe, your Highness, and your ministers, on subjects connected with the state of public affairs. Mr. Webbe at the same time reported to me all the replies, which he returned to the statements and propositions of your Highness and your ministers. These replies, however, your Highness has entirely omitted in the narrative which your letter contains of the transactions and negotiations at your Highness's Court. The inaccuracy, fallacy and injustice of the statements contained in your Highness's letter are peculiarly remarkable in the extraordinary revival of your claim to the districts of Gohud and Gwalior. Your Highness has stated that claim not only without any reference to the repeated discussions of that question between your Highness, your ministers, and Major Malcolm, but, after that question had been completely and finally adjusted by a formal act of your Highness's government, and by your own personal acceptance in public Durbar of the list of treaties confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace. At a conference holden on the 20th May 1804, between your Highness's chief minister, the late Bappoo Wittul, and other principal officers of your government and the British Resident Mr. Webbe, accompanied by Major Malcolm, Bappoo

Wittul declared in the most solemn manner, on the part of your Highness, that the claim to Gohud and Gwalior had been entirely abandoned; and the British Resident having expressed a desire to be enabled to report to me the final adjustment of that question, Bappoo Wittul authorized the Resident in the most unequivocal manner to assure me, that the claim had been completely relinquished by your Highness; and Bappoo Wittul having reported to your Highness the declaration which he had made to the British Resident in your Highness's name, your Highness not only verbally assented to that declaration, but ratified it in the most public, formal, and solemn manner, by receiving from the hands of the British Resident, in your public Durbar, the list of treaties confirmed by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, amongst which treaties is the engagement concluded by the British Government with the Ranah of Gohud. A transaction, so public and formal, must be considered to possess all the force and obligation of the most solemn treaty; and inseparable as that is from the due execution of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, to revive the question relative to the districts of Gohud and Gwalior, would invalidate the treaty of peace, and impair the obligation of every stipulation which it contains.

Under these circumstances, it becomes my duty to require that your Highness should now distinctly confirm, by a written instrument, the declaration made to the British Resident in your Highness's name relative to your claim to the possession of Gohud and Gwalior, and that you should distinctly declare that your Highness considers your acceptance of the list of engagements, delivered into your hands by the British Resident on the 20th of May 1804, to constitute a formal recognition of those engagements. I request that your Highness's reply to this requisition may be immediately communicated to his Excellency Lord Lake at the head quarters of the British army in Hindostan; and that you will be pleased, under a written instrument transmitted to Lord Lake, to declare in plain terms, whether your Highness now proposes to dispute the validity of any of the treaties which you have already solemnly recognized; and particularly whether you now propose to dispute the validity of the treaty between the British Government and the Ranah of Gohud.

Your Highness has signified that you had taken several

opportunities of sending for Mr. Webbe, and of personally explaining to him, in the most impressive manner, the hostile nature of Holkar's views, and the propriety and expediency of frustrating the mischievous tendency of Holkar's projects; that the evil had not yet encreased to such a magnitude that it might not be overcome by common exertion; and now that the British forces under the command of his Excellency General Lake had arrived near Jyepoor, it was highly desirable that your whole army should be assembled for the purpose of co-operating in the extermination of the enemy, by which means that object might be speedily accomplished to the satisfaction of both states; but that your government had sustained heavy losses, and had experienced the most severe pecuniary embarrassments, and that to enable your Highness to collect an army money was indispensably necessary, that without money it was impossible to assemble an army or prosecute war. That as under the perfect union and identity of interests subsisting between the two states, the loss and injury sustained by one must be considered to be the loss and injury of both, if, in consideration of the embarrassed state of your Highness's finances, the honourable Company's government would, in the actual crisis of affairs, grant you pecuniary assistance, to the extent which might be requisite to prosecute the war, such would be conformable to the dictates of union, and would therefore not be misapplied; that if however there should be any hesitation about affording you any pecuniary aid, you had requested that it might be given to you on loan without interest, and the amount be afterwards deducted from the annual sum of 20 lac and 50,000 rupees (which includes the revenue of Pergunnahs, Dhoolpore, Barree, and others) that you were to receive from the Honourable Company.

Your Highness will recollect that by the terms of the defensive alliance your Highness is bound to employ your utmost exertions in conjunction with the British power in the prosecution of joint war. No obligation however is imposed upon the British power to afford to your Highness pecuniary aid for that purpose. The British Government is therefore entitled to expect from your Highness that degree of assistance in the prosecution of the war, which the state of your government may enable you to afford, but the grant of pecuniary aid to your Highness is entirely optional on the

part of the British Government. It is unnecessary to examine whether your Highness was really prevented by the embarrassed condition of your affairs from affording any aid in the prosecution of the war against Holkar. If the resources of your Highness's government were exhausted to such a degree as to be inadequate to the supply of the ordinary expenses of the state, it was not reasonable to expect that the British Government should provide, from its own funds, for so enormous a deficiency in your Highness's resources; in other words that the charges of the troops in your Highness's service, to be employed in the prosecution of the war, should be borne by the Company. Such however appears to have been your Highness's expectation. I must assert that your Highness possessed no right, founded either upon the stipulation of any treaty, or upon any principle of justice, to warrant an expectation that the British Government should replace at its own expense all the loss which your Highness had sustained in the war which you had waged against the British power. Your Highness will recollect the discussions on the subject of pecuniary aid which ensued after the Resident had received my instructions upon that subject. On that occasion your Highness's minister submitted to the Resident's consideration four plans for the co-operation of your Highness's troops with those of the British Government. 1st. That your Highness should take the field in person with an army of 25,000 men, with a proportion of infantry and artillery, the total expense of which was computed at twenty-five lacs of rupees per mensem. 2ndly. That your highness's minister Bappoo Wittul should proceed with a smaller force, the expense of which was computed at fifteen lacs of rupees per mensem. 3rdly. That the contingent of troops which your Highness is engaged to furnish in the event of joint war, by the terms of the defensive alliance, and the expense of which was estimated at ten or twelve lacs of rupees per mensem, should be employed under the command of another officer; and 4thly. That a small body of your Highness's troops actually in the province of Malwa, should join and co-operate with the British detachment under the command of Colonel Murray.

Your Highness's minister intimated to the Resident, that your Highness was prepared to carry into effect any one of

these plans of co-operation which the Resident might approve; but at the same time distinctly stated to the Resident your Highness's expectation that the whole charge of whatever forces your Highness might bring into the field should be borne by the company.

Your Highness cannot possibly consider such an expectation to be reasonable, nor can your Highness justly complain of the British Government for declining to afford pecuniary aid to the extent of subsidizing your Highness's contingent troops, which, by treaty, you are bound to furnish at your own charge. Your Highness appears to have considered yourself to be absolutely invested with a right to pecuniary aid under the plea that the sum of 20 lacs and 50,000 rupees per annum, was payable under the treaty to your Highness, or to your government by the British Government; this sum must be supposed to consist of the amount of the stipends assigned to certain Chieftains connected with your Highness's Government by the 7th article of the treaty of peace, and of the nett revenue collected by the British officers since the termination of the war from the districts of Dholepore, Barree, &c.

It is my duty to point out the invalidity of your Highness's claim to the former of those sums. By the express terms of the treaty, the faith of the British Government is pledged for the payment of the stipends to the amount of seventeen lacs, including Jaghires, not to your Highness nor on account of your Highness's government, but to the persons respectively to whom those stipends are assigned. It is impossible, therefore, without a violation of the treaty of peace, and of the public faith pledged to those chieftains and other persons of rank, to admit your Highness's claim to the payment of the amount of those stipends as an available resource for supplying the exigencies of your Highness's government; I could not therefore have consented to grant to your Highness pecuniary aid on the security of the stipends, the amount of which the British Government would have been compelled to discharge, exclusively of the sums which might be advanced for the service of your Highness's government. I shall have occasion to advert to this subject again in a subsequent part of this letter.

I admit, and have never denied, your Highness's claim to

to the nett revenue of Dholepore, Barree, and Rajahkera. The sum, however, due on that account, at the period of time to which your Highness's letter refers, must have been inconsiderable. I shall advert to this subject also in a more detailed manner, in another part of this letter.

It is evident, from your Highness's own statement, that the amount of pecuniary aid which you considered to be sufficient to enable you to fulfil the obligation of your engagements, was very considerable, and that your Highness did not possess, on any ground whatever, a claim upon the British Government to a sum of money in any degree proportioned to the extent of your expectations. The question of granting or withholding such pecuniary aid was exclusively a question of expediency with reference to the interests of the British Government; if, therefore, I had refused to grant that aid, no complaint on the part of your Highness would have been justified. Your Highness possessed no right, by treaty, to demand such aid from the British Government, and any such aid, if afforded, could merely be considered as an act of favour and kindness, but not as a concession of right. Under the alledged extent of your Highness's difficulties and distress, if I had declined to aid you with pecuniary funds, your Highness might, in that case, have been exempted from the imputation of an intentional failure in the duties of the alliance, but you would not therefore have been entitled to claim pecuniary aid as a matter of right from the British Government.

The British Resident, however, under my express authority repeatedly offered to assist the exigencies of your Highness's Government to a certain extent, provided any satisfactory assurance were afforded of the attainment of the object of such pecuniary aid in the due prosecution of war against the enemy.

Your Highness has thought proper to comprize in your letter a detailed narrative of the proceedings of Bappoojee Scindiah and Suddasheo Rao according to the reports conveyed to you by your Highness's servants. It is unnecessary to investigate the accuracy of every part of that detail, since your Highness admits the most material part of the case, the open defection of those chieftains and their public junction with the enemy. Your Highness ascribes their defec-

tion to the want of resources for the payment of their troops, and asserts that their junction with the enemy was involuntary, and the unavoidable consequence of the circumstances in which they were placed. The defect of pecuniary resources might, perhaps, be urged in justification of the inactivity of the force under the command of those officers in the promotion of the common cause; but the actual junction of that force with the enemy's army, and the activity and zeal manifested by those officers in the enemy's cause must be ascribed to other motives, and cannot be justified by their alledged want of means for the payment of their troops. This sentiment is confirmed by the subsequent conduct of those persons who have continued to be among the most zealous and active partizans of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The observations which have been stated on the general subject of affording your Highness pecuniary aid, to enable your armies to co-operate with the British troops, are equally applicable to Bappoojee Scindiah's alledged demands of pecuniary aid from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and from Colonel Monson, of which demands, however, your Highness's letter has conveyed to me the first intimation.

It cannot possibly be maintained that the British Government was engaged to supply Bappoojee Scindiah and Sud-dasheo Rao with funds for the payment of their troops; and your Highness evidently means by the narrative of the proceedings of those officers, merely to justify their conduct in joining the enemy. Your Highness cannot surely expect me to assent to a perverted principle of public faith, which would sanction the most flagrant treachery and desertion of allies and dependants in every case of pecuniary difficulty or distress.

I shall now proceed to reply separately to the several articles stated in your Highness's letter.

The first article relates to your Highness's alledged claim to the districts of Gohud and Gwalior.

I have adverted, in a preceding part of this letter, to the impropriety of your Highness's revival of a claim which has been renounced by your Highness in the most formal and solemn manner in presence of the late Mr. Webbe, and of Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm; and I have deemed it necessary to request your Highness's direct confirmation of your own act.

After the ample discussions upon the subject of Gohud and Gwalior between Major Malcolm and your Highness's ministers, and after your Highness's solemn and public renunciation of the claim to those districts confirmed by your formal and public acknowledgement of the validity of the treaty subsisting between the Company and the Ranah of Gohud, I cannot consent to receive from your Highness any application on the subject of those districts, resting on the ground of your alledged right to the possession of them. I deem it necessary, however, to explain to your Highness the fallacy of the statement upon that subject, contained in your Highness's letter.

You have stated that, "after the conclusion of the two treaties his Excellency General Lake gave the countries of Gohud and Gwalior, together with the fort of the latter, to the people of the Ranah of Gohud. That the countries of Gohud and Gwalior have for a long period of time been annexed to your Highness's territory; that at the time of the conclusion of the peace your Highness delivered to the honourable Major-General Wellesley a statement, under your own seal and signature, of all the the countries and forts in Hindostan which you had ceded, together with a memorandum of their names and annual value; that in that statement, however, the names of the countries of Gohud and Gwalior, with the fort of the latter, were not inserted; that if your Highness had ceded those countries their names also would unquestionably have appeared in that statement; and that, therefore, the delivery of that territory and fort to the people of the Ranah of Gohud, and their occupation of them was in direct violation of the treaty of peace.

The question respecting Gohud and Gwalior has no connection whatever with the schedule of cessions annexed to the treaty of peace. Those districts which formerly belonged to the family of the Ranah of Gohud were assigned to that chieftain by an engagement contracted by the British Government with the Ranah of Gohud before the conclusion of the treaty of peace; and that engagement was confirmed by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, which stipulates "that certain treaties having been made by the British Government with Rajahs and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, those

treaties are to be confirmed; and that the Maharajah renounces all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made, and declares them to be independent of his government and authority." This circumstance has been totally overlooked by your Highness, although the question of the eventual alienation of the territory of the Ranah of Gohud, by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, was a subject of repeated discussion between the honourable Major-General Wellesley and your vakeels at their conferences previously to the conclusion of the peace, and although Major-General Wellesley distinctly apprized your vakeels, in the course of those conferences, that the territory of the Ranah of Gohud, which always included the fort and district of Gwalior, might be alienated by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty.

Your Highness has stated, under the 2d head, "that among the seven Rajahs, named in the copy of the treaty transmitted to your Highness by me, the name of the Rajah of Jodepore is inserted, which you were not prepared to expect, since the Rajah of Jodepore had, during the last fifty or sixty years, stood in a tributary relation to your Highness, and the greatest exertions were employed to enforce the payment of the tribute from that country by your Highness's ancestors, who fought and bled in the prosecution of that object: That it was not proper therefore to connect the name of the Rajah of Jodepore with the other six Rajahs alluded to."

The name of the Rajah of Jodepore was inserted in the list of treaties, because, previously to the termination of the war, an engagement was concluded with that chieftain by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief; and by the 9th article of the treaty of peace all engagements concluded by the British Government with Rajahs and other feudatories of your Highness are acknowledged and confirmed. The Rajah of Jodepore, however, having subsequently refused to receive that engagement, ratified by the British Government, the alliance became dissolved. This circumstance was stated to the late Mr. Webbe, but by some error or by the miscarriage of the letter to Mr. Webbe, it appears that the name of the Rajah of Jodepore has not been expunged from the list of tributaries. The British Government has no intention to

interfere in any manner between your Highness and the Rajah of Jodepore. The name of the Rajah of Jodepore may therefore be expunged from the list of treaties, and your Highness will act according to your pleasure towards that Rajah.

Under the 3d head your Highness has adverted to "the affair of the fifteen lacs of rupees on account of the territory in Hindostan, which (your Highness observes) according to the provisions of treaty is payable annually to your Highness, and which the British Resident engaged should be paid in three instalments in the year."

Your Highness observes that "at the period for the payment of each instalment, Mr. Webbe brings forward various objections of a nature highly improper and unbecoming."

I have observed in a former part of this letter, that by the express terms of the treaty, the faith of the British Government is pledged for the payment of the pensions, not to your Highness, nor on account of your Highness's government, but to the persons respectively to whom these pensions are assigned. Your Highness however still derives the benefit of those pensions, because by the grant of such allowances your Highness's resources are relieved from the burthen of providing for the persons to whom the pensions have been granted. This question was amply discussed and completely adjusted between your Highness's ministers and Major Malcolm previously to the payment of the first instalment of five lacs of rupees, and this construction of the stipulation of the treaty regarding pensions was stated by the late Mr. Webbe to your Highness's minister, Bappoo Wittul, at the conference to which I have adverted in a former part of this letter, and was unequivocally admitted by that minister. The pensions also have actually been paid according to that rule.

Your Highness's assertion that "at the period for the payment of each instalment, Mr. Webbe brings forward various objections," must certainly be founded in error and misinformation. Agreeably to the order of payment, established by the Resident, Major Malcolm, the first instalment was not payable until the 1st of May 1804. It was paid however by Major Malcolm before the close of the month of February 1804, more than two months before it was due. The next instalment was not due until the 1st of September 1804, but

it was paid by the late Mr. Webbe in the month of July 1804. On the 18th of October, therefore, the date of your Highness's letter, it is a positive fact that no instalment was due.

Your Highness cannot fail to observe the danger to which your dignity and honour are exposed by such unfounded charges of violation of treaty preferred in your name against the British Government. I trust that your Highness will exercise your authority in preventing your ministers and servants from such abuse of your name. Your Highness will remark, that, under this head, a charge is preferred against the British Government of failure in the payment of the stipulated pensions under the treaty of peace, at a moment when those pensions had actually been paid in advance.

The expression in your Highness's letter implies that at the date of that letter the period for the payment of an instalment of the pensions had occurred more than once during Mr. Webbe's residence at your Highness's Court. Whereas Mr. Webbe did not arrive at Boorhanpore until the 12th of May, eleven days after the first instalment became due, and two months and a half after it had been paid. The second instalment was paid by Mr. Webbe more than a month before it was due. The third instalment was not due until the 1st of January 1805, more than two months and a half after the date of your Highness's letter. It appears therefore that, during the whole course of Mr. Webbe's residence at your Highness's Court, only one instalment was payable by that gentleman, and that, far from having objected to the payment of it as your Highness's letter states, Mr. Webbe discharged the amount long before it became due. If your Highness refers to Mr. Webbe's objections to the payment of the pensions into your Highness's treasury, instead of the stipulated payments to the pensioners, the answer to that point has been already stated.

Your Highness proceeds to state under the fourth head that, "The Pergunnahs of Dholepore, Barree and Rajah-Kera, the jumma of which is $5\frac{1}{2}$ lacs of rupees per annum, were assigned to your Highness by the provisions of the treaty. That those Pergunnahs have not yet been delivered up to you, nor has the amount of the collections, from the date of the treaty, been paid to your Highness; that no in-

tention appeared of delivering them to you; nor in the event of their being retained has Mr. Webbe seemed inclined to receive the annual payment of the jumma, but has clearly evaded that point."

Your Highness has never despatched any person properly authorized to receive charge of these Pergunnahs. You cannot therefore consider their continuance in the occupation of the Company to be a just ground of complaint. With reference to the operations of the war against Holkar, the surrender of those Pergunnahs at the present time would be extremely inconvenient; at the termination of hostilities they shall be delivered over to the person whom you may appoint; or, if your Highness should prefer it, the British Government will accept the farm of those Pergunnahs at an equitable rent, which shall be regularly paid into your Highness's treasury. The extraordinary and suspicious occurrences at your Highness's court, have retarded the payments on account of the nett collections from those Pergunnahs. Orders however have been issued to the British representative for the payment of the amount due on an inspection of accounts; and an arrangement shall be adopted for the regular payment of the collections to your Highness, until the Pergunnahs shall have been delivered over to your Highness's officers, if you should not ultimately prefer to let them in farm to the Company.

Fifthly, Your Highness has stated a claim to the collections from Chumarkoonda, Jaumgong Dahood, Pawangurgh, &c. mohauls from the date of the treaty of peace until the date of the restitution of those places. Of this claim, I had never been apprized until I received your Highness's letter. Whatever collections may have been realized from those places within the specified period of time, will of course, when ascertained, be paid to your Highness; and instructions will be issued directing an investigation of that subject by the government of Bombay. When the account shall be adjusted, the British Resident at your Highness's Durbar will be directed to pay the amount into your Highness's treasury.

In the 6th article your Highness has stated, that your Highness being prohibited by the terms of the treaty of peace from stationing troops in the Pergunnahs of Chumar-

koonda, Jaumgong, &c. those Pergunnahs had been destroyed by the violence of turbulent people, and by the Bheels, and that the British officers refused to employ troops for the suppression of those disturbances.

The British Government is not required by the treaty of peace to suppress disturbances in those Pergunnahs, or to protect them from the incursions of robbers. With a view however to manifest my disposition to conform to your Highness's wishes, I will direct the British officers to pay particular attention to the preservation of good order within those districts.

In the 7th article your Highness adverts to the delay which has occurred in relinquishing the Jagheers in Hindostan, amounting to two lacs of rupees per annum, which, by the treaty of peace, are to revert to certain of your Highness's chiefs and relations. On application to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the civil officers of the British Government, within whose jurisdiction those Jagheers are situated, will be vested with authority to surrender them either to the grantees, or to such persons as shall produce the sunnuds which were granted to the several Jagheerdars by Major Malcolm, together with a sufficient authority for receiving charge of the Jagheers on the part of the proprietors.

I have not heard that any application has been made to the British officers on the part of these Jagheerdars. The Jagheerdars will of course be entitled to receive from the British Government whatever has been received by that government from the Jagheer lands, since the date of the treaty of peace.

Your Highness proceeds to state under the 8th head that, "in the second treaty it is provided that, in consideration of the union established between the two states, the officers of the Company's troops will attend to the protection of your Highness's territories in the same manner as to the protection of the Company's. But that, notwithstanding Colonel Murray's coming to Ougein, Jeswunt Rao Holkar invested the fort of Mundesoor during full two months, and plundered and laid waste the whole of that district, including the town; and that in the same manner, while Colonel Murray was at Ougein, Meer Khaun the Afghan, a partizan of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's, invested the fortress of Bhelsa and plundered the

whole of that district, and the town and fort, which he captured; and yet no assistance or protection was afforded by the Colonel."

It is true, that the treaty of defensive alliance contains the stipulation to which your Highness refers; and that stipulation is reciprocal. The permanent security and tranquillity of both states is the basis and object of the alliance. When the security and tranquillity of either state are menaced by the violence and aggression of an external enemy, it becomes the duty of both to combine their efforts for the destruction of the enemy, and each state will have fulfilled the obligation of the defensive alliance in the degree in which its exertions have contributed to that end.

In the prosecution of the war, it must be expected that the enemy will occasionally gain opportunities of ravaging the territories of the allied states. The obligations of the defensive alliance being reciprocal, the British Government might with equal justice ascribe to your Highness a violation of the treaty of defensive alliance, because your Highness afforded no protection to the British territories against the incursions of the enemy.

An appeal to the evidence of facts, however, will manifest the degree in which either state has fulfilled the obligations of the defensive alliance.

By the valour, activity, and skill of the British armies, Jeswunt Rao Holkar has been deprived of nearly all his territorial possessions, a part of which, including the capital city of Indore, was delivered over to your Highness's officers. The whole of his force has been repeatedly defeated, and nearly destroyed with the loss of all his artillery; and he has been deprived of every resource, but that which he derives from the feeble and precarious aid of the Rajah of Bhurtpore.

Has your Highness according to the provisions of treaty contributed in any degree to these victories? On the contrary has not the conduct of your Highness and of your officers aided the cause of the enemy against the power by which those victories have been achieved, and with which your Highness was pledged to co-operate.

Your Highness has asserted, that pecuniary difficulties

have prevented your exertions in the prosecution of the war, and occasioned the junction of a large portion of your Highness's troops with the enemy's force.

Admitting the justice of this assertion can your Highness justly claim, in your own favour, the operation of an engagement, the obligations of which you admit your inability to fulfil? The British Government, however, adopted every practicable measure for the protection of your Highness's territory, and your capital of Ougein was actually protected from plunder by the advance of the British troops at your desire under the command of Colonel Murray. If your Highness's officers at Ougein had joined Colonel Murray with their troops, and employed their exertions in supplying the equipments of the British force, it might have been practicable to have protected Mundesoor or Bhelsa. But far from obtaining any aid from your Highness's officers, Colonel Murray experienced every species of counteraction. Your Highness cannot have forgotten that the misconduct of your officers at Ougein was a constant subject of remonstrance with the late Mr. Webbe; and your Highness is in possession of several memorials on that subject, delivered to you by Mr. Webbe.

The British Resident repeatedly and urgently advised your Highness to proceed to your capital for the purpose of arranging the affairs of your government; for restoring vigour and efficiency to your administration; and of enabling your Highness to fulfil the obligation of the defensive alliance, by seizing the possessions of the enemy in Malwa, and of co-operating with the British force under Colonel Murray. But your Highness, in violation of your repeated promises, and of your defensive engagements, directed your march towards Hosheingabad. In further violation of those engagements, your Highness entered into a negotiation with the Rajah of Berar, without communicating the nature of it to the British Government; and in violation of the treaty of peace, your Highness permitted the accredited vakeel of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to remain in your camp, and permitted the person who assumed the general management of your affairs to maintain a constant and clandestine intercourse with him. These observations constitute a sufficient reply to

the charge of a violation of the treaty of defensive alliance, which your Highness has adduced against the British Government.

On every occasion when the Resident urged your Highness to proceed to Ougein for the purpose of restoring the vigour of your government; of reviving the efficiency of your declining resources; and of co-operating with the British troops in the prosecution of the war, your Highness uniformly asserted your inability to proceed for want of funds to pay your troops; and in your Highness's letter you have ascribed your detention at Boorhanpore to the same cause. Your Highness however stated in the same letter, that you had been enabled by loans, to provide necessaries for your march and for collecting your troops; that you had accordingly marched from Boorhanpore; that you had written to all the officers of your troops to join you from every quarter; and that it was your intention to raise new troops.

It is evident therefore that your Highness never intended to comply with the suggestion of the Resident on the subject of your return to Ougein; for your Highness assigned the deficiency of your funds as the only cause which prevented your return to Ougein in conformity to the Resident's advice; and when your Highness, according to your own declaration, had obtained funds, you marched in a different direction; and afforded to the Resident no explanation of the nature of your designs. Under these circumstances, it is evident that your Highness never entertained the design of proceeding to Ougein, or of co-operating with the British troops in the prosecution of the war. With what degree of justice, therefore, can your Highness complain of the conduct of the British Government in withholding the pecuniary aid which you solicited, until adequate security had been obtained for the due application of those funds to the common cause of the allies, instead of perverting the aid furnished by the allies, to the cause of the enemy.

Your Highness has stated in your letter, that it was your determined resolution, after having collected a numerous army consisting both of old troops and new levies, to proceed to chastize the enemy; and your Highness adds, "how can I be content to see a territory which, for a long time has been

in my possession and in the conquest of which, crores of rupees have been expended, and great battles have been fought, in the possession of another,"—and that, "it is no difficult matter to wrest the territory from the hands of the enemy." I am unable to comprehend your Highness's meaning in the passage above quoted. The enemy has not at any stage of the war been able to effect the conquest of a single district, and, wherever the British troops have approached, the enemy has sought his safety in a precipitate flight, and although subsequently to the date of your Highness's letter, you have received constant reports of the repeated defeats of the enemy by the British troops, your Highness has continued to augment your forces, and to advance into Hindostan. These measures therefore must be ascribed to objects entirely different from those which your Highness has declared. Before I conclude this letter, I deem it necessary to state the leading facts of your Highness's proceedings, and those of your Highness's officers under the treaty of defensive alliance.

First. After your Highness's repeated and solemn assurances to the Resident of your intention to return to your capital, for the purpose of co-operating with the British Government in the prosecution of the war, your Highness, without affording any explanation to the Resident, directed your march towards the territory of Bhopaul, in positive violation of your personal promise repeatedly made to the Resident.

Secondly. Notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of the Resident, on the impropriety of permitting the continuance of the enemy's vakeel in your Highness's camp, that vakeel was permitted to remain, and to accompany your march; and with your Highness's knowledge the person, to whose charge you committed the executive administration of your affairs, maintained a constant and clandestine intercourse with that vakeel of the enemy.

Thirdly. The officers of your Highness's government at Ougein, instead of joining Colonel Murray with any part of the troops stationed at that capital, or affording to Colonel Murray any aid whatever in his preparations for the field, counteracted the measures of that officer, and opposed every

degree of difficulty to his exertions in completing the equipments of the army under his command.

Fourthly. Two of your Highness's military commanders, with the troops under their command, who were appointed to co-operate with the British forces in Hindostan, deserted to the enemy, and have acted with the enemy during the whole war.

Fifthly. Your Highness has openly justified the conduct of those officers in deserting to the enemy, on the plea that the British commanders refused to advance money for the pay of the troops, which your Highness was bound by treaty to furnish at your own charge; thereby maintaining a principle inconsistent with the spirit of the treaties of peace and of defensive alliance.

Sixthly. Your Highness has withdrawn your troops from those districts which had been conquered from the enemy by the British forces, and surrendered to your Highness's officers. Thereby restoring to the enemy a part of his resources, of which he had been deprived by the exertions of the British troops, and of which the benefit had been exclusively transferred to your Highness.

Seventhly. Your Highness has conducted a secret negotiation with the Rajah of Berar without affording to the British Resident any explanation of the nature and object of it; thereby violating an express stipulation of the treaty of defensive alliance.

Eighthly. Your Highness has violated the territory of his Highness the Peishwa, the ally of the British Government, by invading and plundering the district of Saugur; by destroying the city and besieging the fort; and by exacting a contribution from that place by force of arms.

Ninthly. Notwithstanding your Highness's repeated and most solemn assurances to the British representative of your intention to proceed to the capital of your dominions, your Highness has marched with a large army to Narwa, on the frontier of the territory of an ally of the British Government.

Tenthly. Your Highness has continued to augment your army by collecting your troops from all quarters, by new levies, and by the accession of a numerous train of artillery, although your Highness professed an utter inability to supply

funds for the payment of your army previously to its augmentation, and although the declared object of those measures had ceased to exist, thereby justifying a suspicion that your Highness's views were directed rather against the British Government or its allies, than against the common enemy.

Eleventhly. Your Highness has suffered the late flagrant outrages against the person and property of the British Representative and his suite, committed by persons in your Highness's service and within the limits of your Highness's camp, to pass unnoticed and unatoned, without any endeavours to discover and punish the offenders, and without any effectual measures for recovering the plundered property or any declared intention of repaying the amount; without offering a public apology or addressing to me any excuse to palliate an outrage so atrocious against the sacred character of the Representative of the British Government residing at your Highness's Court; and without any endeavour to alleviate the personal distress of the British Representative, either by contributing to his accommodation, or by any acts of kindness or hospitality.

Twelfthly. Your Highness has revived your claim to the districts of Gohud and Gwalior, alienated from your Highness's dominion by the operation of an article of the treaty of peace; after a minute and deliberate discussion upon that subject with your Highness's government; and after the most solemn and public renunciation of that claim on the part of your Highness in presence of the British Resident at your Highness's Court; and after having publicly accepted and confirmed the list of treaties, by one of which this alienation was declared.

Thirteenthly. The general conduct of your Highness's government, and especially the augmentation of your Highness's force and your march to Narwar, have encouraged the enemy to expect your Highness's support, of which expectation the enemy has made a public boast; and a general opinion exists in Hindostan and the Deccan that your Highness has resolved to unite your forces with the remnant of the enemy's power in a contest against the British Government, your friend and ally.

By all these acts your Highness has manifestly violated not

only the obligations of the treaty of defensive alliance, but also of the treaty of peace.

Your Highness cannot have forgotten the reduced state of your power at the time when the generosity and clemency of the British Government granted to your Highness, in the last extremity of ruined fortune, and in the most abject condition of defeat and distress, the liberal peace which you implored, after having vainly endeavoured, by a war of aggression in confederacy with another state, to disturb the foundations of the British empire in India.

Your Highness must be sensible that you were indebted at that moment for your existence as a state, if not for your life, exclusively to the mercy of the British power, which, after an uninterrupted and rapid succession of the most glorious victories over your Highness's armies, after the conquest of the greater part of your former dominions, in the hour of triumph granted to you terms of peace, by which a considerable portion of the territory, conquered by the British arms, was restored to your dominion, and you were again recognized amongst the independent states of India, and placed in a condition of dignity and honour, under every circumstance calculated to alleviate your feelings; to restore the tranquillity of your mind; and to revive the order and efficiency of your government.

After the conclusion of peace, your Highness solicited the protection of the British power against the manifest designs of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which menaced entire ruin to your state. The British Government consented to afford you that protection, and to guarantee your Highness in the secure and tranquil possession of all the rights and privileges of an independent power; and your Highness now is indebted for your perfect security against Holkar, and for the means of protecting your own territory, and of occupying that of the enemy, to the exertions of the British armies opposed to Holkar's forces.

The return which your Highness has thought proper to make for this unmerited liberality on the part of the British Government is sufficiently explained in this letter, and is now public in every region of Hindostan and the Deccan, where the result of the late war, the terms of the peace, and your

Highness's conduct towards the British power, are fully known and well understood. But the British Government is still disposed to view with indulgence even the recent acts of your Highness's counsels. I am still disposed to maintain the relations of amity and peace with your Highness; and to continue to preserve the provisions of the treaties of peace and defensive alliance, provided your Highness shall adopt a course of proceedings suitable to the spirit of those engagements.

In the meanwhile the British Resident is directed to satisfy such parts of your Highness's representations as appear to be proper and compatible with the foundations of the alliance, unless your Highness's conduct shall have precluded all hopes of amity and peace. I most anxiously deprecate such an event, being sincerely solicitous not only to maintain peace with your Highness, but to fulfil every duty of friendship, and to promote the prosperity of your Highness's affairs, and the honour and stability of your government.

But if, in despite of my efforts to maintain the relations of amity, your Highness shall compel me to renew the war, every exertion of the British arms shall again be employed in every quarter of India for the necessary and salutary purpose of imposing a due restraint upon the violence, treachery, and ambition of a state, whose perverted counsels have manifested an utter contempt of every obligation of justice, faith, gratitude, and honour.

WELLESLEY.

A true Copy.

J. MONCKTON,

Dep. Per. Sec. to Govt.

No. XCV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Lake.

MY LORD,

Fort William, April 7, 1805.

1. The despatch from the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under date the 23d ultimo, of which a copy has been forwarded to your Lordship, contains the detail of Mr. Jenkins's conferences with Scindiah's minister, Annah Bhasker, on the subject of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's declared intention of proceeding to Bhurtpore. I trust that Mr. Jen-

kins had before transmitted a copy of that despatch to your Lordship.

2. Considering the extraordinary proposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah connected with a knowledge of the detail of Mr. Jenkins's communications with the Durbar upon that subject, the impression produced upon my mind by the treacherous and insulting nature of that proposition, and by other points of the transaction, suggest to me the expediency of stating to your Lordship in a more decided manner, the resolution which I have adopted with respect to the measures to be pursued towards Scindiah, in the actual situation of affairs.

3. Your Lordship will not fail to remark the distinct avowal of Annah Bhasker, that hitherto the intentions of Serjie Rao Ghautka have been hostile to the British Government. It will be obvious to your Lordship that this avowal constitutes a distinct demonstration of a systematic course of deceit, treachery, and determined hostility on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government since the moment when Serjie Rao Ghautka assumed the administration of his Highness's affairs. Your Lordship will also remark Annah Bhasker's avowal of an amicable and secret intercourse between the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the enemy. The hostile intentions of Scindiah's government have been avowed in a still more distinct manner by Scindiah's vakeel at Nagpore, in a conference with Colonel Close. Your Lordship will participate in the sentiments of indignation with which I contemplate the insolence of that chieftain's government in presuming, under such a complication of treachery, baseness, and ingratitude, to announce its intention of advancing to the vicinity of the British camp for the declared purpose of mediating an accommodation between the British Government, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and Runjeet Sing.* I have already signified to your Lordship my resolution not to suffer Dowlut Rao Scindiah to negotiate for Holkar. The same reasons apply with greater force to the case of Runjeet Sing. The proposal in both cases is a direct and most audacious violation both of the treaties of peace and defensive alliance. The circumstances now within my knowledge, require the distinct

* At this very time Scindiah had written to the Rajah of Bhurtpore and Holkar, that he was advancing to Bhurtpore to assist them. Vide Lord Lake's letter of the 10th of April, p. 524.—[ED.]

expression of my desire not only that Dowlut Rao Scindiah's most unwarrantable assumption of the 'privilege of a mediating power be' resisted in the most peremptory terms, but that in the event of that chieftain's continuing to advance with his army towards Bhurtpore, either through the territory of our ally, the Ranah of Gohud, or by any other route in which he shall pass the line of demarcation prescribed by the treaty of peace, your Lordship will instantly adopt the most active measures for the entire destruction of his force, and that you will employ every effort, and direct all the troops within reach of Scindiah, to act with vigour against that chieftain, if his army should attempt to pass that line under any pretence whatever, or should take up any position upon that line of a dangerous nature to our security. That line is drawn distinctly in the 9th article of the treaty of peace, of which a copy is annexed for reference.

4. I deem it probable that your Lordship will have anticipated my sentiments upon this subject. But to provide for the possible case of a construction of my late orders, which may appear to your Lordship to warrant a greater degree of forbearance with respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah than is consistent with my actual sentiments, I have considered it to be my duty to state to your Lordship, in the most explicit terms, my determination to vindicate the rights and dignity of the British Government, by employing every effort for the destruction of a power which, after violating every sacred obligation of faith, honour, gratitude and justice, now presumes to dictate to the British Government by the insulting measure of an armed mediation, the terms of an accommodation with the enemy, against which it is bound to aid us as an ally. In the event of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, your Excellency will of course endeavour, by every practicable means, to provide for the safety of Mr. Jenkins, and of the gentlemen of the Residency.

5. If Scindiah, after having passed the line of demarcation, or from any such position as is described in the 3d preceding paragraph, or when in advance towards Bhurtpore, should attempt to send letters or vakeels to your Lordship, I desire that your Lordship will not suffer your active operations to be suspended for a moment by such artifices, but that you

will move against Scindiah's army with the utmost vigour, and employ every effort to destroy it, and, if possible, to seize the persons of Scindiah and Ghautka.

6. Your Lordship will feel for the indignity offered to your country by all these most extraordinary and degrading transactions, and I rely upon you and your army to vindicate the dignity of the British Government, by an effectual exertion of British valour, skill, and power. If however, contrary to my present expectations, Scindiah (not violating the line of demarcation, or taking up any such position, or proceeding in the manner supposed in this letter) should send a vakeel to your Lordship, you will refer to my former instructions and notes; but even in this case, after what has passed, it will be necessary to approach Scindiah with a commanding force, and to require his retreat to the distance of at least 100 miles from the frontier, and if he should have crossed the Chumbul, to re-cross that river before your Lordship shall admit any negotiation with him. And if in this case he should delay his retreat, or attempt any other artifice, your Lordship will instantly attack his force with the utmost vigour, and endeavour to destroy it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XCVI.

General Orders, by the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council.

Fort William, April 8, 1805.

The Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that the following copy of a letter addressed by his Excellency in Council to Major-General the honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. on the occasion of the departure of Sir Arthur Wellesley from India, be published in general orders.

To Major General the Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, &c. &c.

SIR,

1. The Governor-General has communicated to the board,

the orders contained in his despatch to your address dated the 24th of January, 1805,* by which you are authorized eventually to relinquish the powers committed to you by his Excellency's instructions dated the 9th November last, to take upon you, "the chief command of all the British troops and of the forces of our allies serving in the territories of the Peishwah, of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, or of any of the Mahratta states or chiefs and to assume and exercise the general direction and controul of all the political and military affairs of the British Government in the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, of the Peishwah, and of the Mahratta states and chiefs."

2. On this occasion the Governor-General in Council considers it to be his public duty to record his high sense of the great and important advantages derived to the British interests in India, from your numerous and substantial services in the field, as well as from the prudence, judgment, and distinguished skill and ability, with which all the political negotiations entrusted to your charge have been conducted.

3. Your long, assiduous, able, and valuable services in Mysore, have received on every occasion the entire approbation of this government. And the Governor-General in Council deems it to be his duty to acknowledge, that the due execution of his orders with regard to the government of Mysore is to be ascribed in a great degree to your conduct, and that the prosperous condition of that country, and the happy state of the British alliance with the Rajah of Mysore, are to be attributed to the efficient aid which you have given to the several Residents who have been employed by the British Government at Seringapatam, and to the Dewan Poornagah in the discharge of his duty.

4. From the time of your march from the frontier of Mysore on the 9th of March, 1803, until the conclusion of the late war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, the success of your military operations was uninterrupted and splendid and his Excellency in Council considers it to be a tribute of just approbation to add, that during the entire

* See p. 267.

course of your eminent services in the Deccan, you invariably displayed all the qualities of a most skilful and gallant officer, together with those principles of justice, honour, and moderation which are calculated to reflect additional lustre upon the triumphs of the British arms, obtained under your personal command.

5. The public interests were essentially promoted by the judgment and discretion manifested by you in conducting the restoration of the Peishwa to the supreme authority of the Mahratta empire, in conciliating the southern Mahratta powers and in maintaining the efficiency of our alliance with the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

6. During the course of your communications with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, previously to the commencement of the war, your proceedings were regulated by the strictest principles of moderation and by the most comprehensive and accurate view of the rights, interests, and duties of the British Government in India. Your conduct throughout the negotiations for the conclusion of peace with both the hostile powers manifested the most distinguished judgment, ability, firmness, and temper. The pacification effected by you in the conclusion of the treaties of Deogaum and of Surjee Angengaum was highly glorious to the British Government, and beneficial to the interests of India, and your prudence and discernment in the conduct and conclusion of your negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, correspond with the glory of your achievements in the field, which have added splendor to the British name and stability to the British empire in India.

7. The Governor-General in Council therefore signifies his public thanks to you for the eminent civil and military services which you have rendered to your country and to the honourable Company in India, and will earnestly recommend your conduct to the favourable consideration of the honourable the Court of Directors, and to the gracious notice of his Majesty.

8. With a view also to recommend your great and brilliant example to the imitation of the service in India, his Excellency in Council will transmit copies of this letter to the governments of Fort St. George and of Bombay, and will

publish the sentiments herein recorded in general orders to the army of India.

We have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servants,

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

Fort William, February 24, 1805.

[*The two following letters from the Marquess Wellesley to Major-General Wellesley relative to the battles of Assaye and Argaum have been found since the preceding Volume went to press, they are therefore inserted here.* ED.]

No. XCVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Major-General Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Fort William. 27th October, 1803.

You will conceive the pride and delight with which I received the details of your most splendid victory of the 23rd September; you will also feel my disappointment at not having received them from yourself: the interruption of the Dak through Cuttack induced the collector to embark all your despatches down to the 3rd of this month, and not a syllable from yourself has reached me of any date between the 12th of September and the 3rd of October.

But from various quarters the particulars of your glory have reached me, although not in a form which can yet admit of a public order (beyond the honours of a salute) yet in substance sufficiently solid to found the basis of hopes as auspicious as your fame must be durable, and in India unrivalled. With much solicitude for the success of your operations on public grounds, and with every additional anxiety which affection could inspire, I have fixed my attention on your progress from the hour of your departure from General Stuart's camp, to the moment of your action of the 23rd of September; and I declare to you sincerely that you have infinitely surpassed all that I could have required from you in my public capacity, and have soared beyond the highest point, to which all my affection and all the pride of my blood could have aspired, in the most sanguine expectations which could be suggested by my sentiments of respect and love for

a brother, who has always held the highest place in my heart.

Your battle of the 23rd (of which I have seen plans) is equal in skill and fortitude to any of which the account exists in history. Your loss certainly was dreadful (if not exaggerated to me)—the result must I think reduce the enemy either to peace or to the condition of mere freebooters; accompanied as your success is by such a crowd of victories in all parts of India, as I believe never before was condensed in so small a space of time. You may, however, be assured that your reputation is of the first lustre and magnitude; and splendid, matchless as was your victory of the 23rd, it was not more than was expected from you, nor in my judgment does it excel the honour you have acquired in conducting your army from Mysore to Assaye, and in accomplishing all the great objects which were finally secured on the 23rd of September.

I am in hourly expectation of your despatches, and therefore I shall not write more at present; you will be glad to receive this short note, and when you reflect on the troubles by which I have been surrounded you will pardon my omission of private letters.

God protect you my dear Arthur, and preserve you for your country, and for your most affectionate brother,

WELLESLEY.

No. XCVIII.

The Marquess of Wellesley to Major-General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Fort William, December 23, 1803.

I received this morning your despatch of the 30th of November from Perterly, with the account of your signal and most seasonable victory of Argaum. Although I entirely approved of your armistice, and thought it a most judicious measure, I confess that I prefer your victory to your armistice, and I think your last battle must have removed every obstacle to peace, and facilitated every accommodation which can tend to enlarge the channels of amicable intercourse.

I have not yet divined whether the battle was occasioned by a rupture of the truce on the part of Scindiah, or by

Scindiah's refusal to grant to his Vakeels the powers which you most properly have required (for the purpose of founding the basis of the negotiation on the admission of our retention of a part of our conquests) or by Scindiah's re-disavowal of his avowal of Jeswunt Rao Goorpara, or by an accidental rencontre of the armies before the truce had commenced, or by a treacherous junction between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. But *quâcunque viâ*, a battle is a profit with the native powers.

In any truce or treaty you must now require hostages from Scindiah's or Ragoojee's family upon Lord Cornwallis's principle in 1792.

If you should happen to take the persons of Scindiah or Ragoojee, you will send them with an escort of honour to Fort William, to negotiate peace with me, and to be their own hostages for its due execution.

Ever yours, most affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

No. XCIX.

Lord Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Before Bhurtpore, April 10th, 1805.

I take the very earliest opportunity of informing you that peace is established between the British Government and Runjeet Sing. I trust the terms may be deemed proper by your Lordship. I have taken twenty lacs of rupees from the Rajah, to be paid by instalments for the use of the government, but as he pleads extreme poverty, which I really believe to be the case, I have promised that if he behaves to the satisfaction of government, the last five lacs shall not be taken. He is to pay three lacs down immediately, and the remainder by instalments in three years. I really do think he is in great distress, as he certainly has expended a large sum during the war, and has saved no revenue this year, and very little last year.

Deig is retained as is the country granted him last year. He begged very hard for Deig, but I told him that could not be given; but that possibly if he behaved in a style com-

pletely satisfactorily to government, it might be restored to him hereafter; however, this will depend entirely upon the pleasure of your Lordship. In the meantime it will be a complete check upon him, and that part of the country. I trust my dear Lord, you will not disapprove the steps I have taken, as by this means I am at liberty to proceed towards Scindiah, which will I imagine, prevent his approach. The Rajah received a letter from him last night, advising him not to make peace with the English, saying, that he was coming to his assistance. Scindiah also wrote to Holkar telling him, he would come on with his army, but that in the first instance he should send on Serjie Rao Ghautka to arrange matters. This I imagine he will not do, although he seems mad enough to commit every act of violence and folly.

Holkar is reduced in the extreme; he has no troops, at least so few that they can do no more than guard his person, even those are starving, and he has not a rupee to give them. They have of late had a most wearisome life, and will not remain with him.

I feel relieved by this negotiation, and although I have reason to think we should soon have been in possession of the town, I fear our troops must have suffered exceedingly from the heat. The Rajah's son comes into camp to-morrow, to remain so long as I think proper, and to attend me wherever I choose to take him. The old man is extremely ill. I have directed Mr. Mercer to send a copy of the letter respecting the money to be taken. I thought it was not a matter of consequence to government, the demanding a large sum of money down, but that the grand object was to show to the natives that we could punish the Rajah for his treachery, by taking money and country from him.

I hope and trust, this act of mine will meet your approbation; I felt the necessity of getting rid of this siege, that we might be ready for Scindiah who will I should imagine, give up his hostile intentions.

I shall write publicly on this business in a day or two. I shall wait with impatience for your opinion upon this transaction, and remain,

My dear Lord,
With regard and attachment, affectionately yours,
LAKE.

No. C.

Lord Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.

Head Quarters, Camp near Bhurtpore,
April 19th, 1805.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information a copy of the treaty, which has been concluded with Rajah Runjeet Sing of Bhurtpore.*

I have directed your Excellency's agent to transmit to the Secretary of government in the Secret Department, a detail of the circumstances which have led to the conclusion of this treaty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

LAKE.

No. CI.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Marquess Wellesley.

Received April 19th, 1805.

I have received with great satisfaction your Excellency's friendly letter replete with sentiments of mutual attachment and union, and containing intimations on the subjects of keeping in view the fulfilment of the obligations of alliance, and of the treaties concluded between the two states; of despatching Colonel Close on an embassy to my court, and of the arrival of that officer at Nagpore; of your Excellency's demand for bringing to justice,† those who fell upon the gentlemen of the Residency; of the restitution of the plundered property; and of your Excellency's having at heart the encrease of friendship and harmony between the two states;

* See Appendix.

† It is proper to observe, that the expressions of "bringing to justice," "calling to an account;" "atonement," and "reparation," and others of similar import, must often be rendered into Persian by the same terms. The shades of signification are produced by the application of those terms. The words in Persian which are here translated "bringing to justice," are those which in the Governor-General's letter to Scindiah are used to signify *atonement* and *reparation*. The writer has transferred the application of those words to the perpetrators of the outrage.

together with other points respecting my return to my capital; and from a perusal of the contents of that letter, as well as from the representations of Mr. Jenkins, I am apprized of the degree of your Excellency's disposition to cultivate friendship, and union; and those communications have afforded me great pleasure.

As the foundations of union and attachment are durably and satisfactorily established between the two states, like the wall of Alexander, and as the ever-blooming garden of amity and good understanding, has long been flourishing in a daily augmenting degree, by the favour of God the relations of friendship have lately been renewed and confirmed by the conclusion of engagements, and such is the union subsisting between the two states, that nothing can be added to it; such being the case, the foundations of mutual attachment and friendship are not capable of being shaken or injured. The union, actually subsisting between the two states, induces me to be constantly solicitous for the consolidation and preservation of that amicable connection, and to direct my constant attention to that object. Should it so have happened that any self interested, short sighted person has impressed your Excellency's mind with discontent relatively to this quarter, let your Excellency believe it to be mere falsehood and calumny. It was my positive determination to return to my capital; but hearing of the enemy's invasion of Hindostan, and it being a point of obligation to lay the dust of disturbance, the accomplishment of which object also involves many beneficial consequences, and among others the safety and comfort of the people, I turned back from the high road, and have encamped in this quarter with a powerful and numerous army.

The persons who have presumed to be guilty of such disrespect and improper proceedings towards the gentlemen of the Residency, shall be rebuked, according to your Excellency's desire. Let your Excellency's mind be perfectly at ease upon that subject. I have no object in view, but the observance of the obligations of treaty and of friendship and alliance; and on the part of your Excellency, friendship requires that your Excellency should keep in view, and have at heart the daily encreasing corroboration of the union and alliance as established by treaty. Your Excellency shall be informed whenever Colonel Close shall arrive here. I have

transmitted letters to that gentleman to expedite his arrival. I have written this for your Excellency's information; further particulars have been fully stated in person to Mr. Jenkins, by whose letter your Excellency will be apprized of them. Believing me to be solicitous for the intelligence of your Excellency's welfare, let your Excellency constantly gratify me with letters.

A true translation.

J. MONCKTON,

Dep. Per. Sec. to Govt.

No. CII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Captain Cockburn, R. N.

SIR,

Fort William, 20th April, 1805.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter under date the 14th instant, communicating to me your appointment by his Excellency R. A. Sir E. Pellew, to the command of a squadron of His Majesty's ships in the upper part of the bay of Bengal, destined for the protection of the British possessions and trade between Cape Negrais and Masulipatam.

Being apprized of your wish to be attended by pilots, and by a small vessel for the navigation of the Sand Heads, I have endeavoured to effect an early arrangement for the service of your squadron in that respect.

The present state and equipment of the pilot schooners does not admit the detachment of a schooner from the river; I have however directed a gun brig, (with a pilot on board) of the force noted in the margin,* to proceed to join you at Vizagapatam, in addition to the pilot intended to remain on board the *Grappler*. A skilful master pilot will also be directed to proceed in that vessel, for the purpose of being stationed on board his Majesty's ship under your command during the continuance of your cruize.

I request that you will accept my thanks for the informa-

* *Grappler* gun brig—eight long guns 12-pounders; four carronades ditto; forty-three Europeans, including Commander, Lieutenant, Master and Surgeon, and twenty Natives; burthen 150 tons, victualled for three months.

tion which you have conveyed to me, of your intention of establishing your head quarters during the two ensuing months at Vizagapatam, to which place I shall address any further communications that may appear to be necessary.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Written 22d April, 1805.

I have had the honour to receive your Highness's letter in reply to mine of the 23d of February, (recapitulate its contents) and I have received from Mr. Jenkins a further communication of your Highness's sentiments on the subject to which my letter to your Highness principally related.

It has afforded me the highest satisfaction to be enabled to deduce, from the amicable tenor of your Highness's letter, and from the declarations made to Mr. Jenkins by your Highness's ministers, and personally confirmed by your Highness, a confident opinion that your Highness is now sincerely disposed to maintain the relations of amity and peace with the British Government, in the spirit of the subsisting engagements. Depending therefore upon the sincerity of the solemn professions which your Highness has conveyed to me by letter, and personally through the representative of the British Government at your Highness's court, and of your Highness's declared resolution to act in conformity to those professions; I have resolved to afford to your Highness and to the world, an additional proof of my disposition to confirm the bonds of amity and alliance with your Highness's government by accepting your Highness's letter, combined with the declarations made to the British Resident in your Highness's name, as a sufficient satisfaction for the insults and outrages offered to the British Residency by your Highness's servants, and by authorizing the Resident to proceed to the adjustment of all depending questions, upon the basis of the treaties of peace and alliance.

Colonel Close, of whose mission to your Highness's court I long since apprized you, having been induced by the late

proceedings and transactions at your Highness's court, to await at Nagpore either the final result of a state of circumstances so peculiar and unexpected as that which was produced by the conduct of your Highness's government, or the receipt of further instructions from me for the regulation of his proceedings, and your Highness having continued your march with rapidity to the northward, I have issued instructions to Colonel Close directing him to return to the Deccan, unless at the period of his receipt of those instructions, he should have made considerable progress towards your Highness's camp. This circumstance, however, I consider to be extremely improbable; and I therefore request, that, in every instance, your Highness will consider Mr. Jenkins, whose conduct I entirely approve, to be vested by me with full powers for the termination of all affairs, and that you will receive the communications of that gentleman as equally valid with those which might be conveyed to your Highness through Colonel Close; and that your Highness will not suspend any measures or arrangements whatever in the expectation of the arrival of Colonel Close, or of any other British officer at your Highness's camp.

I have fully understood what your Highness has written on the subject of your proceeding with a powerful and numerous army to the northward, for the purpose of laying the dust of disturbance. It is necessary to observe to your Highness, that this course of proceeding is inconsistent, not only with the positive obligation imposed upon you by the treaty of defensive alliance to co-operate with the British forces against the common enemy; but also with the spirit of the treaty of peace, which obviously prohibits on the part of your Highness the adoption of measures calculated to afford encouragement and support to the enemies of the British power; and it is my duty to state to your Highness, in the most distinct terms, that I cannot admit the interference of any power whatever for the adjustment of differences between the British Government, and any other state or power in India; and your Highness's perseverance in the declared object of your march to the northward, will justify every suspicion of the sincerity of your late amicable professions, and without the possibility of success in the attainment of any salutary object, may lead to the most serious consequences. As the ally of the British

Government, under the subsisting treaty, it is your Highness's duty to act in concert with the British forces against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, either until his power shall have been completely reduced, or until the British Government shall deem it expedient to grant terms of peace to the enemy. The only mode in which your Highness's co-operation can be useful, is by your immediate return to the southward, for the purpose of occupying the remaining possessions of Holkar in the province of Malwa. Your Highness's return to your capital will enable you both to occupy those possessions, and to adopt the arrangements necessary for the permanent settlement of your government. In the event of your Highness's returning to Ougein with these views and intentions, I shall be sincerely disposed to afford to your Highness every degree of assistance in restoring the vigour of your government, and in reviving the resources of your dominions.

The arrangements of the defensive alliance are calculated to provide for the security and prosperity of your Highness's government; for the permanent tranquillity of your dominions; and for the due exercise of your legitimate rights as an independent state; and the views of the British Government, in consenting to the conclusion of that alliance, will be accomplished in the degree in which it may contribute to the attainment of those desirable objects. The recommendations therefore contained in this letter are intimately connected with every advantage which can be derived from the most prosperous condition of your Highness's affairs.

Mr. Jenkins has my instructions to communicate fully with your Highness and your ministers, upon all the topics of this letter; to that gentleman's verbal representations therefore I refer your Highness for further particulars, hoping to hear from the British Resident, and from Lord Lake the Commander-in-Chief, within the course of a few days, that your Highness, with your army, has proceeded from your present position on the frontier of the Company, towards your own capital, in conformity to the dictates of amity and peace, and to the spirit of the subsisting engagements between the two states.

WELLESLEY.

No. CIV.

Lord Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.—(Extract.)

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Camp, April 25, 1805.

I have been honoured with all your notes and directions respecting Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which your Lordship may rest assured shall be carried into effect in the most direct and speedy manner possible. My only fear is, that on my approach, he with his confederates will retire, and that it will be impossible for me to follow him; the country through which he will pass to the Deccan, being at this season so extremely hot, and almost entirely without water. All shall be done that men can do. I am obliged to cross at Dholepore to get at him, as it is not possible to reach the Chombrill by any other road. I could have wished to have gone by Kerowly, and by that means have got above him, and placed him between Colonel Martindell and my army; but that is almost impracticable at any time of the year, and at this season totally so; the passes through the hills are most difficult, particularly so with guns, and the scarcity of water is beyond imagination. However, if he will remain at Schilghur, I will contrive to pass a part of my army at Dholepore, join Martindell, and if possible be in his camp before he suspects any thing. The only difficulty is, that he and his confederates are so alarmed and wary that they never rest at night. It becomes necessary now that Mr. Jenkins should leave his camp, but I do not choose to demand him till I am near enough to enforce obedience, and be able to give the Resident protection. There is no vile act these people are not equal to; that inhuman monster Holkar's chief delight is in butchering all Europeans, and by all accounts Serjie Rao Ghautka's disposition towards us is precisely the same, consequently a little management is necessary. Before your Lordship's instructions arrived, I had determined in the event of Scindiah's advance to have attacked him instantly, but I never had any hopes of his doing that. There can be no doubt of his having broke the treaty by suffering our two

avowed enemies to reside in his camp. I shall therefore lose no time, but reach him as soon as I can.

I feel most anxious to come up with these associates in villainy and have no doubt we shall give a good account of them. The only thing I have to dread is the health of the Europeans; I am trying to find out some mode to keep their tents cooler, but their construction is so ill calculated to keep off heat, that as yet I have not succeeded in my endeavours. If I should get into cantonment during the rains, others shall be made, for it is impossible to go on with these.

The winds are very hot at present; thank God, we are healthy, and I hope may continue so.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever most affectionately yours,

LAKE.

P. S. I am happy to say, the Seiks that were in the Doab have entirely left it. I dont know of an enemy at present in any part of our territories.

No. CV.

Earl Camden to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Most Secret.)

Downing Street, 29th November, 1804.

MY LORD,

[Received 2nd May, 1805.]

It is my duty to inform your Lordship of the probability of a rupture with the Court of Madrid, in order that you may be on your guard, in case of negotiations now going forward at that court, not ending in accommodation.

It is probable that those negotiations will be brought to a very speedy conclusion; and though not officially announced, it appears so probable that Mr. Frere has left Madrid, that I expect in the course of a very few days to have to inform your Lordship of the commencement of actual hostilities.

From the strength of his Majesty's squadron in the Indian seas, and from the prudence, foresight, and vigour of your Lordship's administration, I rest with confidence that his

Majesty's dominions in the East Indies will suffer neither threat nor attack.

It will be for the consideration of his Majesty's Government at home aided by your opinion on the actual state of his Majesty's forces by sea and land in India, when your Lordship shall receive the notification of war, whether it will be possible to attack the enemy's possessions in those seas with advantage and effect.

I shall not lose a moment in communicating to your Lordship the account of the actual rupture with the Court of Madrid, whenever information shall be received of that event.

I have the honour to be,
my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient,
and most humble servant,
CAMDEN.

No. CVI.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley. —(Extract.)

(Most Secret.)

East Sheen, 20th December, 1804.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 2nd May, 1805.]

In looking to what is to become of India after it passes from your Lordship's hands, I own, retaining the same strong impressions of Sir George Barlow's general merits, under which the appointment was originally made, I do feel an earnest desire that some person (under the present aspect of affairs) could be sent from hence.

We were not insensible to this consideration when the measure was first decided on; but the recurrence of war in Europe, and the necessity of holding India together, with a vigorous and commanding hand, after the recent introduction of our authority into the Mahratta empire, are new motives to augment the weight due to every thing your Lordship has said on this subject, although it may not, unfortunately remove the difficulty we before experienced in finding a person properly qualified for this arduous trust.

Under the conviction, if not actually embarked, that your return is not likely to be long protracted, it will be Mr. Pitt's object and mine to try whether a satisfactory choice cannot be made at home, and the leaning of our opinions at the present moment is, that it might be desirable in case we should succeed, that your successor should proceed from hence towards the close of the ensuing season so as to arrive in Calcutta about the month of October next immediately after the monsoon.

Should we find that your Lordship is actually on your return, his departure might be proportionably accelerated, but in not delaying it beyond that time his chance of receiving the Government, together with much valuable information, from yourself, will be improved, whilst we think that the interval is even more than your feelings will probably incline you to devote under present circumstances to the administration of the Government, and amply sufficient to enable your Lordship to put things on that footing on which it would be your wish they should stand when delivered over to a successor.

I am, my dear Lord,
with great regard very faithfully yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

No. CVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Lord William Bentinck.

MY LORD,

Barrackpore, May 4, 1805.

I am happy to inform your Lordship that a prospect appears of an early termination of hostilities in Hindostan, and that I entertain strong expectations that our alliance with Scindiah will not be violated.

Your Lordship has probably expected that such an event would lead to my immediate departure for England; I have long been anxious to relinquish this arduous charge, and this year the state of my health has increased my desire of returning home; for which happy event I had prepared the *San Fiorenzo* frigate under Admiral Rainier's permission.

Having above a year ago announced my intention to the

government at home, and received their permission to depart, I hope to be able to sail from Bengal in August at the latest period. I am not yet certain whether a successor will be appointed from England to arrive here, either before or soon after my departure, or whether Sir George Barlow will take charge of the government, but in any event, I hope to embark in August.

As this intelligence may be important to your Lordship, my sincere wish to promote the convenience of your government, induces me to announce it to you. I am not particularly anxious that you should observe secrecy on this occasion, nor do I desire the circumstance to be published.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and esteem,
my Lord,
your Lordship's faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. CVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Lake.

(Official and Secret.)

MY LORD.

Fort William, 17th May, 1805.

1. Your Lordship will have received several communications by my authority, by which you will perceive that I have accepted an apology from Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the late outrage offered to the British Residency, and that it is not my wish that your Lordship should pursue Scindiah, unless he shall make demands at the head of his army from a menacing position.

2. As Scindiah has retired, it does not appear to me to be advisable for your Lordship to pursue him at this season, although it would certainly be justifiable to act hostilely against him, in consequence of his reception of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of Ameer Khaun. It is however extremely desirable to avoid war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. I should hope that he will not now seek it, and if it be possible to effect a settlement of Holkar's affairs without further war, such an arrangement would certainly be advisable.

3. It is now expedient to canton the army at its several fixed stations, and this measure properly arranged, will afford sufficient security to our possessions. But although I expect that we may avoid war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I am decidedly of opinion that the best security for the preservation of peace, will be such a distribution of our armies as shall enable them to act against the enemy with vigour and celerity, in case Scindiah should commence hostilities, or Holkar again attempt to disturb the tranquillity of our territories.

4. Your Lordship will therefore take this circumstance into consideration in cantoning the army, and in every arrangement which you may adopt will advert to the possibility of our being hereafter compelled to employ our arms against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to the necessity of securing our valuable possessions against the predatory attempts of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or of any other freebooter.

5. For this purpose it will be necessary in the event of hostilities that the troops to be employed against Scindiah, or any freebooter who may attempt to violate our territories, should be completely ready to commence active operations as soon as the season will permit, and arrangements will of course be adopted by your Lordship for collecting supplies, &c. and for completing every other preparation which may be necessary to enable your Lordship to destroy Scindiah at an early period of the ensuing season.

6. I sincerely hope that the active employment of our troops may become unnecessary, but I consider it to be requisite to request your Lordship's attention to the possible contingency of our being compelled to attack Scindiah, or to operate against Holkar about the month of August, or as soon as the violence of the rainy season may have subsided.

7. The arrangements stated in a subsequent part of this despatch for the cantonment of the troops, will enable your Lordship to assemble a sufficient body of troops at the shortest notice, but your Lordship will consider the arrangement to be indispensable, with a view to provide if necessary, for the defeat of every attempt which may be made either by Holkar singly, or by Scindiah, or by their united forces against our possessions in the northern quarter of Hindostan. The grain and stores required for the corps destined

for eventual field service, should be collected at an advanced post, and measures should be adopted for this purpose with all possible expedition.

8. Your Lordship will be pleased to send the Bombay army under Major-General Jones, towards Rampoorah, there to be cantoned until the season shall admit of its movement to Guzerat. It is of great consequence that the Bombay army should return to that province as soon as may be possible, and I should hope that it might march through Malwa, when the season becomes more favourable, before the violence of the rains shall commence. If the Bombay army is to wait until the complete termination of the rainy season before it moves towards Guzerat, a long period of time must elapse before the government of Bombay can have the services of the troops at present under the command of Major-General Jones, and considerable inconvenience to the public interests in the province of Guzerat may result from the delay. I am satisfied therefore that your Lordship will direct the movement of the Bombay army to Guzerat as soon as the season may admit of the adoption of that important arrangement.

9. In proceeding through Malwa your Lordship will of course take particular care that the Bombay army is of sufficient strength, especially in cavalry, to be superior to the Mahrattas. The Bombay army should be able not only to defeat the main body of the Mahratta armies, but should also be able to protect its supplies, against any plunderers who may attempt to intercept them, while our troops are opposed to the main body of the Mahratta armies. For this purpose it will be indispensably necessary to strengthen the Bombay army with an efficient body of cavalry, and your Lordship will probably be of opinion that two regiments of native cavalry will be necessary to secure there important objects.

10. It is also of importance that the equipments of the Bombay army should be rendered as complete as possible, and that the Bombay troops under the command of Major-General Jones should be placed in a state, fit for active field service previously to the commencement of their march towards Guzerat.

11. Your Lordship will probably consider it to be advisable to direct Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm to accompany the Bombay army, for the purpose of facilitating his arrival at the court of

Dowlut Rao Scindiah. In that case adverting to the general tenor of my recent instructions to your Lordship, Colonel Malcolm might be empowered to employ that army in its march to Guzerat, for the purpose of carrying into effect any arrangements which may be adopted in concert with Scindiah for securing the person of Holkar, or for prosecuting the objects of the instructions with which your Lordship may furnish Colonel Malcolm.

12. In cantoning the troops under your Lordship's command, it appears to me be necessary to provide for the following objects :

First. The subsidiary force with the Rana of Gohud, to be stationed either at Gohud or in some favourable position in that district.

Secondly. A force in the province of Bundelcund sufficient to cover that province, and to enable the revenue officers to complete the settlement of the revenue.

Thirdly. A force at Agra and Muttra.

Fourthly. A force at Delhi, and in the northern part of the Doab.

13. With regard to the European troops, I am inclined to be of opinion, that with reference to the considerations to which I have adverted in the 5th and 7th paragraphs of this despatch, it will not be advisable to send the whole of them to such a distance as Futtý Ghur, and Cawnpoor. Your Lordship will, in all probability, find it expedient to canton the main strength of your army on the right bank of the Jumna, or in the vicinity of that river, provided the health of the Europeans be not exposed to risk by this measure ; dangerous effects may be produced on the counsels of Scindiah, by the return of our troops to stations far removed within the interior of our own provinces. The cantonment of the troops on the frontier, while it keeps in check all hostile or predatory attempts, will also confirm the tranquillity and good order which now subsist in the conquered provinces. If such an arrangement were practicable, it would be highly desirable to maintain a large body of Europeans in cantonment on the right bank of the Jumna, and I recommend this point to your Lordship's most serious attention. I wish, indeed, that your Lordship would consider whether it might not be expedient to fix the European cantonments,

or at least one considerable European corps on the right bank of the Jumna permanently. Such an arrangement will always enable your Lordship without difficulty to compose every corps in advance of a due proportion of European and native infantry. It appears to me that every corps in advance should be composed of a certain proportion of infantry and regular cavalry, and if possible of Europeans, as I consider any regularly composed army of this description to be superior to any force, which the whole collected power of the native states can now assemble.

14. Adverting to the state of our military power and resources, and to the condition of the Mahratta armies, it appears to me that all corps of irregular troops in our service may now be reduced. The expense of these corps is great, and their reduction would afford immediate relief. Care must be taken however to make a suitable provision for the native chiefs, who will otherwise be compelled to seek service with the enemy. It is possible that the irregular corps may be disposed of among the allies, and the officers formerly in Scindiah's service may be distributed among the several irregular corps. The corps of Pagahs* entertained in Bundlecund, if not already discharged, may in all probability be dismissed immediately.

15. With regard to the Sepoy battalions in Bundlecund, who quitted the service of Ambajee and of Scindiah, to enter into our service, it may not be advisable to disband them, if they can be employed without expense to the British Government. Three of them might be allotted to the Rana of Gohud, and three might be employed at Delhi, instead of the three battalions of Nujeebs, under Colonel Ochterlony. I understand that two of Scindiah's former battalions, are already under Colonel Ochterlony at Delhi. This arrangement would therefore provide for eight of these battalions.

16. Perhaps the Soubahdar of Jhansi, as we have engaged to protect him, would receive one or two of these battalions, and the remainder might be disposed of among our other allies and dependants. The Begum Sumroo may also be induced to receive into her service some of the irre-

* Household cavalry—A species of body-guard, not unfrequently entertained in native states.

gular corps to be commanded by British officers and to dismiss all Frenchmen who may now be in her service.

17. The irregular cavalry which at present may be in our service should not be increased on any account, and the whole may probably be distributed between the King at Delhi, the Rana of Gohud, and other chiefs, and may be commanded by their own native officers, or by British officers formerly in Scindiah's service, according to the nature of the different corps, and to the terms on which they entered our service.

18. Sheikh Kullub Ally, and any other native commanders, who have conducted themselves to the satisfaction of your Lordship, should be liberally rewarded. These commanders may perhaps object to be placed under the command of the European officers formerly in Scindiah's service; but they may have no objection to being placed under the command of an officer in the Company's service; at all events it is of the utmost importance to dispose of these corps as soon as may be possible. Every effort should also be made to reduce all other extra charges of every description without delay, and the greatest exertions should be made to settle our conquests, and to secure the revenue from them.

19. On all these points, I request your Lordship to transmit to me a detailed report as soon as may be practicable. I request your Lordship also to transmit to me with all convenient expedition. 1st. A return of all the irregular cavalry in the British service, according to their several districts, or corps, with a state of monthly expence, &c. 2d. The same of the irregular infantry. 3d. A plan for the reduction of the corps of irregular cavalry and infantry, now in our service, by transferring them to our allies, and by posting the British officers, lately in the Mahratta service to these corps. 4th. A detailed plan for the distribution of these troops on the right bank of the Jumna; also cantonments at Agra, Delhi and Bundelcund; a distribution of the troops in the Doab and Rohilcund, including the Vizier's territory. This detailed plan should shew the number of troops proposed to be stationed at the different cantonments, garrisons, &c. and should be accompanied by a general return of the number of men composing the army under the command of your Lordship.

20. I shall also be happy to receive from your Lordship, statements of the quantity of grain and stores collected at the different depôts; as well as of the ordnance, cattle, stores,

&c. and also to learn from you the portion of supplies which you would desire to draw from Benares and Patna.

21. The enclosed copies of orders to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay will apprize your Lordship of my intentions with regard to the troops under those governments respectively, and will enable your Lordship to regulate your proceedings with reference to the distribution of the troops in the province of Guzerat, and in the Deccan.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRs,

Fort William, May 18th, 1805.

1. The despatch from your honourable Court in the political department under date the 28th of November 1804, was received at Fort William on the 2d instant, and a reply to it from the Governor-General in Council, will be submitted to your honourable Court by an early conveyance.

2. I trust that the explanations which the Governor-General in Council offers to the indulgent consideration of your honourable Court, in answer to the remarks contained in your honourable Court's letter, may prove satisfactory to you; and I entertain a confident expectation that the Governor-General in Council will also afford sufficient proof to your honourable Court that the motives and objects of all his endeavours in your service, have been the preservation and improvement of the interests of the Company, and of the nation in India.

3. The present state of affairs in India appearing to admit of my early resignation of the Government General, and my health being extremely precarious, I propose to embark for England in a ship of war as soon as the season will permit; Sir Edward Pellew has provided a vessel for the purpose, and I am therefore enabled to submit to your honourable Court this respectful notification of my fixed intention to deliver over the charge of this government to Sir G. Barlow, at that period of time.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CX.

*N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. Secretary to Government, to Lieut.-Colonel
Ochterlony, Resident at Delhi.*

SIR,

Fort William, May 23, 1805.

1. The establishment of a permanent arrangement for the support of his Majesty Shah Allum, and of the royal household at Delhi, having been under the consideration of the Governor-General in Council, with reference to the notes of instructions transmitted to you on the 16th of November 1804, and to the observations contained in your letters dated the 30th of the same month, the 8th of December following, and the 9th of February 1805, I am directed to communicate for your information and guidance the final determination of his Excellency in Council on this important question.

2. The objections stated in your despatches of the 30th November and 8th December 1804, to the transfer of the lands to be assigned for the support of the royal household, to the management of native officers to be appointed by his Majesty's sole controul, are extremely forcible. His Excellency in Council has accordingly been pleased to determine that the territory to be assigned to the royal family shall remain under charge of the Resident at Delhi, and that the revenue shall be collected, and justice be administered in the name of his Majesty, and under regulations to be prescribed by the authority of the British Government.

3. The territory to be assigned to his Majesty is to comprise all that portion of the territory on the right bank of the Jumna, ceded to the honourable Company under the treaty of Serjie Anjengaum, which is situated to the north-west of a town or village named Kaboolpore, in the map of the ceded and conquered provinces constructed by Lieut.-Colonel Colebrooke. All the lands in the Doab now under your management are to be transferred to the Collectors of Seharunpore, or of Alighur, and the lands on the right bank of the Jumna, to the south-east of Kaboolpore, which may have been committed to your charge, are to be made over to the Collectors of Alighur, or of Agra. The districts to which these lands are to be respectively annexed must be determined with reference to the local position of the several pergunnahs to be transferred.

4. The territory assigned for the support of his Majesty and the royal family, is to continue as at present under your management, and you are authorized to let the lands in farm for a period of three years, on the best terms which can be obtained, reporting your proceedings in the execution of this arrangement for the confirmation of the Governor-General in Council. The general engagements to be required from the farmers will be stated to you in a separate despatch.

5. You will communicate this arrangement to his Majesty Shah Allum, and you will at the same time signify to his Majesty, the request of the Governor-General in Council, that his Majesty will be pleased to appoint a dewan and other inferior officers to attend at the office of collection for the purpose of ascertaining and reporting to his Majesty the amount of the revenues which may be received, and the charges of collection, and of satisfying his Majesty's mind that no part of the produce of the assigned territory shall be misappropriated.

6. Two courts of justice will be required for the administration of civil and criminal justice, according to the Mahomedan law, to the inhabitants of the city of Delhi and of the assigned territory lying without the precincts of the city. The judges of each of these courts must be selected from amongst the most respectable and learned of the Mussulman inhabitants of Delhi, and no sentences of the criminal courts extending to death should be carried into execution without the express sanction of his Majesty, to whom the proceedings in all trials of this description are to be reported by the judge of the court before whom the prisoner may be tried, through the channel of the British Resident.

7. No criminal must in future suffer the punishment of mutilation, under sentences of the courts, to be established in the assigned territory. When a prisoner shall be sentenced under the Mahomedan law to lose two limbs, the sentence must be commuted for imprisonment and hard labour for the term of fourteen years; and when the sentence shall adjudge the prisoner to lose one limb, it is to be commuted for imprisonment and hard labour for seven years.

8. A civil servant of the Company will be appointed your assistant for the special purpose of aiding you in superin-

tending the collection of the revenue, and the administration of justice.

9. You are desired to report for the consideration and orders of the Governor-General in Council, your sentiments with respect to the subsidiary regulations which ought in your judgment to be adopted for the administration of justice in civil and criminal cases, and with respect to the establishments which may be required for each of the courts. The system to be introduced will necessarily be defective, and the utmost circumspection will therefore be required in the selection of the judges, on whose character and integrity the equity of their decisions must in a great measure depend.

10. You will signify to his Majesty that if the arrangements now to be introduced into the assigned territory shall be found to be ill calculated to promote the improvement of the country, and to ensure the realization of the public revenues, the Governor-General in Council will hereafter submit for his Majesty's approbation such modifications of the proposed system, as shall in his judgment appear to be necessary to ensure to his Majesty all the advantages which the country is capable of yielding, and at the same time to secure the happiness and prosperity of the people.

11. To provide for the immediate wants of his Majesty, and his royal household, the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to determine that the following sums shall be paid monthly in money, from the treasury of the Resident at Delhi:—to his Majesty for his private expences, 60,000 sicca rupees; to the heir apparent exclusive of the revenues of Cote Cossim his jagheer, 10,000 do.; to Mirza Izzut Buksh, his Majesty's son by his favourite wife Mobaurick Mahl, 5,000 do.; to Mirza Moazem Bukht, 1,000 do.; to his brother, 500 do.; to his Majesty's fifty younger sons and daughters, at 200 rupees each, say 10,000 do.; to Shah Newauzkhan, 2,500 do.; to Syed Reza Khan, 1,000 do.;—total per mensem 90,000 sicca rupees.

12. If the produce of the revenue of the assigned territory should hereafter admit of it, the monthly sum to be advanced to his Majesty for his private expences may be increased to the extent of one lac of rupees.

13. You are likewise authorized to pay to his Majesty at the great festivals of the Jeshun, the Edes, Nouroze Bus-sunt, Hooly and at the Ramzaun, the sum of 10,000 rupees according to antient established usage.

14. In the negotiation of this arrangement as it respects the heir apparent, and his royal Highness Mirza Izzut Buksh, it must be stipulated that the Jagheers now held by those princes in the Doab, shall be surrendered to the British Government.

15. The arrangements proposed in your letters to the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 16th of March, and to his Excellency the Governor-General, dated the 23d of the same month, for the establishment of a military force for the protection of the assigned territory, and of the north-west frontier of our possessions in Hindostan is considered to be judicious. The Governor-General in Council is however of opinion, that it would be expedient to substitute for the three Nudjeeb battalions, proposed to be stationed at Carnoul or Paniput, and at Nurnole, three of the battalions heretofore in the service of Ambajee Inglia, and now employed in Bundlecund; and to attach to these corps a sufficient proportion of European officers, from the officers heretofore in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and now in the pay of the British Government.

16. The sentiments of the Governor-General in Council on this arrangement, have been communicated to the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief, by whom you will be furnished with instructions for the regulation of your proceedings. The Commander-in-Chief will also determine whether in consequence of the vicinity of the assigned territory to the possession of the Seiks, it may be necessary to maintain any irregular cavalry on the frontier.

17. The pay of the troops of every description to be employed in the assigned territory is to be regularly issued to them from the treasury of the Resident at the court of Delhi, under proper regulations to be determined hereafter.

18. Your suggestion that the Forts of Govilghur, Mandoo-ghur and Kanoor, should immediately be dismantled, appears to the Governor-General in Council to be judicious, you will not however demolish the fortifications until you shall have

obtained the previous sanction of the right honourable the Commander-in-Chief to that measure.

19. When the arrangements prescribed in this despatch shall have been carried into effect, you will submit for the consideration and orders of the Governor-General in Council a detailed report of your proceedings in the introduction of the system proposed to be established in every branch of the administration of the territory assigned to his Majesty, and you will furnish regular monthly accounts of all your receipts and disbursements, according to forms which will be transmitted to you from Fort William. You will likewise submit to the Governor-General in Council frequent reports of all matters connected with the administration of the affairs of the territory placed under your superintendence and management, in every department of the public service.

20. The success of your administration will, in a great measure depend on the prudence and circumspection which may regulate your choice of the native officers to be employed in the immediate charge of the revenues, and of the police of the assigned territory, and on your own vigilance in the detection of abuses. The reputation and permanent interest of the British Government require that the administration of the affairs of the assigned territory, should be established and maintained on a basis of justice and moderation, and the Governor-General in Council entertains a confident expectation that the important trust committed to your charge, will be executed in such manner as shall impress on the minds of all descriptions of persons under your authority, a just sense of the inestimable advantages they will receive, in their transfer to the mild and equitable authority of the British Government, from the lawless dominion of a Mahratta despot.

I have the honour to be, &c,

N. B. EDMONSTONE,

Sec. to Gov.

No. CXI.

Sir Edward Pellew to the Marquess Wellesley.

H. M. S. *Culloden*, Madras Roads,

May 24, 1805.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

Upon my arrival at this anchorage on the evening of yesterday I was favoured with your Excellency's letter of the 4th instant, for which I do myself the honour of expressing my acknowledgments.

The terms in which your Excellency has done me the honour of expressing your entire coincidence in those measures which I have judged expedient for the defence and protection of the trade and settlements of his Majesty's empire in the East Indies, are extremely gratifying to my anxious regard for your Excellency's favourable opinion, and although I cannot permit myself to indulge the full extent of those liberal expressions in respect to my arrangements, they convey to my mind a very sensible increase of that regret which I entertain upon your Lordship's resolution of quitting your important station, by which I am deprived of a co-operation which I had been sanguine enough to anticipate with the most flattering assurances of cordial unanimity.

It is extremely pleasing to me to learn that the arrangement I had made for your accommodation upon your expected departure for Europe, should have been accepted by your Excellency as a sincere token of that attention, which it would ever be my industrious care to shew to your convenience, and the preference given to one of the ships lately purchased into the Royal Navy at Bombay by your Excellency, to either of his Majesty's regular frigates, has induced me to despatch his Majesty's ship *Howe* for your reception, and her Captain will receive my instructions to await the communication of your Excellency's final arrangements for your embarkation, for which purpose he will hold a constant communication with Vizagapatam, that he may be apprized thereof as early as possible.

The *Sir Edward Hughes* must have been recommended under erroneous information, as from a personal knowledge of that ship I could not permit myself to comply with your

suggestion in her favour, from a consideration of the extreme inconvenience to which your Excellency would be exposed on board her, by reason of her interior structure being totally unadapted to the accommodation which will be required, independent of a variety of disadvantages otherwise respecting her sailing and equipment.

I trust the *Howe* will be found more suitable in every respect, being a remarkably fine ship, with large accommodations, a good sailer, and able to carry a quantity of water, and every other species of supply amply sufficient to permit her proceeding direct to England, without a necessity of putting into any port for obtaining further supplies.

Your Excellency's offer of accommodating the departure of a convoy from Bengal to the period of your quitting India, conveys to me an additional instance of that attentive view to the benefit of the public service, which has invariably characterized your Excellency's administration, but I have made such arrangements as will preclude the necessity of encumbering the ship on which you will embark with such a charge, and she will therefore be at perfect liberty to proceed at your disposal on her voyage without impediment.

The absence of Captain Lambert, and the earnest wish expressed by Captain Cockburn of returning to Europe, has induced me to select him for the honour of conveying your Excellency to England, under a persuasion that you will find in him a zealous officer, in whose favour I feel myself warmly interested, and from whom I have an entire confidence of your Excellency's receiving every attention so justly due to your Lordship's convenience and accommodation.

I have the honour to be,
my Lord Marquess,
your Excellency's most obedient
and most humble servant,
EDWARD PELLEW.

No. CXII.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.

London, Jan. 18, 1805.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received May 25, 1805.]

I am happy to have it in my power to acquaint you that Lord Cornwallis has consented again to undertake the government of India. His long experience in that situation, his eminent public character, and the relation in which he stands from former habits both to Sir George Barlow (who under different circumstances was destined for the government) to the Court of Directors, and also to the King's government, renders his appointment under present circumstances peculiarly advantageous.

It is certainly a considerable effort at his age to undertake so arduous a trust at so great a distance from home: he is however in good health, and not disposed to deny to the public his services wherever they can be made useful. His nomination has passed the Court, and will be regularly notified by the present conveyance to Bengal.

His Lordship will regulate his departure from hence in some degree according to the advices that may arrive; his present determination is not to embark before the middle of May next, unless we should hear that you are actually on your return. Should circumstances detain your Lordship in India till Lord Cornwallis's arrival, I am sure it will afford him great satisfaction to have an opportunity of communicating fully and freely with you; and I am satisfied you will not only feel anxious to strengthen and facilitate the progress of his administration, but derive great personal satisfaction from delivering over the government into his hands.

I am, my dear Lord,
with great truth and regard,
very sincerely and faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

P.S. Since writing the above I have seen Lord Cornwallis; he seems to incline to call at Madras in his way out, which will probably somewhat accelerate his departure from hence.

No. CXIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Sir Edward Pellew.

(Private.)

SIR,

Fort William, May 25, 1805.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received intelligence from Europe which induces me to believe, that under a supposition of my actual departure from India, the government in England had nominated the Marquess Cornwallis to be my successor in this government, and that his Lordship is probably now on his passage to India. As the state of affairs in this country admits of my departure from India without danger to the public interests, your Excellency will be sensible of my anxiety to have at my command a ship of war to carry me from India at the first moment that the season will admit of my embarkation.

Adverting to these circumstances and to the urgency of the case, I have resolved, notwithstanding my letter to your Excellency's address of the 4th May 1805, to avail myself of the permission contained in your Excellency's order of the 26th March 1805, and I have accordingly written a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, desiring Captain Cockburn, of his Majesty's ship *Phaeton*, to proceed immediately to Calcutta with that ship, and to prepare, in conformity to your Excellency's instructions, to convey me to Europe as soon as possible.

I sincerely hope that this arrangement will not prove inconvenient to your Excellency, and that you will approve the latitude which I have given to your orders under a case of peculiar exigency. I have been further induced to select the *Phaeton*, from having understood that Captain Cockburn is desirous of returning to Europe, and from the high character and reputation of that officer and of his ship.

I still entertain a most sanguine expectation of having the satisfaction of seeing your Excellency previously to my departure. Indeed I feel the less apprehension in leaving India at this period of time from the confidence which I repose in your Excellency's arrangements for the protection of this empire against any foreign attack. If I should be disap-

pointed, however, in the expectation which I have formed of a personal interview with your Excellency, I request your Excellency to accept the most cordial assurances of my high respect, and to believe that I leave India with a full impression of your public merits and high character.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and esteem, Sir,
your Excellency's most faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. CXIV.

Sir Edward Pellew to the Marquess Wellesley.—(Extract.)

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Culloden, Madras, May 25, 1805.

I beg first permission to congratulate your Lordship on the happy termination of your difficulties with Rao Holkar, and those misguided princes who have been influenced by him to depart from that safe and honourable path (a due observance and continuance of their public faith and engagements). It must be an extreme satisfaction to your Lordship's mind that you depart from so important and extensive an empire, after a period of years burthened with the most laborious duties of mind, leaving to your successor a peaceful country. If I could permit myself for one moment to consider your favourable sentiments to result from any other source than that extensive liberality so strongly marked in your Lordship's mind, I should be ashamed to venture on such a subject. That I feel and possess as much earnest zeal and honest endeavour to do my country service by strenuous exertion as any man alive, I shall ever boast, and I did, I confess, hope to have reaped laurels in a country where such eminent talents had been so long displayed; and in hearty execution of plans by your wisdom formed, I did hope a field might be opened for more active exertion in my department, and that it might be made more useful to your Lordship's views, and my country's advantage. Although I quit such flattering expectations with great regret, yet I cannot but feel in common with my countrymen the most unbiassed and affectionate

attachment to your Lordship's person and welfare ; and it is under the influence of such feelings that I have ventured to differ in opinion from your Lordship's friends on the convenience you were likely to experience by embarking on the *Sir Edward Hughes*. I should not be so direct in my expressions if I had not been on board her, and known her capacities. She could furnish your Lordship's family with no accommodation, is a wretched bad sea boat, steers ill, sails worse, is badly armed, and miserably weak ; and as I had destined her to the China convoy, I could not reach her in time ; I marked her for that service, meaning to send her home as unfit for our service, and have so stated her to the Admiralty. I have thought the *Howe*, late *Kussaroo*, is certainly more convenient than either the *Phaeton* or *San Fiorenzo* ; and as Captain Cockburn is very desirous of going to Europe, I have sent her to him in exchange for your Lordship's use, and directed him to follow your orders in every respect, both as to time of waiting on you, progress of his voyage, and port of debarking in England. She has uncommonly large apartments in cabin ; and below, will conveniently stow all your Lordship's baggage and suite, is powerfully armed, a strong ship, and sails fast, with the singular advantage of carrying with ease water and provisions for six months, so that you will have no more delay on your voyage than suits your Lordship's convenience.

Captain Cockburn's connections may possibly be known to you, but if they should not, I can speak of him as a young man of much merit as an officer, and a well bred gentleman, whose urbanity of manners will, I am satisfied, render your Lordship comfortable, as your Lordship will and must have a great deal to embark, as well as live stock, for which convenience must be made ; and as at this season nothing is to be apprehended from the enemy on his station, I should recommend your Lordship to call him to the river a month sooner than you may want him, you will find your convenience in doing so every day of your voyage, from the ship having time to prepare for your reception without hurry or confusion. I must not omit to inform your Lordship that Lord Melville is very anxious you should receive every accommodation.

Your Lordship's consideration of attaching yourself to a

convoy will, I trust, be unnecessary, as I shall be able to attend to that in time without your being encumbered, unless you prefer sailing in company. I had hoped, and fully intended, paying my respects at the seat of Government however inconsistent it might have been; but as your departure will necessarily create you an encrease of affairs, I must hope your excuse and a more favourable opportunity of being presented to your Lordship hereafter,—an honour I shall much aspire after.

As a war with Spain has taken place, I have thought it necessary to guard against any attempts upon our China trade from Manilla, to which port *La Semillante* was dispatched last month from Mauritius with that view. I have therefore sent an active officer, with two large frigates and a sloop of war, to look into that port, and to act as circumstances may require,—keeping in constant view the protection of our trade, and placing one ship between the Paracels and the coast of Cochin China, as our ships chiefly pass that way; and if your Lordship can procure a little more exertion in preparing the regular ships from this port and Bombay, so as to leave Madras at latest the first of August, we should avoid the dangers of the equinoxial tiffoons, the fatal effect of which were experienced last year.

That your Lordship may have a speedy passage, and meet every wish confirmed on your arrival in England, will be very gratifying to the feelings of my Lord Marquis,

Your most respectful

and most obedient humble servant,

ED. PELLEW.

No. CXV.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.—(Extract.)

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, June 2, 1805.

The Governor-General in Council now submits to your honourable Committee the arrangement which has been adopted by this government for the purpose of providing for the future maintenance of his Majesty Shah Allum and

the Royal family, and for the general settlement of his Majesty's affairs, and the principles upon which that arrangement is founded.

It has never been in the contemplation of this government to derive from the charge of protecting and supporting his Majesty, the privilege of employing the Royal prerogative, as an instrument of establishing any control or ascendancy over the states and chieftains of India, or of asserting on the part of his Majesty any of the claims which in his capacity of Emperor of Hindostan his Majesty may be considered to possess upon the provinces originally composing the Moghul empire. The benefits which the Governor-General in Council expected to derive from placing the King of Delhi and the Royal family under the protection of the British Government are to be traced in the statements contained in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 13th of July 1804, relative to the evils and embarrassments to which the British power might have been exposed by the prosecution of claims and pretensions on the part of the Mahrattas, or of the French, in the name and under the authority of his Majesty Shah Allum, if the person and family of that unhappy monarch had continued under the custody and control of those powers, and especially of the French. With reference to this subject, the Governor-General in Council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee to the contents of the enclosure of our despatch of the 13th of July 1804, marked A., and to the 73d paragraph of that despatch, in proof of the actual existence of a project for the subversion of the British empire in India, founded principally upon the restoration of the authority of the Emperor Shah Allum, under the control and direction of the agents of France. The difficulty of every project of that nature has been considerably increased by the events which have placed the throne of Delhi under the protection of the honourable Company. The Governor-General in Council further contemplated the advantages of reputation which the British Government might be expected to derive from the substitution of a system of lenient protection, accompanied by a liberal provision for the ease, dignity, and comfort of the aged monarch and his distressed family, in the room of that oppressive control and that degraded condition of poverty, distress, and insult, under

which the unhappy representative of the house of Timur and his numerous family had so long laboured.

Regulated by these principles and views, the attention of the British Government has been directed exclusively to the object of forming such an arrangement for the future support of the King and the Royal family as might secure to them the enjoyment of every reasonable comfort and convenience, and every practicable degree of external state and dignity compatible with the extent of our resources, and with the condition of dependence in which his Majesty and the Royal family must necessarily be placed with relation to the British power. In extending to the Royal family the benefits of the British protection, no obligation was imposed upon us to consider the rights and claims of his Majesty Shah Allum as Emperor of Hindostan, and the Governor-General has deemed it equally unnecessary and inexpedient to combine with the intended provision for his Majesty and his household, the consideration of any question connected with the future exercise of the imperial prerogative and authority.

The Governor-General in Council has determined to adopt an arrangement upon the basis of the following provisions. That a specified portion of the territories in the vicinity of Delhi, situated on the right bank of the Jumna should be assigned in part of the provision for the maintenance of the royal family. That those lands should remain under the charge of the Resident at Delhi, and that the revenue should be collected, and justice should be administered in the name of his Majesty Shah Allum, under regulations to be fixed by the British Government. That his Majesty should be permitted to appoint a Dewan and other inferior officers to attend at the office of collector, for the purpose of ascertaining and reporting to his Majesty the amount of the revenues which should be received and the charges of collection, and of satisfying his Majesty's mind that no part of the produce of the assigned territory was mis-appropriated. That two courts of justice should be established for the administration of civil and criminal justice, according to the Mahomedan law, to the inhabitants of the city of Delhi, and of the assigned territory. That no sentences of the criminal courts extending to death should be carried into

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execution without the express sanction of his Majesty to whom the proceedings in all trials of this description should be reported, and that sentences of mutilation should be commuted.

That to provide for the immediate wants of his Majesty, and the royal household, the following sums should be paid monthly in money, from the treasury of the Resident at Delhi:—to his Majesty for his private expences, 60,000 sicca rupees; to the heir apparent, exclusive of certain Jagheers, 10,000 do.; to a favourite son of his Majesty, named Mirza Izzut Buksh, 5,000 do.; to two other sons of his Majesty, 1,500 do.; to his Majesty's fifty younger sons and daughters, 10,000 do.; to Shah Newauze Khan, his Majesty's Treasurer, 2,500 do.; to Syud Rezzee Khan, British Agent at his Majesty's court, and related to his Majesty by marriage, 1,000 do.—Total per mensem, 90,000 sicca rupees.

That if the produce of the revenue of the assigned territory should hereafter admit of it, the monthly sum to be advanced to his Majesty for his private expences might be increased to one lac of rupees.

That in addition to the sums specified, the sum of 10,000 rupees, should annually be paid to his Majesty on certain festivals, agreeably to ancient usage.

The Governor-General in Council deemed the arrangement proposed by the Resident at Delhi for the establishment of a military force for the protection of the assigned territory and of the north-western frontier of our possessions in Hindostan, to be judicious, and accordingly resolved to confirm those arrangements, with certain modifications calculated to afford a provision for part of the irregular force in the service of the British Government, from the expence of which it was an object of the British Government to be relieved, and also for a proportion of the European officers heretofore in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who quitted that service under the proclamation of the Governor-General in Council of the 29th August 1803.

On the basis of this plan of arrangement detailed instructions were issued to the Resident at Delhi, under the date the 23d May, with orders to carry it into effect, with the least practicable delay.

The Governor-General in Council entertains a confident expectation that the proposed arrangement and provision will be satisfactory to his Majesty, and will be considered throughout all the states of India to be consistent with the acknowledged justice, liberality, and benevolence of the British Government.

The Governor-General in Council also confidently trusts that the proposed arrangement will be sanctioned by the approbation of your honourable Committee, and of the honourable the Court of Directors.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your most faithful humble servants,
WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

No. CXVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Earl Camden.

MY LORD,

Fort William, June 5, 1805.

1. A proposition having been made to me by M. De Caen, Captain-General of the French possessions to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, for the establishment of a cartel for the exchange of prisoners of war, made in India by the subjects of Great Britain and of France, I have the honour to annex for your Lordship's information a copy of my correspondence with M. De Caen on this subject.

2. Your Lordship is apprized that this government at present possesses no authority to consent to any exchange of prisoners of war, but it appears to be extremely desirable that the course to be pursued with respect to the prisoners who may hereafter be made by the officers of the British Government to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, should be prescribed at an early period of time by instructions from England. The Governor-General in Council has accordingly referred this question to the honourable Court of Directors by the present despatch, with a request that the Court will

obtain, through his Majesty's ministers, an early communication of his Majesty's pleasure on the subject.

3. Your Lordship will observe by my letter to M. De Caen, dated the 4th April 1805, that a considerable number of prisoners of war have been permitted to return to the Isle of France under engagements not to serve against the British Government or its allies, in the present war, until regularly exchanged by the proper authorities in Europe, and I have since determined, with the view of relieving the public finances from a heavy expesne, and also from a consideration of the sufferings of the prisoners, to allow all the prisoners now in India to return on the same conditions to the Isle of France.

4. Whatever may be his Majesty's pleasure with respect to the establishment of a general cartel for the exchange of the prisoners of war in India, I take the liberty to express, through your Lordship, my humble solicitation that his Majesty will be graciously pleased to confirm the exchange of those prisoners who have already been released by the authority of the Representatives of the two nations in India, as well as of all who may be released in the same manner previously to the receipt of his Majesty's commands on the question now submitted to your Lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXVII.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee
of the Honourable the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, June 7, 1805.

1. In our despatch of the 26th March the Governor-General in Council had the honour to state to your honourable Committee that the documents referred to in that despatch appeared to his Excellency in Council to comprize all the information necessary to enable your honourable Committee and the honourable the Court of Directors to form a judgment on the policy of the treaties of peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of the various questions arising out of the stipulations of the trea-

ties of peace with those chieftains respectively. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, does not deem it to be necessary to enter into any further discussion of those questions.

2. Adverting, however, to our original intention of furnishing your honourable Committee with detailed information on the subject of the question agitated at Scindiah's Durbar relative to the separation of Gohud and Gwalior from the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that question having been again brought forward by Scindiah after a solemn and public renunciation of his right to those possessions, the Governor-General in Council deems it right to submit all the documents connected with that question in a collective form to the notice of your honourable Committee.

3. With this view the Governor-General in Council has the honour to annex to this despatch the documents enumerated in the annexed list, No. 1, which comprize all the information necessary for the complete elucidation of that question.*

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
your most faithful humble servants,
WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

[Enclosure.]

*Copy of a Letter from N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government, to
Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm, dated 8th April 1804.*

SIR,

I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches noted in the margin,† on the subject of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's pretensions to the possessions of Gwalior, and the territory of the Rana of Gohud, and to

* It would be impossible, consistent with our remaining space, to give the whole of the documents referred to; the principal points are sufficiently stated in the letter of N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government.—[Ed.]

† To the Secretary, 17th February; No. 11, 24th February; No. 12, 24th February; No. 17, 4th March; No. 18, 8th March; to the Secretary, 16th March.

communicate to you the following observations and instructions for the regulation of your conduct in effecting a final adjustment of the question on which the ultimate disposal of that fort and territory depends.

2. Copies of the treaties concluded by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with Ambajee Ingolia, and with the Rana of Gohud, and ratified by the Governor-General in Council, and of the instructions of Government to the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of occupying the fort of Gwalior, and of maintaining the engagements concluded with the Rana of Gohud, have been already transmitted to you. With a view however to provide for the possible event of the miscarriage of my despatch enclosing copies of those treaties, I am directed to transmit to you duplicate copies.

3. The Governor-General's original instructions to Major-General Wellesley, of the 27th June, as well as his Excellency's instructions to Mr. Mercer of the 22d of July (of which a copy was transmitted to Major-General Wellesley on the 3d of August) contain a sufficient intimation of the intention of Government to conclude a treaty with the Rana of Gohud, and to occupy Gwalior. The instructions to Mr. Mercer state in direct terms the situation of the Rana of Gohud and of his territory at the commencement of the war, together with the relation of the power of Scindiah, and of Ambajee, to that district. Reference is made to the same subjects in various passages of the Governor-General's instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, of which copies were regularly transmitted to Major-General Wellesley.

4. The Governor-General is not apprized whether these documents were duly received; from the tenor of some expressions in your despatches his Excellency in Council would have concluded that these documents had never been received from you. I am directed to inform you that a due attention to those papers would have removed all doubt respecting the objects of this Government with regard to Gwalior and Gohud, and would have established, on the clearest grounds the policy of the treaties concluded with Ambajee, and with the Rana of Gohud, as well as the rights of the Company derived from those engagements; copies also of the treaties concluded with Ambajee ought to have reached you previously to the 21st February, at which time it appears that you had not received any copy of that document.

5. It is probable that many of the documents enumerated in these paragraphs have miscarried by the irregularity of the Dawk, either between Hyderabad and Major-General Wellesley's camp, or between Major-General Wellesley's camp, and that of Scindiah.

6. By the minutes of the conference which you held with Moonshee Kavel Nyne, and Ambajee Ingolia's vakeel on the 21st February (enclosed in your despatch, No. 11,) you appear however to be aware of the probable conclusion of the treaty with the Rana of Gohud, and of the obligation of that engagement on the public faith of the British Government; and you properly opposed, on that ground, the untenable assumption of Scindiah's officer that such engagements were not subject to the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace. The arguments also by which you justified

under the treaty concluded with Ambajee, to Moonshee Kavel Nyne, in a subsequent conference with him, the prosecution of the siege of Gwalior, after the Commander-in-Chief's receipt of intelligence of the conclusion of peace, were in strict conformity to the actual state of facts.

7. Although the arguments stated in the instructions of the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, under dates the 13th and 20th February, appear to his Excellency in Council to establish our right to maintain the arrangements adopted with respect to the territories of the Rana of Gohud, including Gwalior, by the treaty concluded with that chieftain, his Excellency the Governor-General deems it expedient to enter into a further discussion of that question with reference to the pretences opposed to your assertion of that right by the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in the various conferences which have passed on this subject.

8. By the tenor of your despatches those pretences appear to be,

1st. That the Fort of Gwalior and the country of Gohud were not comprehended in the cessions directedly made to the Company by the treaty of peace, and therefore could not be alienated under the 9th article.

2d. That no such person as the Rana of Gohud exists, and therefore no treaty concluded with any person assuming that character could be confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

3d. That neither Ambajee nor the Rana of Gohud are of the description of "Rajahs or others, &c." with whom all treaties concluded by the British Government are confirmed under the treaty of peace.

4th. That the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who negotiated the treaty of peace, understood the honourable Major-General Wellesley that the fort of Gwalior, and the country of Gohud, were to be retained by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that the treaty of peace was concluded in this confidence. The first and second of these pretences appear to have been properly repelled by your replies to Moonshee Kavel Nyne, and Ambajee Ingli's vakeel. It may however be observed, in addition to your reply to the second ground of argument assumed by these persons, that the person with whom the British Government concluded engagements as the legitimate Rana of Gohud, is acknowledged to be the lineal descendant of the ancient Ranas; that under a promise of an ample provision from the British Government, this Chief, at the commencement of the war, raised a considerable body of troops, with which he successfully opposed the troops of Ambajee; and that he has actively and usefully co-operated with the British troops during the whole course of the war. On the third head of objection you have also declared with propriety that the state of Ambajee's power, and of his relation to Scindiah, admits no doubt; that Ambajee is a person of the description stated in the 9th article, and the Rana of Gohud also is unquestionably of the description stated in that article. It is impossible to suppose that the 9th article would have been framed in such terms as should exclude from its operation treaties concluded with Ambajee, or the Rana of Gohud, when the main object of that article, must have been to confirm those particular treaties of which the importance had been repeatedly stated in the Governor-General's instructions, and distinctly

declared in the original instructions to Major-General Wellesley, of the 27th of June. This objection therefore is a mere fraud; and it is evident from various passages in the conferences, as well as from the words of the treaty, that Scindiah's vakeels and ministers considered Ambajee, and the Ranah of Gohud, to be persons of the description stated in the 9th article, and apprehended the necessary operation of that article not only upon the territory of Gohud, and the fortress of Gwalior, but upon other possessions held by Ambajee, to the southward of Gohud. The restrictive clause in the 9th article, excluding from the general operation of the article all districts to the southward of Gohud, holden by the tenure described in that clause, is evidently founded upon an apprehension that, without a restriction, all the territories occupied by Ambajee might have been alienated under the general terms of the 9th article. And no doubt can exist that, under the general terms of the article, unaccompanied by the restrictive clause, all the territory occupied by Ambajee, might have been alienated either to Ambajee or to the British Government. In your despatch, No. 12, you have stated in detail the attempts of Scindiah's minister to represent that the Rana of Gohud is not of the description of persons comprehended in the 9th article; but you have not specified your replies to that artful and fraudulent misrepresentation. The Governor-General in Council is desirous of receiving at the earliest convenient time, a detailed statement of your answer to Bappoo Wittul, in the conference of the 23d of February, of which conference the particulars are related in your despatch, No. 12, with the omission of your replies to the disrespectful and false insinuations of that Mahratta agent.

9. You will receive further instructions with reference to the insolent and arrogant tone of menace and defamation recently resumed by some of the Mahratta agents in their conferences with you. The object of such conduct and language is probably connected with the basest purposes of corrupt private interest. But the Governor-General in Council is resolved not to suffer with impunity in any quarter the revival of that spirit of wanton insult and barbarous provocation which occasioned the war, and which is incompatible with the relations of peace. The glory of the British arms displayed in the war, and the moderation and generosity of the British Government evinced by the terms of peace, and of the defensive alliance, might have taught the Mahratta agents the propriety of observing a course more suitable to their condition. But the Governor-General in Council will enforce the respect due to the great and powerful empire which is committed to his charge, even at the hazard of dissolving all connection with any state whose councils shall prove so infatuated as to oppose falsehood and insolence to justice, clemency and public faith.

10. With regard to the fourth objection, every doubt with respect to the confirmation of the engagements concluded with the Rana of Gohud, by the 9th article of the treaty of peace, is obviated, and every pretence fabricated by the minister of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in support of a contrary proposition, is confuted by a reference to the minutes of conference between the honourable Major-General Wellesley and the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, during the negotiation of peace.

11. From the minutes it appears, that both the honourable Major-General Wellesley and the vakeels were fully aware of the extent to which the stipulations of the 9th article of the treaty might eventually operate.

12. Major-General Wellesley repeatedly urged upon the vakeels the danger to which the interests of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were exposed by a delay on their part in the adjustment of the terms of peace, under the indispensable necessity of providing in any treaty of peace for the confirmation of all engagements which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief might have concluded with the states and chieftains of Hindostan, and distinctly apprized the vakeels that by delay Scindiah was exposed to the hazard of being deprived of his whole territory; and the vakeels are stated to have observed, when the 9th article of the treaty of peace was under discussion, "that, by agreeing to the demand, the Maharajah might, without knowing, cede away half of his remaining territories, as the engagements concluded by the Commander-in-Chief might contain stipulations to grant territory to the south of the line which Major-General Wellesley had demanded as a boundary."

13. The ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah however appear to maintain that they received from Major-General Wellesley assurances which justified a confidence that, notwithstanding the distinct provision of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, the territory of Gohud, including Gwalior, would remain in the possession of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but, on reference to the minutes of conference, no such assurances appear to have been given; Major-General Wellesley, in reply to the observation above quoted, assented to the justice of it, but expressed his belief that no treaty had, at that time, been concluded, "by which territory was granted south of the line mentioned, and that it was not intended to deprive Scindiah of any territory but what Major-General Wellesley had claimed."

14. It is evident that by these declarations Major-General Wellesley did not pledge, either his own word, or the faith of the British Government, for Dowlut Rao Scindiah's possession of the territory of Gohud after the conclusion of peace. On the contrary, Major-General Wellesley admitted that the apprehension of the vakeels, with respect to the alienation of that territory, might possibly be verified; and merely expressed an opinion that no arrangements, involving the alienation of that territory, had probably been concluded at that time.

15. On a subsequent discussion of this question, Major-General Wellesley is stated to have declared to the vakeels, that it was not intended to demand from the Maharajah "territory for any Rajahs or Sirdars beyond what had been already granted, and that none of the Maharajah's remaining territories (such as were really his) should be granted away by any treaty made with any Rajah or other person."

16. It is manifest that in this description of territory Major-General Wellesley could not mean to include the territories of Gohud and Gwalior, because Major-General Wellesley had, at a preceding conference, acquiesced in the apprehension of the vakeels, that territories south of those ceded to the Company might be alienated by the effect of engagements concluded by the Commander-in-Chief, an opinion which, at a succeed-

ing conference, Major-General Wellesley confirmed in the most explicit terms. On that occasion the vakeels expressed an apprehension that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be deprived of Jyepore and Gohud by the terms of the second article as it originally stood; Major-General Wellesley replied, that "Dowlut Rao Scindiah positively would not lose Jyepore and Gohud by the second article of the treaty, *although he might by another*; and Major-General Wellesley positively refused to insert any thing in the treaty which *should tend to defeat the arrangements which might have been made by General Lake with the Rajahs of Jyepore, Gohud, or others.*"

17. From this review of what is stated to have passed at the conferences between the honourable Major-General Wellesley, and the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with respect to the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, it is evident, First, That the vakeels received no assurance from Major-General Wellesley of an extent to justify an expectation that, notwithstanding the nature of any engagements which might have been concluded by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with respect to Gohud and Gwalior, that territory and fort would form a part of Scindiah's dominions after the peace. Secondly, That the declaration of Major-General Wellesley, on which the vakeels must have founded this expectation, although it may have encouraged a hope that Gwalior and Gohud might remain in the possession of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, plainly stated the possible existence of engagements by which Scindiah must be deprived of Gwalior and Gohud under the 9th article. Thirdly, That Major-General Wellesley distinctly declared to the vakeels, that any engagements which the Commander-in-Chief might have concluded with any chief in Hindostan, and particularly with the Rana of Gohud, must be confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

18. The verbal declarations of Major-General Wellesley therefore, far from affecting the operation of that article with respect to the territories guaranteed to the Rana of Gohud, confirm it in the most positive terms.

19. The strongest presumptive evidence exists to corroborate the tenor of these recorded declarations of the honourable Major-General Wellesley. It could not be supposed that Major-General Wellesley would have admitted any construction of the 2d and 9th articles of the treaty of peace, or would have given to the vakeels any assurances by which the confirmation of engagements contracted with the Rana of Gohud would be precluded, because in the Governor-General's instructions of the 27th of June, by the tenor of which the honourable Major-General Wellesley regulated the conditions of the peace, it is distinctly stated that the Rana of Gohud is to be placed in the condition of a feudatory to the Company, and that Gwalior is to be occupied by the British troops.

20. It is evident therefore that, if Scindiah really be of opinion that the treaty with the Rana of Gohud could not have been confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace, the vakeels of Scindiah must have intentionally deceived him with regard to the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, and to the assurances and declarations of the honourable Major-General Wellesley; but the rights of the British Government, and

the obligation of its pledged faith, cannot be affected by the erroneous expectations which Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been induced to entertain, with regard to the limited operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

21. In the instructions of the Governor-General in Council to the Commander-in-Chief, of the 13th February,* the question of the confirmation of the treaty concluded with the Rana of Gohud, under the 9th article of the treaty of peace, is considered principally with reference to the engagements concluded between the British Government and Ambajee, by which those territories were ceded to the Company, which were subsequently guaranteed to the Rana of Gohud.

22. If it should be pretended that the engagement concluded with the Rana of Gohud could not be confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace, unless the territory guaranteed to the Rana by that engagement had been previously wrested from the dominions of Scindiah, either by conquest or by a just and valid cession, that under actual circumstances we could not justly claim the benefit of the cessions made by Ambajee, and that therefore those territories ought to revert to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, you will find this question discussed, in the instructions to which the preceding paragraph refers. One material argument however in support of our just claim to the benefit of the cessions made by Ambajee having been omitted, I am directed to take this opportunity of supplying it with a view to enable you to meet the pretensions of the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

23. If we had not acquired a proprietary right over those territories, and consequently a right to dispose of them by the engagements with Ambajee, that right must have been obtained by conquest. The Commander-in-Chief was withheld from proceeding to the actual occupation of those territories, for the express purpose of ultimately restoring them to the Rana of Gohud, agreeably to the Governor-General's original plan, exclusively by the earnest entreaty of Ambajee, and by the conclusion of engagements with Ambajee. The reduction of Gwalior, and the territory dependent on it, was the declared and intended object of the Commander-in-Chief's military operations, after the surrender of Agra, and the victory of Laswaree; the army was actually moving towards Gohud and Gwalior, when the cession of that fortress and territory, by the treaty concluded with Ambajee, precluded the necessity of directing the march of the army into that country. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief therefore merely despatched a small body of troops for the purpose of receiving possession of Gwalior, under the terms of the treaty concluded with Ambajee.

24. It is to be observed, at the same time, that the Rana of Gohud had been, previously to the conclusion of the treaty with Ambajee, actively and successfully employed at the head of a considerable body of forces which he had levied by the aid of pecuniary supplies furnished by the British Government, in expelling the troops of Ambajee from the terri-

* See p. 21.

tory of Gohud, and that no force of the enemy remained in that territory (excepting in Gwalior) capable of resisting, in any degree, the complete and immediate occupation of it by the British troops.

25. The fraud practised by Ambajee, with a view to frustrate the just rights, and to evade the necessary result of the power of the British Government by artifice and treachery, cannot be admitted in aid of the pretences now urged by Scindiah's ministers.

26. In every point of view therefore in which the question can be considered, the right of the British Government to claim the confirmation of the cession in favour of the Rana of Gohud, appeared to be indisputably established. The faith of the British Government is also pledged to maintain the obligation of its engagements with that chieftain, from which we cannot be released, unless the Rana of Gohud shall consent to release us, or shall violate his faith, or unless our original right to form the treaty shall be disproved. In the last case we should be placed in the same situation as that of a failure in the prosecution of the war. We should be deprived, by a paramount necessity, of the means of fulfilling our engagements, and although motives of generosity in such a case would dictate the propriety of providing for the Rana of Gohud, he would possess no positive claim upon our public faith. His present rightful claim upon our faith, is commensurate with our original right to contract the engagement, and with our present ability to fulfil it, and we cannot wantonly yield the just rights of a faithful ally to the interests or prejudices of an enemy in the war.

27. The ministers of Scindiah may attempt to assert a separate claim to the restoration of the fortress of Gwalior, which is retained by the British Government, together with the subsidy secured to the British Government, under the treaty of the Rana of Gohud. But both these advantages are accompanied by corresponding obligations of protection, under the guarantee of the Rana's territories and independence, and both are necessary to enable us to fulfil those obligations. Without the full command of Gwalior we could not be responsible for the security of the district of Gohud, and without the subsidy we should not possess the requisite funds for maintaining the troops which we are bound by the treaty to furnish for the protection of the Rana's country, person, and authority.

28. The Governor-General deems it to be an indispensable obligation upon the British Government to fulfil the promises and assurances made by the honourable Major-General Wellesley, in the name of the British Government, in the extent in which they were intended to operate. His Excellency however is decidedly of opinion, that the claim described in the preceding paragraphs cannot be justly founded on any of the promises or assurances pretended to have been made by Major-General Wellesley to the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

29. The general assurances stated to have been given by Major-General Wellesley, "that it was not the intention of the British Government to destroy Scindiah's state, and that the 9th article of the treaty of peace would be construed in the manner least injurious to Scindiah, consistent with our public faith," must be limited by Major-General Wellesley's more

particular declarations, as stated in the conferences, and by the positive terms of the treaty of peace founded on Major-General Wellesley's instructions, and on the success of our arms.

30. The evident object and operation of the war, and peace, were to destroy Scindiah's hostile military power, with relation to the British Government and its allies, and especially to exclude Scindiah from all command of our frontier, or of the dominions of our allies, more particularly in the north-western provinces of Hindostan. The total destruction of Scindiah's state, would have been an act of wanton vengeance; but it must never be forgotten, that the effectual reduction of his means of reviving an hostile military power, especially on the banks of the Jumna, was the main object of the war, and of the peace; Major-General Wellesley's declaration was therefore undoubtedly made with this limitation. With reference to the particular case of Gohud and Gwalior, Scindiah's ministers have drawn from Major-General Wellesley's declarations a conclusion equally false and presumptuous. Major-General Wellesley expressly declared, that by the operation of the 9th article, Scindiah might lose the district of Gohud (which includes Gwalior) and that our public faith required that any engagement concluded by Major-General Lake, with the Rana of Gohud, should be confirmed by the treaty of peace.

31. The ministers of Scindiah now complain, that the alienation of Gohud will destroy Scindiah's state, and will establish a construction of the 9th article of a tendency injurious to Scindiah, beyond the limits compatible with Major-General Wellesley's assurances; but those assurances were accompanied by an express reservation of the particular case on which the Mahrattas ground their present complaint, since Major-General Wellesley distinctly declared at the same conferences, that (although we neither intended the destruction of Scindiah's state, nor any injury beyond the express words and necessary operation of the treaty, and the indispensable obligations of our public faith) yet that our public faith required the confirmation of any engagements concluded with the Rana of Gohud, and that such engagements under the 9th article, might alienate the district of Gohud from Scindiah.

32. The occupation of the fortress and city of Gwalior, by the British troops, has already been stated to be intimately and inseparably connected with the objects and purposes of the arrangement concluded with the Rana of Gohud. With regard to the British Government, the possession of Gwalior forms a most important part of that comprehensive political arrangement, which was planned by the Governor-General before the commencement of the war. The post is highly important to the British Government in a military as well as in a political point of view, and cannot properly come under the description of cessions demanded exclusively with a view to the extension of our dominion or resources.

33. We should not be justified by the nature of our engagements with the Rana of Gohud, in abandoning without his consent the fortress and city of Gwalior to any power except to the Rana himself, and least of all can we justly cede Gwalior without the Rana's consent to that power which usurped the Rana's hereditary dominions, and from the oppressive

control of which he has been relieved by his own successful exertions in the war co-operating with the British army, and by the engagements concluded between him and the British Government.

34. On the facts and arguments above detailed is founded his Excellency the Governor-General in Council's conviction of the justice and indispensable necessity of maintaining the obligation of our late engagements with the Rana of Gohud.

35. The Governor-General in Council is however solicitous, on substantial grounds of policy, to conciliate the good will and satisfaction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, by every concession which may be practicable, consistently with the public faith and honour, and with the security of the just objects and purposes of the war, and of the peace; and his Excellency is of opinion, that, under the subsidiary and defensive alliance lately concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the extension of his territories and pecuniary resources, beyond the scale on which they are left by the operation of the treaty of peace, is not dangerous to the extent which might be apprehended under a different state of circumstances; but the establishment of the Rana of Gohud in his ancient possessions, under the protection of the British power, and the occupation of Gwalior by the British troops, were considered by the Governor-General, previously to the commencement of the war, to be objects of the highest importance; and in his Excellency's instructions to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, of the 11th of December 1803, those objects are among the articles reserved even in the event of the conclusion of a subsidiary and defensive alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

36. His Excellency cannot expect that any concessions would reconcile Scindiah cordially to an alliance which he has been compelled to accept exclusively by the exigency of his affairs. Concessions tending to restore any portion of the military power and influence of Scindiah in the north-western provinces of Hindostan might revive hopes of recovering an ascendancy in that quarter, and might furnish the means of renewed war, instead of cementing the ties of alliance. The symptoms of a disposition to gratify unreasonable demands might encourage arrogance and rapacity; and the treacherous and suspicious character of the Mahrattas might view in such a policy the indications of weakness and timidity, rather than the proofs of generosity and moderation.

37. His Excellency therefore would deem it to be highly impolitic, even if it were practicable, consistently with the obligations of public faith, to restore to Scindiah the possession of Gwalior, or the territory of Gohud, which would again establish the power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in that commanding position in Hindostan, whence, after the aggression of the confederates, it was a primary object of his Excellency's policy, to exclude the Mahratta power.

38. The rights of the British Government, under the treaty of peace, having been distinctly stated in this letter, the justice and necessity of asserting those rights must be maintained at the Durbar of Scindiah, in the most public manner, and stated by you directly to Scindiah himself, in the most explicit terms.

39. You will deliver to Scindiah himself attested copies of the treaties with Ambajee and with the Rana of Gohud. You will accompany these documents by a full statement in writing of the grounds on which is founded the right of the British Government to maintain the treaty with the Rana of Gohud; and you will add in the most public and solemn manner, such verbal explanations as may appear to be necessary.

40. You will then signify to Scindiah in the most firm, but temperate and amicable language, the fixed resolution of the Governor-General in Council to maintain the rights and interests of the British Government, established by the treaty of peace, and by the treaty with the Rana of Gohud, according to the tenor of those instruments.

41. His Excellency the Governor-General is anxious that all questions connected with the treaty of peace should be finally adjusted with the least practicable delay; and his Excellency accordingly directs that you will immediately proceed to the adjustment of those which form the subject of this despatch, upon the principles stated in the preceding instructions.

42. After the just rights of the British Government, under the treaty of peace, shall have been duly and formally recognized by Scindiah, it may be proper to review the condition of his resources in the amicable spirit of the treaty of defensive alliance. When the Governor-General in Council shall have been convinced that Scindiah's counsels are actuated by a due sense of the real nature of his situation, and of the principles and objects of the alliance, every degree of reasonable consideration will be extended by this Government to mitigate his distress, and means may be found of affording relief to his resources, without injury to our public faith, or to our public safety, without sacrificing our allies to his wounded pride, or our security to his rapacity and ambition.

43. The nature of those means, as well as the mode of applying them, will form the subject of future instructions to you: but the preliminaries to these acts of generosity and clemency must be the recognition of our just rights, and the manifestation of those sentiments towards us which are due to the superiority of our arms in the war, to our moderation and clemency in the peace, and to our liberality and generosity in the defensive alliance.

44. Scindiah must remember that he is indebted to the forbearance of the British power for every possession which he retains, and even for his existence. He must remember that the British power, in the moment of victory, and of progressive conquests, restored him to whatever resources he now possesses, and after having established the just limits of cession, founded upon the success of the war, granted to him the gratuitous protection and guarantee of the arms by which he had been vanquished, for the security of the dominions reserved to him by the peace.

45. This condition, under such a settlement, is incompatible with a spirit of arrogance and encroachment; nor will the Governor-General in Council consent to listen to any demands which shall be urged in a tone unsuitable to the relations subsisting between the two states, and which shall lead to consequences inconsistent with the principles of the treaties

of peace and alliance, and with the rights and interests of the Company and its allies.

46. I am directed to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your letters of the dates and numbers stated in the margin.*

47. The Governor-General in Council approves the motives which induced you to postpone further communications with Scindiah's Durbar on the subject of Gwalior and Gohud, according to the statement contained in your despatch of 16th March; and his Excellency in Council will also approve any delay which you may have interposed on the same subject, in consequence of the instructions of Major-General Wellesley of the 17th March, which the Governor-General in Council deems extremely prudent and proper.

I have the honour, &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Gov.

No. CXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Earl Camden, K. G.

MY LORD,

Fort William, June 10, 1805.

Since the despatch of my letter to your Lordship under date 14th May, 1805, the state of affairs in India has assumed such an appearance as to promise to admit of the return to Europe of the different regiments ordered to embark from India by his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

2. I have accordingly addressed the enclosed letter to Lord Lake respecting the return of these corps, which I hope may take place towards the close of this year.

3. The 74th regiment has been ordered to march from Poonah to Fort St. George or to Bombay, with reference to the most convenient port for the embarkation of that regiment. It appears to me, that notwithstanding the greater distance of Fort St. George from Poonah, the 74th regiment will be embarked from that fort in preference to Bombay, as all the families of the men, and the stores, &c. of the regiment are at Fort St. George.

4. The Meuron regiment will be embarked as soon as the 56th shall have reached India; and the Meuron regiment is ordered to be prepared for that purpose.

5. The 25th dragoons and the 76th regiment are returning

* From No. 1, dated 12th January, to the letter to the Secretary, 18th March inclusive.

to cantonments with Lord Lake, and in all probability will arrive at Calcutta in sufficient time to admit of their embarking in the month of January from Calcutta.

6. I request your Lordship to submit this despatch, together with my letter to Lord Lake, to His Royal Highness the Duke of York.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXVIII.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 15th June, 1805.

1. The advices which the Governor-General in Council has received from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah since the 31st of May (the date of our last despatch to your honourable Committee on the subject of the transactions at that chieftain's court), have not conveyed the intelligence of any important occurrence. Dowlut Rao Scindiah, accompanied by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, continued his march in the direction of Kotah.*

2. On the 16th of May those chieftains proceeded with a light body of troops to join Serjie Rao Ghautka, who had advanced to the vicinity of Kotah for the purpose of realizing the money which Ambagee had consented to pay (as stated in the 150th paragraph of our despatch of the 31st of May).

* A letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee, dated the 31st May, contains a narrative of the proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of the negotiations at his Highness's Court in continuation of the despatch of the 24th March preceding; but is too voluminous for insertion. It shews the progressive steps by which Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under the influence of his profligate minister, reached the acme of treachery by his actual junction with the common enemy here adverted to, under the mask of a pretended and delusive mediation; thus completely realizing the suspicions of that chieftain's real designs described in the Governor-General's letter to Lord Lake of the 7th of April, p. 515. A complete account of the whole of the negotiations with Scindiah and Holkar in 1804 and 1805 was printed by the House of Commons 19th June 1806; they occupy a large volume, and may be referred to by any person desirous of examining the intrigues of a Mahratta Durbar.—[Ed.]

The acting Resident continued with the baggage in the rear at the express recommendation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

3. On the 17th of May the battalions of Meer Khaun, in a state of extreme weakness and distress joined the camp, accompanied by the baggage of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. On the same day, the battalions and guns of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under the command of Baptiste, arrived in the vicinity of the camp of the confederates. The acting Resident subsequently joined the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at the position which that chieftain and Jeswunt Rao Holkar at the date of our latest advices occupied between Kotah and Boondi. The acting Resident's repeated endeavours to obtain permission to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had proved ineffectual. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to annex to this despatch for your honourable Committee's information copies of two letters from the acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah to his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 27th May, the date of our latest advices from the camp of the confederated chieftains.

4. From those despatches your honourable Committee will observe, that a probability at that time existed of a material change in the situation of affairs at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by the dismissal of Serjie Rao Ghautka. Such a change may be expected to afford a favourable opportunity for the re-establishment of our relations with the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, upon the basis of the existing treaties. Your honourable Committee will further observe, that in consequence of that expected change in the administration of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government, the acting Resident had deemed it proper to suspend the delivery of the Commander-in-Chief's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to which the 151st paragraph of our despatch of the 31st of May refers.

5. Having received from the Commander-in-Chief a copy of his Excellency's instructions to the acting Resident in reply to the acting Resident's communication of the expected change in the councils of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to annex to this despatch a copy of that document, together with a copy of the Commander-in-Chief's letter, to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to which it refers. The course of proceeding adopted by the Commander-

in-Chief on this occasion, and the tenor of his Excellency's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah appear to the Governor-General in Council to be perfectly proper.

6. The Governor-General in Council has the honour to apprise your honourable Committee that Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm arrived in the camp of the Commander-in-Chief on the 1st of June. Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm will be prepared to proceed to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah whenever the state of affairs at that chieftain's court shall be such as to promise success to the negotiations with which he may be entrusted.

7. Your honourable Committee will observe, from the document to which the 4th paragraph refers, that it appears that Ambagee has been compelled by severe extortion to pay thirty lacs of rupees to the confederated chieftains.

8. The Governor-General in Council deems it proper to annex to this despatch, for your honourable Committee's information, copies of two letters from his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief, dated respectively the 26th and 30th of May; the former stating the arrangements adopted by the Commander-in-Chief for the permanent establishment of the subsidiary force of British troops to be stationed with the Rana of Gohud, according to the provisions of treaty;* and the latter containing the Commander-in-Chief's reply to the instructions of the Governor-General in Council of the 17th of May (the substance of which is stated in the 134th paragraph of our despatch of the 31st of May, and a copy of which instructions accompanied that despatch). By the tenor of those documents, your honourable Committee will be apprized of the arrangements adopted by the Commander-in-Chief for the disposal of the troops under his Excellency's personal command, in conformity to the instructions to which this paragraph refers.

We have the honour to be,

honourable Sirs,

your most faithful humble Servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

* See Appendix.

No. CXIX.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, June 16th, 1805.

The Governor-General in Council deems it proper to transmit to your honourable Committee the enclosed extract from a despatch from Captain T. Sydenham, the officiating Resident at the court of Poonah, containing his report of the most important topics of a conference which he held with his highness the Peishwa on the 26th of May.

Your honourable Committee will observe with satisfaction his Highness the Peishwa's voluntary acknowledgement of the benefits which he has derived from the operation of his alliance with the Company, and the honourable testimony which his Highness has afforded of the justice, liberality, and moderation, of the British power, by contrasting the condition of his person and government when exposed to the rapacity, violence, and treachery, of his servants and dependants, with the ease, dignity, and independence, which his Highness now enjoyed under the protection of the honourable Company. Your honourable Committee will not fail to deduce from the terms of his Highness's acknowledgement, the complete extinction of that spirit of jealousy and suspicion with regard to the views and designs of the British Government, which appears to have prevailed in the mind of his Highness for a considerable period of time previous to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, and the happy substitution of the sentiments of entire confidence in the British power.

The Governor-General in Council solicits the attention of your honourable Committee to his Highness the Peishwa's description of the characters of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and Serjie Rao Ghautka. The sentiments of his Highness the Peishwa upon that subject are entitled to peculiar attention, and may be considered to be the general sentiments of the people of India with regard to the views, dispositions and power, of those several chieftains.

In the weakness, turbulence and profligacy, of their respective characters, your honourable Committee will trace the causes of those disorders which have for a time suspended

the complete operation of the system of political arrangement* adopted by the British Government for the permanent security of this extended empire, and for the establishment of general tranquillity in India.

We have the honour to be,

Honourable Sirs,

Your most faithful humble servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

[Enclosure.]

Extract from a Letter from Captain T. Sydenham, Acting Resident at Poonah, dated 27th May, 1805.

4. The persons present at the interview, exclusively of the gentlemen who accompanied me, were the minister Kestnajee Bawanie, Arrund Rao, and Byajee Naigue.

5. The first part of the conversation, which was occupied chiefly by mutual compliments and enquiries, was carried on between his Highness and

* The following extract from the despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated Fort William, the 12th April 1804, which was too long for insertion in this work, explains concisely the system of political arrangement alluded to in the text.—[Ed.]

“The Governor-General in Council cannot conclude this branch of the subject of the present despatch without offering to your honourable Committee his most cordial congratulations on the complete accomplishment of the plan of political arrangement in the north-western provinces of Hindostan, which was formed by the Governor-General for the exclusion of the Mahratta power from that quarter of India, and for the establishment of the influence of the British Government in the north of Hindostan on the most solid and durable foundations. The conclusion of defensive alliances with the chiefs of the Rajpoot and Jaut tribes must secure the ascendancy of the British Government in those states, and must prove an insuperable obstacle to the establishment of the influence of the Mahrattas in these states. A particular article of those treaties also provides effectual security against the introduction of the power or influence of the French, or of any other European state, into the councils or armies of our new allies. The stipulation of mutual aid in case of war ensures to us the use of a powerful body of native troops, which may prove essentially useful in a variety of services; while the obligation which the treaties impose on our allies, of submitting all their disputes to the British Government, and abiding in all cases by the arbitration of that Government, precludes the danger of our becoming involved in any unjust or unnecessary wars, and affords us powerful means of preserving to the utmost possible extent the future tranquillity of the northern provinces of Hindostan.”

myself, through Anund Rao, but the Peishwa suddenly broke through this fatiguing and inconvenient custom, and addressing me in Hindostani, received my replies directly in the same language.

6. His Highness said that the several articles of intelligence which I had sent to the ministers had been faithfully translated and communicated to him ; that he was extremely rejoiced every thing had been settled at Bhurtpore in a manner so perfectly satisfactory ; and that he lamented the ungrateful, faithless, and perverse conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in rushing into a war which must terminate in the total destruction of that chieftain. I replied, that his Highness must be sensible that it was your Excellency's most anxious desire to maintain with Dowlut Rao Scindiah the relations of friendship which had been established by the treaty of Serje Anjengaum, and to extend to that chieftain the support and assistance which had been promised by the subsequent treaty of alliance.

That even when the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was more than equivocal, when some of his measures and movements were extensively indicative of hostility, your Excellency still entertained a hope that Dowlut Rao Scindiah might be made sensible of his error, and might return to a proper sense of his obligations to the British Government. I observed, that his Highness had very justly stigmatized the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah as rash, faithless, and ungrateful. A circumstance had lately occurred which I was afraid might remove the possibility of an amicable arrangement with that chieftain. I alluded to the union of Dowlut Rao Scindiah with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and the shattered remains of his discomfited adherents. I need not offer any remark upon that extraordinary and monstrous proceeding ; I could not venture to anticipate your Excellency's decision upon so important an object as that of peace or war ; but his Highness must be convinced, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had now avowedly and shamefully violated all his engagements with the British Government, and that the British Government could not stoop to the humiliating circumstance of witnessing its alliance, its engagements, and the public repose of India so trifled with, and exposed to the caprice of any one, or of any combination of the chieftains of his country. I concluded by assuring his Highness that even in this peculiar juncture of affairs the conduct of the British Government would be marked by its characteristic principles of justice, moderation, and liberality.

7. His Highness then addressed me nearly in the following terms, as far as my recollection serves me :—" Your paths, and those of the Mahrattas are different ; your way is open and straight—theirs is crooked and concealed. When you have a friend, you are friendly ; when you have an enemy, you shew your enmity and destroy him : but sometimes your enmity ends in friendship ; their friendship always ends in enmity. I know you both : I have tried you both ; and I speak from what I have felt. These men with turbans, who were my servants, sought my ruin ; you who wear hats, and are foreigners, saved me from destruction, and gave me back my throne. While they were here I was insulted and oppressed ; now that you are here I am at repose, and do as I please. They took from their master crores of rupees, and still asked more ; you have spent crores of rupees for

a friend, and demand no return. Between Scindiah and Holkar this is the difference—Scindiah is a weak foolish boy, who is himself incapable of government, and is led by the advice of others. If his servants advise well he acts well; if his servants advise ill, he acts ill: great crimes are committed by his government, but he himself is faultless. Holkar is a bad man from his heart; he loves disorder—he hates repose. Whatever he does proceeds from himself: he is a monster who must be destroyed. Serjee Rao Ghautka is almost worse than Holkar. While these men have power, there cannot be repose; though they should have only a hundred men, still they would excite disorder. These are the men who have brought Scindiah into difficulties, and in the end will ruin him. Let Lord Wellesley extirpate the guardians, but let the child be preserved. The Company must give Scindiah good counsellors, and must keep its army* at Oujein; all will then be quiet. I can have no friendship for Scindiah, for he was cruel to me, and always insulted me, but it was not his fault. This is what I think.”

8. I requested the Peishwa to receive my respectful acknowledgements for the unreserved manner in which his Highness had done me the honour of communicating his thoughts. His sentiments and opinions would do credit to the wisest and best of princes. I should have great pleasure in communicating them to Lord Wellesley. It was very pleasing that the principles which always had directed, and would always continue to direct the conduct of the British Government, were so distinctly understood, and so justly appreciated by the head of the Mahratta empire. I observed that no person could be so intimately acquainted with the characters and disposition of the Mahratta chieftains as his Highness; and that I had no doubt the characters his Highness had so forcibly drawn of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar were perfectly correct. I said, I believed your Excellency was persuaded that many acts of Scindiah's government might be attributed to the advice of evil counsellors, and that all his late conduct might be traced to the desperate councils of Serjee Rao Ghautka, acting in concert with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The culpable weakness of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's character was doubtless very much to be lamented; but the essential principles of government, and the established forms of all independent states required that the Sovereign should be held solely and exclusively responsible for the acts of his government. Authority always implies responsibility; and in the external relations between independent states the ministers of a government were known only as the organs and instruments of the Sovereign. The choice of ministers was therefore one of the most important and difficult duties of a Prince, inasmuch as it involves either the prosperity and glory, or the ruin and disgrace, of every state. I again observed that it was impossible for me to anticipate your Excellency's final determination; I could only assure his Highness that whatever might be the provocation offered by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the British Government would adopt no measure which was not called for by indispensable necessity, and could not be justified upon acknowledged principles of sound policy, good faith, and public honour.

* Meaning, I believe, the subsidiary force.

9. His Highness replied, that no doubt every master must answer for the conduct of his servants ; that the British Government had done all that was possible to reclaim Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; and that if Scindiah was ruined, it was his own fault for following such evil councils. His Highness then made many inquiries about the number and condition of Scindiah's army : I said I had no exact information of the numbers of his force, but that it was composed of men of desperate fortunes, who assembled to live by plunder, and of the wreck of the troops of Holkar and his adherents. His Highness asked whether Scindiah had any regular battalions ; I replied he had some battalions which were called regular ; but which were undisciplined, unofficered, and badly armed. His Highness said they would all run away at the sight of Lord Lake's army ; I replied that was very probable ; but if they had the means of flight we had the means of pursuit ; and as Neir Khan was with Scindiah he would be able to tell what chance there was in escaping from our cavalry.

J. ADAM,
Deputy Secretary to Government.

No. CXX.

The Marquess Cornwallis to the Marquess Wellesley.—(Extract.)

Madras Roads, July 19, 1805.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received July 25, 1805.]

I arrived last night at this anchorage, when I learned that your Lordship is still in Bengal. I have therefore requested the Admiral to despatch an express vessel, to inform you that it is my intention to proceed in three or four days to Calcutta, in order that my arrival might be as little inconvenient to your Lordship as possible.

The *Medusa* was ordered to carry you to England, if you desired it ; I understand, however, that you have made a different arrangement.

I have the honour to be,
my dear Lord,
your most obedient and faithful servant,
CORNWALLIS.

No. CXXI.

The Honourable Jonathan Duncan to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Bombay Castle, July 25, 1805.

1. By a letter to your Excellency's Private Secretary from Mr. Shank, the conclusion of the long depending definitive treaty with the Guikowar has been already announced, and as the proceedings respecting its negotiation have passed chiefly through my separate correspondence with the Resident at Baroda, I have now the honour to submit the result in the same form to your Excellency.

2. All that passed on this subject during the life time of the late Guikowar minister, Rowjee Appajee, extended only to that government's consenting to the measure of comprizing in one definitive treaty the several stipulations contracted up to that period between the two states, as comprehended in the previous engagements of the 15th of March, 6th of June, and 29th of July 1802; the proceeding in respect to which was, by the 22d paragraph of your Lordship's commands above cited, to depend on circumstances, of which your Excellency was pleased to leave this government to be the judge; whilst, with regard to the insertion therein (as the same instructions intimate) of the amount of the expenses of the first campaign, that has become unnecessary, from their having been intermediately settled and liquidated, to the amount of eleven lacs of rupees.

3. The death of the Dewan, which happened on the 18th of July 1803, occasioned a considerable interruption to the progress of the proposed definitive treaty; respecting which I afterwards availed myself of the presence here in April 1804, of Major-General the honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, to obtain from that officer, as well, from motives of personal kindness on his part, as in general view, to the separate powers, with which he then stood vested, such a draft of this treaty as we both deemed consistent, not only with the instructions of the supreme government of the 15th of December 1802, but which had become incidentally requisite, for the purpose of corresponding, with certain relative clauses in the intermediate treaty of Bassein; stipulating in particular, for that power of mediation between the Poonah and Guikowar

states, that the last mentioned treaty vests in the British Government; and for engaging the Guikowar state to abide and be guided in like manner by our decision, in respect to all points of exterior policy; and against its giving service to Europeans or Americans, without our consent; and providing the like exemption of duties, as in the Bassein treaty, on articles required for the use of the subsidiary force, which is to continue stationed in the Guikowar dominions.

4. The draft of the proposed treaty* being thus concerted between the honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley and me, was transmitted to Major Walker, the Resident at Baroda, with a letter of instructions, having also the honourable General's approbation.

5. It was my intention that Major Walker should correspond separately with me, in an official form, respecting the more material points of occurrence in carrying these instructions into effect; but as this intercourse was afterwards continued in a private form, I have extracted, and had copied into the voucher No. 3, such parts as may throw light on the progress and termination of this negotiation, and prove explanatory (as per Major Walker's letter of the 26th of April) of the motives, that inclusive of the subsequent notices, in the same series of correspondence, led to certain exemptions specified in the 8th head of the treaty from duties on articles not of a commercial nature, in return for their similar forbearance, in favour of the British troops; whilst, by the farther extracts in this same accompaniment, under dates the 9th and 16th of May, and 18th of August 1804, your Excellency will be apprized of such variations from the first draft of the treaty as were on Major Walker's representation admitted of, in concurrence with the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley; at the same time that the sequel of the separate correspondence, and more especially, the Major's own report of the 23d of April, herewith transmitted, will shew what farther modifications were found necessary in the several articles of the treaty, before it could be at length rendered palatable to the native administration; whence it has ultimately been reduced into the form now transmitted, for the consideration and eventual ratification of your Excellency in

* See Appendix.

Council; towards the farther elucidation of which several circumstances, the under stated additional observations, are respectfully submitted.

6. Under the last cited dates, of the separate correspondence in the voucher No. 3, reference will be found to have been made by Major Walker to some inaccuracies in the draft of the treaty in No. 2, as far as respects the names of the Pergunnahs, and the sum total of their jumma or rental, as pledged by the Guikowar government, to the amount of between twelve and thirteen lacs of rupees per annum, for the liquidation of the advances, on account of the first loan, for the Arab sebundy, and of the second, for their final discharge, partly by the Company, and partly by certain Shroffs, on the condition of these latter recovering a rateable proportion of their said advances, in common with ourselves, as adverted to in the agreement passed to Major Walker by the Rajah, under date the 29th of July 1802, in pursuance of which I have pleasure in being able here to notice, that by a private letter from the Resident of the 6th instant, he informs me that the debt due to the Company from these advances has been reduced, according to an official statement which he proposes to forward, from about thirty-two lacs to nearly twenty-two, the whole of the first loan, including interest, having been it seems discharged, excepting about seventy thousand rupees.

7. From the 4th to the 8th article of the treaty, as finally concerted between the Resident and the Guikowar government, there occurs a transposition of their first order from that inserted in the original draft, for no better reason, as would seem, than the fanciful idea, on the part of the native administration at Baroda, to connect thereby more closely the duties expected from the subsidiary force, with its institution, as provided for, under the immediately preceding head.

8. The principal objection of all those started by the Guikowar administration to the conclusion of the present treaty inclusive of the adventitious articles adverted to in the 3rd preceding paragraph (for with respect to the mere comprehension of the contents of all their former stipulations into one general engagement, they had none), relates to that government becoming bound by the 11th article to submit to your Excellency's mediation the outstanding accounts between it

and his Highness the Peishwa; which, if rigidly enforced, without the experience of that favour which has formerly been shewn to them (as set forth in the accompaniments to my letter to the supreme Government of the 4th of June, 1802, and farther alluded to in the late Guikowar Minister's, accompanying the address of this Government to Bengal of the 23d of January, 1803; and again, under dates the 20th, 24th, and 29th November; 22d and 29th of January, and 2nd and 17th of February last, in the correspondence No. 3), must, with their other incumbrances, be more than the Guikowar Principality can bear; and they have accordingly been brought at all to acquiesce in this stipulation under such qualifications as may not be deemed duly to correspond with the relative engagement which the British Government has contracted in pursuance of the treaty of Bassein; under such circumstances, it might perhaps still be desirable to leave to both states to settle their own accounts, which they might probably also effect in that event more to their reciprocal satisfaction than through any formal interposition on our part; at the same time that our conciliatory influence might still have its operation in bringing the parties to a reasonable compromise and desirable understanding on this most essential and equally perplexing and difficult part of the present negotiation.

9. The next point, involving considerable hesitation, respects the services to be performed by the subsidiary force, and more especially as far as regards those expected from the corps constituting the addition made to it in the early part of 1803; for full information respecting which I beg to refer to the letter from the Resident of the 14th of January 1803, with its already mentioned accompaniment from Raoba, the late Dewan, as transmitted to the Government General on the 23rd of the same month, which joined to the separate correspondence copied into the voucher, No. 3, under the dates thereof, marked in the margin,* will prove sufficiently elucidatory of the strenuous and long continued objections by Sutaram, the Dewan to wave a positive stipulation in the treaty for one-third at least of the subsidized

* 9th and 16th of May; 25th and 27th November; 1st, 4th, 8th, 12th, 15th, 16th, 19th, 24th, and 31st December, 1804; 1st, 12th, 15th, 18th, 22nd, 24th, 30th, and 31st January, 1805; and the 16th and 17th of February, and the 23rd and 31st of March, 1805.

force being permanently employed on the Moolluck-gheery ;* respecting which, I trust, that the terms finally concurred in relative to this contested point, as inserted in the 4th article of the treaty, may meet with the approbation of Government, and not appearing to exceed the limits prescribed on the same subject in the letter from your Excellency in Council of the 15th of December, 1802.

10. Whilst on this part of the subject I may observe, that these Moolluck-gheery levies have constituted for many years past a part of the revenues, both of the Peishwa's and Guikowar's governments, the collection of both shares having generally been entrusted to the latter, as the supreme Government must already be apprized, from the former reports and advices of this government, as well as of the general state of Kattywar, and the advantages in prospect in the event of the Company's taking a more direct interest in the affairs of that perturbed peninsula of Guzerat, of which an adequate prospect is delineated in Major Walker's address to the Government General, under date the 20th of January, 1804, as continued in my correspondence on the subject with the honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley of the 22nd of February following;† but notwithstanding the honourable General's sentiments being in favour of a degree of interposition on our part, sufficient to enable us to suppress and to obviate the recurrence of the commotions among the turbulent chieftains in that part of the country, and to render unnecessary the periodical military progresses now made through it by the Guikowar's own forces for the collection of the Moolluck-gheery ; adding also thereby to the security of our own navigation, by dislodging the pirates from that part of the coast. The circumstances of the times, and the consequent employment of our troops on services of greater urgency and importance have hitherto precluded all effectual recourse to any of the means thus suggested for improving our connection with that part of the Peishwa's and Guikowar's dependencies, which may likewise account perhaps for the silence of the supreme Government on the subject of Major Walker's above noticed suggestions.

* Moolluck-gheery signifies literally, making the circuit of the country ; practically, it was the annual march of a Mahratta army through the country to levy contributions.

† Vide voucher 3, date 16th May, 1804.

11. Meanwhile, Babajee, the uncle of the present Guikowar minister, has ever since the reduction of Kurree, or for these three years past, been ranging through the Kattywar, chiefly for the purpose of levying the arrears and current dues of this Moolluck-gheery; having collected, on the former of these heads, in the year 1804, to the amount of upwards of five and twenty lacs, besides about seventeen lacs, according to the information received up to the month of April last, on account of the latter; of which realizations he has, from our proving unable to send any force along with him, hitherto rendered no satisfactory account; although it be probable that the most considerable part thereof has been expended in the payment of his troops, and that the rest may have been disbursed in liquidation of the warrants or assignments which those and others of the Guikowar troops obtain according to custom for their preceding accumulated arrears, inclusive of some payments to the Company from the same funds.

12. With a view of obviating as far as possible the necessity of recurring thus annually to measures of force (or at least of military array; for the greater part of these tributaries require only the advance of the troops to their frontier to settle for their accustomed payments) for what is an acknowledged due from the chieftains throughout the peninsula of Guzerat the Resident at Baroda has been endeavouring to induce these parties to consent to make good, under the Company's guarantee, the amount of their respective Moolluck-gheery tributes; which would prove no less advantageous to their own countries than a saving to the Guikowar government; but there is no sufficient probability that the Resident's salutary views in this respect can be adequately realized, unless through the course and influence of one circuit to be jointly undertaken by the Guikowar's and Company's forces to such an extent as the government had authorized as long ago as the 20th of November, 1802; as then also reported to your Excellency in Council, and sanctioned in the 56th paragraph of the answer from the supreme Government of the 15th December, 1802; and it is perhaps to be regretted that from the occurrence of the external warfare above alluded to, the then proposed expedition was prevented from taking place; as otherwise all the essential objects of it might already have been obtained, and that degree of tranquil pros-

perity ensured to the extensive territory in question, to which, it may generally speaking, be presumed to have for ages past been a stranger; whilst in its present state all the coast, from Diu Head to the Gulph of Cutch, affords an easy landing place to our European enemies in the event of their being disposed to avail themselves of that channel of entrance into India.

13. The next article requiring remark is the 12th, wherein the alteration from the draft consists in the exemption of the Guikowar troops from going beyond their own frontier in the event of a general war; the motives for acquiescing in which limitation are specified in the Resident's official report on the treaty, on the grounds previously discussed in my separate correspondence with him in the voucher No. 3, under dates the 9th, 14th, and 15th of March, 1805.

14. The following, or 13th article of the treaty, is peculiar in having its original tenor as provided for in the draft, altogether struck out, and its place filled up with clauses providing against Canoojee's or Mulhar Rao's restoration to power, or to other provision than by very moderate pensions, merely adequate to their subsistence. Proportionately to the solicitude of Seetaram and the Baroda administration at one period, to be allowed to participate in the territorial advantages of a successful war against the late, or any future enemy (to meet which anxiety on their part the 13th article in the draft had been expressly conceded), may be estimated their jealousy and dread of these branches of the Guikowar family, of which they seek thus to guard and provide the strongest barriers against the return, at the sacrifice of what may be presumed to have been but recently a favourite object; and although what they thus aim at may appear to be already sufficiently and expressly provided for by the correspondent commands of your Excellency in council, in the 37th, 38th, and 54th paragraphs of the letter from the supreme Government of the 15th of December 1802, still I viewed it as both unnecessary and objectionable to condescend to gratify thus far, in a solemn treaty, the personal feelings of Rajah Anund Rao's ministers rather than his own, by such a stipulation of permanent enmity against any part of the Guikowar family. It must accordingly be concluded that the Resident found it urgently requisite to gratify the Dewan Seetaram and his family

on this occasion, to the effect also of his official address to this Government on the 25th of May 1804, as per the accompanying extract thereof, No. 5, on the occasion of Mulhar Rao's being, in pursuance of his own request, and in concurrence with the opinion of the Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, and subsequent approbation of your Excellency in council, under date the 2nd of August 1804, transferred from his rigorous confinement in the fortress of Ahmedabad to our custody; notwithstanding which I would only advise the ratification of this unexpected article, under the express explanation that whatever future measures may be taken in respect either to Mulhar Rao, or to Canoojee, or any of the several dispersed members of the Guikowar family, such as Mookund Rao, and Mooran Rao (illegitimate sons of the late Rajah Govind Rao), and others, should not take place otherwise than in communication with, and by the free consent of Anund Rao, the reigning prince, and the acknowledged legal head of the family.

15. Having thus gone through the articles of the treaty as concerted by the local authorities at Baroda, I may refer to Major Walker's accompanying report of the 23rd of April last, as sufficiently accounting for such part of my instructions of the 19th of the same month of the preceding year, as it has been found advisable altogether to dispense with in the present situation of the Guikowar government, relating chiefly to the single article of its subsidiary corps of cavalry, which the 4th and following paragraphs of the Resident's letter, sufficiently accounts for his not pressing the immediate acceptance of under the present pecuniary incumbrances of that Principality.

16. With all the other parts of Major Walker's letter of the 23rd of April, and of its postscript, I have much pleasure in expressing my unqualified concurrence, inclusive of the proposed arrangements in respect to the chieftain of Limree, which, if your Excellency be pleased to authorize the Resident at Poonah to treat for with his Highness the Peishwa, and to correspond with me on the subject of, there seems little room to doubt but that desirable arrangement may be completed.

17. Of the two copies of the treaty now transmitted, together with the three schedules therein referred to, that under

the company's seal is meant to be ratified and returned to Baroda; and the other, which is duly attested by Rajah Anund Rao's seal and signature, is for deposit among the records of the supreme Government in like manner, as there is a third copy to remain among those of this Presidency.

18. Having in the separate communication adverted to in the first paragraph of this address, already referred to one principal cause of the interval that has elapsed since my receipt in May of the treaties now forwarded, I may here add, that the importance of their contents, and the difficulties that had occurred, in view to one or two of the articles, have also had their share, in conducing to this degree of delay, in transmitting them for your Excellency's determination.

19. In considering the difficulties that Major Walker had in this negotiation to overcome, from the requisite insertion of the additional article of mediation, correspondent to the treaty of Bassein; and respecting the Moolluck-gheery service, it would be doing injustice to that zealous and able officer to conclude the present address, without intimating to your Excellency my opinion, that his patience and discretion, have obtained in these respects in particular, what might otherwise have proved unattainable.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

My Lord,

Your Excellency's most obedient
humble servant,

JONATHAN DUNCAN.

By order of the honourable the Governor,

(Signed) H. SHANK,*

Private Secretary.

A true Copy.

J. ADAM,†

Dep. Sec. to Gov.

[Enclosure.]

A. Walker, Esq., to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

HONOURABLE SIR,

Baroda, 23d April, 1805.

1. I have the honour to submit for your consideration, my proceedings under your instructions dated the 19th of April 1804, for negotiating a

* Mr. Shank is now a Director of the Honourable East India Company.—[ED.]

† Mr. Adam was subsequently Acting Governor-General of India.—[ED.]

treaty of defensive alliance, between the honourable Company, and the Guikowar state.

The commencement of this negotiation was retarded by some local circumstances of embarrassments, in which the Guikowar administration was involved, and afterwards by the war which broke out with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

It will be sufficient at present to state these causes generally, and the particular arguments which were brought forward during the discussions, which attended each article, will appear in the course of this report.

2. As the 1st and 2d articles of the definitive treaty offered no subject for discussion, and were assented to on the precise terms of the draft which accompanied your despatch of the 19th April 1804, I shall proceed to observe on the 3d article.

3. A modification of the 3d article will be observed in the introductory sentence as included in the draft. It is difficult to state the causes which made the Guikowar minister, wish this verbal alteration, but a great deal of discussion, consuming much time, having taken place upon mere trifles, I assented with the less hesitation to a change which did not affect the sense or construction of the article.

4. In observing on the 3d article it would be improper to pass unnoticed the recommendation contained in the 4th paragraph of your despatch of the 19th April, and it will be necessary to assign the motives which induced me not to press the Guikowar government to the acceptance of a corps of our cavalry, in lieu of an equally chargeable part of the comparatively unserviceable Sillahdar establishment. The provision of funds for the discharge of so large a portion of the Guikowar available force, as the adoption of this plan necessarily implies, would, under present circumstances, be an effort beyond the ability of government, independent of the strong objections which the administration entertain to relinquish the services of men, who although not so effective and serviceable in a military point of view, are yet more dependent and useful in their predatory excursions.

5. Considering also the influence which the sirdars of the government possess, they would not fail to exert it to the utmost in endeavouring to dissuade Seetaram from conceding to an article which would so materially and seriously affect their interest. Under the preceding considerations, I forbore urging the introduction of an article which appeared too remote in its attainment, and which would not yield any relief to the Guikowar finances.

6. In reporting my opinion, how far it might have been practically advisable to make the substitution of cavalry part of the now stipulated number of 3000 infantry, the nature of the services expected from the British subsidiary force should be taken into consideration.

7. The security of Guzerat, efficient protection to the person of his Highness Anund Rao Guikowar, and the necessary guards in the fort of Baroda afford ample employment to the original subsidiary force of 2000 men, and the substitution of a regiment of cavalry, in lieu of any part of this body, would have reduced the infantry to less than a battalion, a force

inadequate to the due performance of the duties for which infantry alone are calculated.

8. I shall have the honour to bring this subject more immediately to your consideration, when I report the discussion which took place on the nature of the services on which the subsidiary troops were to be employed; at present it will be sufficient to observe, that the Guikowar administration would never have admitted the encrease of an expensive addition to their military force, unless encouraged by the idea, that it would be applicable to the only duties for which they required a corps of disciplined infantry.

The circumstance of cavalry being a description of troops inapplicable to the due performance of these duties precluded the possibility of negotiating with effect for the substitution of a corps in lieu of the half augmentation of the subsidiary infantry; besides, had this commutation taken place, it would have deprived us of any expectation of obtaining a body of cavalry in addition to the present subsidy.

But independent of these considerations, the substitution of a corps of cavalry, for any part of the subsidiary infantry, might not be thought advisable, as diminishing our military preponderance in Guzerat, and after providing for the defence and protection of the Rajah, would not leave a sufficient disposable force of infantry.

9. It is not however, to be inferred from the foregoing observations, that the admission of a corps of cavalry in addition to the subsidiary force is abandoned.

The Guikowar administration have expressed their assent generally to the measure, but they discovered an invincible aversion to make it the subject of negotiation under their present incumbrances.

10. The arguments they used were founded on the impoverished state of their finances, which they affirmed would not permit them to bind themselves to engagements which apparently would lay an additional weight on the burthens which already pressed so heavy upon them.

Convinced of the truth of this reasoning, I refrained from urging the admission of an article which promised to be so remote in its execution, and the success of which depended on a thorough and determined reform of the Guikowar finances. Under the present situation of affairs, it would also appear to the Guikowar minister, to be dictated more by a desire to benefit our own interests, than to assist the Guikowar state.

11. The introductory part of the 4th article of the treaty as it now stands, formed that of the 8th in the draft, which was forwarded for my guidance. This inversion of the order of the articles, as it altered not their sense, or construction, I admitted, that circumstances of trifling import might not protract the conclusion of the treaty.

12. The article itself however was the subject of a long and intricate discussion, and involved a subject of the nicest consideration.

13. It will be unnecessary on the present occasion to trace to what origin the Guikowar government derives the right of levying the tributary contributions, known by the name of Moolluck-gheery, it will be sufficient to notice, that the right claimed by the one party, is acknowledged by the

other, though the presence of a coercive force is necessary to ensure the due payment of a contribution, which it is held dishonourable to yield, unless by compulsion, to have totally withheld from the Guikowar government all hopes of receiving assistance from the subsidiary force, on a point of such great importance to the financial interests of the state, would not have been advisable on many considerations.

14. On the disbanding of the Arab Sebundy, the Guikowar government relinquished a considerable portion of the means by which these contributions were levied, and they confidently expected, that the part of the subsidiary force which supplied its place, would not prove less efficacious in the assistance to be rendered, than the discharged Sebundy.

In the discussion of this point, the Guikowar minister adduced the disappointment which his government had experienced in this hope not having been realized, and the consequent necessity to which Babajee had been reduced, of levying an additional force to supply the place of the discharged Arabs, to the amount of an annual expence of 12 lacs of rupees. At the same time, the Dewan observed, that he did not mention this as a matter of complaint, as he was sensible that our forces had been necessarily otherwise disposed of. He also added, and for the truth of which, he appealed to me, that, under the temporary alienation of the subsidiary troops, he had made no application for assistance, nor did he expect it in the present situation of affairs, but this sacrifice to public convenience could not warrant he thought, his entering into a stipulation which would preclude his state from receiving that support when circumstances admitted.

15. Influenced by the above considerations, my endeavours have been directed in framing this article to reconcile a due regard to the interest of the Guikowar government, with the credit and honour of the British character.

In pursuance of these objects it will be observed, that mention of Mooluck-gheery is omitted, our assistance in this respect is limited to the due correction of dependents, who withhold the payment of the Sircar's just claims, and even to cases, of the necessity of which, the British Government is to be the sole arbiter.

16. If however the more remote advantages of the measure are considered, the employment of British troops on the Moolluck-gheery service is the less to be deprecated.

The presence of a body of disciplined troops would have considerable effect in restraining the predatory disposition of the Mahrattas; the condition of the people of Kattywar would be thereby improved, and the difficulties which obstruct the path to an amicable arrangement for the more regular payment of this revenue would be greatly removed.

17. Any arrangement, however, to effect this desirable object, in a country where power in the strong is subservient to the oppression of the weak would prove nugatory, unless an ascendancy is established sufficient to enforce engagements, and support that degree of local authority which is necessary to afford protection.

18. It will appear evident, that the annual incursion of a predatory

band cannot tend to effect this salutary end ; the practice of Moollockgheery can only be eradicated by an habitual intercourse and attention to the circumstances of the chieftains of Kattywar ; we should be in a situation to restrain and counteract that spirit of violence and rapine which they exhibit in their mutual aggressions ; and their respect and confidence would be a natural result of our ability to afford protection.

19. An influence in Kattywar would also be of importance, as affording the means of repressing the piracies, which are so injurious to the commerce of Bombay, and would also secure to the British nation exclusive advantages both of commercial and political tendency.

20. As no difference of opinion existed upon the 5th and the 6th articles, I proceed to the 7th, forming the 6th in the draft.

21. For the discussion which took place upon this article, I found it convenient, with a view to avoid miscomprehension on the part of the Guikowar minister, to refer to his Mahratta translation, which has caused an inversion of the clauses, without however affecting the tenor of the agreement, and the annexation of a schedule, to contain the account of advances with the funds assigned for their payment, instead of inserting them in full in the body of the treaty, will, I trust, as being more convenient for reference, meet with your approval.

A small addition to the latter paragraph of this article is to be observed in stipulating that Mahls shall be assigned for the payment of the past or any future advances which the Company's government may make to that of the Guikowar. The advantage of this arrangement consists in obliging the Guikowar ministry, when demanded, to assign landed security for the repayment of sums already advanced, or for such further eventual advances as have not been, or may not in themselves be of sufficient importance to require the security of a separate obligation.

22. The first part of the 8th article is an exact counterpart of the 7th article in the draft. It was readily agreed to on the part of the Guikowar minister, but he earnestly desired that the operation of the latter part might, for the honour of his government, be mutual.

As this stipulation conceded nothing but what the Guikowar government had a just right to expect, I assented to the addition.

23. From motives of political expediency, as well as a due regard to the credit of the British Government, I assented to the addition proposed by the Guikowar minister in the succeeding part of this article, with a view to prevent any interruption of cordiality by the officers of the Guikowar government, being exposed to the vexatious impositions of the farmers of the Customs, even in the very districts which had been ceded by it to the Company.

In conferring however this mark of friendship, care has been taken to preserve the public revenue from diminution.

24. The insertion of the words " neither will the Company's government entertain in their service any of the Guikowar servants, dependants, or slaves, contrary to the inclination of that state," was giving to the articles of the treaty, as stated in the draft, a reciprocal operation, which in no way affects the interests of the Company, but was necessary to re-

move an anxiety, I observed on the subject, and which might probably owe its origin to some male and female dependants, having occasionally absconded to the British camp, to evade the authority of their masters.

Although these people had always been delivered up on demand, yet to have reserved the right of retaining them in opposition to the wish of the Guikowar administration, might have left some latent dissatisfaction.

25. The 10th article underwent a small alteration by the insertion of the words "in communication with the Guikowar Sircar." This was a sacrifice to their vanity, to which I long hesitated to give my consent. I was unwilling to clog the power which the Company reserved to themselves, of deciding upon the foreign contentions of the Guikowar government with even a complimentary qualification.

26. The 11th article of the treaty too nearly affected the interests of the Guikowar government to meet with a ready acquiescence. It in consequence underwent a tedious discussion and most minute scrutiny from the Guikowar ministry.

A knowledge of their total incapacity to satisfy even the just demands existing against the Guikowar state in favour of his Highness the Peishwa, rendered the ministry exceedingly averse to the introduction of this article under any modification proposed, and their final consent to it may be considered as a proof of the confidence they repose in the justice and protecting support of the Company's mediation.

27. The consideration of the 12th article also afforded some discussion.

On this subject the Guikowar administration, apprehensive of being left defenceless and exposed, wished to object to the unqualified employment of the subsidiary force at a great distance from Guzerat. At the same time they appealed to past experience to prove the readiness of their acquiescence to the British troops proceeding on any service where they were required.

28. In reply to this reasoning, I observed, that the protection of Anund Rao's government, and the security of his territories, would ever be the first object of the subsidiary troops, but the interests of the two states were now so firmly united, that it became necessary, for their own sake alone, that the Company should be enabled to exert every possible means to terminate any hostility wherever it might arise, which would assuredly, however remote the scene, involve their government in its event.

29. In conformity to this train of argument, I did not object to admit a modification to the article; agreeing, that a battalion of the subsidiary troops for the protection of the Rajah, or such a proportion as may appear necessary for the security of Guzerat, would remain in the event of foreign hostility.

30. The nature and limits of the assistance which the state of Anund Rao Guikowar was to afford to the British troops, in the event of foreign war, was the next subject of discussion in this article.

It was on this subject that the Guikowar minister exerted every effort to induce me to relax from expecting co-operation from the Guikowar force beyond the limits of Guzerat.

31. They took this occasion to state, that on the event of their troops marching beyond the boundaries, a very considerable addition would be thereby made to their expenses ; they particularly dwelt on the inability of their finances to bear this additional burthen, and enquired how the British Government could expect them to engage themselves to the performance of articles that would increase the difficulties which it was the object of our alliance to remove.

32. The sincerity of their attachment to the interests of the English Government, and their readiness to afford the co-operation of their troops, had been evinced in two instances without the necessity of formal engagements, and we could not doubt their readiness to repeat their assistance, whenever our occasions required and their means admitted.

33. Their readiness to assist us even at the expense of their own interests, the administration affirmed, had reduced them to a disgraceful and unpleasing dilemma, by the unauthorized return of Cacajee's army, and the consequent exposition of their weakness to punish the authors of that retrograde movement from want of funds to render the government independent of their demands.

34. The same necessity which required the absence of our troops made it still more necessary that they should retain their own, and they concluded their arguments on this subject by observing that as they were dependent on us to relieve them from their present difficulties, so their assent to our terms must be the result of necessity, as no consideration could conscientiously induce them to engage their government to the performance of an article which would involve them in discredit and disgrace.

35. It was in vain, honourable Sir, that I urged every topic resulting from the known justice and generosity of the British Government, and the perfect reliance they might place on its forbearance to require any co-operation of their troops beyond the real ability of the Guikowar state to afford. The Guikowar minister was inflexible, and refused to engage beyond any further co-operation than what is contained in the two concluding paragraphs of the 12th article.

36. The admission of this modification did not appear to differ so materially from the nature of my instructions, and the spirit of the engagements between the two states, as to warrant a discontinuation of the negotiation. It was not, I considered also, the object of the present negotiation to require them to enter into engagements, which under their present circumstances they would not be able to perform, and the provision as above noticed for extending their co-operation in extraordinary cases appeared to me as much as could be usefully demanded.

37. As the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th articles of the treaty were agreed to without observation or comment, I shall proceed to notice the omission of the 13th article as stated in the draft, and the substitution of the one occupying this number in the treaty.

38. The perfect indifference which the Guikowar minister evinced to the advantages that were held out in the 13th article of the draft by a participation of territory, induced me to avail myself of his moderation to omit

this article, and thereby to leave the British Government at liberty in the future disposal of conquests which may be made by the co-operation of the forces of the two states.

Any benefit therefore which may hereafter accrue to them must be received as an unqualified testimony of disinterested liberality and friendship.

39. The substituted article (13) in its original form, as proposed by the Guikowar administration, tended to exclude both Canojee Guikowar and Mulhar Rao from the enjoyment of every comfort and to serious personal restraint. This would have, however, been opposed from principles of humanity and moderation if those of policy had not proved satisfactory to the Guikowar minister.

40. I have now, honourable Sir, submitted to your notice, to the best of my recollection, the whole of the reasoning and arguments brought forward during this long and tedious discussion. I have still to state generally the causes which contributed to protract the conclusion of the treaty.

41. The commencement of the war with Jeswunt Rao Holkar required the utmost exertion, both on my part and that of the administration, to bring into the field a body of Guikowar forces.

The uneasy and irritating discussions which attended that measure diverted the attention of the Durbar from the present, and indeed from any serious business.

42. When however the negotiation was resumed, I was concerned to observe an unwillingness, on the part of the Guikowar minister, to enter on the subject. A considerable time elapsed before I could get from him any decided opinion after he had been in possession of the draft of the treaty which I had presented for his consideration. It was not until after repeated conversations that the Dewan became convinced of the necessity of the agreements between the two states being consolidated into one definitive treaty for the purpose of receiving the ratification of the most noble the Governor-General, and entered seriously into the consideration of the subject.

43. His first objections were applied to prevent the introduction of any stipulations into the definitive treaty which were not included in the conventions already existing. He insinuated that these conventions being sufficient to consolidate and unite the interests of the two states, the introduction of any new articles was unnecessary, and that the tenor of the request contained in the letter of his late father Raoba implied only the ratifications of the existing agreements by the most noble the Governor-General.

44. Such, honourable Sir, was the general reasoning of the Guikowar minister, which delayed the commencement of the negotiation, and seemed to be dictated by a conviction that the agreements already concluded contained every advantage which the Guikowar state expected from our alliance, and with the sufficiency of which they were perfectly contented. The arguments which protracted it in progress were urged at different periods, and are already detailed for your information.

45. I have the honour to accompany this address with two copies of the treaty* as formally executed by his Highness Anund Rao Guikowar, and a third under the seal of the honourable Company; a fourth similarly executed is left in possession of his Highness, until exchanged, for the bearing the ratification of the Supreme Government.

In transmitting these instruments, permit me to express my hope that the several modifications, additions and alterations, which have been introduced will be found not to differ essentially from the spirit or tenor of the engagements between the two states, and that the final result of this negotiation may receive your approbation.

I have the honour to be,

honourable Sir,

your most obedient humble servant,

A. WALKER,

Resident.

P. S. 1. Since writing the foregoing part of this letter, it has occurred to me that some explanation will be required of the difference which will appear in the schedule B., both in its amount, and the names of the districts assigned for the repayment of the advances made by the honourable Company and the Shroffs at Baroda.

2. To explain the first, it will be necessary to advert to the period when the first loan was made to the Guikowar state for the purpose of discharging the Arab Sebundy.

The estimated amount thought necessary to effect this purpose was twenty lacs of rupees; but when the measure was carried into execution, an additional two lacs were required, to obtain which the Government found it requisite to comply with the demands of the Shroffs in assigning over the additional security of the Pergunnah of Raj Pempla and the Syer Kotah of the fort of Baroda.

3. The substitution of the name of Kurree for that of the Pergunnah of Senor was an arrangement of conveniency for the accommodation of the Company, when the additional jaydad for the expense of the subsidiary force became the subject of discussion.

The late minister Raoba was at a loss to name the Pergunnahs for this purpose, from many causes of local difficulty, when I proposed the cession of the Pergunnahs of Matter and Mondeh. An objection however existed to this measure, as those two districts were already appropriated for the payment of the Sellahdar establishment of the Guikowar army. This difficulty was removed by their Agent agreeing to accept an assignment on Senor. The revenues of Kurree became appropriated for the repayment of the loan, and the Company obtained in Jaydad two of the best Pergunnahs in the Guikowar possessions; thus, all parties were satisfied.

4. Referring to the 14th paragraph of the letter, wherein, on the affirmation of the Guikowar minister, the expenses of Babajee's army are stated to be encreased to the additional amount of a lac of rupees per month on

* See Appendix.

account of the discharge of the Arabs, it appears necessary to mention that, from the materials in my possession, I am authorized in stating, that these expenses will not exceed, at the utmost, the sum of 75,000 rupees per mensem.

5. I have the honour to transmit, with this despatch, a memorandum of the new schedule, to which, with your approbation, I propose to obtain the acquiescence of the Guikowar government, as the means of supplying the deficiency which was found to exist in overrating the Pergunnah of Dholka, and in the amount of the Domalgaums, as also of obtaining a territorial or particular assignment in lieu of the general warrants on Kattywar.

6. It may be necessary to point out the difference which exists between this memorandum and the schedule. The Pergunnah of Neryad is stated at its full value, it being proposed, that the amount of Khemauledd-eins assignment should be appropriated for the Company's Jaydad, and this Sirdar receive an equivalent from some other division of the Guikowar territories.

Dholka is reduced to its fair net value of 4,25,000 rupees.

The Pergunnah of Edurer Mandasa and the village of Gudasser (a dependancy on the Company's Pergunnah of Mondeh) are introduced to supply the remaining deficiency.

7. Such, honourable Sir, is the arrangement I intend, with your approbation, to propose to the Guikowar minister; in fact, unless this is adopted, I see no other mode in which they could satisfy our claims, unless by the cession of the Pergunnah of Padra. To this, however, there would be much objection, as Padra is a Khangee Pergunnah, and which, by being situated in this neighbourhood of Baroda, is considered as a nearer appendage of the Guikowar family.

8. It was my original design to have obtained an assignment on the chieftain of Limree, but which I abandoned, in consequence of that person being a tributary of the Peishwa, yet, if his Highness could be prevailed upon to relinquish this tribute to the Company, in exchange for any other equally productive portion of the Guikowar Mooluckgheery, the exchange would be of very great political importance to the interests of the Company, independent of the tendency it would have to smooth the difficulties at present in the way of the additional cession.

By the chieftain of Limree becoming a tributary of the Company, their influence would extend round the Gulf of Cambay as far as the port of Gogo, and from the manner in which this Prince's possessions are intermixed with those of the Company in the Pergunnahs of Dholka and Dhundooka, it becomes necessary and important that no other state should have the power of interference in his territories.

The Rajah of Limree is also a chieftain of some consequence among the Princes of Kattywar, and the right of interference which this exchange would give to the Company would be a matter of consequence when the object referred to in the 16th paragraph of the letter is taken seriously into consideration.

No. CXXII.

The Military Secretary to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 25th July, 1805.

In conformity to your Excellency's orders to report upon the execution of your Excellency's instructions of the 17th and 31st of May to the different Military authorities in Hindostan and the Deccan, for the purpose of exhibiting a connected view of the actual state of the military preparations in different quarters of India, I have the honour to submit to your Excellency the following statement :—

The army under the personal command of the Right Honourable Lord Lake,* consists of 8 regiments of cavalry (3 European and 5 Native) 3 regiments of European infantry, 11 battalions of Sepoys, and a proportion of European and Native artillery, amounting to about 135 European and 225 Native artillery, 875 European, and 1793 Native cavalry, and 6500 Sepoys.—Total about 10,248 men fit for duty.

This force is distributed as follows: *Agra*, H. M.'s 8th, 24th, and 25th dragoons; the 1st and 4th regiments of Native cavalry, and 4 battalions of Sepoys, with the European artillery in the field.

Futtypore Sikry.—H. M.'s 75th and 76th regts.; H. C. Europ. regt.; and 2 battalions of Sepoys.

Muttra Head Quarters.—2d, 3d, and 6th Nat. cavalry; 5 battalions of Sepoys. Two field pieces, and a proper complement of artillery men are attached to each battalion; and there is a complete battering train and field park, with a sufficient number of bullocks at *Agra*.

Provisions for this army, for six months, and grain for the cavalry for nine months, are in store at *Agra*, on their way to that fortress.

Exclusive of the force, under the personal command of

* *Hindostan*.—The army under the personal command of Lord Lake: H. M.'s 8th, 24th, and 25th dragoons, 875; the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th Native cavalry, 1793. Total 2668. H. M.'s 75th and 76th, and H. C. European infantry, 729; European artillery, 135; Native ditto, 225; Sepoys, 11 battalions, 6500. Total 10,257. The 76th and 25th dragoons are under orders to return to Europe as soon as they are drafted.

Lord Lake, there is one battalion of Sepoys at Ally Ghur; 28 companies of Sepoys at Delhi, 2 battalions at Panniput, 2 battalions at Deeg, 14 companies at Rampoor, 2 battalions at Futti Ghur, and H. M.'s 22d regiment, with 2 battalions at Cawnpore.

The force under Colonel Martindell* is stationed in the vicinity of Narwa, and consists of 4 troops of Native cavalry, 2 companies of European artillery, and 5 battalions of Sepoys, amounting altogether to about 3200 men.

The subsidiary force in Gohud† is composed of 3 battalions of Sepoys, and one company of artillery; there is not any return of this force, but it probably amounts to about 2200 men. This force is exclusive of the garrison of Gwalior, which consists of 12 companies of Sepoys.

This force is cantoned at Tonk Rampoor, and consists of H. M.'s 65th and 86th regiments, and six battalions of Bombay Sepoys, with a proportion of artillery‡ and two months' provision. The force under Major-General Jones§ amounts to about 4500 men; is under orders to be prepared to return to Guzerat, and will probably be ready to move in the month of August. On the 19th of June, Colonel Woodington, commanding the troops in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda river, states, that every thing between Baroda and Kota is by the latest intelligence perfectly tranquil, nor does it appear at present that after Major-General Jones has passed the armies of Scindiah and Holkar, there is any probability of an enemy to oppose him.

From the preceeding statement, it appears that the troops in Hindostan, prepared for actual service, amount to the following number:—

Army under the personal command of Lord Lake, 10,257; troops in Bundelcund under Colonel Martindell, 3200; subsidiary force in Gohud, 2200; Major-General Jones's corps at Tonk, 4500.—Grand total in Hindostan, 20,157.

* *Bundelcund*.—Colonel Martindell's force: Native cavalry, about 200; 5 battalions of Sepoys, 3000. Total 3200, exclusive of artillery.

† Subsidiary force in Gohud, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Bowie.

‡ Belonging to the Bombay army.

§ Major-General Jones's corps: European infantry, H. M.'s 65th and 86th regiments, 682; Native infantry, 6 battalions, 3609. Total, exclusive of artillery, 4368.

The Deccan.—The force in the Deccan consists of the 94th regiment, 12 battalions of Sepoys, 3 regiments of Native cavalry, and a proportion of European artillery, and of pioneers, &c. Of this force two battalions are stationed at Poonah, two at Hyderabad, and one in the forts of Ahmednuggur, Galna, and Chandore, leaving a disposable force* of one regiment of European infantry, three regiments of Native cavalry, and seven battalions of Sepoys, with a proportion of artillery, and a well equipped battering and field train. The whole of this force is under the command of Colonel Wallace of H. M's 80th regiment, and the principal part of it is cantoned at Futtypore, a place 14 miles N. E. of Adjunttee, and 30 miles S. W. of Mulkapoor. Colonel Wallace states the force under his command to be in condition of efficiency for immediate service, and arrangements are in progress for completing his equipments and stores to the month of December, 1805. This force is exclusive of the contingents of the Peishwa and of the Soubahdar of the Deccan. Colonel Close (in the month of June) inspected the latter, amounting to 6500 cavalry, and 4800 infantry, and found it to be in a state of efficiency for service.

Colonel Wallace has made the following distribution of the troops under his command.

Of the contingent of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, 1500 cavalry and 500 infantry are stationed at Omrautty, and 1500 at Ellichpoor. The remainder is cantoned at Akola, about 70 miles from Colonel Wallace's Camp, and is ordered to be constantly collected and prepared for service.

The Peishwa's contingent is ordered to take up a position near Umulneera, on the Boree river, which is also about 70 miles from Colonel Wallace's position.

By this distribution the British troops command the high road leading from Boorhanpoor: the contingent of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the roads by the Nernulla, and other passes to the eastward of Colonel Wallace, and the contingent of the Peishwa, the roads leading by Scindwah and the western Ghauts. The whole of the forces, with the exception

* Disposable force in the Deccan under Colonel Wallace: 7 battalions of Sepoys, 4304; 94th regiment, 400; 3 regiments Native cavalry, 1042; artillery, about 112. Total fit for duty, 5858, exclusive of 424 pioneers.

of the corps at Omrautty, can effect a junction in seven days, and prepared to move at the shortest notice.

It may be proper to add, that his Excellency, Sir John Cradock, has adopted measures for completing as speedily as possible all the native battalions in the Deccan of the Madras establishment, which however are actually from 6 to 800 rank and file in strength.

Sir John Cradock has also made arrangements for maintaining a respectable force* in the ceded districts, subject to the government of Fort St. George, which will be ready to move at a moment's notice. The flourishing condition of the government of Mysore will also enable your Excellency to employ the services of the Mysore troops at the shortest notice, whenever that measure may appear to be expedient.

Guzerat.—The force in Guzerat,† including the 1st battalion 6th regiment at Surat, amounting to 1372 rank and file, consists of 4975 men. Of this force, the field force under Colonel Woodington, is upwards of 2500 men, including 424 European infantry. In addition to this force, the 2d battalion, 3d regiment Bombay infantry, was ordered by Colonel Close on the 24th of June to March to Panwell, in conformity to the Governor-General's orders to detach another battalion from the Deccan to Guzerat. On the arrival of this corps in Guzerat, Colonel Woodington's field force will exceed 3000 men fit for duty. Colonel Woodington has two 12-pounders, two howitzers, and a due proportion of field artillery, with two month's provisions for the whole of his corps, and with a large equipment of stores, &c. He is ordered to keep his corps in constant state of preparation for active service, and the government of the Guickowar is prepared to co-operate against Scindiah to such extent as may appear to be necessary. The corps under Colonel Woodington is at present assembled at Baroda; and there is a

* Force at Bellary: 22d dragoons, 447; 2d Native cavalry, 444. Total 891. Artillery, 191; H. M.'s 33d regiment, 589: 4 battalions of Sepoys, 4745. Total 5789. The 33d is under orders to relieve the 94th, as soon as 6 companies of the 34th (600 men) shall reach Bellary. The 19th dragoons is at Colar, and the 6th Native cavalry at Arcot ready to move at a short notice.

† Force in Guzerat: Artillery, 46; European infantry, 474; 4 battalions of Sepoys, 3083; battalion in Surat, 1372. Total 4975.

force of 723 men at Dohud in addition to the field force. This place can be occupied without difficulty, and it appears by Colonel Woodington's report that the fort of Pawunghur has not been repaired since the last siege, and is in a ruinous condition.

Your Excellency will perceive from the preceding detail that the total number of troops prepared for active service in different quarters of India is as follows :—

Hindustan, 20,148; Deccan, exclusive of garrisons, &c. 5858; Guzerat, exclusive of ditto, upwards of 3000; Dohud, 723.—Total, exclusive of garrisons, &c. 29,729.

In conformity to your Excellency's orders, the 74th regiment has been sent to Bombay, and the 5th and 7th Native cavalry to the territories of Fort St. George. The troops in the Deccan do not now exceed the number which the Company is engaged to furnish to the Peishwa and the Subahdar of the Deccan, under our engagements with those chieftains respectively. The subsidiary force serving with the Nizam is entirely composed of corps belonging to the establishment of Fort St. George, but the Peishwa's subsidiary force consists at present only of two Bombay battalions instead of six; the remaining four corps of the Peishwa's subsidiary force belong to the Madras establishment, and will be returned to Fort St. George as soon as the arrival of Major-General Jones's corps in Guzerat shall enable the government of Bombay to complete the Peishwa's subsidiary force with Bombay battalions. The four Madras battalions at present in the Deccan are the only corps belonging to that establishment employed without the territories of Fort St. George, with the exception of the Hyderabad* subsidiary force, 314 men stationed at Trincomalee and in the eastern seas, the troops in Cuttack,† (Company's European regiment, and the 2d battalion, 17th regiment), and some details serv-

* Subsidiary force at Hyderabad: 1 regiment of European infantry; 6 battalions of Sepoys; 2 regiments of Native cavalry; 2 companies of European artillery; and 2 companies of Pioneers.

† In Cuttack: H. C. European infantry, 208; 2d battalion 17th regiment, 749.

Trincomalee and Eastern service: European artillery, 57; Lascars, 207; European infantry, 50. Total 314.

ing as an escort to the Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

J. ARMSTRONG,
Milit. Sec.

No. CXXIII.

The Governor-General in Council to Lord Lake.

MY LORD,

Fort William, July 25, 1805.

1. The Governor-General in Council has taken into consideration the despatch of Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm, addressed by your Excellency's direction to the Secretary to Government, under date the 30th ultimo, communicating the copy of a letter from the Acting Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to your Excellency's address, dated the 20th ultimo, which contains the Acting Resident's report of his communication with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the subject of your Excellency's requisition for the dismissal of the British Residency within a limited number of days.

2. The argument by which Dowlut Rao Scindiah has endeavoured to justify his evident resolution to avoid a compliance with your Excellency's demand for the release of Mr. Jenkins, is destitute of any real force, and Scindiah himself is probably sensible of its fallacy. The Governor-General in Council, however, deems it advisable to deprive Scindiah of the advantage of any pretext for the detention of Mr. Jenkins by a distinct confirmation of your Excellency's demands under the seal and signature of the Governor-General.

3. The Governor-General has accordingly addressed the enclosed letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, confirming and enforcing your Excellency's demand for the dismissal and safe conduct of the British Residency, and a copy of that letter is annexed to this despatch for your Excellency's information.

4. Your Excellency will observe, that the letter from the Governor-General, addressed to Scindiah, refers to former letters of the Governor-General addressed to that chief, but not delivered to Scindiah by Mr. Jenkins in consequence of the unfavourable state of affairs at Scindiah's Durbar. It appears to be absolutely necessary that the Governor-General's letters should now be delivered to Scindiah, in order to remove every possible ground of error or misconstruction of

the views of the British Government. This point has already been stated to your Excellency in the letter from the Governor-General in Council, under date (25th June), and it appears to be proper to recommend it to your Excellency's particular attention.

5. If this requisition should also prove unsuccessful, it will be evident that Scindiah is either disposed, or is compelled to hazard the alternative of war. Whatever latitude of action Scindiah may possess, or may be allowed with regard to this particular point, it seems evident from the tenor of the advices received since the despatch of our instructions to your Excellency of the 25th ultimo, that the power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah is at present absorbed in that of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that a speedy dissolution of the connection between those chieftains cannot reasonably be expected by the exclusive operation of those causes on which the Governor-General in Council has been induced to found that expectation. If it be evident that Dowlut Rao Scindiah is disposed or compelled to hazard the renewal of war rather than comply with the demand for the dismissal of the Residency, the speedy prosecution of hostilities on the part of the British Government, appears to be advisable upon every principle of dignity, security, and even of economy, unless the confederates should be induced to suppose that notwithstanding the failure of the present final requisition for the release of the British Residency, the British Government still entertained an expectation of accomplishing its release without proceeding to hostilities against Scindiah, it may reasonably be apprehended that they will ascribe our forbearance to motives incompatible with the dignity of the British Government and with the reputation of our power. Such an impression would obviously encourage the confederates in their hostile designs, and in either case the confederates would derive from delay, additional advantages in the prosecution of them. It cannot, however, be supposed, either that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will refuse or evade a compliance with the Governor-General's demand, without previously resolving to detain Mr. Jenkins at the hazard of war, or that Scindiah can now expect to deceive us by any further subterfuges. Great danger must inevitably be produced by our abstaining from the prosecution of hostilities at the earliest practicable period of time, if

Scindiah should refuse or evade a compliance with the present demand.

6. In conformity to these sentiments, the Governor-General in Council now authorizes and directs your Excellency to be prepared to commence active operations against the confederated forces as soon as the season will admit, and the Governor-General in Council requests that your Excellency will transmit with the least practicable delay a plan of operations for the eventual prosecution of hostilities in every quarter of Hindostan and the Deccan.

7. Copies of this despatch will be transmitted to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Residents at Poonah, Hyderabad, and Nagpore, together with a circular letter from the Chief Secretary, of which a copy is annexed for your Excellency's information. Directions will be issued for placing the armies in the Deccan and in Guzerat in a state of readiness to act against the forts and possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in those quarters.

8. No act of hostility however against Scindiah is to be committed without further instructions from the Governor-General, but your Lordship will be pleased, at whatever time you may deem expedient, to make any forward movement of the troops in Hindostan which you may deem advisable, either with a view to the protection of our possessions, or to the attainment of a final settlement of affairs with Scindiah and Holkar in that quarter.

We have the honour to be,

my Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient
humble servants,

WELLESLEY.

G. H. BARLOW.

G. UDNY.

[Enclosure.]

The Marquess Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Written 25th July, 1805.

Your Highness has been apprized that his Excellency the Right Honourable Lord Lake, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, is vested by this government with full powers on the part of the British Government to regulate and control all political and military affairs in Hindostan.

Lord Lake has addressed to your Highness several letters desiring the dismissal of Mr. Jenkins and the other gentlemen and escort attached to the Residency from your Highness's camp, and their safe conduct to a British station. These requisitions, however, your Highness has not been pleased to regard with due attention, and I am now informed by a despatch from Mr. Jenkins, that your Highness's ministers, under some apparent error, have endeavoured to justify this neglect of the Commander-in-Chief's requisition, and of the repeated and earnest applications of Mr. Jenkins for his dismissal and safe conduct, by referring to a letter in which I informed your Highness that Mr. Jenkins was vested with powers to transact all matters which related to the interests of the two states, and to letters of a similar import addressed to your Highness by Colonel Close.

My notification to your Highness of Mr. Jenkins's authority to transact all affairs connected with the interests of both states was made under circumstances differing entirely from those which suggested the necessity of suspending Mr. Jenkins's functions, and of requiring his dismissal from your Highness's court. Having been officially apprized of the powers vested in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, your Highness cannot entertain any doubt of Lord Lake's authority to suspend Mr. Jenkins's functions and to demand his dismissal. Independantly of these considerations, it cannot be unknown to your Highness, that according to the acknowledged privileges and powers of the accredited minister of a foreign state, the Representative of the British Government at your Highness's court is entitled to demand his dismissal even without any direct communication to your Highness of such demand from the Government which he represents, and that a refusal to comply with that requisition would constitute a violation of those laws and usages which are acknowledged and revered amongst all civilized nations. With a view, however, to remove every obstacle to the immediate release of Mr. Jenkins and the other gentlemen and the escort attached to the Residency, I deem it expedient to confirm, by a direct communication to your Highness, the demand which you have received from Lord Lake the Commander-in-Chief and from Mr. Jenkins, and to signify to your Highness my expectation that within the space of fourteen days after your receipt of this letter, your Highness will permit Mr. Jenkins, the gentlemen, and escort of the Residency to depart from your camp, and will afford them safe conduct to the nearest British station. Your Highness must admit that the British Government is entitled to withdraw its Representative from your Highness's court without any reference to the conduct of your Highness's government. Your Highness therefore will not persevere in a refusal to comply with this requisition, after so many solemn demands from the British Government.

It is my duty to apprise your Highness that I will never recede from this demand. It is superfluous to state, that after the expiration of the term limited for the dismissal of Mr. Jenkins, neither his Excellency Lord Lake, the Commander-in-Chief, nor I, can receive from your Highness any communication which you may desire to make through Mr. Jenkins; nor will Mr. Jenkins be authorized to transact any official busi-

ness with your Highness, or with your Highness's ministers. At the same time it is necessary to signify to your Highness that your responsibility for the safety of Mr. Jenkins and of every person attached to the Residency, from injury or insult, is not diminished by the suspension of that gentleman's functions as the Representative of the British Government at your Highness's court. I trust, however, that after your receipt of this letter your Highness will not persist in detaining Mr. Jenkins; such an act, far from tending to the accomplishment of any object connected with the interests of your Highness, is calculated to preclude every advantage to be derived from the preservation of amity and concord between the two states.

Your Highness has already been apprized, that after the arrival of Mr. Jenkins and the gentlemen and escort attached to the Residency under safe conduct at a British station, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be prepared to receive any confidential agent whom your Highness may think proper to despatch for the purpose of communicating on points connected with the welfare and amity of both states; and that, at a proper season, an officer of rank will be despatched to your Highness's court in the capacity of Representative of the British Government.

I deem it proper to take this opportunity of desiring that your Highness will consider his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief Lord Lake to be vested with full powers to conduct all political and military affairs in Hindostan on the part of the British Government; and that you will deem his Excellency's acts and communications to be as valid as if proceeding immediately from my authority.

I have recently addressed several letters to your Highness, under date the 4th and 22d of April. The extraordinary and unfavourable state of affairs at your Highness's court has of necessity prevented Mr. Jenkins from delivering my letters to your Highness. Those letters, however, will now be delivered to your Highness, and all error and misconstruction of the intentions of the British Government will henceforth cease. If any part of those letters should appear to your Highness to require explanation, you will be pleased to refer to Lord Lake, who has public authority to state my sentiments to your Highness.

My determination is to maintain the late treaty of peace without alteration; I trust that your Highness's disposition will be found to be equally conformable to the treaty of peace, the conditions of which the British Government cannot consent to change in any degree. Your Highness must be satisfied that the alternative of war or peace now rests with your Highness; no demand has been made upon you, nor will any demand be advanced by the British Government beyond the limits of the treaty of peace. But no concession can be granted inconsistent with that engagement. Your Highness, I trust, is determined on your part to respect the allies and territories of the Company, and not only to afford no assistance to our enemies, but to co-operate with Lord Lake against them.*

* A detailed account of the whole of the negotiations with Scindiah will be found in the next volume of this work.—[Ed.]

No. CXXIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Marquess Cornwallis.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, July 27th, 1805.

I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 19th instant* from Madras Roads on the 25th, and I heartily congratulate your Lordship on your safe arrival in India.

Your Lordship will be informed of the events which had delayed my departure from Bengal until the season for a favourable passage had elapsed. The consequences of this delay have compelled me to remain in this arduous charge from the close of the month of May to the present moment, under circumstances which have rendered me anxious to accelerate my departure: the general state of my health will not permit me to expose myself to the inconvenience of an attempt to embark until the season shall admit of my departure with a tolerable prospect of a good passage down the bay; and the same cause has required that the *Howe*, which the Admiral has assigned for my accommodation, should receive some repairs and improvements. The *Howe* will be ready in a few days; and I understand that I may attempt the passage down the bay with some prospect of success, about the 20th of August.

The *Howe* having been prepared for me, and Captain Cockburne having taken considerable pains in the preparations, it is my intention to decline the offer of the *Medusa* for the voyage. In the mean while, I shall be happy to deliver over the charge of this Government to your Lordship immediately upon your arrival.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,
your most obedient and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

EXTRACT FROM CALCUTTA GAZETTE.

Fort William, 30th July, 1805.

The Honourable Company's yacht the *Charlotte*, arrived from Diamond Harbour early this morning, having on board Marquess Cornwallis, appointed by the honourable the Court

* See p. 578.

of Directors to the offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the forces in India At six o'clock his Lordship landed, and was received with the usual honours.

At half past eight o'clock Marquess Cornwallis took the oaths and his seat as Governor-General.

No. CXXV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Lake.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, July 30th, 1805.

The preparations for my approaching departure have occupied me so severely that I have been unable to reply to your last very kind and affectionate letters. This morning I have, to my very great satisfaction, been relieved from the charge of this Government by Lord Cornwallis; and I shall now be at liberty to answer your Lordship's obliging private communications in the fullest manner previously to my actual embarkation. But I could not allow this express to depart without renewing to your Lordship in the most cordial spirit of gratitude, affection and respect, the assurances of my unalterable friendship and attachment. I propose to embark between the 15th and 20th of August. Lord Cornwallis having written to your Lordship, you will be apprized of the intentions of this Government respecting the state of affairs in Hindostan. You will also have learnt the arrangements which have been made in England with regard to your own situation. On this subject I shall offer no further remark than that my wish must be to preserve your Lordship's invaluable services until affairs shall have been finally settled in India. As far as your kindness to me is concerned, your Lordship will best satisfy my mind by continuing to serve your country in this quarter of the globe to the completion of every object of peace and prosperity. Lord Cornwallis will probably embark on the river before I can attempt to sail in the present state of the season. It is doubtful whether any letter from your Lordship however would now find me in India; but I sincerely hope to hear from you fully and frequently in England.

Ever, my dear Lord,

yours most sincerely and affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Sir A. Paget, K. B.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, August 12th, 1805.

I have the honour to inform you that I resigned this Government on the 30th July to the Marquess Cornwallis, and that it is my intention to embark on Thursday next, the 15th instant in His Majesty's ship the *Howe*, which has been for some time past prepared for my reception and accommodation on the voyage to Europe. I expect to leave the Hoogly River on the 22nd of this month, and to reach England by the close of the month of December, 1805, or the beginning of January 1806. I am happy to inform you that the Company's possessions are in a state of perfect tranquillity, and have not been disturbed since the expulsion of the Holkar family from Hindostan in the month of May, 1805.

With great respect and regard,

I have the honour to be, my dear Sir,
your most faithful Servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. J. Duncan, Governor of Bombay.

SIR,

His Majesty's Ship *Howe*, off the Sand Heads,
August 26th, 1805.

I cannot depart from India without requesting you to accept my grateful thanks for the ability, zeal and diligence, which you have uniformly manifested in aiding me to discharge the duties of the arduous trust of the General Government during my long and eventful administration.

In times of the utmost difficulty and danger, I have derived the most important advantages to the public service from your honourable and judicious spirit of active cooperation; and your administration of your separate duties has been justly entitled to my approbation in every important department.

Your personal kindness towards me on various occasions also demands my sincere and cordial gratitude.

The recollection of your public services, and of your obliging attentions, will always be present to my mind; and I assure you that I shall ever feel a great degree of pleasure in fulfilling the public duty of acknowledging your eminent merit in the government of Bombay, and in acquitting myself of the obligations of private friendship which I owe to your invariable civility and personal regard for my wishes.

With the most cordial zeal for your welfare, happiness and honour, and for the prosperity of your government,

I have the honour to remain, Sir,

with great respect, regard, and esteem,

your most faithful and obliged servant,

WELLESLEY.

P. S. I hope to have the honour of hearing from you in England.* W.

* Mr. Duncan's reply was as follows :

To the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 24th September, 1805.

I had last night the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter from the Sand Heads, under date the 26th of last month.

A communication so pleasing from your Lordship must at all times prove highly agreeable to me; and, the gratification thence derived is, in the present instance enhanced from the letter reaching me at a period, when after learning by the newspapers that your Lordship had left Calcutta, any expectation I might have indulged of being favoured with a line on your Lordship's departure, had the next thing to ceased.

Under these circumstances, it is most consolatory and flattering to find myself honoured and distinguished by so creditable a testimony of having been able in my subordinate department to co-operate to your Lordship's satisfaction in the great objects of your Lordship's more than seven year's honourable and arduous administration of our Indian Empire; and, if to this discharge of my duty I have been so fortunate as to add the rendering acceptable to your Lordship, the few attentions of a more private nature, such as the arrival of any of your Lordship's friends, may have afforded the means of, the kind reference your Lordship is now pleased to make concerning them, leaves the balance of the obligation essentially on my side.

Be assured, my Lord, that my best wishes accompany your Lordship for a safe and pleasant passage, leading to a happy meeting with your Lordship's family and numerous friends; as likewise of the gratification I should

[*The following Addresses, presented to the Governor-General on his Lordship's departure from India, are extracted from the Calcutta and Bombay Gazettes. ED.*]

No. CXXVIII.

To Stephen Laprimaudaye, Esq. Sheriff of Calcutta.

SIR,

We request you to convene a meeting of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, for the purpose of considering of an address to his Excellency Marquess Wellesley, on occasion of his approaching departure.

We have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servants,

C. Green, Major-General; P. Speke; T. Pattle; R. Smith; T. Graham; W. R. Munro; W. S. Greene; P. Limrick; S. Davis; C. A. Bruce; H. P. Foster; H. Ramus; M. Campbell; B. Mason; G. Boyd, &c. &c.

In compliance with the above requisition, I request the attendance of the British inhabitants of this settlement, at the Public Rooms of Carlier and Scornee, on Monday next, the 29th of July instant, at Nine in the morning.

S. LAPRIMAUDAYE,
Sheriff.

Calcutta, 27th July, 1805.

experience in the event of my having at any future period occasion to approve myself in any degree useful to your Lordship, or to those in whom your Lordship may take an interest; and that, in any case, I shall feel it highly conducive to my honour, credit and happiness, to be favoured with your Lordship's correspondence and commands.

I have the honour to remain,

with the most respectful regard and esteem, My Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient and obliged humble servant,

J. DUNCAN.

Proceedings held at a Meeting of the British Inhabitants of Calcutta, on Monday 29th of July, 1805.

In consequence of the notice published on the 27th instant, by the Sheriff of the town of Calcutta, a general meeting of the British inhabitants was this day held, for the purpose of considering of an address to the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, on the occasion of his approaching departure.

The meeting having been opened by the Sheriff, Mr. Mackenzie moved, that Mr. Speke be requested to take the chair; which motion was seconded by Mr. Smith, and unanimously agreed to.

Mr. Speke having accordingly taken the chair, Mr. Smith addressed the meeting in an impressive speech, and concluded by moving, that a Committee be appointed, with instructions to prepare an address to the Marquess Wellesley, on the occasion of his departure for Europe, expressive of the high sense entertained by the British inhabitants of Calcutta, of his eminent public services. The motion was seconded by Mr. Colebrooke.

Mr. Strettell then addressed the meeting in an appropriate speech, in support of the motion.

The Committee having submitted to the meeting the draft of an address, it was read and unanimously approved; and the following resolutions were proposed, seconded, and agreed to.

Resolved, That this meeting do concur in the address, which has been read.

That the Chairman be requested to wait on the Marquess Wellesley, to ascertain at what time it will be agreeable to his Lordship to receive the address of the British inhabitants of the settlement.

That the Chairman, accompanied by the members of the Committee, and such other gentlemen as may be pleased to attend, do present the address.

That the thanks of this meeting be given to the Sheriff.

That the thanks of this meeting be given to the Chairman.

Monday, August 5th, 1805.

The Chairman having notified to the settlement, that in conformity to the instructions of the general meeting, on the

29th ultimo, he had the honour of waiting upon the Marquess Wellesley, and that his Lordship had appointed this day at ten o'clock for receiving the address; the Chairman, accompanied by a great number of the inhabitants of the settlement, proceeded to the government house at the time appointed.

On being introduced to the Marquess Wellesley, the Chairman read and presented the following address:

To the most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, K. P. &c.

MY LORD,

The British inhabitants of Calcutta, upon occasion of your departure for Europe, are desirous to offer once more to your Lordship that testimony of public esteem, which they feel to be so justly due to the merits of your administration.

The events of the last seven years have marked the period of your government, as the most important epoch in the history of European power in India.

Your discernment in seeing the exigencies of the country and of the times, in which you were called to act, the promptitude and determination, with which you have seized on the opportunities of acting, your just conception and masterly use of our intrinsic strength, have eminently contributed, in conjunction with the zeal, the discipline, and the courage of our armies, to decide upon these great events; and to establish, from one extremity of this empire to the other, the ascendancy of the British name and dominion.

We are impressed with the firm persuasion, that you have governed with a direct view to the glory of your country, and to the prosperity of its possessions, and with no other personal feeling than the honourable ambition of obtaining its applause as your reward. To the community at large, no doubt, it belongs to fill up the measure of that reward. But it is a duty incumbent upon those among whom you have lived and acted; whose personal concern in the course of your government has enabled them to appreciate its character; to declare before the nation their sense of your public services.

It is under the impression of this duty that we address you; and with the desire to mark in the most authentic manner, that you carry with you to our common country, the respect, the regard and the confidence of your fellow subjects;

a confidence which is undiminished at the last hour of your administration; a respect, and a regard which are founded on our long experience of your ability, of your unsullied integrity, of your impartial and honourable use of power, and of your high and liberal spirit in the conduct of public affairs.

In taking leave of your Lordship, we cannot forbear expressing our hope and confidence that you will long continue to regard the welfare of a country, which has been the scene of your eminent public services; and that your talents and the weight of your character, will be employed to strengthen the persuasion, that of all external objects of its attention, a firm, just and politic government of India, is the most nearly connected with the greatness, the wealth, and the glory of the British nation.

Signed by upwards of 600 persons.

Reply of the Marquess Wellesley.

GENTLEMEN,

I receive this last testimony of your esteem with the most cordial sentiments of respect, gratitude and affection.

In the progress of those extraordinary events, which have occurred during the last seven years, the favourable opinion of this great and flourishing settlement has attended every important act of my administration; you have declared that the same opinion now accompanies its close; and in the moment of my approaching departure while I remain among you, without power, influence, or authority, you are pleased, in this public manner to express your undiminished sense of the principles by which I have been directed, and of the objects which I have pursued in the long exercise of those high and sacred trusts. Your able, honest, zealous and active assistance, in your several capacities, has aided the progress of my administration, in every crisis of difficulty and danger; I have endeavoured to adapt the spirit of my government at this settlement to your general character and disposition; and to merit your confidence, by a just estimation of your loyalty to our sovereign, of your public spirit and attachment to our country, of your dutiful zeal for the interests of the East India Company, and of the industry, integrity, ability, and

knowledge which distinguish the British inhabitants of Calcutta.

Whatever may be the final judgment of my Sovereign, of my country, and of the East India Company with respect to my public services, your kindness and favour will claim my faithful and affectionate remembrance. In every scene of my future life, the prosperity of the British empire in India will excite a lasting sentiment of solicitude and anxiety. The welfare of these extensive dominions constitutes not only a principal object of the general policy of our country, but a solemn obligation of moral duty inseparably connected with the honour and reputation of the British name.

To a due sense of these important considerations, I ascribe the auspicious choice which has been made by his Majesty, and by the honourable Company, of the revered personage, who has succeeded to me in the government of these valuable possessions. In delivering my arduous trust into his hands, I entertained a confident expectation, that under the influence of his approved talents and virtues, this great government would be exercised with wisdom, equity, and firmness, for the happiness and welfare of Asia, and for the interest and glory of the British nation; and I trust that you will witness the progressive augmentation of his long acquired fame, in the increasing prosperity of every interest committed to his charge.

It will be my duty to assert in every situation, the principles by which I have regulated my conduct in the government of this empire, and to inculcate the necessity of maintaining the foundations of our ascendant power in Asia, upon the firm basis of justice, fortitude and clemency.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXIX.

Proceedings of a Meeting of British Inhabitants of Bombay, held on the 31st August 1805.

A meeting of British inhabitants having been this day held at the Court House, to consider of an address to the Marquess Cornwallis on his arrival in India, and to the Marquess Wellesley, on occasion of his approaching departure, pursuant

to public notification, the Sheriff opened the business of the day as follows :

“GENTLEMEN,

“In compliance with a requisition from some of the principal British inhabitants at this Presidency, I have convened you for the purpose of considering of an address to the Marquess Cornwallis on his arrival in India, and to the Marquess Wellesley on the occasion of his approaching departure. It must be the source of congratulation to every British inhabitant of India, and an additional motive of gratitude to the Government of Great Britain, that the administration of these valuable dominions has been committed to the Marquess Cornwallis ; —a personage grown grey in the toils of honour and glory ; and who, in the rare union of civil and military talents, is a memorable example of devotion to his country, by his services in the three most enlightened and civilized quarters of the globe. While we entertain a just confidence in the administration of our present Governor-General, we cannot be insensible to the attachment, respect and admiration that are due from us to that illustrious character, the Marquess Wellesley, whose vigilance, energy and provident counsels have been anxiously engaged in ensuring stability to the British territories in India. Who, while the states of the enemy were inflicted with the inevitable evils of war, preserved the British territories in the productive security of peace ; and who, in the midst of heavy demands of pecuniary aid, arising from a complicated and extensive warfare, has surmounted unusual difficulties in sustaining the credit of the British resources.”

Sir James Mackintosh was then unanimously requested to take the chair, and having complied with the wish of the the meeting.

Mr. Money, Superintendent of the honourable Company's Marine, rose and spoke in substance as follows :

“MR. CHAIRMAN,

“The real object for which we are here assembled, as been so clearly explained by the Sheriff, that I feel relieved from a considerable degree of embarrassment, arising out of a consciousness of my own inability, to render justice to the motion which I shall have the honour of submitting for your consideration.

“I would willingly have resigned the office to abler hands, and have rejoiced, had my learned friend, Mr Thriepland, afforded the aid of his superior talents, and persuasive powers, in recommending as a fit subject for the gratulations of the British inhabitants of Bombay, the arrival of the great and venerable character who has resumed the functions of Governor-General of India.

“Committing myself, however, to your indulgence, I will endeavour very briefly, to state the grounds upon which I shall propose an address to the Marquess Cornwallis; in which I will hope for the unanimous concurrence of this numerous and respectable assembly.

“It appears to me, Sir, that the British empire does not contain the man, whom, under all existing circumstances, we could so appropriately address upon his succession to the Supreme Government.

“It is not to rank or station, however elevated, that we are to offer the homage of our congratulations.

“It is not to an untried character, unknown in India, whom interest or party has raised to eminence or power, that we are called upon to pay the tribute of unearned applause.

“It is to one whose whole life has exhibited an uninterrupted series of most signal services to his country, in the field, in the cabinet, in important embassies, and in the beneficent office of sheathing the sword of civil warfare.

“In so promptly complying with the wish of his Sovereign, and the request of the East India Company, at such a crisis; in relinquishing the enjoyments of honourable and necessary repose for the heavy responsibility of an arduous station, at so advanced a period of his virtuous and memorable life, when every motive of personal ambition, gratified to the fullest extent, must have ceased to have had an operative influence on the human mind, he has afforded such a bright example of entire devotion to the good of his countrymen, as, in the best annals of antient or modern times, has never been surpassed:—an example which, (I have high authority for saying) must tend to attach us more to that happy and favoured land which has produced so distinguished a proof of patriotism.

“It is impossible, Sir, for me, upon a moment’s reflection,

to contemplate such a sacrifice, without revering the motive, and venerating the man.

"If ever a public character were entitled to universal respect and esteem, this illustrious patriot has pre-eminent claims; for none have ever passed through a long and eventful life, less affected, and less actuated, in their public course, by the spirit or prejudice of party; and consequently, we find that however men may have been divided by political dissensions and conflicting opinions; however they may have differed upon points of foreign polity or domestic government; yet, all have united in bestowing on the dignified object of the proposed address, the benedictions of a grateful and admiring country.

"Let us then join in the general voice; let us have with truth, to say, in application to ourselves—*Cœlum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt*.

"Let us by an unanimous resolution give substantial proof to our country at home, that British feelings and sentiments may live and flourish in Indian climes.

"I will not any longer occupy the attention of the meeting, but proceed to move that a Committee be formed, for the purpose of preparing an address to the most honourable Charles Marquess Cornwallis upon his arrival in India."

Lieut.-Colonel Macquarie, of his Majesty's 86th regiment, seconded the motion.

Mr. Thriepland, the honourable Company's Counsel, then addressed the meeting to the following effect:

"MR. CHAIRMAN,

"As it is impossible for any man to entertain a higher sense than I do, of the pure and disinterested spirit which alone could actuate the present Governor-General in consenting to resume the functions of an arduous office in a distant country, and which has been described in such glowing and animated language, by my very able, eloquent, and most respectable friend, Mr. Money, I shall sign an address expressive of that sense, and of true veneration for a character of tried and veteran worth, with the utmost satisfaction."

"But I certainly think we should be wanting to ourselves, and should display our own characters in a light that would do them very little credit, if we hesitated to accompany that

address with another, no less ardent and sincere, to that illustrious statesman, who will soon be restored to the bosom of his country, whose administration has so often, and so lately been the theme of praise and admiration, not in this place only, but in every quarter of British India, and will continue to be remembered for the signal advantage it has conferred, as long as gratitude is a virtue regardless of the situation of its object.

“Sir, I do not mean to trespass on your time on this occasion; but I cannot conclude without requesting to be forgiven for having presented myself to your notice, as the mover of an address to the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, when I know there is not one of those, who form the trading and commercial part of this flourishing community, who would not have rejoiced, and who was not ready to anticipate me in that act of profound respect, and bounden duty; and when I mention the mercantile interest of Bombay, I am mistaken if it will be easy to find a body of equal numbers, who have a greater stake in the prosperity, or more liberal and enlightened views of the true interests of their country, to give weight to the sentiments they entertain, and are zealous to avow, of public men, and of public affairs.”

Mr. Thriepland concluded with moving, that the same Committee might also prepare an address to the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, on occasion of his departure from India.

Mr. Charles Forbes * seconded the motion.

The several motions having been made and seconded, the Chairman proceeded to take the sense of the meeting on each, and both being unanimously agreed to, the following gentlemen were named a Committee to prepare the addresses :

Sir James Mackintosh; W. T. Money, Esq.; Lieut.-Colonel Macquarie, of his Majesty's 86th regiment; S. M. Thriep-land, Esq.; Charles Forbes, Esq.; Alexander Adamson, Esq.; Colonel Spry, of his Majesty's 77th regiment; Captain Christian, R. N.; P. Hadow, Esq.; Lieut.-Colonel Baillie; Lieut.-Colonel Williamson; F. Warden, Esq.; Captain Mahony; O. Woodhouse, Esq.; D. Inglis, Esq.; James Law, Esq.; and S. Halliday, Esq.

The above Committee then retired; and having returned

* Now Sir Charles Forbes, Bart. [ED.]

with the addresses, the same were read to the meeting by the respective movers, and afterwards, severally, from the chair; and the question being put on each, that it should be adopted as the sense of the meeting, the same was unanimously carried in the affirmative.

The following resolutions were then moved and unanimously adopted :

“That the addresses be engrossed, and remain at the Theatre for Signature, till Saturday the 7th of September.”

“That the Chairman be requested to solicit the favour of the honourable the Governor to transmit the respective addresses at such time, and in such manner, as he may deem most eligible.”

“That the thanks of this meeting be given to the Sheriff for his attention in convening the British inhabitants of the settlement.”

The Chairman then retired, and the Sheriff having resumed the chair, Mr. Money moved the thanks of the meeting to Sir James Mackintosh, for his readiness in complying with the request of the meeting in taking the chair, and the ability with which he had conducted the proceedings of the day; which being seconded by Mr. Thriepland, was unanimously agreed to. The meeting was then dissolved by the Sheriff.

ADDRESS

To His Excellency the Most Honourable Charles Marquess Cornwallis, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Governor-General of the British Territories in India, and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's and the Honourable the East India Company's Forces, &c. &c. &c.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 31st August, 1805.

We the undersigned British inhabitants of Bombay, beg leave to congratulate your Excellency on your safe arrival in India, and upon your having assumed the functions of your great office.

Your Lordship's life has been devoted to the service of your country in war and in peace, in difficult negotiations, in military operations the most arduous and brilliant, and in the noble employment of healing the wounds of civil discord.

You now complete the dignified consistency of this character, by once more coming forth from honourable repose to the cares and toils of public service, at a period of life when

the best men deem themselves released from laborious duty, and from a situation where no wish of your honest ambition was ungratified.

This is an act, my Lord, which could only have arisen from the unmixed principle of public duty; the disposition to do such an act is rare, the opportunities of doing it with motives so unsuspected and indisputable, are still more rare; such an act, if it only served to prove the possibility of virtue so disinterested, would be a signal service to mankind, and your Lordship's sacrifice of yourself on the present occasion, confers on you a distinction which none of your past or future honours can surpass.

For our parts, my Lord, we thank you for endearing to us our country, to which we become more fondly and proudly attached, when we see that it is capable of producing such examples.

An administration originating in motives so pure, has every prospect of being happy in its progress. Your Lordship is, from experience, well acquainted with its difficulties. But we can venture to assure you, that as your departure from Great Britain was accompanied by the admiration of the whole nation, so your arrival in this country is attended by the veneration of every British subject, and that your government will be aided by the renown of your virtue and valour, which time has not effaced from the minds of the princes and nations of India.

We have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Excellency's most obedient
and faithful servants.

To the Most Noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, &c. &c. &c.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 31st August, 1805.

We, the undersigned British inhabitants of Bombay, beg leave to offer our grateful acknowledgements to your Lordship at the close of your eventful and brilliant administration.

With the same sincerity, and in the same spirit of independence, which has actuated us in our congratulations to your noble successor, we now present ourselves to your Lordship.

The British character is not so far corrupted in us that we can pay homage to mere power and greatness. It is therefore

with pleasure that we chuse this unsuspected moment for declaring our unfeigned sense of the claims on public admiration and gratitude which your splendid abilities and unwearied exertions in the cause of your country, have so justly gained for you during your memorable government of India.

We earnestly wish that your Lordship's voyage to Europe may be safe and prosperous, and that the active zeal which has marked your career abroad may soon find scope for its exercise at home.

We are confident that your Lordship will ever find a happiness worthy of you in the memory of your important services, in the renewal of your intercourse with illustrious and accomplished friends in literature, which you have not only liberally patronized but most successfully cultivated; and above all, in the performance of those duties, public as well as private, of which the number is encreased and the obligations strengthened by your distinguished talents and eminent station; and the active discharge of which is the safest and most pure source of enjoyment which it has pleased Divine Providence to allot to mankind.

We have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful and humble servants.

No. CXXX.

*Proceedings of a Meeting of the European and Native Merchants of Bombay,
held on the 31st August, 1805.*

At a meeting of the principal British and Native Merchants of Bombay, held immediately after the meeting of the British Inhabitants, convened for the purpose of considering of an address to the Marquess Cornwallis on his arrival in India, and to the Marquess Wellesley on his approaching departure, Mr. Alexander Adamson in the chair,

It was proposed by Mr. Charles Forbes, seconded by Mr. James Law, and unanimously resolved,

“That the most noble the Marquess Wellesley be solicited to permit a statue of him to be executed by the first artist in England, to be sent out to Bombay as soon as possible.*

* The statue was executed by Bacon, and erected at Bombay, at a cost of upwards of five thousand guineas. [ED.]

“ That the following gentlemen be requested to wait upon the Marquess Wellesley on his arrival in England, to prefer the said application on behalf of the merchants of Bombay, namely, Messrs. David Scott, John Forbes, and Patrick Crawford Bruce.

“ That the honourable the Governor in Council be requested to allot an eligible spot on Bombay Green, within the fort, for the reception of the statue of the Marquess Wellesley.

“ That a subscription be immediately set on foot for the above purpose, to be open for the signatures of the European and native merchants of this settlement.

“ That the thanks of the meeting be given to the chairman.”

ALEXANDER ADAMSON, Chairman.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, Esq. &c.,
Bombay.*

SIR,

Captain Mahony has delivered to me your letter, dated the 22nd of February 1806, transmitting to me an address from the inhabitants of the settlement of Bombay, to which I now

* The following is an extract of a letter from the Governor of Bombay to the Marquess Wellesley, respecting the reply to the Bombay address, which his Lordship transmitted from England.

MY LORD,

Parell, July 3, 1809.

Major Mahony having delivered to me the letter with which your Lordship has favoured me, under date the 8th September, giving cover to your Lordship's answer to the Address from the inhabitants of this settlement, on the close of your Lordship's brilliant administration of India; I lost no time in making a communication thereof to the Committee of the Subscribers, who have since published the whole in our Government newspaper, the *Bombay Courier* of Saturday last.

It will, I know, be very interesting to your Lordship to hear that we continue in peace in this country, and that our influence pervades it from the Thibet mountains to Cape Comorin. Your Lordship left us indeed no enemy capable of contending with us, with serious effect.

I have the honour to remain,
with the greatest respect, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient and
very humble servant,
JONATHAN DUNCAN.

have the honour to transmit a reply; I request you to have the goodness to communicate that reply to the gentlemen who signed the address, at such time, and in such a manner, as may tend to manifest my high sense of the favour which they have conferred upon me, and as may be consistent with the public interests intrusted to your care.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your obedient and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

Apsley House,
8th September 1808.

To the British Inhabitants of the Settlement of Bombay.

GENTLEMEN,

The honourable the Governor of Bombay has transmitted to me the highly valuable expressions of public approbation and personal esteem with which you have been pleased to favour me, in your public address of the 31st August 1805. The sentiments conveyed in that address have raised the warmest emotions of my respect, gratitude and attachment.

In every situation, at every moment of my life, I shall cherish an affectionate remembrance of your constant exertions for the public service, of the zeal with which you aided my administration in every difficulty and danger, and of the generous and honourable testimony by which you have marked its close. You may be assured that, with the strongest sense of your personal kindness and regard, I shall ever retain the most anxious solicitude for the prosperity of your public spirited, and flourishing settlement.

WELLESLEY.

Apsley House,
8th September 1808.

No. CXXXI.

An Address from the Students of the College of Fort William to the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, of which the annexed is a copy, having been presented on the 6th instant, his Lordship was pleased to transmit the answer which is published after it to the gentlemen of the College.

To the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley K. P. &c. &c. &c.

MY LORD,

We have already had the honour of uniting with the British inhabitants of Calcutta in a public acknowledgement of the general benefits which have been experienced under your Lordship's government; but we feel that those who have partaken in the advantages arising from the College of Fort William, have still a peculiar duty to perform, in conveying to your Lordship the expression of their respect, affection, and gratitude.

Convinced by personal experience of the advantages which have been already derived from this institution, we presume to express our hope that the ultimate expectations of your Lordship will not be disappointed, but that under the continued and certain operation of the same liberal, benevolent and and comprehensive system, the Students of the College of Fort William may become useful instruments in securing the prosperity of these opulent provinces, and in augmenting the happiness and confidence of their inhabitants.

But whatever may be the future progress and success of this institution, we shall constantly retain a lively recollection of the obligations conferred upon us by your Lordship, and shall most gratefully acknowledge the high sense which we entertain of the advantages afforded to us under your administration.

The interest which your Lordship has professed to feel in our honourable progress through life, will never cease to be a powerful inducement to zealous exertion in the discharge of our public duty; and an anxious desire to deserve and to maintain the good opinion of your Lordship will animate our

endeavours to diffuse those benefits which it was your object to perpetuate by the institution of the College of Fort William.

There are many, my Lord, who have with us partaken in the benefits of the institution whose absence prevents them from joining this tribute of gratitude and esteem; our knowledge however of their general sentiments justifies us in assuring your Lordship, that they cordially participate in the feelings which we have presumed to express, and that they unite in the fervent hope that you may long live to enjoy the just reward of your great and splendid services, in the consciousness of their beneficial effects, and in the merited applause and admiration of your country and of mankind.

We have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient and faithful servants,

W. Scott; H. Hodson; R. C. Plowden; W. B. Bayley; T. Perry; J. Wauchope; J. Walker; George Swinton; W. Morton; J. Littledale; Hugh Hope; C. R. Lindsay; H. M. Turnbull; H. Alexander; H. G. Christian; C. H. Hoppner; A. Revely; W. Doren; W. W. Bird; H. Newnham; C. Chapman; P. D. Gordon; W. Loch; A. Mackenzie; M. Ricketts; Jas. Ewing; J. Eyre; W. C. Ward; E. Parry; Thos. Pakenham; J. L. Savage; W. B. Gordon; P. Monckton; Thos. C. Scott; G. J. Siddons; H. A. Williams; A. J. Halhed; J. Ewer; R. B. Gardner; W. Wright; W. F. Clark; Walter Ewer; W. C. Smyth; H. Wood; C. Lushington; R. Walpole; A. Blagrove; A. Oakeley; J. P. Watson; J. Roberdeau; R. B. Berney; J. Shurey; C. Dawes; E. Maxwell; Rob. Vansittart, &c.

No. CXXXII.

To the Gentlemen of the College of Fort William.

Fort William, August 10th, 1805.

GENTLEMEN,

I request you to accept my sincere thanks for the grateful and affectionate marks of kind attention, with which you have honoured me in your letter of the 6th of August.

The advantages afforded by the College of Fort William, have been confirmed and augmented by the favourable disposition of the students at every period of time since the

foundation of the Institution; and I am happy to find, that the same zeal, industry and spirit of emulation, which have repeatedly demanded my approbation, continue to animate the students in the prosecution of their prescribed course of study.

The merit of your conduct in the public service will ever be an object truly interesting to my heart; and will afford the most satisfactory proof of your kind remembrance, and of your personal regard for me.

Your successful progress in the honourable career of your respective public duties will, I trust, contribute to preserve the memory of my administration, together with the integrity of the British name, and the prosperity of the British interests in Asia. Nor can I contemplate any reward equal to the gratification which I expect to derive, from observing the improvement of these provinces, under the operation of a liberal and comprehensive system of public education, aided by the happy influence and protecting care of a wise, just and benevolent government.

I have the honour to be with the most sincere regard, and with the most earnest anxiety for your welfare and honour,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend and servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXXIII.

NATIVE ADDRESSES FROM THE COLLEGE OF FORT WILLIAM TO THE MOST NOBLE THE MARQUESS, WELLESLEY ON THE OCCASION OF HIS LEAVING INDIA.

*Address from the Pundits of the College.**

MY LORD,

1. By your having founded the College of Fort William, learned men call you the protector of the Kingdom of Science. We Pundits are the subjects of that kingdom, and

* There was also an Address from the Moonshees in the Arabic and Persian departments of the College. [ED.]

therefore address your Excellency as our Governor in a peculiar sense.

2. The news of your departure from this country has deeply affected our hearts; we therefore present this recital of your acts and virtues as a testimony of our high esteem for your person and government.

3. That field of science which the Emperor Ackber cultivated, after it had lain neglected (like a wilderness) from the reign of Vikrumaditya, your Lordship has again brought into a state of cultivation; notwithstanding it had lain waste from the reign of Ackber.

4. By this you have secured to yourself the fame of steadily viewing the end of a great undertaking, regardless of the difficulties which might impede its progress; and of obtaining for the English nation a share in the divine kingdom of *Science*, which it did not before possess.

5. You are esteemed as one who has the true interests of your own nation at heart, and hailed as the steady friend of science, and the object of the high regard of the learned.

6. You have destroyed the tyrant *Tippoo Sultaun* in battle, and have conquered the *Maharastras*, a nation of warriors, to whom Mohummud Shah and Mahabut Jung ceded a fourth of the empire.

7. The honour and greatness which that nation has gradually obtained, through the decay of the Mussulman power, ever since the time of Nadir Shah, has been brought down by you to the ground.

8. By these victories you have acquired new territory for the English nation, and have secured that which they had already possessed.

9. By these and various other acts of your government, equally splendid and beneficial, you now are, and always will be hailed as the man who has firmly settled to the honourable Company that empire which, in an inferior sense, was theirs before.

10. You are the increaser of the national prosperity; a possessor of heroic energy; the depresser of haughty heads; and the terror of your country's enemies.

11. All who know the extent of the tyranny of *Tippoo Sultaun*, and who are acquainted with the distresses which

the *Maharastras* brought upon the people of Bengal and Orissa, will concur with us in these sentiments.

12. And all who know what *science* is, and can estimate the benefits which arise from it; and all who can enter into the design of the other great undertakings and splendid actions of your Lordship, will unite with us in declaring that great renown and the respect of mankind are your just due.

13. May Almighty God grant to your Excellency the enjoyment of the full wishes of your heart.

(Signed by 21 chief Pundits.)

College of Fort William,
July 31, 1805.

No. CXXXIV.

Address from the Moonshes of the Hindoostanee Department of the College of Fort William to the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, K. P., &c. &c.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP,

We, the Moonshes of the Hindoostanee department of the College of Fort William, deem it an incumbent duty, on the occasion of your Lordship's departure, to offer to your Lordship the sincere and unanimous expression of our reverence and gratitude for the various benefits of which we have participated during the long period of your Excellency's auspicious, just, and ever memorable administration.

Under the auspices of your Lordship, has been founded this noble Institution; and from it Eastern literature has derived lustre, and a spread which has pervaded every quarter. The Arts and Sciences have been respected and promoted; and the various Oriental tongues have been studied with an encreased degree of ardour, interest and success. Most conspicuous under this progressive improvement is the Hindoostanee language. Prior to the era of the College, this tongue was merely colloquial, or used alone in poetry. But now, like the Arabic and Persian, it is formed into a science, and has become the medium of written intercourse. Nay, in this language numerous are the compilations and original compositions which have been distributed through the various regions of Asia, and extended to Europe.

Those works will ever constitute a general benefaction; and, although your Lordship is about to depart from India, yet will they preserve to us the indelible record of your Lordship's transcendent fame.

College of Fort William,
August 10, 1805.

No. CXXXV.

Presidency Orders by the Vice President, Deputy Governor, &c. &c.

Fort William, August 17th, 1805.

The most noble the Marquess Wellesley having signified his Lordship's intentions to proceed from the Government House to Fort William on Tuesday morning next, the 20th instant, to embark at the water-gate of Fort William for Europe, the Governor-General's body guard is to be drawn up at seven o'clock on Tuesday morning, to the north of the Government House, and to attend his Lordship through Fort William to the place of embarkation near the water-gate.

The European and native troops in garrison, excepting such guards as cannot be dispensed with, are to be under arms at seven o'clock on Tuesday morning, and to form a street from the Calcutta gate to the water-gate.

The commanding officer in garrison, and the garrison staff, to be ready at the Calcutta gate to receive the Marquess Wellesley, and conduct his Lordship to the water-gate.

The accustomed honours to be paid by the officers and troops to his Lordship in passing through Fort William; a salute of nineteen guns to be fired from the ramparts of Fort William on his Lordship's embarkation at the water-gate, and another salute of nineteen guns to be fired, when the honourable Company's yacht on which his Lordship is to embark shall be under weigh.

Colonel Stoven, commanding in garrison will be pleased to issue such further orders as may be necessary respecting the troops in garrison, for carrying the preceeding orders of the Vice President and deputy Governor into effect.

Extra batta to be served out to the European troops in garrison on the occasion.

By order of the honourable the Vice President, &c.

L. Hook,

Secretary to the Government Military Department.

Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary, August 21st. 1805.

The most noble the Marquess Wellesley having appointed this morning for his public departure from Fort William, the principal officers of the government, and the principal inhabitants of Calcutta, assembled at the Government House at seven o'clock. A public breakfast was given on the occasion by the honourable Sir George Barlow, Bart, Vice President, at which were also present the honourable the Chief Justice, Sir John Royds, and Sir Henry Russell, Judges of the Supreme court of Judicature, and Mr. Udny.

At eight o'clock the Marquess Wellesley, accompanied by the honourable Sir George Barlow, Sir John Anstruther, and Mr. Udny, and by the civil and military officers of government, and principal inhabitants of Calcutta, and escorted by the Governor-General's body guard, proceeded in his carriage to Fort William. His Lordship was met at the Calcutta gate by Colonel Stoven, the commanding officer in garrison, and by the garrison staff; the troops in garrison formed a street from the Calcutta gate to the water-gate, through which his Lordship passed, receiving the usual honours due to his high rank and character.

A vast concourse of the native inhabitants of Calcutta assembled on the occasion, and attended the Marquess to the water-gate where his Lordship was met by the European inhabitants of Calcutta, who had proceeded to Fort William for that purpose.

On his Lordship's embarkation on board the honourable Company's yacht, the *Charlotte*, a salute of nineteen guns was fired from the ramparts of Fort William, and a second salute of nineteen guns was fired when the yacht got under weigh.

His Lordship is attended down the river by the Town Major of Fort William, by Colonel Harcourt, the officers of his Lordship's family, and by several gentlemen of the civil and military service.

The officers of his Lordship's family who attend him to England are, Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, Private Secretary; Captain Sydenham,* and Captain Campbell, Aides-de-Camp; John Forbes, Esq. Keeper of the Records, and Dr. Francis Buchanan, Surgeon.

* Captain Benjamin Sydenham; his public services, and those of his younger brother, Captain Thomas Sydenham, are fully stated in the Appendix.

APPENDIX.

A.

Treaty for the Settlement of General Peace in Hindostan and the Deckan, and for the confirmation of the friendship subsisting between the Honourable English East India Company and its allies, his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Peishwah Behauder, settled between the said Honourable Company and the said allies, by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, resident at the Court of Hyderabad, in virtue of the powers delegated to him by his Excellency the Most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, one of his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor General in Council of all the British Possessions, and Captain General of all the British Land Forces in the East Indies.

Whereas, by the terms of the treaties of peace concluded by Major General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, on the part of the honourable Company and its allies, with the Maha Rajah Sena Saheb Soubah Rajah of Berar, at Deogaum, on the 17th of December 1803, and with Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at Surje Anjengaum, on the 30th of that month, which treaties have been duly ratified by the Governor General in Council and by the allies of the British Government, certain forts and territories have been ceded by Maha Rajah Sena Saheb Soubah, and by Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the honourable Company and its allies, the following articles of agreement, for the settlement of the said forts and territories, have been concluded by the British Government, and by the said allies.

ARTICLE 1st. The province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Balasore, and all cessions, of every description, made by the second article of the treaty of Deogaum, or by any treaties which have been confirmed by the tenth article of the said treaty of Deogaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the honourable East India Company.

ARTICLE 2nd. The territories of which Maha Rajah Sena Saheb Soubah formerly collected the revenues, in participation with his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan, and those formerly possessed by Maha Rajah Sena Saheb Soubah, to the westward of the river Wurdah, ceded by the third article of the treaty of Deogaum, and the territory situated to the southward of the hills, on which are the forts of Nernullah and Gawilghur, and to the westward of the river Wurdah, stated by the fourth article of the treaty of Deogaum to belong to the British Government and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan, with the exception of the districts reserved to Sena Saheb Soubah, in the fifth article of the said treaty of Deogaum.

ARTICLE 3rd. All the forts, territories, and rights of Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the Doab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests, in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jyepoor and Jodepoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud, ceded by the second article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty to the honourable Company.

ARTICLE 4th. The fort of Baroach, and territory depending thereon, ceded by the third article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the honourable Company.

ARTICLE 5th. The fort and city of Ahmednuggur, together with such part of the territory depending thereon as is ceded by the third article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum to the honourable Company and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Peishwah.

ARTICLE 6th. All the territories which belonged to Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, before the commencement of the late war, situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjunttee Hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapore, the town and district of Gandapore, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery, ceded by the fourth article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum to the honourable Company and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan.

ARTICLE 7th. All cessions made to the honourable Company by any treaties which have been confirmed by the ninth article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the honourable Company.

ARTICLE 8th. This treaty, consisting of eight articles, being this day, the 17th of Mohurrum, corresponding with the 28th of April, settled and concluded, at Hyderabad, by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, with his Highness the Nawaub Asoph Jah Meer Akber Ali Khaun Behauder, Soubahdar of the Deckan, the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick has delivered to his said Highness, a copy of the same, in English and Persian, under the seal and signature of the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, and his Highness the Nawaub Asoph Jah Meer Akber Ali Khaun Behauder has delivered to the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick another copy, also in Persian and English, bearing his Highness's seal and signature; and the aforesaid Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick has engaged to procure and deliver to his said Highness, without delay, a copy of the same, duly ratified by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, on the receipt of which by his said Highness, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the honourable the English East India Company and on his Highness, and the copy of it now delivered to his said Highness the Nawaub Asoph Jah shall be returned.

Done at Hyderabad, this 28th day of April, Anno
Domini 1804, or 17th day of Mohurrum, Anno
Higeræ 1219.

APPENDIX B.

Treaty for the Settlement of General Peace in Hindostan and the Deckan, and for the confirmation of the friendship subsisting between the honourable English East India Company and its allies, his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Peishwah Behauder, settled between the said honourable company and the said allies, by Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, resident at the Court of his Highness the Peishwah, in virtue of the powers delegated to him by his Excellency the Most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick, one of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, Governor General in Council of all the British possessions, and Captain General of all the British land forces in the East Indies.

Whereas, by the terms of the treaties of peace, concluded by Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, on the part of the honourable Company and its allies, with Maha Rajah Senah Saheb Soubah Rajah of Berar, at Deogaum, on the 17th of December 1803, and with Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at Surje Anjengaum, on the 30th of that month, which treaties have been duly ratified by the Governor General in Council, and by the allies of the British Government, certain forts and territories have been ceded by Maha Rajah Sena Saheb Soubah, and by Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the honourable Company and its allies, the following articles of agreement, for the settlement of the said forts and territories, have been concluded by the British Government, and by the said allies.

ARTICLE 1st. The province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Bala-sore, and all cessions, of every description, made by the second article of the treaty of Deogaum, or by any treaties which have been confirmed by the tenth article of the said treaty of Deogaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the honourable English East India Company.

ARTICLE 2nd. The territories of which Maha Rajah Senah Saheb Soubah formerly collected the revenues, in participation with his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan, and those formerly possessed by Maha Rajah Sena Saheb Soubah, to the westward of the river Wurdah, ceded by the third article of the treaty of Deogaum, and the territory situated to the southward of the hills, on which are the forts of Nernullah and Gawilghur, and to the westward of the river Wurdah, stated by the fourth article of the treaty of Deogaum to belong to the British Government and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan, with the exception of the districts reserved to Sena Saheb Soubah in the fifth article of the said treaty of Deogaum.

ARTICLE 3rd. All the forts, territories, and rights of Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the Doab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jypore and Jodepore, and of the Ranah of Gohud, ceded by the second article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the honourable Company.

ARTICLE 4th. The fort of Baroach and territory depending thereon, ceded by the third article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the honourable company.

ARTICLE 5th. The fort and city of Ahmednuggur, together with such part of the territory depending thereon, as is ceded by the third article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum to the honourable company and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Peishwah.

ARTICLE 6th. All the territories which belonged to Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah before the commencement of the late war, situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjunttee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapore, the town and district of Gandapore, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery, ceded by the fourth article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum to the honourable Company and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan.

ARTICLE 7th. All cessions made to the honourable Company by any treaties which have been confirmed by the ninth article of the treaty of Surje Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the honourable Company.

ARTICLE 8th. This treaty, consisting of eight articles, being this day, the 14th of May 1804, Anno Domini, corresponding with the 3d of Suffer, 1219 Anno Higera, settled and concluded at Poonah, by Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, resident with his Highness the Peishwah, Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close has delivered to his said Highness a copy of the same, in English, Persian, and Marhatta, under the seal and signature of the said Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, and his Highness the Peishwah has delivered to the said Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close another copy, also in Persian, Marhatta, and English, bearing his Highness's seal, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, aforesaid, has engaged to procure and deliver to his said Highness, without delay, a copy of the same, duly ratified by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, on the receipt of which by his said Highness, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the honourable the English East India Company and on his Highness, and the copy of it now delivered to his said Highness shall be returned.

APPENDIX C.

Treaty of amity and alliance between the honourable the East India Company and Maha Rajah Seway Beshoinder Runjeet Singh Behauder, Behauder Jung, settled by his Excellency General Gerard Lord Lake, Baron Delhi and Laswaree and Aston Clinton, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in India, in virtue of authority vested in him for that purpose by his Excellency the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor General in Council of all the British possessions, and Captain General of all the British Land Forces in the East Indies, in behalf of the honourable the East India Company, and by Maha Rajah Seway Beshoinder Runjeet Singh Behauder, in behalf of himself, his heirs and successors.

ART. 1. A firm and permanent friendship is established between the honourable the English East India Company, and Maha Rajah Seway Beshoinder Runjeet Sing Behauder, and between their heirs and successors.

ART. 2. As friendship has been established between the two states, the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both, and an adherence to this condition shall be constantly observed by both states.

ART. 3. Whereas circumstances have occurred which have interrupted the friendship formerly subsisting between the honourable Company, and Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing Behauder, which friendship is now renewed, in order to prevent the recurrence of such circumstances, the Maha Rajah agrees as a security to the British Government, that one of his sons shall constantly remain with the officer who may command the British forces in the Soubahs of Delhi or Agra, until such time as the British Government may be perfectly satisfied in regard to the Maha Rajah's fidelity; and the honourable Company on the other hand agrees, that upon satisfactory proof being afforded of the Maha Rajah's fidelity and attachment to the British Government, the fort of Deeg, which is now in the possession of the officers of Government, shall be restored to Rajah Runjeet Sing.

ART. 4. Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing binds himself to pay to the honourable the English East India Company, in consideration of the peace now granted to him, the sum of twenty lacs of Furkhabaud Sicca rupees by instalments, as hereunto subjoined; and the honourable Company in consideration of the losses the Maha Rajah has suffered, and the destruction of his country, and of the representations he has made of his inability to provide means for the immediate payment of this amount, agrees to receive it by instalments as undermentioned: and the honourable Company further promises that if at the period when the payment of the last instalment of five lacs of rupees shall become due, the Government shall be satisfied with the proofs of the Maha Rajah's fidelity and attachment, the payment of this instalment shall be remitted.

To be paid immediately	F. S. Rupees 3,00,000
In two months	2,00,000

F. S. Rupees 5,00,000

Instalments.

At the end of the year 1862 Summhut (April 1866)	3,00,000
At the end of the year 1863 Summhut (April 1867)	3,00,000
At the end of the year 1864 Summhut (April 1868)	4,00,000
At the end of the year 1865 Summhut (April 1869)	5,00,000

F. S. Rupees 20,00,000

ART. 5. The country which was formerly in the possession of Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing previously to the accession of the English Government, is now con-

firmed to him by the honourable Company; and the honourable Company in consideration of the friendship now established, will not interfere in the possession of this country, nor demand any tribute on account of it.

ART. 6. In the event of any enemy evincing a disposition to attack the dominions of the honourable Company, Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing binds himself to assist to the utmost of his power in expelling the enemy; and in no measure to hold any correspondence, or be in any way connected with, or assisting to the enemies of the honourable Company.

ART. 7. As by the second article of the present treaty, the honourable Company become guarantee to Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing for the security of his country against external enemies, the Maha Rajah hereby agrees, that if any misunderstanding should arise between him and the sircar of any other chieftain, the Maha Rajah will in the first instance submit the cause of dispute to the honourable Company's Government, that the Government may endeavour to settle it amicably, agreeably to justice and ancient usage. If from the obstinacy of the opposite party, no amicable terms can be settled, then Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing may demand aid from the Company's Government. In the event above stated in this article it will be granted.

ART. 8. The Maha Rajah shall not, in future, entertain in his service, nor give admission to any English or French subjects, or any other person from among the inhabitants of Europe, without the sanction of the honourable Company's Government; and the honourable Company also agrees not to give admission to any of the Maha Rajah's relations or servants without his consent. The above treaty comprised in eight articles, has been duly concluded and confirmed by the seals and signatures of his Excellency General Gerard Lord Lake, and Maha Rajah Seway Beshoinder Runjeet Singh Behauder at Bhurtpoor, in the Soobah of Akbarabaud, on the seventeenth day of April, 1805, corresponding with the 16th of Mohurram, 1220 Mijree, and with the third day of Bysaack, 1862, Summhut.

When a treaty containing the above eight articles shall be delivered to Maha Rajah Seway Beshoinder Runjeet Sing Behauder, under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, the present treaty under the seal and signature of his Excellency General Gerard Lord Lake, shall be returned.

A true copy.

(Signed)

J. ADAM.

APPENDIX D.

Treaty of Perpetual Friendship and Alliance between the Honourable English East India Company Behauder and the Maha Rajah Behauder, Rajah of Travancore.

Whereas the treaty concluded in the year 1795, between the honourable Company of Merchants of England, trading to the East Indies, and his late Highness the Rajah of Travancore, was intended to defend and protect the Travancore country against foreign enemies, and to strengthen and to fix the terms of the ancient friendship and alliance subsisting between the Company and the Rajah of Travancore; and whereas it is evident that the intentions of the contracting parties have not been duly fulfilled, and whereas the said Company and his Highness the Rajah of Travancore have judged it expedient that additional provisions should at this time be made for the purpose of supplying the defects in the said treaty, and of establishing the connection between the said contracting parties on a permanent basis of security in all times to come; therefore, in order to carry into effect the said intentions, the present treaty is concluded by Lieutenant Colonel Colin Macaulay, resident at Travancore, on the part and in the name of his Excellency the Most Noble Marquis Wellesley, K.P. and K.C., Governor General in Council of all the British possessions in the East Indies, and by his Highness the Rajah of Travancore,

for himself, agreeably to the following articles, which shall be binding on the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

ART. 1. The friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties shall be considered as the friends and enemies of both. The honourable the East India Company Behauder especially engaging to defend and protect the territories of the Maha Rajah Ram Rajah Behauder of Travancore against all enemies whatever.

ART. 2. Whereas, by the seventh article of the treaty concluded in the year 1795, between the Maha Rajah Ram Rajah Behauder and the English East India Company Behauder, it was stipulated, "that when the Company shall require any aid of his troops to assist them in war, it shall be incumbent on the said reigning Rajah, for the time being, to furnish such aid, to such extent, and in such numbers as may be in his power, from his regular infantry and cavalry, exclusive of the native Nayers of his country," and the Company being now willing entirely to release the Rajah from the obligations incurred under the said stipulation, it is hereby concluded and agreed, that the Ram Rajah Behauder is for ever discharged from the aforesaid burthensome obligation.

ART. 3. In consideration of the stipulations and release contained in the first and second articles, whereby the Company become liable to heavy and constant expense, while great relief is afforded to the revenues of the Rajah, his Highness engages to pay annually to the said Company a sum equivalent to the expense of one regiment of the honourable Company's native infantry, in addition to the sum now payable by the said Rajah, for the force subsidised by his Highness, by the third article of the subsidiary treaty of 1795, the said amount to be paid in six equal instalments, commencing from the first day of January 1805: and his said Highness further agrees, that the disposal of the said sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops to be maintained by it, whether stationed within the Travancore country or within the Company's districts, shall be left entirely to the Company.

ART. 4. Should it become necessary for the Company to employ a larger force than that which is stipulated for in the preceding article, to protect the territories of the said Maha Rajah against attack or invasion, his Highness agrees to contribute, jointly with the Company, towards the discharge of the increased expense thereby occasioned, such a sum as shall appear, on an attentive consideration of the means of his said Highness, to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual nett revenues of his said Highness.

ART. 5. Whereas it is indispensably necessary that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the funds destined to defray, either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses described in the preceding article of the present treaty, it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor General in Council of Fort William in Bengal, shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor General in Council shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right, either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the Government of Travancore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Behauder such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness the Maha Rajah Ram Rajah Behauder, as shall appear to him, the said Governor General in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available, either in time of peace or war.

ART. 6. And it is hereby further agreed, that whenever the said Governor General in Council shall signify to the said Maha Rajah Ram Behauder, that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the fifth article, his said Highness Maha Rajah Ram Rajah Behauder shall immediately issue orders to his aumils or other officers, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, according to the tenor of the fifth article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and controul of the English Company Behauder; and in case his Highness shall not issue orders within ten days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the said Governor General in Council shall be at liberty to issue orders, by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenues of the said territories, as he shall judge

expedient, for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said military funds, and of providing for the effectual protection of the country and welfare of the people. Provided always, that whenever, and so long as any part or parts of his said Highness's territories shall be placed, and shall remain under the exclusive authority and controul of the said East India Company, the Governor General in Council shall render to his Excellency a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed. Provided also, that in case whenever his Highness's actual receipt or annual income, arising out of his territorial revenues be less than the sum of two lacks of rupees, together with one-fifth of the nett revenues of the whole of his territories, which sum of two lacks of rupees, together with the amount of one-fifth of the said revenues, the East India Company engages, at all times and in every possible case, to secure, and cause to be paid for his Highness's use.

ART. 7. His Highness the Maha Rajah Ram Rajah Behauder, engages that he will be guided by a sincere and cordial attention to the relations of peace and amity established between the English Company and their allies, and that he will carefully abstain from any interference in the affairs of any state in alliance with the said English Company Behauder, or of any state whatever. And for securing the object of this stipulation, it is further stipulated and agreed, that no communication or correspondence with any foreign state whatever shall be holden by his said Highness, without the previous knowledge and sanction of the said English Company Behauder.

ART. 8. His Highness stipulates and agrees, that he will not admit any European foreigners into his service without the concurrence of the English Company Behauder; and that he will apprehend and deliver to the Company's Government all Europeans, of whatever description, who shall be found within the territories of his said Highness, without regular passports from the British Government, it being his Highness's determined resolution not to suffer, even for a day, any European to remain within his territories unless by consent of the said Company.

ART. 9. Such parts of the treaty (A.D. 1795) one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, between the English East India Company and the late Rajah of Travancore, as are calculated to strengthen the alliance, to cement the friendship, and to identify the interest of the contracting parties, are hereby renewed and confirmed; and accordingly his Highness hereby promises to pay, at all times, the utmost attention to such advice as the English Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states.

ART. 10. This treaty, consisting of ten articles, being this day, the 12th day of January 1805, settled and concluded at the fortress of Jeeroovanamaporam, in Travancore, by Lieutenant Colonel Colin Macaulay, on behalf and in the name of his Excellency the Most Noble Marquis Wellesley, Governor General in Council, with the Maha Rajah Ram Rajah Behauder, he has delivered to the said Maha Rajah one copy of the same, in English and Persian, signed and sealed by him, and his Highness the Maha Rajah has delivered to the Lieutenant Colonel aforesaid, another copy, also in Persian and English, bearing his seal and signature, and signed and sealed by Vayloo Tomby, Dewan to the Maha Rajah aforesaid; and the Lieutenant Colonel aforesaid has engaged to procure and deliver to the said Maha Rajah, without delay, a copy of the same, under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Most Noble Marquis Wellesley, Governor General in Council, on the receipt of which by the said Maha Rajah the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the honourable Company and on the Maha Rajah Ram Rajah Behauder, and the copy of it now delivered to the said Maha Rajah shall be returned.

A true copy.
(Signed)

C. MACAULAY,
Resident at Travancore.

APPENDIX E.

Treaty of Amity and Alliance between the Honourable the East India Company and Maha Rajah Seway Ranah Kerrut Sing Luckinder Behauder, providing for the Guarantee, on the part of the Honourable Company, of the country of Gohud and others, to be held by Maha Rajah Ranah in Sovereignty, and for the Payment, on the part of the Maha Rajah Rana, of a Subsidiary Force from the Honourable Company; concluded by his Excellency General Gerard Lake, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in India, in virtue of Authority vested in him for that Purpose by his Excellency the most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Captain General and Commander-in-Chief of all the Land Forces serving in the British possessions in India, and Governor General in Council at Fort William in Bengal, on the part of the Honourable Company, and by Maha Rajah Seway Ranah Kerrut Sing Behauder, for Himself, his Heirs, and Successors.

ART. 1. A permanent friendship and alliance is established between the honourable Company and Maha Rajah Rana Kerrut Sing Behauder, and between their heirs and successors. In conformity to the friendship established, the friends and enemies of one party shall be the friends and enemies of both.

ART. 2. The honourable the East India Company hereby agree to establish Maha Rajah Ranah Kerrut Sing in the sovereignty of his hereditary countries of Gohud, and the undermentioned districts, to be possessed by him, his heirs, and successors, free from all deductions, under the guarantee of the honourable Company :—

Gualior Khas; Antree and others, five Muhals, Antree, Chummuck, Powan, Salbye and Chunour; Ullahpore; Summoulee; Puharghur and others, composing Talook Sukurwaree; Talook Jetwur; Purgunah Binde with its Talooks; Purgunah Phomp; Talook Oomree; Talook Ballawa; Talook Jugnee; Seroy Choolah; Doondree; Ahnoun; Noorabad; Attowra; Buhadurporee; Ballaittee; Curwas; Hawellee; Gohud; Behut; Talook; Sookulharee; Talook Amaun; Inderkee; Nhodah; Lehar and others, forming Zillah Katchwakar, Lahar, Rampoom, Kuksees, Kuthoonuda Baksa, Gopalpoom; Goojirra; Kuttoullee; Lawan Kalan; Purgunah Moh; Purgunah Ratwa; Talook Deoghur.

ART. 3. Three battalions of the honourable Company's Sepoys shall be permanently stationed with Maha Rajah Rana for the protection of his country, the expenses of which shall be regularly paid by Maha Rajah Rana to the honourable Company every month, at the monthly rate of twenty-five thousand Lucnow sicca rupees, or rupees of the same standard value, for each battalion, amounting to the monthly sum of seventy-five thousand rupees, or nine lacks of rupees annually. In the event of a failure on the part of the Maha Rajah Rana, in the regular monthly payment of the expenses of the battalions, the honourable Company's Governments retains to itself the right of appointing a person to superintend the collection of the above amount from the country.

ART. 4. Maha Raja Rana agrees, that the possession of the fortress and city of Gualior shall be permanently vested in the honourable Company's Government, and that it shall be at the option of the government to station the honourable Company's troops in whichever of the other forts or places of strength in the Rana's country, and at whatever time the government may deem expedient, with the exception of Gohud; and to level such forts and places of strength in the Rana's country, with the exception of Gohud, as to the government may appear advisable.

ART. 5. The honourable Company shall not demand any tribute from the country delivered over to Maha Rajah Rana Kerrut Sing.

ART. 6. In the event of an enemy of the honourable Company evincing a disposition to attack the countries lately taken possession of by the honourable

Company in Hindostan, Maha Rajah Rana agrees to send the whole of his forces to their assistance, and exert himself to the utmost of his power to repel the enemy, and to omit no opportunity of proving his friendship and attachment.

ART. 7. As by the second article of the present treaty the honourable Company becomes guarantee to Maha Rajah Rana for the security of his country against external enemies, Maha Rajah Rana hereby agrees, that if any misunderstanding should arise between him and the Sircar of any other chieftain, Maha Rajah Rana will, in the first instance, submit the cause of dispute to the Company's Government, that the government may endeavour to settle it amicably. If, from the obstinacy of the opposite party, no amicable terms can be settled, then Maha Rajah Rana may employ the honourable Company's troops, stationed for the protection of his country, against the opposite party.

ART. 8. Although Maha Rajah Rana retains the exclusive command of his own army, yet he hereby agrees to act, during the period of a war, in conformity to the advice and council of the Commander of the Company's troops.

ART. 9. Maha Rajah Rana shall not entertain in his service, or in any manner give admission to any English or French subjects, or any other persons from amongst the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the British Government.

The above treaty, comprised in nine articles, has been duly concluded and confirmed, under the seal and signature of his Excellency General Gerard Lake, at Beanah, on the 17th day of January 1804, of the Christian æra, corresponding with the 3d of Sowall, 1218 Higera, and with the 20th of Maugh, 1816 Sumbut, and under the seal and signature of Maha Rajah Sewah Rana Kerrut Sing Luckinder Behauder, at Gualior, on the 29th day of January 1804, of the Christian æra, corresponding with the 15th of Sowall, 1218 Higera, and with the 3d Phagon, 1860 Summut. When a treaty, containing the above nine articles, shall be delivered to Maha Rajah Sewah Rana Kerrut Sing Luckinder Behauder, under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Most Noble the Marquis Wellesley, Governor General in Council, the present treaty, under the seal and signature of his Excellency General Gerard Lake, shall be returned.

APPENDIX F.

Definitive Treaty of General Defensive Alliance between the honourable English East India Company on the one part, and the Maha Rajah Anund Row Guicowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Behauder and his children, heirs and Successors on the other, settled by Major Alexander Walker, Resident at Baroda, having full powers from the Government of Bombay, which is in like manner authorized by his Excellency the Most Noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, Governor General in Council appointed by the honourable the Court of Directors, to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

Whereas various agreements have been concluded between the honourable Company on the one part, and Anund Row Guicowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder on the other, all tending to improve and increase the friendship and alliance between the contracting parties, viz:—A convention dated at Cambay, the fifteenth of March, 1802, settled by the Governor of Bombay on the part of the honourable Company, and by Rowjee Appajee Dewan on the part of Anund Row Guicowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Behauder.

An agreement dated at Cambay the 6th of June, 1802, settled by the Governor of Bombay on the part of the honourable Company, and by Rowjee Appajee Dewan on the part of Anund Row Guicowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Behauder, and an agreement made by Anund Row Guicowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Behauder, with Major Alexander Walker, Resident at Baroda, on the part of the honourable Company, dated at Baroda the 29th of July, 1802; and whereas it is desirable to

consolidate the stipulations of all these separate engagements with one definitive treaty, and further to improve the state of alliance of the contracting parties in like manner as has been applied for by the aforesaid Rowjee Appajee in his letter of the 10th of Suffer or the 12th of June, 1803, desiring that the present engagements between the honourable Company and the Guikowar state may be drawn up in terms consonant to those employed in the treaty of Bassein between the honourable Company, and his Highness the Peishwa; the said Company and the Maha Rajah Anund Row Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder, do hereby accordingly agree to the following articles framed for that purpose.

ART. 1. All the stipulations of the engagements heretofore made between the contracting parties and above recited, viz., on the 15th of March, 6th of June, and 29th of July, 1802, are hereby confirmed and are to bind the contracting parties, their heirs and successors for ever.

ART. 2. The friends and enemies of either party, shall be the friends and enemies of both, and if any power shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, or against their respective dependents or allies, and after due representation shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction which the contracting parties shall have required, the contracting parties will proceed to prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand.

ART. 3. Whereas, in conformity to the agreements heretofore made between the honourable Company and the Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder, a subsidiary force of 2000 men was subsidized, and inclusive of the half augmentation of the subsidiary force first fixed upon, the Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder agrees to receive, and the honourable Company to furnish, a permanent subsidiary force, of not less than 3000 regular native infantry, with one company of European artillery, and their proportion, viz. two companies of gun-lascars, with the necessary ordnance, and warlike stores and ammunition, which force is to be stationed in the territories of the said Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder.

ART. 4. The subsidiary force will, at all times, be ready to execute services of importance; such as the protection of the person of Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder, his heirs and successors, the overawing and chastisement of rebels and excitors of disturbance in his territories, and the due correction of his subjects or dependants, who may withhold the payment of the Sircar's just claims; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor like Sebundy to be stationed in the country to collect the revenue. One battalion of these forces, however, or such a proportion of them as the performance of the foregoing services may require, will proceed to Kattywar, when there may be a real necessity for it; but the English Government, whose care and attention to all the interests of the Guikowar state cannot be doubted, must remain the judge of its necessity.

ART. 5. In order to provide the regular payment of the whole expense of this subsidiary force, Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder has ceded, by the agreements aforesaid, viz. dated the 15th March, 6th June, and 29th July, 1802, and 2d June, 1803, districts and other funds, of which a schedule (A) is annexed to this treaty, of the yearly net value of 11,70,000 rupees. This cession is confirmed by this treaty, and Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder hereby cedes the districts of which the schedule is annexed, with all the rights of sovereignty thereof, and all the forts which they contain, in perpetuity, to the honourable Company.

ART. 6. The districts of Chowrassy, Chickly, Surat, Chouth, and Kaira, have been ceded to the honourable Company by Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder, as a proof of his friendship, and as a testimony of his sense of the benefit which he has received from his alliance with the honourable Company's government. The cession of these districts is confirmed by this treaty, and Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder hereby cedes the districts above-mentioned, with all the rights belonging to the sovereignty thereof, and all the forts which they contain, in perpetuity, to the honourable Company.

ART. 7. Whereas the honourable Company have, at different periods, assisted Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumshier Bahauder, both from their own

funds and those of bankers, with advances of money, a particular account of which, as well as of the funds assigned for the payment of the same, is contained in the schedule annexed, marked (B) it is hereby agreed, that the full amount of the russod of the districts therein named, according to the provisions in the eighth article of the agreement of the 29th July, shall be collected on account of the honourable Company, and the persons therein referred to, until these debts and the interest due upon them shall be fully paid; and for the past or any future advances which the Company's government may make to that of the Guikowar, Mahals shall be assigned as their security.

ART. 8. Grain, and all other articles of consumption and provisions, all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary numbers of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force, shall be exempted from duties in the territories of Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder, and the commanding officer and the officers of the subsidiary force shall be treated, in all respects, in a manner suitable to the importance of the trust placed in them and the dignity of the British Government. In like manner shall the officers of the Guikowar government meet with similar consideration and respect from the honourable Company. In consideration, also, of the good will and friendship which has so long happily subsisted between the honourable Company and the Guikowar government, such goods and articles as may be *bond fide* required for the private use or consumption of that family, or of the ministers, shall be allowed to be purchased at Surat and Bombay, and to be sent from thence free of duties, on being accompanied by a passport from the Resident at Baroda.

As the Deccan is the native country of the Mahrattas, who inhabit or serve in Guzerat, such of this nation as may be in the Guikowar service shall be allowed to pass and repass freely, with their families, through the honourable Company's territories.

It is expressly understood, that the admission of this article is not to sanction, or in any shape to authorize the transit of merchandize or of prohibited goods.

ART. 9. The Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder hereby engages, that he will not entertain in his service any European or American, or any native of India, subject of the honourable Company, without the consent of the British Government; neither will the Company's government entertain in their service any of the Guikowar servants, dependants, or slaves, contrary to the inclination of that state.

ART. 10. Inasmuch as, by the present treaty, the contracting parties are bound in an alliance for mutual defence and protection, Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder engages never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any power whatever; and in the event of difference arising, whatever adjustment the honourable Company's government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may, in communication with the Guikowar Sircar, determine, shall meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

ART. 11. Whereas there are certain unfinished transactions between his Highness the Peishwa and Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder, and there exist certain papers of accounts which are unadjusted, Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder doth hereby agree, that the honourable Company's government shall examine into and finally adjust the said transactions, papers, and accounts, and the demands resulting therefrom; and Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder binds himself, his heirs, and successors, to abide by such adjustment as the British Government shall accordingly determine. Further, in respect to these unsettled pecuniary affairs existing with the governments of his Highness the Peishwa and the Guikowar, it behoves the latter to repose a similar faith in the British Government as the Peishwa, who has agreed to abide by the adjustment of these concerns.

This settlement shall be effected by the honourable Company, after taking into mature consideration the impoverished state of the Guikowar finances; and the latter government entertain a full conviction, that no oppressive demand will be enforced under the Company's mediation.

ART. 12. If, notwithstanding the defensive nature of the agreement between the contracting parties, and their desire to cultivate and improve the relations of peace with all the powers of India, war should unfortunately break out, it is agreed that with the reserve of a battalion of native infantry to remain near the person of

the Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder, or such proportion as may appear necessary for the security of Guzerat, the residue of the subsidiary force, with their ordnance and public stores and ammunition, shall be immediately put in motion, for the purpose of opposing the enemy.

The troops of the Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder shall accompany the British troops to the boundaries of Guzerat, in order to terminate the war. Should, however, any great exigency arise, the circumstances shall be mutually considered, and the best means in the power of the contracting parties pursued to terminate the same.

ART. 13. As the enemies of both states are the same, those who are in opposition to the Guikowar government, or in rebellion to it, can never, while acting in this manner, be admitted to the friendship of the honourable Company; but should Canoojee Guikowar, who comes under this description, repent and submit himself, it will be advisable to allow him a suitable pension, on which he may subsist and reside at Bombay, or at any other place which may be equally safe and convenient.

Neither Canoojee Guikowar nor Mulha Rao Guikowar will have any other claim on the Guikowar government than the pension which has been assigned to the latter, and that which may eventually be assigned to the former.

ART. 14. When the subsidiary troops will take the field, the Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder will supply such quantities of grain and Brinjarries to attend the army, as the resources of his country may afford, the British Government defraying the expense thereof.

ART. 15. If disturbances shall, at any time, break out in the honourable Company's territories or districts, bordering on those of the Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder, the said Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar shall consent to the employment of such a proportion of the subsidiary force, as may be requisite to quell the same: and if, at any time, disturbances shall break out in any part of the Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder's territories, to which it might be inconvenient to detach a proportion of the subsidiary force, the British Government will, in like manner, at the requisition of the said Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder, detach such a proportion of the troops of the Company, as may be most conveniently situated to assist in quelling the said disturbances in the Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder's territories.

ART. 16. In future the subject of each state, who may take refuge with either, shall be delivered up, if the state from which such parties shall have fled appear to have any demand of debt or any just claim against him or them: but as a free intercourse between the countries under the two governments is also intended, frivolous claims against parties resorting from their own to the others jurisdiction are not to be preferred, and in all serious cases cordiality will be shewn.

ART. 17. The contracting parties hereby bind themselves to take into consideration, hereafter, the commercial relations between their respective territories, and to settle them in due time by a commercial treaty.

Done at Baroda, the 21st April, Anno Domini 1805.

Schedule A. A statement of the Funds assigned and Districts, in perpetual sovereignty, to the honourable Company, by Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder, in order to provide for the regular payment of the subsidiary troops.

The Pergunnah of Dholka, 4,50,000 rupees; ditto Neryaud, 1,75,000; ditto Beja-poor, 1,30,000; ditto Matter, 1,30,000; ditto Mondeh, 1,10,000; the Tuppa of Kurree, 25,000; the Kimkatodra, 50,000; Warrat on Kattywar, 1,00,000.—Total 11,70,000 rupees.

Baroda, the 21st April, Anno Domini 1805.

(Signed)

A. WALKER,
Resident.

Schedule B. A statement of the Advances made by the Honourable Company and various Bankers to Maha Rajah Anund Rao Guikowar Sena Khas Kheyl Shumsheir Bahauder, comprising an account of the funds assigned for their re-payment, according to the provisions made in the eighth article of the Agreement of the 29th of July, Anno Domini 1802.

Advanced on account of the first loan, for the reduction of the Arab Sebundy.

By the honourable Company.—December 21st 1802, as per account settled by the Accountant-General at the Presidency, under this date, 10,77,447r. 3a. 96p. *By the Shroffs.*—Hurry Bucktee, Arjooujee Nathjee Terwady, Samul Becherdass, Mungul Sukeedass, (inclusive of Manoty) 12,48,000r.—Total 23,25,447r. 3a. 96p.

On account of the second loan, for the discharge of the Arab Sebundy.

By the honourable Company.—January 31st 1803, as per account and bond of this date, 8,89,683r. 0a. 16p. *By the Shroffs.*—Samuldas Beckerdass, 4,96,143r. 2a. 50p.; Mungul Suckeedass, 4,27,458r.—Total 18,13,284r. 2a. 66p.

Funds assigned for the re-payment of the foregoing.—1st. the Pergunnah of Baroda, 6,00,000 rupees; 2d. ditto Petland, 3,00,000; 3d. Talooka Ahmedabad, 1,00,000; 4th. ditto Kerul, 25,000; 5th. the Sayer Kotee of the Fort of Baroda, 75,000; 6th. Pergunnah of Kurree, 1,50,000; 7th. ditto Raj Pimpla, 45,000.—Total 12,95,000 rupees.

Baroda, the 21st April, Anno Domini 1805.

APPENDIX G.

Treaty with the Rajah of Soonth, 1803.

Trusting and believing in Providence: I hereby declare that, desirous to embrace the very amicable offer made to me by Colonel Murray, commanding the British troops in Guzerat Attaveesy, and conquered districts, on behalf of the honourable Company Bahauder, and to cement the friendship which at present so happily exists between me and the honourable Company's government, I have, in testimony thereof, of my free will and consent, entered into the following engagements with the honourable Company Bahauder, under whose protection it has pleased the Almighty to place me.

ARTICLE 1. As tributary to Powaghur and the honourable Company Bahauder, I hereby engage to continue the payment of the same annual tribute as it has been usual for me to pay to the late government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, namely, 2,700 rupees: but should it please the honourable Company's government graciously to release me, in future, from the payment of the aforesaid tribute, then I engage to present them annually with such Nuzzerannee, in token of my allegiance, as they may be pleased to direct, which shall be in lieu of all other sums whatever; and as long as I continue faithfully to adhere to the interests of the honourable Company, this concession of the tribute to be paid by me, if acceded to by his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, shall not be liable to be revoked.

ARTICLE 2. I engage, on every occasion, to consider the enemies of the English as my own, and to the last extremity to defend my country, and oppose any attempt of a hostile nature which may be made by a foreign power, for the passage of troops through my districts, and relinquish all claim to indemnification for any losses myself or subjects may suffer on the occasion.

ARTICLE 3. On all occasions when my country is threatened by a foreign force, either on account of my attachment to the British Government or by people, my enemies, I shall receive assistance from the honourable Company's government, to enable me to resist the enemy: unless it should appear the invasion is intended merely to punish insubordinate subjects of mine, who may have violated my neighbour's boundaries, when I agree to adopt such measures as may satisfy the aggrieved.

ARTICLE 4. I engage, on all occasions, to be answerable for the safety of the property and persons of the British Government, its servants and subjects, where-

ever they may be, now or hereafter, in my districts, and relinquish all claim to remuneration for these services from the Government, as far as relates to them or those in their service: but with respect to their subjects, I reserve the right of taxing merchandize and exacting payment according to antient custom, for the protection which I hereby engage to give to the merchants.

Concluded, Camp Calliban, December 15th, 1803.

(Signed)

J. MURRAY,
Collector.

APPENDIX H.

Treaty with the Rajah of Lunawara, 1803.

In virtue of the authority which has been vested in Colonel John Murray, commanding the British forces in Guzerat Attaveesy, and districts conquered from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to ratify and conclude a treaty of amity with me, on the basis of friendship, and on those terms of reciprocal benefit which had been previously acceded to on my part, and recommended in my behalf by Colonel Murray, during his continuance in the Lunawara district; and anxious to profit by the friendly protection which the honourable Company Bahauder has been graciously pleased to extend towards me, I do, of my free will, and in conformity to the terms previously agreed to, hereby enter into or confirm the following conditions, namely:

ARTICLE 1. First, as tributary to the honourable Company Bahauder, I hereby engage, in consequence of their gracious concession, in my behalf, of the tribute hitherto usually paid by me to the late government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to maintain, at my own expense, devoid of every claim to remuneration from the government of the honourable Company Bahauder, a military force for the defence of my territories, the services of which shall be at their command, in repelling every attempt hostile to their interests, by an invasion of the Guzerat through my districts: and I hereby engage to relinquish all claim to indemnification for any injury myself or subjects may sustain, in our persons or property, by these efforts against the common enemy, considering, on all occasions, the enemies of the English as my own, and pledging myself to defend my country against them to the last extremity; further engaging, to give such token of allegiance as his Excellency the Governor-General may be pleased to require.

ARTICLE 2. Secondly, I engage, on all occasions, to be answerable for the safety of the property and persons of the British Government, its servants and subjects, wherever they may be, now or hereafter, in my districts, and relinquish all claim to remuneration for their services from the Government, as far as relates to them or those in their service; but with respect to their subjects, I reserve the right of taxing merchandize and exacting payment, according to antient custom, for the protection which I hereby engage to give the merchants.

Concluded, Camp Lunawara, November 14, 1803.

(Signed)

J. MURRAY,
Collector.

APPENDIX I.

Copy of a Treaty concluded with Shahamut Sing, Rajah of Pretaubghur, by Colonel Murray, commanding the British troops in Guzerat, the Attaveesy, and Malwa, 1804.

ARTICLE 1. The Rajah disclaims all subjection or acknowledgment of superiority to Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

ARTICLE 2. The Rajah engages to pay the tribute formerly paid by him to Jeswunt Rao Holkar to the British Government, when the most noble the Governor General shall think fit to order it to be levied.

ARTICLE 3. The Rajah shall consider the enemies of the British Government as his own, and engages that he will not permit them to remain in his districts.

ARTICLE 4. All British troops and stores, of every description, for the British army, shall be permitted to pass free through the districts of the Rajah; and the Rajah further engages to afford them every assistance and protection.

ARTICLE 5. The districts of the Rajah shall deliver at Mulhar Ghur five thousand maunds of rice, two thousand maunds of gram, and three thousand maunds of jowaree, for which a fair and equitable price shall be paid on the delivery, to be made one half in fourteen, the remainder in twenty-eight days.

ARTICLE 6. In the full confidence that the above articles shall be strictly performed by the Rajah, Colonel Murray, commanding the British forces, engages to raise no contributions, either of money, cattle, or grain, nor will he permit any contributions to be levied by detachments of British troops under his command.

ARTICLE 7. The Rajah engages to coin in the mint of Pretaubghur, such bullion as the commanding officer of the British troops may find convenient to send there, the British Government defraying the actual expense.

ARTICLE 8. This treaty shall be sent, with the least possible delay, for the ratification of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General; but the above articles shall be strictly adhered to by the officer commanding the troops and the Rajah, till the ratification shall arrive.

Given under my hand and seal, this 25th day of November, 1804, in Camp on the Chumbul.

(Signed)

J. MURRAY,
Collector.

APPENDIX K.

Treaty with the King of Queda, 1802.

In the year of the Higera of the Prophet (the peace of the most high God be upon him) 1215, the year Hun, on the 12th day of the moon Mohurrun, on the day Aaorbare, (Wednesday) whereas, this day, this writing sheweth, that Sir George Leith, Baronet, Lieutenant-Governor of Pulo Pinang,* on the part of the English Company, has agreed on and concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance with his Highness Yeng de Pur Tuan Rajah Mooda of Purlees and Queda, and all his officers of state and royals of the two countries, to continue on sea and land, as long as the sun and moon retain their motion and splendor, the articles of which treaty are as follows:

ART. 1. The English Company are to pay annually to his Highness Yeng de Pur Tuan of Purlees and Queda, 10,000 dollars, as long as the English shall continue in possession of Pulo Pinang, and the country on the opposite coast hereafter mentioned.

ART. 2. Yeng de Per Tuan agrees to give to the English Company, for ever, all that part of the sea-coast that is between Qualla Kurrican and the river side of Qualla Mooda, and measuring in land from the sea-side sixty Orlongs; the whole length above-mentioned to be measured by people appointed by Yeng de Pur Tuan and the Company's people. The English Company are to protect this coast from all enemies, robbers, and pirates, that may attack it by sea, from south to north.

ART. 3. His Highness Yeng de Pur Tuan agrees, that all kinds of provisions wanted for Pulo Pinang, the ships of war and the Company's ships may be bought at Purlees and Queda, without impediment or being subject to any duty or custom; and all boats going from Pulo Pinang to Purlees and Queda, for the purpose of purchasing provisions, are to be furnished with proper passports for that purpose, to prevent impositions.

ART. 4. All slaves running away from Purlees and Queda to Pulo Pinang, or from Pulo Pinang to Purlees and Queda, shall be returned to their owners.

ART. 5. All debtors running from their creditors from Purlees and Queda to Pulo Pinang, or from Pulo Pinang to Purlees and Queda, if they do not pay their debts, their persons shall be delivered up to their creditors.

* Prince of Wales Island

ART. 6. Yeng de Pur Tuan shall not permit Europeans, of any other nation, to settle in any part of his dominions.

ART. 7. The Company are not to receive any such people as may be proved to have committed rebellion, or high treason, against Yeng de Pur Tuan.

ART. 8. All persons, guilty of murder, running from Purlees and Queda, to Pulo Pinang, or from Pulo Pinang to Purlees and Queda, shall be apprehended and returned in bonds.

ART. 9. All persons stealing chops (forgery) to be given up likewise.

ART. 10. All those who are or may become enemies to the Company, Yeng de Pur Tuan shall not assist with provisions.

ART. 11. All persons belonging to Yeng de Pur Tuan, bringing the produce of the country down the river, are not to be molested or impeded by the Company's people.

ART. 12. Such articles as Yeng de Pur Tuan may stand in need of from Pulo Pinang are to be procured by the Company's agents, and the amount to be deducted out of the gratuity.

ART. 13. As soon as possible after the ratification of this treaty, the arrears of gratuity now due, agreeable to the former treaty and agreement to his Highness Yeng de Pur Tuan of Purlees and Queda, to be paid off.

ART. 14. On the ratification of this treaty, all former treaties and agreements between the two governments to be null and void.

These fourteen articles being settled and concluded between his Highness Yeng de Pur Tuan and the English Company, the countries of Purlees and Queda, and Pulo Pinang, shall be as one country; and whoever shall depart or deviate from any part of this agreement, God will punish and destroy him: he shall not prosper.

This done and completed, and two treaties, of the same tenor and date, interchangeably given between his Highness Yeng de Pur Tuan and the Governor of Pulo Pinang, and sealed with the seals of the state officers immediately officiating under his Highness Yeng de Pur Tuan, in order to prevent disputes hereafter.

Wrote by Hakim Ebrahim Eben (son of) Sirree Rajah Mooda, by order of his Highness Yeng de Pur Tuan of exalted dignity.

A true translation.

(Signed)

J. SWAINE, M. T.

Approved and confirmed by the Governor-General in Council, November 1802.

APPENDIX L.

*Memoire sur l'importance actuelle de l'Inde et les moyens les plus efficaces d'y retablir la Nation Française dans son ancienne splendeur.**

Pondicherry, 6th August, 1803.

Ce n'est point par le tableau de notre ancienne prospérité dans le péninsule de l'Inde, qu'il s'agit de démontrer l'importance du commerce de cette belle contrée dans le monde politique; c'est encore moins par le recit de nos défaites et l'exposé de notre decadence, aussi rapide que notre splendeur avoit été courte, qu'on doit fixer l'attention d'un gouvernement sage, qui, après avoir réglé entre la France et les voisins, les rapports que ses avantages naturels du climat et de la situation prescrivoient, depuis long-tems comme devant, lui assurer une paix sans interruption ne peut avoir en vue d'autre objet pour compléter la gloire nationale que de venger sur l'Océan nos droits si souvent injurés avec impunité, et d'établir sur cet élément un *droit de gens* universel qui assure à tous les pavillons commerçants liberté de passage d'un pôle à l'autre, et remplacer la guerre par une émulation louable qui deviendra la source du bonheur des nations. C'est donc sur le contraction de l'influence prodigieuse qu'à donnée à l'Angleterre sur toute l'Europe, un commerce sans rivalité dont elle s'est rendu l'arbitre; c'est sur le calcul des ressources immenses qu'elle a tiré dans cette guerre terrible de ses possessions territoriales dans l'Inde tant pour nous susciter chaque année de nou-

* This document is referred to by the Governor-General at p. 155.—[ED.]

veaux ennemis en ouvrant les trésors à de nouvelles coalitions, que pour maintenir cette marine formidable d'ont elle est si fière, et sur laquelle elle fondé son droit à l'empire des mers; enfin c'est sur le souvenir de nos humiliations passées des traités de paix disgracieux qu'elle nous a forcé de signer surtout celui de 1763 dont on ne peut se rappeler sans indignation qu'est fondue la nécessité de ne point séparer la métropole de ses colonies et de faire occuper à la France dans le système politique de l'Asie, le rang que sa prépondérance lui donne incontestablement parmi les puissances Européens. Le Gouvernement François n'aura rempli que la moitié de sa tâche quand par une paix solide, il aura donné à la république des barrières impénétrables, à quoi lui servirait cette étendue de côte de plus de 200 lieues sans interruption, si de riches et de puissantes colonies ne leur assurent un échange mutuel de productions, si une commerce florissante et une navigation libre ne détournent au profit national cette source d'opulence et de prospérité que nos rivaux ont si adroitement employé contre nous jusqu'à présent en nous en privant, en un mot à quoi abouterait toutes nos brillantes conquêtes, si le pavillon François ne flotte avec une gloire égale dans les deux hémisphères.

Tournez donc vos regards vers l'orient, O mes compatriotes, l'Asie vous offre un champ vaste pour deployer votre genie et votre courage, vous y trouverez des immenses sujets de speculations si vous pouvez combattre avec avantage vos ennemis naturels; lorsque l'Inde sera rendue a sa grandeur primitive et que les oppressions Britanniques seroient fermés elle ouvrira ses sources inépuisables de richesses.

Avant d'indiquer les moyens les plus probables d'attaquer avec succès les Anglois dans leurs possessions de l'Inde, il est nécessaire de faire le tableau de leur situation actuelle dans cette partie du monde; de leur état militaire, de leur administration civile; enfin de leurs rapports public avec les différent peuples qui bordent leur immenses frontières. Personne n'ignore que l'Indostan, depuis le demembrement de l'Empire Mogul, offre plus qu'aucun autre pays une scène de vicissitudes, des trônes renversées, des Princes assassinés, de l'usurpateur revetu de la souveraineté, et par consequent ne présente à la vue d'un observateur qu'un bouleversement général des interests divers de chaque gouvernement au milieu de toutes les révolutions qui se succèdent. C'est pourquoi l'on ne sera pas étonné que les details suivants différent en beaucoup des points de tout ce qui a été dit et écrit sur l'Inde avant la conquête de Maysour et des provinces soumises a Tippoo Sultan, catastrophe, que a de nouveau changé totalement la face des affaires et qui en augmentant à-peu-pres d'un tiers les richesses et la force des Anglois ne fait qu'ajouter à la nécessité de rétablir l'équilibre dans ce vaste empire autrefois si florissant.

Des succès prodigieux que la Compagnie Angloise obtint par ses armes lui procurerent la souveraineté d'un immense territoire et de double d'habitants qui contiennent les isles Britanniques et la prerogative plus étonnante encore d'être l'arbitre de tout l'Indostan, mais ces avantages tous brillants qu'ils sont, loin d'affermir son existence future doivent par la suite contribuer a accélérer sa ruine; car arrivée d'une prospérité a laquelle elle s'attendoit peu et ne peut pas être en état de soutenir elle ne consultera bientôt plus que sa cupidité sans bornes, et bouleversera la constitution primitive du pays en la surchargeant des formes tout a fait étrangères qu'elle y introduiroit par violences. L'oppression sous toutes les formes fut encouragés par des actes successifs de tyrannie et des outrages sans nombre qui furent toujours impunis et la depopulation de ces contrées florissantes fut l'effet soudain de ces injustices; d'ou l'on peut conclure que par le flux naturel des probabilités humaines il arrivera une époque ou toutes les puissances de l'Inde, malgré les prejugués religieux et les intérêts qui les separerent se liguèrent contre les Anglois pour punir leurs usurpations et leur perfidies; l'Europe a enseigné a l'Asie l'art de la guerre, et l'usage des armes; on en fabrique aujourd'hui dans l'Indostan qui ne sont inferieures a celles qui sortent de nos manufactures.

La domination a laquelle pretend la Grande Bretagne et le privilège exclusif de la Compagnie pour le commerce intérieure de l'Inde s'étendent depuis le Cap Comorin vers le 10°. degré jusqu'au 29°. degré de latitude septentrionale et de l'est a l'ouest sur un terrain d'environ 800 milles Anglois outre ses possessions sur la côté de Guzzerat, de Malabar, etc. et les acquisitions qu'elle vient de faire des vastes états de Tippoo Sultan. Les domaines de la Compagnie sous le Présidence du Bengale peuvent se diviser en trois parties près égales. La première

partie est cultivée; la seconde ayant été abandonnée par les habitans qui fuyoient l'oppression, s'est couverte de bois, et sert a présent pour l'asyle aux tigres, aux léopards, loups, buffles, et éléphants : enfin l'autre tiers est occupé par des canaux, lacs, et marais. On suppose que les habitans qui y ont pris naissance sont encore au nombre de 12 à 15 millions; et le produit de leurs travaux et de leur industrie qui est exporté chaque année égale 2,500,000 livres sterling, ou 52,500,000 livres tournois. On peut d'après cela calculer quelle seroit l'étendue de la population, et des productions si la partie abandonnée étoit cultivée de nouveau.

Les possessions de la Compagnie sous la Présidence de Madras à la côte Coromandel, de Golconda, et d'Orixa, sont susceptibles de plus grande amélioration encore et pourroient conséquemment fournir une plus grande quantité d'objets pour l'avancement du commerce. Les Circars du nord de Moustaphanagur, Ellore, Rajahmandrie, et Chicacole, deviendroient également une source abondante de richesses sous une système judicieuse de gouvernement, ces provinces qui furent cédés à Monsieur de Bussi en 1753 par Salabut Jung ajoignées à Mazulipatam, et au Condavir que Monsieur Duplex avoit déjà obtenu de Mouzaphur Jung rendirent alors les François maîtres de la plus grande partie des côtes de Coromandel et Orixa sur une prolongement sans interruption d'environ 200 lieus depuis Madapilly jusqu'au la pagode de Jagrenate. Ces pays sont bornés par une vaste chaine de montagnes, qui ont à-peu-près la même direction que la côte, et en sont distantes de 30 à 35 lieues dans certains endroits quoique dans d'autres elles ne soient pas de plus de 10. Ces montagnes sont couvertes d'immenses forêts de bambous et dans leur étendue, il n'y a pas plus de 3 ou 4 passages qui suivant M. De Bussi lui-même pourroient être défendus avec 100 hommes contre une armée entière. Les revenus de ces quatre provinces étoit computés dans ce tems là à 3,100,000 roupies. Les Anglois en tirent à-peu-près la même somme, mais si les baux étoit portés à leur just valeur, les produits pourroient être augmentées de près du double; il est évidente qu'à cette époque les François se trouvoient maîtres de la plus vaste étendue de territoire qu'est jusques alors été possédé par aucune nation Européene dans l'Indostan, sans en excepter les Portugais même au comble de leur grandeur; d'ailleurs il ne manquoit aucun des avantages du commerce pour doubler la valeur de ces acquisitions importantes, car les toiles propres au commerce d'Europe fabriqué dans cette partie de Dekan, sont supérieurs de beaucoup, et moins chères que dans le Carnate; dans le province de Rajahmundrie il y a des forêts considérables de bois de Teck, et c'est la seule partie de la côte Coromandel et de celle d'Orixa qui fournisse ce bois d'un usage si universel dans toute l'Inde, et si précieux pour la construction navale; la province de Chicacole abonde en riz, et autres grains, et peut-être exporte chaque année une grande quantité; il seroit d'autant plus important qu'on sert bien la valeur de circars du nord, qu'on doit les regarder comme une domaine nationale, auquel nous avons des droits incontestables, et que nos ennemis ne nous ont arrachés qu'à l'issu de la guerre la plus désastreuse qu'ait jamais soutenue la France.

Mais quoique la Grande Bretagne paroisse être arrivée au fait de la prospérité, par la souveraineté qu'elle exerce sur la plus riche portion de l'Asie, on est dans l'erreur si l'on croit ses ressources inépuisables, et l'on ne sera point étonné du dérangement progressif de ses finances dans l'Inde, quand on connoitra les causes de l'appauvrissement rapide de cette contrée privilégiée; c'est ce qu'il est à-propos de développer ici par un exposé abrégé du système commerciale de la Compagnie Angloise depuis ses brillantes acquisitions.

Bien des personnes croient qu'il y a encore au Bengale une grande quantité d'espèces; l'idée qu'on a concu en générale de la masse d'argent qui circule dans ce pays est fondée principalement sur le calcul des sommes immenses exportés annuellement de l'Europe pour les échanger contre les productions de l'Inde qu'on ne peut obtenir que par des métaux. Mais malgré cette exportation prodigieuse de monnoies de l'Europe, et quoique des nouvelles conquêtes vers le nord et des concussions sans nombre, vient faire circuler dans les établissemens de la Compagnie Angloise des nouveaux fonds, cependant la disette de numéraire devient plus considérable que les sources d'où l'on avoit tiré ne furent abondantes.

Depuis que les Anglois sont maîtres du Bengale, ils n'ont cessé d'en exporter une quantité immense d'espèces et c'est une des plus grandes fautes politiques qu'ils aient peut commettre; car c'est la plus que dans toute autre pays qu'elles

sont nécessaires à l'encouragement d'industrie et des arts. On peut évaluer le revenu totale du commerce du Bengale à trois millions sterling par an : la moitié de cette somme reste en circulation pour les frais de gouvernement civil et militaire, l'autre moitié passe en Angleterre en marchandises de Bengale, de Bombay, et de la Chine. Supposons maintenant que deux million et demi qui circule, les employés de la commerce en envoient chaque année un tiers dans leur patrie comme leur propriété particulière en or, argent, ou pierres précieuses, il s'en suivra qu'il sort tous les ans des possessions Angloises deux millions sterling pour lesquels il ne revient dans l'Inde aucun équivalent.

Il est certain qu'il est sorti de Bengale des sommes énormes qui excède de beaucoup le pillage qu'ont pu y faire les Anglois, et qui probablement n'y retourneront jamais. En 1738, Nadir Shah connu en Europe sous le nom de Thamas Kouli Khan, emporta de Delhi tant en espèces qu'en ornemens massifs, vaisselle, l'ingot, etc. la valeur d'environ un milliard six cent quatre-vingt millions tournois. Cassim Alli Khan emporta en 1764 un trésor peut-être égale au quart au moins un tiers de l'argent alors en circulation dans le Bengale et le Bahar ; le vuide occasionné par le défaut des exportations ordinaires de l'argent en l'ingot depuis 1756 jusqu'à 1766 fut calculé être pendant ces dix ans de plus de 8 millions sterling (168,000,000 livres) depuis cette époque la Compagnie ne peut pas avoir exporté pour son commerce de la Chine moins de 20 millions sterling (410,000,000 livres) tant en l'ingots qu'en piastres. La guerre d'Hyder Ally, celle avec les Marattes, les deux dernières avec Tipou Sultan ont coûté plus de six millions sterling (126,000,000 livres) d'argent courante du Bengale ; depuis 30 ans il y a entré peu d'argent et point du tout d'or importé de l'Europe et presque point d'ailleurs ; le commerce de Golphe Persique d'où l'on tiroit d'abord une quantité assez considérable des métaux est presque tomber totalement. On peut conclure d'après cela que la masse d'espèces monnoyées doit avoir été autrefois d'une immensité inconcevable, mais ces épuisemens continuels en ont réduit la quantité à une somme beaucoup moindre qu'on ne le suppose généralement.

De toutes ces considérations on peut résumer que le nerf de la grandeur politique des Anglois dans l'Inde s'affoiblissait à mesure que leurs domaines ont augmenté, le corps gigantesque subira le sort de tant de puissances qu'il a renversées devant lui, et perdant l'équilibre s'écroulera de lui-même pour faire place à un autre peuple qui s'offroient pour fermer les plaies des opprimés et ne voudroit d'autre récompense de les avoir délivrés que les avantages naturels du commerce dans le pays le plus fertile et le plus riche du monde. L'éclat passager qu'à donné récemment à la Compagnie Angloise la chute du Sultan de Maysour et la conquête de ses belles provinces a été acheté chèrement si l'on fait attention que la plus grande partie des trésors trouvés dans Seringapatam est devenu le propriété de preneurs, et que les domaines immenses de Tippou ont été partagé en trois parties dont la première a été cédé au Nizam comme allié des Anglois dans cette guerre, la seconde donné aux Marattes en raison de leur anciennes réclamations sur ce pays, enfin la troisième est resté pour toujours annexée au territoire de la Compagnie. Mais il doit se passer quelques années avant que les revenus de ce tiers puissent couvrir les dépenses et les charges qui ont été occasionnée par cette guerre de six mois dont le succès est un des événemens le plus heureux qui sont arrivés aux Anglois depuis la fondation de leur première établissement dans l'Indostan. Cependant malgré la solidité qui semblent donner à leur gouvernement la brillante conquête du Maysour, il ne manqueroit pas d'ennemis redoutables prêts à déployer contre eux leurs étendards ; les Marattes qui, s'ils étoient réunis, ont à leur disposition plus de 200,000 hommes de cavalerie et le fameux Zimaun Shah qui commande 100,000 de ces indomptables guerriers descendants de ceux qui parcoururent et ravagerent toute l'Asie sous Gengis Khan, Tamerlins, Thamas Kuli Khan, etc. et menacent encore les possessions Angloises d'une nouvelle invasion, ce qu'ils ne manqueroit pas d'exécuter s'ils étoient soutenus par quelque puissance Européenne ; ce puissant Prince semble n'attendre qu'une alliance et un prétexte plausible en apparence pour commencer les hostilités. Les prétextes seroient en grande nombre, et ils existent dans la politique cruelle qu'à adopté le célèbre Lord Clive lors de la soumission des provinces principales du Bengale, et son successeur M. Hastings qui n'a pas moins que lui contribué à soulever et à réunir tous les exploits par une révolution totale dans cette partie du globe ; il est nécessaire d'entrer à ce sujet dans quelques détails qui

pourroit donner une idée de la base sur laquelle est fondu l'édifice extraordinaire de la puissance Britannique dans l'Indostan.

Depuis la conclusion du traité de Benares en 1773, l'Empire Mogol est resté sans chef constitutionnel et sans que le vrai souverain fut reconnu dans aucune état particulière ; l'indécision et l'incertitude sur ce grand point de souveraineté feront toujours naître des demêlés qui ne cesseront de menacer la Compagnie Angloise d'une dissolution précipitée, et d'une suite des dissensions plus importantes que celles qui ont précédées la prospérité de son gouvernement dans ce pays.

La Compagnie Angloise leve comme trésorier de l'empire les revenus impériaux des provinces de Bengale, Bahar, et Oriza, sous le privilège et l'autorité spéciale de l'Empereur qui a été forcé de lui accorder cette faveur par une suite d'événemens extraordinaires, qui n'appartiennent point à ce sujet à condition qu'elle deviendra le garant perpétuel du payement de 25 lacs de roupies comme tribut annuelle de la Nababie du Bengale, assurant en même-tems à l'Empereur la possession incontestable d'Ellahabad et Corah, provinces que lui étoit solennellement cédées et garanties comme une domaine inaliénable pour le maintien de sa dignité impériale. Telles furent les conditions sous lesquelles le Nabab du Bengale et la Compagnie Angloise reçurent leur autorité et leur privilèges de la cour de Delhi. Le grand fondateur du pouvoir Britannique dans l'Indostan le fameux Clive, fut celui qu'obtint ces immenses concessions de Shah Allum, alors roi de Delhi, elles ont transformé un Compagnie de négociants en souverains puissants qui y ont un grand établissement militaire et regulier. Par différens traités qui furent conclus à divers époques au profit de la Compagnie pour des nouvelles cessions, Shah Allum fut confirmé dans la souveraineté ainsi que dans la possession de Corah et Ellahabad et cependant on a violé les obligations les plus sacrés d'une manière outrageante : on n'a tenu aucune des conditions auxquelles on s'étoit engagé. Bientôt les Nababes d'Oude et de Bengale refusent hommage à l'Empereur, et la Compagnie non-seulement arrêta la payement du tribut stipulée mais elle vendit même les provinces d'Ellahabad et de Corah pour 50 lacs de roupies au Nabab d'Oude, Soujah-al-Doulah, Vassal immédiat de l'empire et qui avoit particulièrement accédé solennellement à ces cessions et à la guaranté du traité. Ces doubles vols politiques a été commis par M. Hastings dans le commencement de son administration.

Tel est le traitement qui reçut de la part d'une société de marchands avanturiers, l'Empereur de l'Indostan, l'unique rejetton de l'illustre maison de Timur, si respecte dans tout l'Orient que la souveraineté est reconnue universellement, quoiqu'en effet la substance de son pouvoir s'est évanouie, et que la Compagnie Angloise elle-même dérive son pouvoir constitutionnel de sa bonté infinie. Il est évident que Shah Allum devoit-être le souverain incontestable de l'Empire Mogole, étant l'arrière petit fils d'Aureng-Zeb, dixième successeur en ligne directe de Tamerlan. Cette grande question sur la souveraineté étant décidée, il reste à juger s'il n'est possible que les rejettons de cette malheureux famille trouvent un jour des protecteurs qui feront valoir leurs droits sacrés et briseront leurs fers ignominieux. C'est alors qu'un alliance reciproque et un réunion sage des pouvoirs assureroit la permanence de souveraineté de l'Empereur, et rendroient heureux les sujets réels et les tributaires en les faisant jouir de la sûreté personnelle et des richesses qui produisent la paix, l'agriculture, et un commerce libre.

La Compagnie Angloise par le traitement ignominieux qu'elle a fait éprouver au Grand Mogol a donc forfait son droit de divan et de trésorier de l'empire ; les Nababs d'Oude et de Bengale sont également coupables de félonie, parcequ'ils on agi en traites envers leur souverain légitime. Ainsi l'Empereur de Delhi a son droit réel et incontestable de transmettre à qui bon lui semble la souveraineté de ses états ainsi que les arrérages qui lui sont dûs par les Anglois ; ces arrérages du tribut de 26 lacs de roupies promis par la compagnie joint a l'intérêt du pays se montent aujourd'hui à plus de quatre cent cinquante-deux millions tournois, somme qui excède de beaucoup la valeur des propriétés mobilières de la Compagnie.

Les actes d'injustice et de tyrannie commis par les Anglois ou en leur nom sont trop connus pour qu'il soit nécessaire de les rappeler ici. Il n'est personne qui ignore la condamnation inique, et l'exécution cruelle du Rajah Nured Comar ; l'imprisonnement violent des Begams mère et épouse de Soujah al Doulah et le saisie arbitraire de tout leur trésor ; l'outrage sanglant commis sur la

personne, les finances, et la prospérité du Rajah de Benares Cheit Sing, enfin tant d'autres violences, infractions des traités, usurpations, etc. etc. ont fait dans le cœur de ceux qui en ont été victimes des plaies trop profondes pour qu'elles puissent être fermées de long-temps. La guerre injuste et cruelle fait aux Rohillahs en faveur du Nabab d'Oude, la destruction presque totale de ce peuple noble et guerrier et la dévastation de leurs riches provinces ne pourront jamais être oubliées des descendans de ces malheureux qui ont été obligés de fuir au nombre de 500,000 chez ceux qu'ils regardoient auparavant comme leurs plus cruels ennemis, les Marattes.

On a voulu persuader au public que les Anglois n'ont rien à craindre des naturels du pays trop timides et trop faible pour attaquer leurs vainqueurs, et qu'ils peuvent compter sur une possession permanente des domaines qu'ils ont envahis. Cependant il est aisé de prouver que ces opinions sont très-fausSES et que l'Empire Britannique dans l'Inde est plutôt fondé sur la crainte que sur la force. On n'a aucun raison pour croire que l'Indostan eut jamais manqué de peuples courageux, il est certain que plusieurs puissances de ce pays ont des grandes armées de cavalerie et d'infanterie bien disciplinées et qui ne sont pourtant pas composés d'étrangères, les Sipahis au service des Européens sont braves et très-bien exercés à toutes les opérations militaires ; en un mot il n'y a peut-être aucune peuple du monde qui montre dans les souffrances autant de courage et d'intrépidité que les Indiens.

Quoique la plus part des nations de l'Inde aient été autrefois tributaires des Empereurs Mogoles et depuis soumises aux Anglois, il n'y en a cependant qui n'ont jamais été subjugués et se regissent encore suivant leur propre gouvernement, tels sont les Marattes qu'il n'a jamais été possible de réduire. Ces peuples sont gouvernés par un conseil de plusieurs Rajahs de la religion des Indous, ils se sont toujours défendus de l'esclavage, et même ils ont souvent obligés leurs voisins à devenir leurs tributaires ; ils ont forcé le fameux Aurungzebe à leur payer un tribut annuel de la quatrième partie de revenu du Deccan c'est ce qu'on appelle le Choute. Les Marattes continuèrent à recevoir le choute jusqu'à ce que l'Empire Mogol ont été entièrement épuisé par les ravages de Nadir Shah. L'Empereur pour les dédommager leur permit de recevoir le même droit sur les provinces de Bengale. Il est vrai qu'à cette époque le Mogol n'étoit pas plus le maître du Bengale que de Decan ; cependant les Marattes mirent en devoir de faire valoir leurs prétensions, et ils acquirent par là un nouveau droit au choute, ils envoyèrent dans le Bengale une armée de 80,000 hommes qui défait entièrement celle de Nabab usurpateur Aliverdi Khan, qui en 1747 fut obligé d'acheter la paix des Marattes en leur cédant le Cuttack, et s'engagent de plus à leur payer un choute de douze lacs de roupies. Depuis cette époque la Compagnie Angloise ayent pris possession du Bengale ainsi que des provinces de Bahar et d'Orissa qui avoient été conservées par les derniers Nababes ; il y a eu sur l'article du choute plusieurs discussions entre les employés de la Compagnie et les chefs Marattes ; on voit par là que ceux ci ont toujours demandé le rétablissement de ce tribut auquel ils ont des droits incontestables ainsi qu'au paiement des arrérages qui leurs sont dus depuis que les Anglois sont devenus souverains du Bengale. Les Marattes possèdent un pays très-étendu ; leurs domaines actuels s'étendent vers la partie méridionale de la péninsule jusqu'aux frontières des états de Tippou Sultan ; et jusqu'à la province de Guzeratte au nord, séparées des territoires appartenans à la Perse par la rivière Padder et de l'Empire Mogol par le Jamna ; à l'est ils vont jusqu'au Carnate et bordent les frontières du Soubah du Deccan ; ce pays de Cuttack qui leur appartient étendant inégalement leurs possessions à travers la presqu'isle jusqu'au golphe du Bengale. Leurs revenus sont évalués à plus de 252 millions tournois. Les laboureurs et les fabriquiers dans ce pays quittent souvent leurs chaumes et leurs métiers pour aller aux combats ; ils ne reçoivent d'autre éducation qu'une éducation militaire et leurs armées sont presque entièrement composés de cavalerie accoutumés depuis long-tems aux expéditions militaires, ils sont toujours prêts à quitter leurs pays pour ravager les territoires voisins et les rendre tributaires ; ils ont été formidables de tout tems, mais ils le sont devenus bien d'avantage depuis leur expédition contre Anaverde Khan, on les a vu depuis prêts à terrasser Hyder Alli Khan et faire voir que ses forces n'étoient pas en état de se mesurer avec les leurs. Ils travaillent maintenant à former des corps d'infanterie et ils ont déjà des bataillons qui ne le cèdent

en rien pour la discipline et la bravoure à aucuns troupes de l'Inde, même celles au service des puissances européennes.

Il est évident que du jour où la puissance du Sultan du Maysour à été abattue il n'existe plus dans l'Inde que deux puissances réels qui puissent prétendre à quelque influence sur le balance politique dans cette partie du monde; ce sont les Marattes et les Anglois, en calculant le cours naturel des événemens, l'Asie doit-être avant peu témoin d'une contestation des plus importantes; que ce soient les Anglois qui jettent le premier le gantelet les Marattes ne manqueront certainement pas de la ramasser, et d'accepter le défi; et en supposant même que la discipline et la valeur européenne donnent aux premiers un avantage au raison de 10 contre 1, cependant ils ne manqueront pas d'ennemis pour les occuper, et le premier succès obtenus contre eux par les Asiatiques ne sera pas loin de leur ruine totale.

L'Angleterre est bien peu prévoyante si elle suppose que ses nombreux sujets dans l'Inde ne soient pas disposés à briser leurs fers, et à secouer le joug sous lequel ils gemissent. Les puissances de l'Europe et de l'Asie envoient avec raison les vastes et superflus domaines qu'elle possède, et il est probable que l'un d'elles ou tous ensemble chercheront un jour à lui enlever la souveraineté dont elle jouit dans ce pays. Les Marattes suffiroit seuls s'ils étoient bien dirigés et bien commandés pour accomplir cette important révolution. Tel est l'état des possessions de Bretagne en Asie, et tels sont les rapports politiques avec ses voisins. Les naturels du pays detestent son gouvernement oppressif, qui les accable, et fait tous les jours deserter un grande nombre d'habitans; enfin la Compagnie Angloise par la terme de son administration et ses privilèges extraordinaires tyrannise non-seulement ses sujets, mais encore souvent ses compatriotes et quelquefois ses employés. L'homme impartial et judicieux peut d'après cela prononcer si la puissance Britannique dans l'Indostan est inébranlable, et si la politique doit continuer à lui procurer le même succès.

Pendant il seroit absurde de s'abuser sur les difficultés auxquelles on doit s'attendre si l'on veut attaquer les Anglois de vive force dans leurs possessions de l'Inde tant comme il seroit dangereux de ne pas connoître quel résistance ils pourroient opposer à une invasion de leur territoire. Il est certain que la compagnie pour la défense de ses vastes domaines a sur pied l'armée la plus formidable et sans aucun doute la mieux discipliné qu'ait jamais vue l'Asie; elle entretient dans une activité perpetuelle environ 160,000 tant cavalerie que l'infanterie qui sont répandus dans les trois Présidences de Calcutta, Madras, et Bombay, sur l'immense surface qu'elles occupent. Cette armée est composée des troupes Européennes et Indiennes, qui peuvent être classés de cette manière; savoir, 20 régimens Européennes d'infanterie l'un portant l'autre à 800—16,000 hommes. 6 régimens de cavalerie ou dragons 600—3600. 4 régimens d'artillerie tant royale que de la Compagnie faisant à-peu-près 3600 hommes; en tout environ 23,600 Européennes. Les Présidences du Bengale, et de Madras ont chacun 20 régimens de Sepahis de deux battalions à 1200 hommes, celle de Bombay en a dix, ce qui fait un totale de 50 régimens de 2400 ou 120,000 Sipahis, outre 17 régimens de cavalerie Indiennes dans les trois Présidences à 600 hommes chaque, faisant 10,200 cavalerie, d'où l'on voit que les troupes reguliers Indiennes se montent au moins à 130,000 hommes, mais il faut observer que les bataillons de Lascars de l'artillerie, pionniers, pontonniers, etc. les corps appelés bataillons de revenues dont il y a de 8 à 10 tant dans les circars que dans les pays conquis sur les Hollandois ne sont point compris dans cette exposé. La force de ces corps est assez ordinairement indéfini, et s'augmente ou diminue suivant le besoin qu'on en a. Il est évident que cette armée quoique très-considérable en elle-même ne peut suffire à couvrir un espace de plus de 300 lieus en longueur sur 260 en largeur, surtout si l'on considere qu'elle doit en même-tems fourni aux garnisons des places conquises sur les Hollandais depuis cette guerre. L'isle de Ceylon qui occupé 3 régimens Européennes et deux bataillons de Sepahis et les Molucques qui n'exigent pas moins de deux régimens Européennes et de deux bataillons de Sepahis; de plus les Polygars qui se trouvent dans le sud de côte Coromandel ainsi que dans les circars tiennent continuellement en activité plus de 10,000 hommes qui sont occupés pendant six mois de l'année à leur faire une guerre de chicane qui consomme beaucoup de monde sans mettre fin aux déprédations de cette caste redoutable d'Indous qu'on n'a jamais pu soumettre.

Voyons maintenant par quels moyens la France avec une marine délabrée et de beaucoup inférieure à celle de l'Angleterre peut cependant se flatter de l'attaquer avec succès dans ses possessions de l'Inde et lui porter de ce côté la les coups les plus décisifs quant à l'issue de cette longue guerre les obstacles sans nombre qu'ont en a surmonter les Français pour résister à leur nombreux ennemis et de convertir en vainqueurs les puissantes coalitions formés contre eux n'admettoient point de mesures ordinaires de la part de leur gouvernement dont tous les ressorts continuellement tendus ont donné lieu à des efforts prodigieux de génie et de valeur. C'est sa politique communicante presque toujours, le mouvement rapide qui avoit produit l'invention à fait enfanter des projets extraordinaires, qu'on n'eût pas manqué dans un autre siècle de releguer avec les Histoires fabuleuses d'Amadis de Gaule, ou de Roland le furieux, et il est à remarquer que de toutes les vastes entreprises confiées par le gouvernement aux généraux de la république celles qui lui ont le mieux réussi, avoit toujours été regardées d'avance par ses ennemis comme hérissées de difficultés insurmontables.

La fameux expédition d'Egypte occupera sans doute le premier rang dans l'histoire des succès de la république en même temps qu'elle a immortalisé le héros qui l'avoit calculé dans le secret le plus impénétrable, et qui l'a exécuté avec une rapidité non moins étonnante. Le conquérant de l'Italie devenu le rival d'Alexandre ne se put sûrement pas s'arrêter sur les bords de l'Indus, s'il eut eu le temps de mettre à exécution ses superbes projets et si le bonheur de sa patrie ne l'eût appelé à de plus hautes destinées ; mais il n'y a point à craindre que dans le poste éminent que ses talents et ses vertus lui ont mérités, le premier Consul oublié jamais une colonie, dont il est le fondateur, et renoncer à un plan dont le succès peut-être si important, et qui en portant la guerre en Asie doit influer si puissamment sur le sort politique de l'Europe, et réaliser ce que disoit au Parlement d'Angleterre un célèbre ministre du Roi George II. pendant la guerre de 7 ans que c'étoit au cœur de l'Allemagne qu'il falloit conquérir l'Amérique, ce qu'on peut actuellement retorquer en disant que cette en Asie qu'il faut conquérir l'Angleterre. Depuis quelques années des gens d'esprit ne cessent de dire, et la multitude de répéter que le projet de faire passer une armée par terre d'Egypte dans l'Inde est un chimère et une des ces entreprises fabuleuses dont l'exécution est impossible. Ces assertions on été appuyés de tant des raisonnements captieux qu'il n'est pas étonnant qu'un grande nombre de personnes qui connoissent aussi peu la géographie que l'histoire se soient laisser persuader sur un sujet qui d'ailleurs elles avoient si peu de raison d'approfondir. S'il étoit nécessaire d'appuyer par des exemples la possibilité de faire marcher une armée formidable à travers les sables de l'Arabie sans remonter à une époque aussi reculé que le siècle d'Alexandre, on pourroit citer l'expédition plus moderne de Gengis Khan qui en le 13^e. siècle parcourut en conquérant l'Asie dans tout son largeur avec une armée de plus de cent mille hommes et ne s'arrêta qu'au Bhosphore de Thrace; celle de Tamerlan également Tartare qui deux siècles après fit des conquêtes plus brillantes encore, et après avoir tout soumis depuis la Chine jusqu'à l'Europe, qu'il fit trembler, revient sur ses pas pour jeter les fondemens de l'Empire Mogul, qui n'existe plus que de nom depuis l'invasion de Nadir Shah qui transversoit pareillement avec les forces considérables l'espace immense et dans beaucoup d'endroits désert, qui se trouve entre la Perse et Delhi. Les armées de ses puissants guerriers étoient d'ailleurs suivant l'usage orientale, surchargées d'une quantité infinie des bouches inutiles qui dans les Indes ne quittent jamais les camps, ainsi que d'une suite pompeuse plus magnifique qu'utile et plus embarrassant encore en raison des obstacles qu'elle oppose toujours aux évolutions militaires tandis qu'une armée européenne qui entreprendroit une marche aussi longue et aussi pénible ne se chargeroit que de bagage qui lui seroit absolument nécessaire et ne se grosseroit dans ses progrès que de compagnons d'armées, qui pourroient beaucoup lui servir et dont on trouveroit à se recruter partout ou elle passeroit.

Les Français en se rendant maîtres de l'Egypte et s'y maintenant dans un état de défense respectable ont déjà exécutés la moitié de la tache brillante qui leur est imposée, celle de combattre avec avantage leurs ennemis naturels, en leur prenant par la seul côté attaquant qu'ils présentent. C'est l'élite des troupes invincibles de la république, c'est à l'armée de l'est si justement dénommée, qu'est réservée de retablir dans l'Indostan l'honneur des armes Françaises, et de réaliser

les vastes et nobles projets qu'avoit songées Dupleix pour l'aggrandissement de sa nation, lorsque par une impéritie ministérielle, dont les conséquences furent trop bien senti depuis ce grand homme fut arrêté au milieu de sa carrière et rappelé dans sa patrie ou une compagnie de marchands qu'il avoit si bien servi pendant 30 ans le laissa mourir dans une médiocrité qui approchoit de l'indigence. Sans prétendre tracer à l'armée d'Egypte la route qu'elle doit tenir il est à-propos d'indiquer comment il est possible de lui épargner la plus grande partie de la marche pénible du désert, et de le faire entrer avec peu de difficulté dans un pays fertile et bien cultivé qui ne leur opposera aucune résistance. Le moyen seroit donc de profiter de l'absence de la flotte Angloise qui est obligé de quitter sa croisière sur les côtes d'Egypte de temps contre pour aller se ravitailler ailleurs, et de se saisir des vaisseaux qui se trouvent dans les ports d'Alexandrie pour transporter à-peu-près 20,000 hommes à Alexandrette le port le plus nord de la côte de Syrie. Cette armée toute fraîche encore prennent de la son point de départ, et dirigeant sa cours vers l'orient trouveroit bientôt l'Euphrate qui n'est distante d'Alexandrette que d'environ 60 lieues. Ce célèbre fleuve une fois passé on trouve les plaines de Diarbeker, autrefois tant vantés sous le nom de Mesopotamie et en suivant le cours de l'Euphrate jusqu'au près de l'ancienne Babilone par une marche de cent cinquante lieues on reprendroit de nouveau la route de l'est pour gagner Bagdad sur le Tigre ; c'est ce fleuve qui sépare le Diarbekir de la Perse, et l'Isphane n'est pas éloigné de Bagdad de plus de 130 lieues. Ce superbe Royaume est trop bien connu pour qu'il soit nécessaire de s'étendre sur la fertilité de son territoire, et les ressources immenses qu'il fourniroit à une armée victorieuse qui l'envahiroit ; la Perse d'ailleurs depuis le renversement du trône des Sophis par l'usurpateur Thamas Kouli Khan a été déchiré par des guerres civiles et continuellement livrée au pillage des différens tyrans qui sont rapidement succédés sur cette scène changeante ; c'est pourquoi loin de trouver le moindre opposition, on doit s'attendre à être partout accueilli de manière à traverser ce vaste pays, aides de toutes ses richesses et de ses productions. On y trouveroit en outre d'excellens chevaux, peut-être en assez grand nombre pour monter toute l'armée ; des bœufs pour l'artillerie, ainsi que des chameaux et des éléphants pour les baggages ; il seroit même facile en flattant un peu le goût des Persans, et ne heurtant point leurs préjugés religieux d'y former quelques bataillons de sipahées, qui seroit très utiles à l'armée dans sa marche et feroit d'excellent troupes pour l'Inde, où cette nation jouit d'une grande réputation de valeur ; là ils ont à traverser la Perse et les provinces orientales qui en dependent peut-être supposés d'environ 450 lieues, jusqu'au frontière de Caboul ou commence l'Empire Mogol ; c'est alors que l'armée trouveroit à faire des alliances importantes et à se recruter considérablement parmi les tribes guerriers qui habite vers cette partie. Les Seiks qui possèdent une vaste étendue de territoire entre le Caboul et le Lahore pourroient par eux mêmes devenir des ennemis très redoutables aux Anglois en raison de leur esprit militaire et enthousiaste ; de la force de leur constitution et des dangers aux qu'elles ils sont continuellement exposés ; s'ils venoit à se réunir sous un seul chef. M. Hastings pendant sa trop célèbre administration vouloit engager le conseil de Calcutta à envoyer contre eux des troupes de la Compagnie en conjonction avec les Marattes qui leur faisoient la guerre, pour justifier ce projet d'agression unique il alla jusqu'à prédire une révolution totale dans les Indes si on permettoit à ce peuple martial d'arriver à sa maturité sans interruption ; comme si de peur qu'un nation devienne un jour formidable, on avoit le droit de l'exterminer. Quelle logique ? On peut après cela supposer qu'il ne seroit pas difficile de les déterminer à se ranger sous des étendards destinés à combattre ceux qui avoit conçu le projet de leur destruction. De Caboul la capitale de la province de ce nom jusqu'à Delhi il n'y a pas plus de 200 lieues en passant par le beau pays de Cashmire et de Lahor dont les frontières bordent celles de l'Indostan proprement dit.

On voit par cet aperçu que l'armée de l'Est peut en partant d'Alexandrette et évitant la plus grande partie du desert gagner la capitale de l'Empire Mogol après une route d'environ 850 lieus ; en supposant les marches de 4 lieus par jour l'une dans l'autre, en moins de sept mois à dater de l'époque de son départ d'Egypte elle doit être en possession de Delhi ; une flotte qui partiroit d'Europe pour cela ne pourroit pas se rendre en moins de temps, et certainement pour transporter le même nombre d'hommes les dépenses seroient de plus de double. D'ailleurs les

sables de l'Arabie et le climat brûlante seront ils des obstacles pour ceux qui les Alpes n'ont pu arrêter, et qui ont pu se frayer un chemin par des défiles jusqu' alors impénétrables.

C'est de sa Majesté Impériale que les François doivent dériver leur influence politique dans l'Indostan, c'est en débutant par un acte de justice en rétablissant l'illustre maison de Timur dans tous ses droits, et la rendant à sa splendeur primitive que peuvent acquérir des titres à la reconnaissance de l'Empereur Shah Allum, et lorsque ses titres seront appuyés d'une force militaire des plus formidables, on peut d'avance calculer les effets certains de la bienveillance de ce Prince. C'est au nom de l'Empereur qu'on doit entamer des Négociations et former des alliances, lui seul peut avec efficacité rallier autour du son Trône la plupart des Princes de l'Empire, qui ne se sont depuis longtemps séparés de ses intérêts, que parce qu'il manquoit des forces pour les retenir dans le devoir, et que les Anglois se présentant dans un moment d'anarchie, ont eu peu de peine à arrêter tout-à-fait le mouvement d'une machine désorganisée. Il n'y a point de que les Mahrattes qui depuis le chût du Sultan de Maysour sont devenus les ennemis naturels des Anglois, n'embrassent avec empressement le projet d'une coalition, dont le but seroit d'abaisser une puissance rivale, qui touche leur frontière en beaucoup des points, et qui auroit eu pour autre objet, de relever la dignité de l'Empire dont la Peshwa (c'est ainsi qu'on nomme le chef des etats Marattes) s'est déclaré Vicegérant, dans la dernière invasion qu'il fit de l'Indostan en 1784, à la tête d'une armée considérable qui s'empara de Delhi, et força l'Empereur à confier à son chef la régence de ses etats; la cour Impériale doit continuer à être l'âme de toutes des operations de l'armée Françoise, jusqu'à ce que le plus grand succès l'aient rendu tout-à-fait maitresse des Côtes; et comme c'est là le but de ses exploits, elle ne peut trop tôt se mettre en mesure d'aller au-devant des ennemis qu'elle sera venue chercher de si loin, l'intendu immense de territoire que les Anglais ont à garder les empêchera toujours de pouvoir réunir en un seul point, des forces considérable sans laisser la plus grande partie de leurs places fortes à découverte, et ils ne pourroient dans aucun cas, opposer à la fois plus de 30,000 hommes, dont les trois quarts seroient Sipahis, sans affoiblir de beaucoup leurs différentes garnisons; ce qui rendroit les sièges beaucoup moins longs, et moins difficiles. C'est pourquoi il seroit important de les occuper de tout cotés, et de les empêcher par là de penser à se secourir d'une Présidence à l'autre, à cet effet l'armée Françoise qu'on a déjà supposé de voir par ses alliances segrossir d'un corps puissant des Mahrattes, et des meilleurs troupes de l'Indostan, pourroit se former en trois divisions, dont la plus foible et la moins exposée resteroit dans la Ville Impériale ou aux environs, pour ne jamais perdre de vue celui qui par son autorisation speciale sembleroit diriger tous ses mouvemens. La seconde division et la plus forte sous les ordres du general en chef, entreroit par le Viziriât d'Oude dans les possessions Angloises, et bientôt en suivant le cours de Gange traverseroit dans toute sa largeur la riche Province de Bahar qui n'est capable d'aucune défense; c'est dans celle du Bengale qu'on doit s'attendre à une résistance opiniâtre, à des obstacles considérables, mais aussi c'est la terme d'une marche de mille lieues; c'est dans ce pays si renommé par ses richesses, qu'est située l'opulente capitale de l'Empire Britannique en Asie; quel motif d'encouragement!! Enfin la troisième division par une marche à-peu-près égale dirigerait sa route vers la côte Malabare, en parcourant à travers le pays des Marattes, un des cotés du triangle qui forment Delhi, Calcutta, et Bombay. Le premiere Maratte qui pourroit être le plus utile en raison de la situation de ses etats et de ses forces considerables seroit Govind Rao Scindiah qui possède à present tout le pays de Gohud, d'Agra, le Jynagur et va presque jusqu'au portes de la capitale de l'Empire. Ses intérêts en feroit un allié sur lequel on pourroit compter sur tout si on n'annonçoit point de trop vastes projets de conquête. Bombay et Goa sont sans contredit les deux pointes les plus essentielles de la côte occidentale de la Presqu'isle de l'Inde; mais dans l'alternatif et l'impossibilité d'attaquer les deux à la fois Goa semble presenter aux François beaucoup plus d'avantages réels, d'abord en raison du territoire considerable qu'en depend et pourroit entretenir l'armée par ses revenus, ensuite par la bonté de son port, et sa position avantageuse, en regard aux etats Marattes, avec qui l'on ne sauroit trop le répéter il est désormais indispensable d'entretenir d'étroites liaisons. L'importance de cette conquete en temps de paix ne seroit pas moindre en raison de la facilité qu'elle offre de communiquer avec la Mer Rouge, et il est aisé d'entrevoir que par la suite cette communication peut rendre à nouveau

cette ville autrefois si florissante, l'entrepot de toutes les richesses de l'Asie, en bouleversant totalement le système commercial actuel, et faisant reprendre aux productions de l'Indostan la route que les Arabes et les Venetiens leur faisoient tenir avant la découverte de Cap de Bonne Esperance par Vasco de Gama.

Tandis que les Anglois comme on doit le supposer, réuniroient tous leurs moyens et mettroient tous en œuvre pour opposer des digues au torrent impétueux qui se débordera sur leurs possessions de l'Inde par l'occident, il faudroit leur porter par l'Orient un coup tout aussi imprévu et peut être plus difficile à parer, si les mesures étoient bien prises ; l'Espagne à peu paru jusqu'à présent sur la Theatres de la Guerre, et ne paroît point avoir encore rendu à la République des très grandes services comme allié ; cependant il est au pouvoir de cette puissance de servir la cause commune d'une manière efficace et d'employer utilement sa marine, qui n'est point en état de disputer à celle des Anglois les mers de l'Europe. Les ports de Cadix, de Ferrol, et de Carthagène, sont pleines de Vaisseaux de Guerre et de Commerce, qui depuis plusieurs années n'osent se montrer ; La Mexique, et l'Amerique meridionale ont eu très peu de communication avec leur métropole depuis la guerre, par consequent leurs ports doivent être dans le même cas que ceux d'Espagne. On peut croire d'avance qu'il ne seroit pas difficile de déterminer la cour de Madrid à se prêter à des mesures qui en accelerant la paix auroient l'avantage de faire sortir ses colonies de l'état de langueur et de stagnation qui les mine de jour en jour. Ces mesures seroient d'équiper secrètement à Cadix par exemple ou dans un autre port moins observés par les Anglois, un nombre de vaisseaux capable de transporter environ 12,000 hommes de débarquement, cette flotte importante convoyée convenablement, si elle avoit le bonheur comme il est probable d'échapper à la vigilance de l'ennemi, se rendroit en six semaines de plus à Porto Bello sur l'Isthme de Panama, situé vis-à-vis la Ville de ce nom, qui n'en est distant que de 20 à 25 lieues, ou si le ministre Espagnole aimait mieux, à la Vera Cruz dans le Golphe de Mexique, d'où l'on peut aisément communiquer par terre avec Accapulco dans la mer du Sud, c'est dans ce port qu'aborderont tous les vaisseaux qui vont des Philippines à Mexique, et c'est cette communication, ou à travers l'Océan Pacifique qui unit les possessions d'Espagne en Asie avec celles d'Amérique. Il est évident que la réussite d'un tel projet dépend absolument de la bonne intelligence qui doit regner entre les puissances alliées et suppose que des ordres auroient provisoirement été donnés au gouverneur Espagnol de l'Amérique Meridionale, à l'effet de rassembler à Panama ou Accapulco un nombre de vaisseaux suffisant pour recevoir cette petite armée à qui l'on accorderoit une espace d'un mois pour les rafraichissements, et pour se rendre de Porto Bello à Panama, ou de la Vera Cruz à Accapulco. Toutes les précautions d'où dépend ordinairement le succès des opérations navales, étant ainsi prises, cette nouvelle flotte en partant dans la bonne saison et suivant la route ordinaire des gallions arriveroit à Manilla après un voyage de deux mois et demi environ, sans la moindre opposition de la part des Anglois, qui n'ont jamais pensé à entretenir une croizure dans ces parages.

De cette manière la République dont toutes les opérations durant cette guerre ont été calculé sur un échelle immense, pourroit en moins de six mois faire passer en Asie des forces qui par la route qu'elle tiendrait prendroit le nom d'armée de l'Ouest, et seroit bientôt à même de rivaliser les exploits de celle de l'Est. Si d'un autre côté quelques vaisseaux de ligne et quelques fregattes pouvoient échapper de Brest et venir par le Cap de Bonne Esperance se joindre au convoi qui arriveroit par la mer du Sud, rien ni pourroit s'opposer au succès de cette entreprise extraordinaire et digne des François.

L'objet principal de cette Expédition seroit de reconquérir sur les Anglois les colonies Hollandaises, dont ils sont en possession. En conséquence l'armée de l'Ouest après une relâche de deux mois aux Isles Philippines, seroit embarqué sur la même flotte qui l'auroit apporté d'Amérique et sous le convoi d'autant des vaisseaux de guerre Français et Espagnols qu'on pourroit réunir d'abord, s'emparer des Moluques qui n'ayant que des foibles garnisons seroient emportés d'un coup de main, et retarderoit très peu les opérations ultérieures. La flotte après avoir laissé des garnisons dans les isles le plus considérables comme Amboyna et Banda cingleroit vers le détroit de la sonde comme étant moins soumis que celui de Malacca à la surveillance de la marine Anglaise et de la dirigeroit sa cours vers Trinquarale dans l'Isle de Ceylon, qui en raison de la bonté de son Port, est un des points les plus importants de l'Inde, et commande en quelque sort tout le na-

vigation du Golphe de Bengale. La conquête de Trinkamalé seroit bientôt suivie de celle de Colombo et de Point de Galle, que malgré la bonté de leurs fortifications sont loins d'avoir des garnisons suffisantes pour une défense opiniâtre. C'est dans la belle Isle de Ceylon que l'armée de l'Ouest établirait son quartier générale en s'y fortifiant d'une manière inattaquable, c'est de là qu'elle seroit en mesure de coopérer avec l'armée de l'Est en faisant s'il étoit nécessaire une diversion à la côte de Coromandel, enfin c'est de la combinaison irresistible des opérations profondément calculés de ces deux armées que pourroit resulter la conquête presque totale de l'Indostan, l'abaissement considerable d'une nation rivale acharné après notre destruction, et pour recompenser tous nos travaux un paix glorieux, qui en assurant à la France les avantages de commerce dans les quatres parties du monde, seroit la source d'une prosperité dont les annales n'ont point jusqu'à present offert d'exemples.

On ne peut se dissimuler que l'une et l'autre de ces plans d'aggression contre l'Inde Anglois, presentent des difficultés que le génie entreprenant de la nation François est seul capable de surmonter, en même temps qu'ils sont susceptibles d'un infinité de modifications et d'arrangement que circonstances peuvent indiquer, mais si l'on réfléchit sur l'impossibilité de porter la guerre aux Indes Orientales par la voie ordinaire des armemens, en raison de l'infériorité marquée de notre marine, et si d'ailleurs on est bien convaincu de la nécessité de balancer au moins la puissance Britannique dans l'Indostan, loin de chercher à réfuter par des subtilités des idées que l'expérience peut rectifier, on s'occupera des moyens d'en hâter l'exécution avant que nos ennemis aient eu le temps de deviner nos projets et de se préparer à repousser les coups terribles qui doivent leur être portés.

Quelquesoit l'issu de cette longue et terrible crise qui semblent menacer le globe d'une subversion totale, quelque vigoureux que soient les derniers efforts de l'Angleterre agonissante, elle ne peut éviter pour long-temps le danger éminent qui en menaçant ses possessions d'Asie menace en même temps son existence politique, comme puissance Européenne. Les fastes de son histoire contiennent l'arrêt irrevocable de sa destruction future, et la prédiction de la catastrophe qui l'attend. Les grandes conquêtes furent toujours en Angleterre le prélude et le germe des plus funestes revolutions; témoin l'histoire d'un de ses plus grands Rois Edouard III. de Henri V. de Richard II. de Henri VI. etc. enfin de George III. lui même dont le regne sera à jamais mémorable par la perte d'une des plus belles possessions de la monarchie Britannique. Si le coup fatale qui doit passer dans l'Indostan cette moderne Carthage ne lui est immédiatement porté par la France, on peut conjecturer qu'il partira avant peu, d'une main non moins sure et probablement plus inflexible et impitoyable. Le flambeau de la civilization, qui a porté les lumières du midi au nord de l'Europe, semble être fixé tant recemment sur les rives glacées du Wolga et de Neiper, cet empire étonnant géant des son berceau, la Russie, qui n'étoit connu dans le dernier siècle que par l'ignorance barbare de ses habitans, joindra bientôt à la gloire des armes qui la occupée principalement jusqu'à present les délices des luxe, qu'on ne trouve que dans un commerce étendu et florissant. Les nombreux besoins de cette nation déjà redoutable, et empressé de se mettre au niveau du reste de l'Europe lui feront sentir la nécessité d'avoir des colonies et les voyages contribuerent tous les jours aux progrès des connoissances géographiques. Les Russes ne tarderont pas à l'appercevoir, qu'il n'est point de peuple en Europe mieux situé qu'eux pour jouir des richesses de l'Indostan, et se rendre maîtresse du commerce de cette contrée. La souveraineté du Czar de Russie s'étend jusque sur une position de l'Asie septentrionale, et par la possession du port d'Astrakan, il se trouve incontestablement l'arbitre de toute la navigation de la Mer Caspienne, ainsi son pavillon peut sans rivalité se montrer jusqu'au rivage du pays de Samarcande, dont la capitale autrefois célébré fut le siège de l'Empire Tamerlan. Les armées de ce fameux conquérant frayerent de la jusqu'à Delhy une route bien connu qui ne présente aucune obstacle; et il est certain qu'il seroit aussi facile et moins dispendieux au cabinet de Petersburg de diriger une armée vers l'Indostan que d'entreprendre une campagne contre l'Italie.

On peut conclure de toute ceci que la souveraineté usurpé par l'Angleterre en Asie doit lui être ravi incessamment. Les Français tant qu'ils posséderont l'Egypte seront toujours en même de devancer les Russes et de faire tourner à leur avantage et au profit de toute l'Europe, cette conquête importante en faisant evanouir ces

vaines prétensions à l'empire de l'Océan, et établissant à jamais la liberté indéfinie des mers. Il est à craindre que la Russie si on lui donne le temps d'étendre sa domination jusque dans l'Inde, ne veuille en interdire tout-à-fait le commerce aux autres puissances Européennes; tandis que la France portant partout son génie entreprenant peut servir la cause de toutes les nations, en rendant à l'Empire Mogol son ancienne lustre, en admettant dans ses ports tous les pavillons commerçants sans exception; enfin en mettant à l'avenir l'Indostan à l'abri de toutes invasions étrangères, elle aura la gloire d'assurer le bonheur futur de l'Asie, de fixer sa politique chancelante et d'ouvrir à l'Europe des sources inépuisables d'opulence et de prospérité.

Epoque digne d'occuper le premier rang dans les annales du dix-neuvième siècle.

(Signé) STANISLAS LEFEBRE,
Lieut. d'Infanterie.

Pondicherry, Jan. 1801.

Etat Major de l'Inde.

De Caen, Général de Division, Capitaine Général.
Vandermaison, Général de Brigade, Lieutenant de Capitaine Général.
De Morgan, Général de brigade.
St. Suzanne, Chef de Brigade, commandant les troupes.
Barot, Adjudant Commandant.

Administration.

Leger, Prefet Colonial.
Cabeau, faisant fonction de Chef d'Administration.
De Montegny, Général de Brigade, Commandant à Chandernagore.
Perfoneral, Chef de Brigade, Commandant à Matré.
De Kerjean, Chef de Brigade, Commandant à Karical.
Lau, Commandant à Cossimbuzar.
De Chaslet, Commandant à Dacca.
De Marlet, Garde Magazine Karical.
De Bru, Master Attendant at Pondicherry.

Arrived at Pondicherry in the Frigate La Belle Poule.

Officers of the 109th Demi Brigade.—Messieurs Bloquet, Capitaine; Grabeuil, Id.; Koeteheh, Lieutenant; Pesloriere, Id.; Roudier, Sous Lieut. Constant, Id.; Total 6.

Officers of Sepoys.—M. Pennemaret Mainville, Chef des ce payes; Le Brun, Capitaine; Peheta, Id.; Chinolt, Id.; Bechard, Lieut.; Bouriet, Id.; Peheta, Id.; Dilper, Sous Lieut. Total 8.

Etat Major.—Binot, Adj. Commandant; Semonin, Capitaine; Dehon, Id.; Le Febre, Lieut.; Le Payre, Sec. de l'Etat Major; Le Maire, Id. Total 6.

M. Brieux, Chef de Lege; Lauriston, Id. Total 2.

Douzon, Chirurgien en Chef; Tourniret, Pharmacien en Chef.

Officiers de l'Administration.

M. Brodelet; Marquet, Garde Magasin; Clericean, Martin, Blin, Gombault, Petit Lamuseure, Cudenec, Courson. Total 9.

Etat des vaisseaux et des troupes parté de Brest dans le mois de Mars. Le vaisseau *Le Marengo*, 74, Contre Amiral Linois. Le Général de Cane passager a bord.

Troupes.—Gardes de Gouverneur, 80 hommes; une compagnie d'Artillerie Legere, 80; 109^{ème}. Demi Brigade, 200.

L'Atalante, 40 canons; 109^{ème}. Brigade, 160; *La Simillante*, 40; 109^{ème}. Demi Brigade, 160; *La Belle Poule*, 40; 109^{ème}. Demi Brigade, 160; *La Côte d'Or*, transport, 3^{ème}. Battalion de la 8^{ème}. Legere, 300.

2^{ème}. Convoi.—*Le Belier*, corvette de 16 canons; *Le Malabar*, autre transport devant porter un battalion de noir Africains, sous le nom de Chasseurs Africains.

La division destinée pour l'Isle de France devait partie sous peu, elle doit être considérable.

APPENDIX M.

List of Casualties with the Honourable Colonel Monson's detachment.

2d Batt. 2d Reg.—Killed, Major James Sinclair, 24th August 1804; Lieut. Thomas Parr, do.; Lieut. N. G. Fulton, do.—Missing, but reported to have been killed, Lieut. William Owen, do.;—Killed, Lieut. W. W. Walker, do.; Lieut. H. P. Stacy, do.; Lieut. Thomas Sneider, do.

2 Batt. 8th Reg.—Killed, Lieut. Williams, 24th August 1804.

2d Batt. 8th Reg.—Killed, Capt. James Crockatt, do.; Lieut. A. R. Maillard, do.

1st Batt. 12th Reg.—Killed, Lieut. Henry Lloyd, 10th July;—Wounded, Lieut. Ford, 27th August; Lieut. H. M. Moss, 24th August; Lieut. T. Browning, 27th do.; Lieut. Dalton, (drowned in crossing Chumbala,) 16th July.

2d Batt. 12th Reg.—Wounded, Lieut. Randall, 25th August;—Missing, Lieut. R. Davidson, 8th July.

1st Batt. 14th Reg.—Killed, Lieut. H. H. Harris, 30th August; Mr. Brugh, Surgeon, do.

2d Batt. 21st Reg.—Killed, Lieut. W. T. Nixon, 24th August;—Wounded, Lieut. Arden, 27th do.

Artillery.—Capt. Winbolt, (drowned in crossing Bannas,) 24th August.

J. GERARD, Adjutant-General.

General Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing, of the troops, under the command of Major-General Fraser, commanding a division of the grand army, at the battle of Deig, 13th November 1804.

Wounded.—1 General Officer.

Artillery.—Killed, 1 Drumm.; 3 Privs. Natives, 1 Priv.; 4 Lascars; 1 Bhisty; 4 Bildars; 6 bullock-drivers.

Wounded.—Europeans, 1 Serjt.; 1 Gunn.; 1 Drumm.; 3 Privs.; Natives, 1 Havildar; 2 Privs.; 1 Serang; 1 Tindal; 14 Lascars; 1 Bhisty; 1 Bildar; 25 Bullock-drivers. Missing, 1 Las.

H. M. 76th Reg.—Killed, 1 Capt.; 2 Serjt.; 2 Corp.; 27 Priv. Wd. 1 Ensign; 5 Serj.; 12 Cor.; 103 Priv. Mg. 11 Priv.

Detachment of recovered Europeans.—Kd. 2 Priv. Wd. 1 Capt.; 1 Lieut.; 10 Priv.

1st European Reg.—Kd. 4 Serj.; 2 Corp.; 16 Priv. Wd. 5 Lieut.; 2 Serj.; 5 Corp.; 1 Drum.; 43 Priv. Mg. 1 Corp.

1st Batt. 2d Reg. N. I.—Kd. 1 Lieut.; 1 Jemindar; 2 Hav.; 1 Naik; 21 Priv. Wd. 1 Lieut.; 1 Soubahdar; 1 Jemindar; 5 Hav.; 4 Naiks; 55 Priv.

1st Batt. 4th Reg. N. I.—Kd. 2 Lieut.; 1 Subr.; 2 Hav.; 19 Priv. Wd. 1 Capt.; 1 Lieut.; 3 Hav.; 1 Naick; 25 Priv.

6 Companies 8th N. I.—Kd. 1 Hav.; 1 Priv. Wd. 2 Priv.; 1 Lascar; 1 Bildar.

15th Reg. N. I.—Kd. 1 Hav.; 3 Naiks; 15 Priv. Wd. 6 Lieuts.; 3 Sub.; 4 Jemdr.; 6 Hav.; 2 Naick; 112 Priv.; 2 Bhisties. Mg. 1 Hav.; 1 Drum.; 12 Priv.

Officers Killed, Wounded and Missing.—Capt. Henry Norford, H. M.'s 76th reg.; Lieut. John Forbes, 1st batt. 2d reg. N. I.; Lieut. C. C. Faithful, 1st batt. 4th do.; Lieut. — Burges, do.; Assist.-Surgeon T. Lyons, 2d do. 15th do. Wd.—Major-Gen. Fraser, severely; Capt. J. Chisholm, H. M. 88th reg. doing duty with H. M. 76th reg.; Lieut. Mansell, H. M. 78th reg. doing duty with recovered Europeans; Ensign W. Brampton, H. M. 76th reg.; Capt.-Lieut. Nicoll, 1st batt. 4th N. I. doing duty; Lieuts. A. Maxton, severely; J. Chatfield, do.; J. Bryant, do. T. Brown, do.; J. Merryman, slightly, (European Regiment.) Lieuts. James Murray, slightly, 1st batt. 2d reg. N. I.; — Hunter, doing duty, do. 4th do.; James Turner, slightly, do. 15th do.; H. Sibley, do.; C. S. Schnell, do.; — Penny, do.; — Hales, 2d do. (since dead); — Boyd, do.—Grand total of Europeans, Kd.—64, Wd.—195, Missing—12. Grand Total of Natives, Kd.—84, Wd.—274, Mg.—15. —The Missing supposed to be Killed.

J. MENZIES, Major of Brigade.

Return of Ordnance, &c. captured at the battle of Deig, by the army under Major-General Fraser, on the 13th November 1804.

Brass Ordnance.—Six 16 pounders, carronades, country made; two 12 do. the honourable Company's, formerly lost; one 9 do. Portuguese gun; two 8 do. 1 Europe made, 1 country made; twenty-eight 6 do. 11 of these are the honourable Company's, formerly lost, and 2 are French, the remainder country made; one 5 do. Europe made; eleven 4 do. 1 Europe made, 10 country made; one 3 do. country made; one 2 do.—Total, 53 guns. One 5½ inch howitzer, country made; one 4 2-5 inch do. galloper, do. formerly lost.—Total, 2 howitzers.

Iron Ordnance.—Six 18-pr. formerly given to the Mahrattas, by Lord Cornwallis at Seringapatam; one 12 do.; one 8 do.; one 7 do.; five 6 do.; two 5 do.; two 4 do.; four 3 do.; four 2 do.; six 1 do.; all Europe made.—Total, 32.

Abstract.—Fifty-three brass guns, of different calibres; 2 do. howitzers, do.; 32 iron guns, do.—Total, 87 pieces of ordnance.

N. B. The whole of the above Ordnance mounted on field carriages, with limbers; furnished with elevating screws, and every requisite apparatus.

Tumbrils, &c.—Nine tumbrils, laden with ammunition; the honourable Company's, formerly lost; 24 tumbrils, laden with ammunition; 4 ammunition carts, the honourable Company's, formerly lost.

N. B. A great number of tumbrils blown up in action, and that were sloughed in the marshes, and afterwards burnt, are not included in the above number.

JOHN HORSFORD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding the Artillery in the Field.

Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded in the lines before Deig, 23d December 1804.

8th Reg. N. I.—Killed, Capt. Young; 12th ditto, Lieut. Bowyer.

Artillery.—Wounded, Lieut. Smith.

H. M. 22d Reg.—Wounded, Capts. Lindsay and Macknight, Lieuts. Sweetenham and Cresswell.

Ditto 76th Reg.—Wounded, Captain Scott.

Hon. Comp. Europn. Reg.—Wounded, Lieut. Merriman.

1st Bat. 8th Reg. N. I.—Wounded, Lieut.-Colonel Ball, Major Bassett, Lieuts. Abernethy and Anderson.

Corps of Pioneers.—Wounded, Capt. Swinton, and Lieut. Forrest.

J. GERARD, Adjutant-General.

Return of Ordnance, &c. captured in the lines before Deig, on the 23d December 1804.

Camp at Deig, 26th Dec. 1804.

Brass Ordnance.—Four 6-pounders; two 4 do.; one 3 do.; one 1½ do.; one 1 do.; three 5½ inch howitzers, two of these belonging to the honourable Company, formerly lost; the other is country made. All mounted on field carriages with limbers.

Iron Ordnance.—One 24-pounder (French); one 12 do.; one 9 do.; one 6 do.; one 4 do.; three 3 do.; one 1½ do.; mounted on field carriages with limbers. 13 tumbrils laden with ammunition; 5 ammunition carts.

Abstract.—Twelve brass pieces of different calibres; 9 iron ditto.—Total 21 pieces, brass and iron, of different calibres.

J. HORSFORD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding Artillery in the Field.

Return of Ordnance, &c. captured in the town and fort of Deig, on the 23d and 24th December 1804.

Camp at Deig, 26th Dec. 1804.

In the town of Deig. Brass Ordnance.—One 6-pounder; two 4 do.; one 1 do.; mounted on field carriages with limbers.

Iron Ordnance.—One 70-pounder; one 28 do; three 24 do. (Europe); two 17 do.; one 12 do. (Europe); two 9 do. (ditto); six 9 do.; seven 6 do.; three 4 do.; one 1 do. Twenty of these guns are mounted on travelling carriages, the remainder are on block carriages of the country fashion.

In the fort of Dwig. Iron Ordnance.—One 60-pounder; two 28 do.; three 12 do.; three 9 do.; six 6 do.; two 4 do.; two 3 do.; six 1½ do.; three 1 do.; twenty swivels of 1-pound. Four of these guns are mounted on travelling carriages, the remainder on block carriages.

Abstract.—Four brass pieces of different calibres; fifty-five iron do. Total, 59 pieces, brass and iron, of different calibres; 20 iron 1-pound swivels.

Shot, powder, and military stores in the magazines not yet taken account of.

J. HORSFORD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding Artillery in the Field.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded and Missing, in the Assault of Bhurt-pore, on the night of the 9th January 1805.

H. M. 75th Reg.—Killed, Lieut.-Col. Maitland. *Ditto 76th ditto*, Lieut. Glubb. *2d Batt. 12th Reg.*—Ensign Waterhouse. *Artillery.*—Lieut. Percival, (in the battery during the day.) Capt. John Wallace, Major of Brigade, (missing, and supposed to have been killed.)

H. M. 22d Reg.—Wounded, Lieuts. Swetnam and Creswell. *Ditto 75th ditto.*—Major Campbell; Capts. Hessman and Brutton; Lieuts. Byne, Tully, Mc Lachlan and Mathewson. *Ditto 76th ditto.*—Capt. Webmer, and Lieut. Crossgrove. *H. C. Eur. Reg.*—Lieuts. Wood, Hamilton and Browne. *1st Batt. 8th. ditto.*—Lieuts. Latter, Kerr and Turnbull. *2d ditto 12th ditto.*—Major Gregory; Capts. O'Donnell and Fletcher; Lieuts. Sharpe and Barker. *Ditto 22d ditto.*—Lieut. Titcher.

H. M. 75th Reg.—Missing, Ensign Hatfield.

J. GERARD, Adjt.-General.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded and Missing, in the Assault of Bhurt-pore, on the 21st January 1805.

H. M. 76th Reg.—Killed, Lieuts. D. Macrae and C. M. Bland. *2d Batt. 15th Reg.*—Lieut. Thomas Mac Gregor.

H. M. 75th Reg.—Wounded, Capt. William Hessman, Lieuts. Thomas Grant and John Craig Dumas. *Ditto 76th ditto.*—Lieuts. C. Templeton, James Macrae and W. Bright. *Ditto 22d ditto.*—Capt. Lindsay. *2d Batt. 9th N. I.*—Lieut. Trowers. *2d ditto 15th ditto.*—Capt.-Lieut. H. Addison. *Ditto 22d ditto.*—Lieuts. Watson, Day and Pollock, *Pioneers.*—Lieut. Gallaway, (doing duty.)

J. GERARD, Adjt.-General.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded and Missing, in the Assault of Bhurt-pore, on the 20th February 1805.

H. M. 75th Reg.—Killed, Lieut. Archibald Stewart.

Artillery.—Wounded, Capt. J. Nelly, Lieut. G. Swiney, and Mr. Conductor Whale. *H. M. 65th Reg.*—Capt. Bates, Lieuts. Bates and Hutchins. *Ditto 76th ditto.*—Capt. W. Boys, Lieuts. Hamilton and Mansel. *European Reg.*—Lieut. Moore, since dead. *8th Native Reg.*—Lieut. Ker, ditto. *1st Batt. 12th Reg.*—Major J. Radcliffe, Lieuts. C. Ryne and J. Taylor. *2nd ditto 12th ditto.*—Capt. Fletcher, Lieuts. J. Barker, J. Drysdale, and Hon. J. Aylmer. *1st ditto 15th ditto.*—Lieuts. H. Sibley, and W. D. Turner. *2d ditto 22d ditto.*—Capt. Griffiths, and Lieut. Blackney. *Pioneer Corps.*—Lieut. A. Lockett. *Bombay Division.*—*1st Grenadier Batt.*—Capt. Steele. *1st Batt. 3d Reg.*—Capt. Kemp. *Ditto 9th ditto.*—Capt. Haddington, and Lieut. Morrison.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Assault of Bhurt-pore, on the 21st February 1805.

Artillery.—Killed, Lieut. George Gowing. *H. M. 76th Reg.*—Capt. H. Corfield, and Lieut. C. Templeton. *2d Batt. 15th Reg.*—Lieut. Hartley. *1st Gren. Batt. Bombay Div.*—Ensign J. Lang.

Wounded, Lieut. Durant, Major of Brigade. *Artillery.*—Capt. Pennington. *H. M. 22d Reg.*—Lieut. Wilson. *Ditto 65th ditto.*—Capts. Symes, Warren, and Watkins, Lieuts. Hutchings, O'Brien, Hinde, Clutterbuck, and Harvey. *Ditto 75th ditto.*—Capt. S. Engel, Lieut. and Adj. P. Mathewson. *Ditto 76th ditto.*—Capt. E. Manton, Lieut. T. M. Sinclair, Qr.-Mast. W. B. Hopkins. *Ditto 86th ditto.*—Capt. Morton, Lieut. Baird. *European Reg.*—Capt. Ramsay, Lieut. Hamilton, Ensign Chance. *1st Batt. 2d Reg.*—Lieut.-Col. J. Hammond, Major Hawkes, and Lieut. Arbuthnot. *Bombay Division. 2d Batt 2d Reg.*—Lieut. Thomas. *1st ditto 3d ditto.*—Lieut. Tovy. *Ditto 9th ditto.*—Lieut.-Col. Taylor, and Lieut. Garraway.

J. LUMSDEN,
Chief Sec. to the Govt.

APPENDIX N.

REPORT OF THE PUBLIC EXAMINATION

AT THE COLLEGE OF FORT WILLIAM,

*Holden in January, 1803.**

PERSIAN.

1. Jenkins, 1st Prize, Bombay; 2. Hamilton, 2d Prize, Madras; 3. Wauchope, 3d Prize; 4. Wood, 4th Prize, Madras; 5. Chaplin, Madras; 6. Keene, Madras; 7. Goodwin, Bombay; 8. Dumbleton; 9. Oliver, Madras; 10. Ewer; 11. Perry; 12. Ross, Madras; 13. Romer, Bombay; 14. Puller; 15. Bouchier, Bombay.

Second Class.—16. Martin; 17. Sparrow, Bombay; 18. Pechell; 19. Newnham, Madras; 20. Rowles, Bombay; 21. Hunter; 22. Paton; 23. Tod, senior.

Third Class.—24. Money; 25. Morton; 26. Long, Madras; 27. Agar, Bombay; 28. Gowan; 29. Plowden, senior; 30. Plowden, junior; 31. Cragie, Bombay; 32. Lushington; 33. Morrieson; 34. Sanders, Madras; 35. Walker; 36. Hayes; 37. Curtis; 38. Peter, Madras.

Fourth Class.—39. Morison, Bombay; 40. Impey, E.; 41. Steadman, Bombay; 42. Watson; 43. Fleming; 44. Vaughan; 45. Impey, H.; 46. Gorton; 47. Liell; 48. Tod, junior; 49. Digby; 50. Batson; 51. Ratray; 52. Shakspeare, W. O. Madras; 53. Maidman, Madras.—Messrs. Bayley, Maconochie, Lawrence, Bird, and Barnett, absent from the Examination.

HINDOOSTANEE.

1. Chaplin, 1st Prize, Madras; 2. Jenkins, 2d Prize, Bombay; 3. Martin, 3rd Prize; 4. Goodwin, 4th Prize, Bombay; 5. Romer, Bombay; 6. Ross, Madras; 7. Dumbleton; 8. Wood, Madras; 9. Hunter, senior; 10. Gowan; 11. Hamilton, Madras; 12. Walker; 13. Newnham, Madras; 14. Bouchier, Bombay; 15. Elliott; 16. Chisholme; 17. Swinton.

Second Class.—18. Ewer; 19. Morrieson; 20. Cole, A. H. Hon. Madras; 21. Spottiswoode, Madras; 22. Plowden, junior; 23. Russell; 24. Tod, senior; 25. Agar, Bombay; 26. Shakspeare, J. T.; 27. Littledale, 28. Fraser.

Third Class.—29. Shakspeare, H.; 30. Scott, T. C.; 31. Scott, D.; 32. Turnbull; 33. Pechell; 34. Paton; 35. Sprott; 36. Watson; 37. Liell; 38. Marjoribanks; 39. Gardiner, E. Hon.; 40. Mainwaring; 41. Morison, Bombay; 42. Sparrow, Bombay.

* Referred to at p. 69, Vol. III.

Fourth Class.—43. Barwell; 44. Higginson, Madras; 45. Gardiner, C. W.; 46. Smith, Bombay; 47. Gorton; 48. Martin, R. C.; 49. Robinson; 50. Steer; 51. Alexander; 52. Moore; 53. Tod, junior; 54. Salter; 55. Digby; 56. Grindall, 57. Shaw, Madras; 58. Dawes; 59. Bennett; 60. Hunter, junior.

ARABIC.

1. Jenkins, 1st Prize, Bombay; 2. Wood, 2d. Prize. Madras; 3. Hamilton, 3d Prize, Madras.

Second Class.—4. Dumbleton; 5. Wauchope; 6. Oliver, Madras; 7. Keene, Madras; 8. Goodwin, Bombay; 9. Long, Madras.

Third Class.—10. Chaplin, Madras; 11. Ross, Madras; 12. Bouchier, Bombay; 13. Perry; 14. Romer, Bombay; 15. Plowden, senior.

BENGALÉE.

1. Martin, 1st Prize; 2. Hunter, 2nd Prize; 3. Morton, 3d Prize; 4. Paton; 5. Gorton; 6. Dumbleton; 7. Chisholme.

Second Class.—8. Morrieson; 9. Pechell; 10. Fleming; 11. Digby; 12. Plowden.

TAMOOŁ.

1. Newnham, Prize, Madras; 2. Hamilton, Madras; 3. Sanders, Madras.

SUNSKRIT.

1. Gowan, Prize; 2. Martin.

PERSIAN WRITING.

1. Morton, 1st. Prize; 2. Goodwin, 2d Prize, Bombay; 3. Swinton; 4. Long, Madras; 5. Morrieson; 6. Paton; 7. Wood, Madras; 8. Wauchope; 9. Oliver, Madras; 10. Turnbull; 11. Keene, Madras; 12. Walker; 13. Ross, Madras.

NAGREE WRITING.

1. Hunter, senior, 1st Prize; 2. Goodwin, 2d Prize, Bombay; 3. Martin; 4. Romer, Bombay; 5. Skakespear, J. T.; 6. Plowden, junior.

BENGALÉE WRITING.

1. Martin, 1st Prize; 2. Hunter, senior, 2d Prize; 3. Morton; 4. Shakespear, J. T.

PRIZES AND HONORARY REWARDS,

Adjudged at the Public Examination in January, 1803.

PERSIAN LANGUAGE.

To Mr. R. Jenkins, Bombay, medal, and 1500 rs.; Mr. T. Hamilton, Madras, medal, and 1000 rs.; Mr. J. Wauchope, medal, and 500 rs.; Mr. E. Wood, Madras, medal.

HINDOOSTANEE LANGUAGE.

Mr. W. Chaplin, Madras, medal, and 1500 rs.; Mr. R. Jenkins, Bombay, medal, and 1000 rs.; Mr. W. B. Martin, medal, and 500 rs.; Mr. T. Goodwin, Bombay, medal.

ARABIC LANGUAGE.

Mr. R. Jenkins, Bombay, medal, and 1500 rs.; Mr. J. Hunter, medal, and 1000 rs.; Mr. T. Hamilton, Madras, medal.

BENGALÉE LANGUAGE.

Mr. W. B. Martin, medal, and 1500 rs.; Mr. J. Hunter, medal, and 1000 rs.; Mr. W. Morton, medal.

SUNSKRIT LANGUAGE.

Mr. C. Gowan, medal.

TAMOOŁ LANGUAGE.

Mr. T. Newnham, Madras, medal.

WRITING.

PERSIAN CHARACTER.

Mr. W. Morton, medal, and 1000 *rs.*; Mr. R. T. Goodwin, Bombay, medal.

NAGREE CHARACTER.

Mr. J. Hunter, medal, and 1000 *rs.*; Mr. R. T. Goodwin, Bombay, medal.

BENGALÉE CHARACTER.

Mr. W. B. Martin, Medal, and 1000 *rs.* Mr. J. Hunter, Medal.

Medals of Merit awarded at the quarterly Examinations in 1802, were presented to the following Students :

Mr. J. B. Elliott, Hindoostanee; Mr. H. Puller, Persian; Mr. M. H. Turnbull, Hindoostanee; Mr. J. Walker, Hindoostanee; Hon. A. H. Cole, Hindoostanee; Mr. J. Romer, Persian; Mr. R. C. Ross, Persian; Mr. T. C. Plowden, Persian.

ENGLISH COMPOSITION.

ESSAY OF FIRST TERM, 1802.

"On the Moohummudan Conquests in India; the periods at which they took place in different parts of Hindoostan and Dukhun; and the principal circumstances attending them."

1. Mr. J. Sprott, medal, and 1000 *rs.*; 2. Mr. J. Romer, Bombay, medal; 3. Mr. T. Hamilton, Madras; 4. Mr. T. Newnham, Madras.

ESSAY OF SECOND TERM.

"On the Moohummedan Government in India, and the time of its greatest prosperity; its Institution and Administration."

1. Mr. T. Newnham, Madras, medal, and 1000 *rs.*

ESSAY OF THIRD TERM.

"On the custom of Hindoo women burning themselves on the decease of their husbands."

1. Mr. W. Chaplin, Madras, medal, and 1000 *rs.*; 2. Mr. T. Newnham, Madras; 3. Mr. J. Sprott; 4. Mr. R. C. Ross, Madras.

ESSAY OF THE FOURTH TERM.

"On the Restoration of Learning in the East."

1. Mr. R. C. Ross, Madras, medal, and 1000 *rs.*; 2. Mr. C. Gowan; 3. Mr. W. B. Martin; 4. Mr. J. Rowles, Bombay; 5. Mr. J. Sprott.

Degrees of Honour, for high proficiency in the Oriental Languages, conferred by his Excellency the most noble Marquess Wellesley, Visitor of the College of Fort William, on the following Students now leaving College :

BENGAL.

Mr. W. B. Bayley,—Degree of Honour in the Persian, Hindoostanee, Bengalee, and Arabic Languages.

Mr. W. B. Martin,—Degree of Honour in the Bengalee and Hindoostanee Languages.

FORT ST. GEORGE.

Mr. T. Hamilton,—Degree of Honour in the Persian and Arabic Languages.
 Mr. W. Chaplin,—Degree of Honour in the Hindoostanee Language.
 Mr. E. Wood,—Degree of Honour in the Persian and Arabic Languages.

BOMBAY.

Mr. R. Jenkins,—Degree of Honour in the Persian, Arabic and Hindoostanee Languages.
 Mr. R. T. Goodwin,—Degree of Honour in the Hindoostanee Language.
 At the same time, Degrees of Honour were conferred on the following Students of last year;
 Mr. J. H. Lovett,—Degree of Honour in the Persian, Hindoostanee and Arabic Languages.
 Mr. C. Lloyd,—Degree of Honour in the Persian, Hindoostanee and Arabic Languages.

Honorary Reward of Books adjudged to the following Students now leaving College, proficient in the Greek and Latin Classics, or in modern Languages.

CLASSICS.

Mr. W. B. Bayley; Mr. W. B. Martin; Mr. S. Bouchier, Bombay; Mr. R. Jenkins, Bombay; Mr. J. J. Sparrow, Bombay; Mr. T. Hamilton, Madras; Mr. E. Wood, Madras; Mr. R. C. Ross, Madras; Mr. W. Chaplin, Madras.

FRENCH LANGUAGE.

Mr. R. C. Ross, Madras; Mr. W. Chaplin, Madras; Mr. T. Newnham, Madras; Mr. J. Romer, Bombay; Mr. E. Wood, Madras.

Students now leaving College to enter on the Public Service, classed in the order of general proficiency.

PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL.

1. Mr. W. B. Bayley,—Degree of Honour in four Languages; viz. the Persian, Hindoostanee, Bengalee and Arabic.—Held a public Disputation last year in the Hindoostanee and Bengalee Languages.—Thesis in the Hindoostanee Language published last year.—English Essay published last year.—Honorary Reward in Classics, Greek and Latin.
2. Mr. W. B. Martin,—Degree of Honour in two Languages; viz. the Bengalee and Hindoostanee.—Second in the Sanskrit Languages; and sixteenth in the Persian.—Held two public Disputations in the Bengalee Language.—Thesis in the Bengalee Language published.—Prize in Bengalee Writing this year. Third in Nagree Writing.—Prize Essay last year. Other Essays published.—Honorary Reward in Classics, Greek and Latin.
3. Mr. H. Dumbleton,—Fourth in the Arabic Language; sixth in Bengalee, seventh in Hindoostanee, and eighth in Persian.—First Prize in Persian Writing last year.
4. Mr. J. Hunter,—Second in the Bengalee Language; ninth in Hindoostanee, and twenty-first in the Persian.—First Prize in Nagree Writing, and second Prize in Bengalee Writing.—Held a public Disputation in Bengalee this year.
5. Mr. W. Morton,—Third in the Bengalee Language; and in the third Class of Persian.—First Prize in Persian Writing this year; first Prize in Nagree Writing last year; and third in Bengalee Writing.—Held a Bengalee Disputation this year.
6. Mr. C. Chisholme,—Sixteenth in the Hindoostanee Language; and seventh in the Bengalee.

7. Mr. D. Morrieson,—In second Class Hindoostanee, in third Class Persian, and in second Class Bengalee.—Fifth in Persian Writing.
8. Mr. P. W. Pechell,—In second Class Persian, in third Class Hindoostanee, and in second Class Bengalee.
9. Mr. W. Paton,—In second Class Persian, in third Class Hindoostanee, and in first Class Bengalee.—Sixth in Persian Writing.
10. Mr. R. C. Plowden,—In third Class Persian, in third Class Arabic, and in second Class Bengalee.
11. Mr. W. M. Fleming,—In fourth Class Persian, and in second Class Bengalee.

PRESIDENCY OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

1. Mr. T. Hamilton,—Degree of Honour in two Languages; viz. the Persian and Arabic.—Second in the Tamool Language, and eleventh in the Hindoostanee.—Held a Disputation in the Persian Language this year.—Prize Essay last year.—Honorary Reward in Classics, Greek and Latin.
2. Mr. W. Chaplin,—Degree of Honour in the Hindoostanee Language.—Fifth in Persian, and tenth in Arabic.—Held a Disputation in the Hindoostanee Language this year.—Prize Essay this year.—Honorary Reward in Latin Classics.—Honorary Reward in the French Language.
3. Mr. E. Wood,—Degree of Honour in two Languages; viz. the Persian and Arabic.—Eighth in the Hindoostanee Language.—Seventh in Persian Writing.—Declamation in Arabic this year.—Prize Essay last year.—Honorary Reward in Latin Classics.—Honorary Reward in the French Language.
4. Mr. R. C. Ross,—Sixth in the Hindoostanee Language, twelfth in Persian, and eleventh in Arabic.—Held a Disputation in the Hindoostanee Language this year.—Prize Essay this year.—Honorary Reward in Latin Classics.—Honorary Reward in the French Language.
5. Mr. T. Newnham,—First in the Tamool Language, thirteenth in Hindoostanee, and nineteenth in Persian.—Prize Essay this year. Essay published last year.—Honorary Reward in the French Language.
6. Mr. J. Long,—In second Class Arabic, and in third Class Persian.—Fourth in Persian Writing.
7. Mr. C. Higginson,—In fourth Class Hindoostanee.

PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY.

1. Mr. R. Jenkins,—Degree of Honour in three Languages; viz. the Persian, Hindoostanee, and Arabic.—Held a Disputation in the Persian Language this year.—Declamation in Arabic this year.—Honorary Reward in Classics, Greek and Latin.
2. Mr. T. Goodwin,—Degree of Honour in the Hindoostanee Language.—Fifth in the Arabic Language, and seventh in Persian.—Held an Hindoostanee Disputation this year.—Obtained second Prize in Persian Writing, and second Prize in Nagree Writing.
3. Mr. J. Romer,—Fifth in the Hindoostanee Language, thirteenth in Persian, and fourteenth in Arabic.—Fourth in Nagree Writing.—Prize Essay this year.—Honorary Reward in the French Language.
4. Mr. S. Bouchier,—Fourteenth in the Hindoostanee Language, fifteenth in Persian, and twelfth in Arabic.—Honorary Reward in Classics, Greek and Latin.
5. Mr. J. J. Sparrow,—In second Class Persian, and in third Class Hindoostanee.—Honorary Reward in Classics, Greek and Latin.
6. Mr. H. Agar,—In second Class Hindoostanee, and in third Class Persian.
7. Mr. J. Morison,—In third Class Hindoostanee, and in fourth Class Persian.
8. Mr. J. Craigie,—In third Class Persian.
9. Mr. G. Smith,—In fourth Class Hindoostanee.
10. Mr. W. Steadman,—In fourth Class Persian.

A REPORT OF THE PUBLIC EXAMINATION,

HOLDEN IN JULY, 1803.

PERSIAN.

First Class.—1. Swinton; 2. Oliver; 3. Wauchope; 4. Keene.*Second Class.*—5. Perry; 6. Ewer; 7. Romer; 8. Puller.*Third Class.*—9. Sanders; 10. Walker; 11. Rowles; 12. Money.*Fourth Class.*—13. Impey, senior; 14. Lushington; 15. Tod, senior; 16. Curtis; 17. Watson; 18. Peter; 19. Plowden.*Fifth Class.*—20. Spottiswoode; 21. Fraser; 22. Lawrence; 23. D. Scott; 24. Tod, junior; 25. Digby.

Cole and Mainwaring absent from the Examination.

HINDOOSTANEE.

First Class.—1. Romer; 2. Walker; 3. Swinton; 4. Gowan.*Second Class.*—5. Scott, T. C.; 6. Plowden; 7. Turnbull; 8. Littledale; 9. Shakespear.*Third Class.*—10. Robinson; 11. Impey, senior; 12. Spottiswoode; 13. Tod, senior; 14. Alexander.*Fourth Class.*—15. Bird; 16. Trower; 17. Gardner, Honourable E.; 18. Liell; 19. Marjoribanks; 20. Gardiner; 21. Moore.*Not Classed.*—Barnett; Carey.

Elliott and Martin absent from the Examination.

ARABIC.

First Class.—1. Oliver; 2. Wauchope; 3. Keene; 4. Perry.*Second Class.*—5. Swinton; 6. Fraser; 7. Sanders; 8. Peter.*Third Class.*—9. Plowden; 10. Rowles.

BENGALEE.

First Class.—1. Gorton; 2. Impey, senior; 3. Tod, senior; 4. Impey, junior.*Second Class.*—5. Spratt; 6. Tod, junior; 7. Liell; 8. Digby.

Barwell and Hayes absent from the Examination.

At the Quarterly Examination in April 1803, Medals of Merit were awarded to Mr. T. C. Scott, Hindoostanee; Mr. H. Alexander, Hindoostanee; Mr. W. H. Robinson, Hindoostanee; Mr. S. Bird, Hindoostanee.

At the public examination in July 1803, Medals of Merit were awarded to Mr. G. Swinton, Persian, Arabic, and Hindoostanee; Mr. H. Impey, Bengalee; Mr. A. B. Todd, Bengalee.

APPENDIX O.

Effective strength of his Majesty's Regiments serving in India, taken from the latest returns, 1st April 1805.

Cavalry.	Present for Duty.	Sick.	On Com- mand.	Total.	Wanting to Com- plete.	Date.
8th Dragoons	362	152	..	514	59	December
19th do.	245	49	56	350	198	December
22d do.	324	86	1	411	133	March
27th do.	218	56	2	276	199	November
29th do.	219	63	1	283	183	December
Total Cavalry	1368	406	60	1834	772	
12th Foot	552	61	23	636	556	March
17th do.	1022	115	3	1140	..	April
22d do.	560	165	86	811	172	December
33d do.	278	74	221	573	550	March
34th do.	944	76	3	1023	..	April
65th do.	61	61	437	559	448	February
73d do.	587	52	2	641	489	April
74th do.	127	92	6	225	848	March
75th do.	397	127	..	524	399	December
76th do.	581	199	..	780	250	November
77th do.	426	58	40	524	321	February
78th do.	380	51	104	535	529	February
80th do.	409	36	316	761	213	March
84th do.	444	67	73	584	318	March
86th do.	393	64	144	601	597	January
94th do.	357	193	4	554	548	March
Swiss Regiment	422	50	1	473	387	March
Total Infantry	7940	1541	1463	10944	6625	
Total Cavalry & Infantry	9308	1947	1523	12778	7397	

Return of the Company's European Infantry, as correctly as can be prepared—Bengal, about 250; Fort St. George, 317; Bombay, 150; Total, 717. Establishment, 3,000.

Artillery.—Bengal, 1,160, July, including Serjeants, Corporals, Drummers, &c.; Fort St. George, 807, June; Bombay, 426, June; Total, 2,393. Establishment as fixed by the Honourable Committee, 3,780; wanting 1,387.

Abstract.—Establishment fixed by the Honourable Committee—3 Regiments of Dragoons, 640—1,920; 15 Regiments of King's Infantry, 15,000; 3 Regiments of Company's Infantry, 3,000. Total Establishments fixed by the Secret Committee, 19,920.

Actual.—King's Troops, 12,778; Company's, 717; Total, 13,495.

It is to be observed that the 74th, 76th, and Meuron's Regiment, with the 25th Dragoons, are under orders to return to Europe, and will be embarked as soon as the 56th and 69th Regiments have reached India; arrangements are in progress for that purpose.

APPENDIX P.

Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary, August 3, 1804.

General Orders by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General and Captain-General.

Fort William, August 1, 1804.

In honour of the eminent services of Major-General the honourable Arthur Wellesley in the command of the forces in the Deccan, during the late memorable and glorious campaign, and as a testimony of respect to the gallant officers and troops who, under the command of Major-General Wellesley, have contributed to the splendid success of the war against the Mahratta confederates, the Governor-General will proceed down the river to meet Major-General Wellesley, and to conduct that distinguished officer publicly to the Presidency of Fort William. The usual salute to be fired when the *Soonamookee* yacht, with the Governor-General on board, shall pass Fort William, in proceeding down the river, and also on her return.

On the landing of the Governor-General with Major-General Wellesley, the troops in garrison, European and native, to be under arms, forming a street from the Governor-General's Ghaut to the north front of the Government House, through which the Governor-General will conduct Major-General Wellesley to the Government House.

The general officer in command at the Presidency, and the officers of the garrison staff, will receive the Governor-General as usual, and the usual honours will be paid to the Governor and Captain-General by the troops.

On the arrival of Major-General Wellesley at the Government House, a salute of thirteen guns to be fired from the ramparts of Fort William.

Banner rolls to be stationed between the Government House and the saluting battery.

Calcutta Gazette, August 16th, 1804.

Major-General the honourable Arthur Wellesley arrived off the Sand Heads on the 8th of August, in his Majesty's sloop the *Victor*. General Wellesley was accompanied by Captain Berkeley, Assistant Adjutant-General in Mysore, Lieutenant Close, Aid-de-Camp; and Captain Campbell, Major of Brigade.

At Saugur, Major-General Wellesley was met by Captain Armstrong, Military Secretary, and by Captain Doveton, Aid-de-Camp to the Governor-General, who had proceeded down the river to conduct Major-General Wellesley to Fort William. Major-General Wellesley arrived in the *Charlotte* yacht at Garden Reach on the night of the 11th August.

Early on the morning of the 12th the Governor-General, attended by the officers of his suite, embarked on board the *Soonamookee*, in conformity to the intention signified in his Excellency's orders of the 1st instant, and proceeded down the river to meet Major-General Wellesley.

Major-General Wellesley arrived on board the *Soonamookee* at ten o'clock, A. M. At two o'clock, P. M. the *Soonamookee* returned to her moorings near Chandpaul Ghaut. In passing the fort, and returning to Calcutta, the *Soonamookee* was saluted from the fort with nineteen guns.

At five o'clock, P. M. the Hon. Sir John Anstruther, Sir G. H. Barlow, and Mr. Udny, the Lieutenant-Governor of Prince of Wales's Island, and Major-General Dowdeswell, proceeded on board the *Soonamookee* to meet Major-General Wellesley.

The Governor-General, accompanied by Major-General Wellesley, the honourable Sir John Anstruther, Sir George Barlow, Mr. Udny, &c. and the officers of the Governor-General's staff, landed at the Governor-General's Ghaut at six P. M. The Governor-General was received by Major-General Cameron, and the staff of the garrison of Fort William; all the principal civil officers of the Government, and the principal European inhabitants of Calcutta had also assembled to congratulate

Major-General Wellesley on his arrival; a vast concourse of natives was present on this occasion.

A street of troops was formed from the Governor-General's Ghaut to the north front of the Government House, through which the Governor-General's carriages, with the Governor-General, the honourable Major-General Wellesley, the honourable the Chief Justice, Sir George Barlow, Mr. Udny, Major-General Dowdeswell, and the Governor-General's suite, proceeded to the Government House; the Governor-General was received with the usual honours as he passed the different corps.

On the arrival of Major-General Wellesley at the Government House, a salute of thirteen guns was fired from Fort William; and in the evening, the honourable the Chief Justice, the members of Council, &c. and all the principal civil and military officers at the Presidency, dined at the Government House.

APPENDIX Q.

[The following Minutes by the Marquess Wellesley are inserted, as they tend to illustrate his Lordship's general views on points not sufficiently explained in the course of the work.—ED.]

Minute of the Governor-General on the improvement of Calcutta.

Fort William, June 16th, 1803.

The increasing extent and population of Calcutta, the capital of the British empire in India, and the seat of the supreme authority, require the serious attention of Government. It is now become absolutely necessary to provide permanent means of promoting the health, the comfort, and the convenience of the numerous inhabitants of this great town.

The construction of the public drains and water-courses of the town is extremely defective. The drains and water-courses in their present state, neither answer the purpose of cleansing the town, nor of discharging the annual inundations occasioned by the rise of the river, or by the excessive fall of rain during the south-west monsoon. During the last week, a great part of this town has remained under water, and the drains have been so offensive, that unless early measures be adopted for the purpose of improving their construction, the health of the inhabitants of Calcutta, both European and native, must be seriously affected.

The defects of the climate of Calcutta, during the latter part of the rainy season, may indeed be ascribed in a great measure to the state of the drains and water-courses, and to the stagnate water remaining in the town and its vicinity.

The health of the town would certainly be considerably improved by an improvement of the mode of draining and cleansing the streets, roads, and esplanade. An opinion is generally entertained, that an original error has been committed in draining the town towards the river Hooghly; and it is believed that the level of the country inclines towards the salt water lake, and consequently that the principal channel of the public drains and water-courses ought to be conducted in that direction.

Experience has manifested that during the rainy season, when the river has attained its utmost height, the present drains become useless; at that season the rain continues to stagnate for many weeks in every part of the town, and the result necessarily endangers the lives of all Europeans residing in the town, and greatly affects our native subjects.

Other points connected with the preservation of the health of the inhabitants of this capital appear also to require immediate notice. No general regulations at present exist with respect to the situation of the public markets, or of the places appropriated to the slaughter of cattle, the exposure of meat, or the burial of the dead. Places destined to these purposes must necessarily increase in number with the increasing population of Calcutta. They must be nuisances wherever they may be situated; and it becomes an important branch of the police to con-

fine all such nuisances to the situations wherein they may prove least injurious and least offensive. It must, however, have been generally remarked, that places of burial have been established in situations wherein they must prove both injurious and offensive; and bazars, slaughter-houses, and markets of meat, now exist in the most frequented parts of the town.

In those quarters of the town, occupied principally by the native inhabitants, the houses have been built without order or regularity, and the streets and lanes have been formed without attention to the health, convenience, or safety of the inhabitants. The frequency of fires, (by which many valuable lives have been annually lost, and property to a great extent has been destroyed) must be chiefly ascribed to this cause.

It is a primary duty of Government to provide for the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of this great town, by establishing a comprehensive system for the improvement of the roads, streets, public drains, and water-courses; and by fixing permanent rules for the construction and distribution of the houses and public edifices, and for the regulation of nuisances of every description.

The appearance and beauty of the town are inseparably connected with the health, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants, and every improvement which shall introduce a greater degree of order, symmetry, and magnificence in the streets, roads, ghauts, and wharfs, public edifices, and private habitations, will tend to ameliorate the climate, and to secure and promote every object of a just and salutary system of police. These observations are entirely compatible with a due sense of the activity, diligence, and ability of the magistrates of Calcutta, by whose exertions considerable improvements have been made in the general police of the town. The Governor-General in Council has frequently expressed his approbation of the conduct and services of the present magistrates of Calcutta, who have zealously and judiciously employed every effort within their power to mitigate the effects of the evils described in this Minute. But the magistrates of Calcutta must be sensible that the establishment of a more comprehensive system of permanent regulation is indispensably necessary for the purpose of securing to the town the full benefit of the laudable services of the officers, to whom the administration of the police has been entrusted by Government.

With these views the Governor-General proposes, that the undermentioned gentlemen be appointed a committee to consider and report to his Excellency in Council the means of improving the town of Calcutta:—Major General Fraser; Major-General Cameron; Mr. Speke; Mr. Graham; Mr. Brooke; Mr. Taylor; Mr. R. C. Birch; Colonel Pringle; Mr. S. Davies; Mr. G. Dowdeswell, superintendent of police; Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt; Captain Shawe; Colonel Garstin; Mr. Tucker; Mr. Fairlie; Mr. Colvin; Mr. Ross; Mr. Alexander; Major Colebrooke; Captain Wyatt; Mr. Dashwood; Captain Aubury; Captain Preston; Captain Blunt, of engineers; Captain Sydenham; Messrs. C. F. Martin; W. C. Blaquire; E. Thoroton; and A. Mackle, justices of the peace of the town of Calcutta; and Mr. R. Blechynden.

The Governor-General proposes that Mr. Tiretta be directed to attend the committee, and that Captain Blunt, of the Engineers, be appointed to officiate as their Secretary.

The Governor-General further proposes that the following special instructions be issued to the Committee.

First. To take the level of the town of Calcutta, and the adjacent country, and ascertain and report what alteration may be necessary in the direction of the public drains and water-courses.

Secondly. To examine the relative level of the river during the rainy season, compared with the level of the drains and water-courses.

Thirdly. To suggest what description of drains or water-courses may be best calculated, first, to prevent the stagnation of rain-water in Calcutta and the vicinity thereof, and secondly, to cleanse the town.

Fourthly. To consider and report what establishment may be necessary for cleansing the drains and water-courses, and for keeping them in constant repair.

Fifthly. To take into consideration the present state of all places of interment in the vicinity of Calcutta, and to propose an arrangement for the future regulation of those places in such manner as shall appear to be best calculated for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants of Calcutta and its vicinity.

Sixthly. To examine the present state and condition of the bazars and markets for meat, and of the slaughter houses in Calcutta, and to propose such rules and orders as shall appear to the committee to be proper for the regulation of those already established, for the removal of such as may have actually become nuisances, and for the establishment of new markets or slaughter houses hereafter.

Seventhly. To enquire into all existing nuisances in the town and vicinity of Calcutta, and to propose the means of removing them.

Eighthly. To examine and report for the consideration of Government the situations best calculated for opening streets and roads, leading from east to west, from the new circular road to Chorwinghee, and to the river, and from north to south, in a direction nearly parallel with the new road.

Ninthly. To suggest such other plans and regulations as shall appear to the committee to be calculated to promote the health, convenience and comfort of the inhabitants of Calcutta, and to improve the appearance of the town and its vicinity.

Tenthly. To form and submit to the Governor-General in Council an estimate of the expense required to complete all such improvements, as may be proposed by the committee.

The means for raising the necessary funds for the purpose of defraying the expense which must attend the execution of the important improvements, suggested in this minute, will claim the early and deliberate consideration of Government. The Governor-General entertains no doubt that those funds may be raised without subjecting the honourable Company to any considerable expense, and without imposing a heavy tax on the inhabitants of Calcutta. It will certainly be the duty of Government to contribute in a just proportion to any expense which may be requisite for the purpose of completing the improvements of the town.

WELLESLEY.

Minute of the Governor-General on the Natural History of India.

Fort William, July 26, 1804.

The knowledge hitherto obtained in Europe respecting certain branches of the natural history of the continent of India and of the Indian isles is defective. Notwithstanding the progress which has been made within the last twenty years in the prosecution of scientific enquiries connected with the manners, produce, and antiquities of this part of Asia, many of the most common quadrupeds and birds of this country are either altogether unknown to the naturalists of Europe, or have been imperfectly and inaccurately described.

The illustration and improvement of that important branch of the natural history of India, which embraces an object so extensive as the description of the principal parts of the animal kingdom, is worthy of the munificence and liberality of the English East India Company, and must necessarily prove an acceptable service to the world.

To facilitate and promote all enquiries which may be calculated to enlarge the boundaries of general science, is a duty imposed on the British Government in India by its present exalted situation, and the discharge of that duty is in a more especial manner required from us, when any material addition can be made to the public stock of useful knowledge without involving considerable expense.

The Governor-General entertains a confident persuasion that, with the facilities which we now possess for the collection of accurate information from every part of India, the natural history of this quarter of the globe may be greatly improved and extended within a comparatively short period of time, without involving the necessity of any material charge on the public resources; but this desirable object will never be attained, unless it shall be made the duty of some public officer, properly qualified for this service, to collect information, and to digest and publish the result of his researches. Under these considerations the Governor-General has had it in contemplation, for some time past, to select a person conversant in natural history to be employed in the cultivation of that useful science, in the Asiatic possessions of Great Britain.

The knowledge, the learning, and the former habits of Dr. Francis Buchanan, have rendered him perfectly competent to the performance of this task, and the Governor-General accordingly proposes, that Dr. Buchanan be directed to collect materials for a correct account of all the most remarkable quadrupeds and birds in the provinces subject to the British Government in India, and to extend his enquiries as circumstances shall admit, to the other divisions of this great continent, and to the adjacent isles.

To facilitate the discharge of this duty, the Governor-General has provided an establishment at Barrackpore, where the quadrupeds and birds which may be collected for Dr. Buchanan will be kept until they shall have been described and drawn with that degree of attention to minute distinctions, which is essentially necessary for the purposes of the natural historian.

The Governor-General proposes that circular orders be transmitted to the principal civil and military officers at every fixed station under this Presidency, requiring them to instruct the medical gentlemen under their authority to correspond with Dr. Buchanan on this subject, and to reply with dispatch and accuracy to Dr. Buchanan's letters; that the principal civil and military officers be further directed to authorize their medical officers to solicit assistance and information from all officers of government under their authority, whether European or native, and that they be required to instruct all persons employed in the service of Government to afford to their medical officers the necessary assistance in procuring such animals as may be required, to communicate the most accurate information which can be obtained from the most intelligent persons in the vicinity respecting their natural history, and to furnish such aid as may be necessary for the conveyance of the animals to the Presidency.

The Governor-General proposes that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, the Honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay, and his Excellency the Governor of the British possessions on the Island of Ceylon, and the Lieutenant-Governor of Prince of Wales's Island, be requested to direct the proper officers under those governments respectively to correspond with Dr. Buchanan, and to afford every practicable assistance to Dr. Buchanan in the prosecution of his researches within the limits of their local authority, and that similar orders be sent to Malacca and to Bencoolen.

With the view of facilitating Dr. Buchanan's correspondence, it will be necessary that the Post Master-General should be ordered to receive and to forward, free from postage, all letters written by or addressed to Dr. Buchanan on the subject of his researches in the department of natural history, and that the governments of Fort St. George, Bombay and Ceylon be requested to issue similar orders to the Post Master-General at those settlements respectively. All letters written by, or addressed to Dr. Buchanan on matters connected with the duty now committed to him, must be superscribed on the envelope with the name of the writer and with the words "Natural History of India."

The following monthly establishment will be required to enable Dr. Buchanan to perform the duty now assigned to him.

For the support of the establishment necessary for the quadrupeds and birds at Barrackpore, 500 sicca rupees; for a painter, 100 do.; for a writer, 40 do.; stationary and colours, 60 do.; expense of collecting wild animals and birds, 300 do. Total per mensem, sicca rupees 1000, or 125*l*.

In proposing the appropriation of the monthly sum of 1000 rupees for the purposes described in this minute, it is the intention of the Governor-General to limit within the amount of 12,000 rupees per annum, the whole of the ordinary expenditure to be incurred in the prosecution of the important objects in his Excellency's contemplation. Some contingent disbursements may occasionally be required for the construction of buildings for the quadrupeds and birds. The amount however will be inconsiderable. It is proposed at the same time to authorize Dr. Buchanan to disburse this sum (or such inferior sum as may be required) in such manner as shall appear to Dr. Buchanan to be best calculated to promote the purposes of his appointment, and that he should be directed at the expiration of every six months, to submit to the Governor-General in Council in the public department, a detailed account of his actual expenditure, with a report of the progress which may have been made in the course of the preceding six months, in forming a collection of rare, beautiful, or singular birds at Barrackpore.

In the month of June 1800, a collection of birds and quadrupeds was commenced at Garden Reach for the service of the proposed institution which it was intended at the time to have annexed to the College of Fort William. The expense incurred for these animals since they were transferred to Barrackpore is sic. rup. 2,791,8,6, or 349%. The amount of this charge will of course be advanced from the general treasury.

The Governor-General proposes that the observations of Dr. Buchanan on such subjects of the natural history of animals as may be collected, together with the drawings of each subject, be transmitted once in each season to the honourable the Court of Directors, with a request to the honourable Court to direct the publication of the work, in such manner as they may deem most proper.

WELLESLEY.

Minute of the Governor-General on the improvement of Indian Agriculture.

Fort William, June 1, 1805.

Upon the first improvement of the grounds at Barrackpore, it was in the contemplation of the Governor-General to combine with the arrangements then adopted at his recommendation, the establishment of an institution calculated to effect the gradual improvement of the agriculture of India, and to ameliorate the general condition of our native subjects in these extensive and populous provinces.

To a cursory observer, the extensive and highly cultivated plains which are to be seen in every part of Bengal, suggest an opinion, that the utmost abundance every where prevails, and that nothing remains to be accomplished to assist the fertility of the soil, or to augment the comforts of the people. On a more accurate investigation, however, it will be found that the great mass of the people who are employed in agriculture (and especially the day labourers) are in a state of comparative indigence.

The poverty of the lower classes of our native subjects must in some measure be ascribed to the improvident policy of the landholders, in generally renting their lands on short leases at the highest rent which can be obtained, and to the long-established practice amongst the Hindoos of every description, of lavishing all the wealth which they can amass in expensive religious ceremonies, at the marriages of their children, and for the maintenance and support of religious mendicants, and other idle retainers. It is however an unquestionable fact, that the produce of the soil is infinitely below what it is capable of yielding under proper management, and that the resources and comforts of the people might be much improved if they were instructed in the best means of converting its natural fertility to the utmost advantage.

Under the present system of Indian agriculture, with the advantage of a soil of uncommon fertility, and of a climate which yields a crop of some description at every season, the industry of a single ploughman, however exerted, is insufficient to enable him to cultivate a greater extent of land within the year than seven acres, and the expense of separating the rice from the husk for culinary purposes, after the grain is reaped, cannot be estimated at a sum inferior to one-fifth part of the value of the grain; whilst a similar operation can be performed in England, and in other European countries, at an expense not exceeding one-fortieth part of the value of the crop.

Similar defects pervade every branch of Indian agriculture, and in no instances are their injurious consequences more manifestly exemplified than in the general state of the cattle employed in the labours of the field within these provinces. A breed of strong and powerful black cattle is to be found in very few situations producing good pasture throughout the year; but the weak and inefficient condition of the cattle generally employed for agricultural and other purposes, as well in Bengal as in the upper provinces, cannot have escaped the notice of the most inattentive observer.

The advantages which would accrue from an improvement of the breed of cattle are great and important; but this desirable object can only be accomplished by the introduction of a more perfect system of husbandry, where the skilful appli-

cation of art shall be employed to provide suitable nourishment for the cattle at those seasons when the pasturage is almost universally destroyed by the parching heat of the sun.

The permanent settlement of the revenues in the lower provinces, by insuring to the landholder the enjoyment of all the advantages which may arise from the improvement of his property, has contributed essentially to the encouragement of agriculture; under the present defective system of husbandry, however, the large proportion which the rent payable to the state bears to the value of the produce of the soil, operates in a certain degree as a check to the employment of the capital of the landholder in the improvement of his property; and this obstacle is only to be removed by the introduction of a system calculated at the same time to augment the produce of the land, and to diminish the expense of preparing the grain for general use.

In the opinion of intelligent European gentlemen conversant with the subject, the profits of the landholder might be augmented in a considerable proportion by the introduction of many simple improvements in the implements of agriculture and in machinery now in general use throughout Europe; by these means the property of a large proportion of our native subjects would be increased, and gradually the comforts of affluence would be more generally diffused through the mass of the people.

Independently of the moral duty imposed on the British Government to provide, by every means in its power, for the improvement of the condition of its subjects, substantial advantages must necessarily be derived by the state from the increased wealth and prosperity of the people. The consumption of all articles of comfort and of luxury would increase with augmented wealth, and the Government would be enriched by the additional produce of the taxes on those articles, without imposing any burden on the people.

Adverting to the genius and habits of the natives of India, it cannot be expected that any attempts will ever be made by them to improve the system of agriculture practised for ages by their ancestors, unless the example shall be given to them by the Government, and unless the personal advantages to be derived from such improvements as shall be found to succeed in practice shall be clearly manifested to them.

Under these considerations, the Governor-General is satisfied that the establishment of an experimental farm, under proper regulations in Bengal, would be an object of great public utility; and he is persuaded that the expense of such an institution would not prove considerable. The object of the establishment ought to be, as already stated, the improvement of the breed of black cattle, the introduction of a better system of agriculture than the system now in general use in these territories, and the reduction of the expense of preparing the grain for consumption by the use of machinery, or by other means.

The quantity of land required for the proposed farm would not exceed three hundred acres, or nine hundred begas, and the establishment could not be founded in any situation so desirable, on many considerations, as at Barrackpore; and at that place manure might be obtained at little expense, and the greater part of the grounds at Barrackpore might be employed as pasture-ground for the cattle. The business of the farm would there be conducted under the occasional inspection of the Governor-General, whose influence might be employed with great advantage to explain the benefits of the plan to the natives of rank and property, and to induce them to introduce on their own estates such improvements as might be found to be useful at Barrackpore.

To superintend the proposed farm with advantage, the assistance of an European overseer of experienced knowledge in the practice and theory of agriculture, and of an ingenious European mechanic and civil engineer, would be absolutely and indispensably necessary. These persons ought also to be men of some education, capable of applying the general knowledge they shall have acquired to the circumstances of a country differing so materially from England in soil, in climate, and in its natural productions; and of explaining in clear and intelligible language, to be translated for the use of the natives, the principles on which their system of management may be founded, and the prospect of ultimate success.

It would likewise become a part of the duty of the superintendant or overseer to correspond on agricultural subjects with intelligent European gentlemen resid-

ing in every part of India, by which means a knowledge of the practice of agriculture in its various branches, as established with success in any one province, might be disseminated and tried by actual experiment throughout the British possessions. In this manner the drill husbandry now practised with advantage in the centre of the Deccan might be extended to many parts of Bengal; means might be devised to instruct the inhabitants in the preservation of hay, for the use of the cattle, at the season when little or no herbage is to be found, and many other useful improvements might be introduced.

Amongst these it has been suggested that the cultivation of the turnip might be introduced with considerable advantage for the purpose of feeding cattle at that season of the year when the deficiency of the articles of food for cattle now in common use is most severely felt.

When a sufficient number of intelligent and industrious natives shall have been instructed in the improved system of agriculture to be introduced at the experimental farm at Barrackpore, they may be dispersed throughout the country, for the purpose of disseminating a knowledge of its advantages; and other establishments may be formed in the distant provinces, as circumstances shall indicate the propriety of the measure, on principles corresponding with those of the proposed establishment at Barrackpore.

It is not improbable that some intelligent Europeans, capable of conducting the business of an experimental farm on these principles, might be found in India; but it appears to the Governor-General to be proper, that the establishment of the farm upon any extended scale should be postponed until the sanction of the honourable the Court of Directors to the measure can be obtained, who may possess the means of considering this important subject, in concert with those distinguished personages in England, whose recent labours and example have contributed so largely to augment the agricultural resources of Great Britain. The question is highly deserving of the mature deliberation and attention of the honourable Court, nor can any subject be presented to their notice more worthy of engaging the exertion of that spirit of liberal patronage which the East India Company has always manifested towards every plan of improvement calculated to ameliorate the condition of the natives of these possessions.

The Governor-General accordingly proposes that a copy of this minute be transmitted to the honourable Court, with the request of this Government, that, in the event of their approving the general principles of the plan, on which it is proposed that the experimental farm shall be established, the Court will be pleased to engage two active and intelligent Europeans, possessing all the qualifications required to enable them to carry the arrangement into execution with a reasonable prospect of success, and to send them to Bengal at as early a period of time as may be practicable. In the meanwhile such part of the present park at Barrackpore as may be rendered useful to the proposed purposes, may be applied to them, under the inspection of Mr. Douglas and of Mr. Buchanan.

WELLESLEY.

APPENDIX R.

[This note was written in Major-General Sir Patrick Ross's copy of the Marquess Wellesley's despatches, it is here published as containing a testimony of Lord Wellesley's respect for the memory and services of Captain Benjamin Sydenham, and of his brother Captain Thomas Sydenham.]

Hurlingham, April, 4, 1837.

I trust that these volumes may be interesting to Sir Patrick Ross, for whom I entertain great respect and esteem, not only personal, but from recollection of his worthy father's, Major-General Ross's services in India during the memorable war in Mysore; nor can I forget the same respectable officer's uniform and active support of my administration, of which an honourable testimony is recorded in the first of these volumes.

Lady Ross also will take an interest in the recital of transactions, in which I derived the greatest advantage from the affectionate attachment and zealous services of her excellent, amiable, and accomplished brothers.

Captain Benjamin Sydenham was for years my most intimate, confidential, and faithful friend, to the hour of his premature, and by me ever-lamented death. He was my principal reliance and support in all difficulties and dangers; and he is entitled to a large share of the merit of whatever success has attended me in public life. His loss was, and is to me irreparable; nor can my affectionate regret for him be diminished, while any power of memory shall remain. Of Mr. Thomas Sydenham's talents, accomplishments, and integrity, I must ever retain the highest estimation, with the strongest gratitude for his continued friendship and assiduous services.

To the remaining branches of a family, so justly endeared to me, may these pages recall and confirm those sentiments which are warmly cherished in my heart.

WELLESLEY.

APPENDIX S.

Memorandum of the Public Services of the Right Honourable Sir Gore Ouseley, Bart. G. C. H. and K. S. L. &c. in India and Persia.

Sir Gore Ouseley's conduct during the time of his residence at Lucnow, was most useful to the British interests, and was fully approved by the Governor-General. In consequence of the strong recommendation of Mr. Henry Wellesley (now Lord Cowley), the Governor-General sanctioned the appointment of Major (now Sir Gore) Ouseley, as Aid-de-Camp to the Nabob Vizier, Saadut Ali. In that situation Sir Gore Ouseley availed himself, with judgment and wisdom, of every opportunity to cultivate a good understanding between the state of Oude, and the British power, whose interests in fact are inseparable.

At the commencement of the Mahratta war in 1803, the 8th or Royal Irish regiment of dragoons, (just then arrived from England, and not being yet mounted,) volunteered to serve on foot, and was marching to join Lord Lake's army: Saadut Ali happened to meet this distinguished corps on their march, as he was hunting, accompanied by Sir Gore Ouseley; who having suggested to the Nabob the service which would be rendered to the cause of the allies, by furnishing these brave men with horses; the Nabob immediately authorized Sir Gore to select horses for that purpose from his Highness's stables: Colonel Salkeld accordingly was sent from Cawnpore, and, with Sir Gore Ouseley, selected the number of horses required to mount the regiment, from nearly four thousand horses then in the Nabob's stables. This munificent and friendly gift greatly delighted Lord Lake, the Commander-in-Chief, who employed the Royal Irish, mounted on the horses of the Nabob of Oude, with the most glorious effect in the memorable victory of Laswaree, and in the pursuit and defeat of Holkar. His Highness further evinced his anxiety to contribute to the success of the British arms under the Government of the Marquess Wellesley, by furnishing gratuitously Lord Lake's army in the field with a considerable number of elephants for the baggage, and of cattle for the use of the camp, which proved most important in aiding the advance and operations of the troops during the war.

These most useful arrangements were all made under the salutary and able advice and suggestion of Sir Gore Ouseley; to whose wise counsels Saadut Ali paid the most ready and favourable attention. These facts, (so creditable to the Nabob and to Sir Gore Ouseley,) afford a most unquestionable proof, that the treaty of 1801 had not alienated Saadut Ali's mind from the Governor-General; and that the operation of that treaty had proved equally beneficial to the Nabob Vizier, and to the British interests.

It may be here remarked, that Saadut Ali acceded to the throne of Oude, on the 21st February, 1798; that on his accession, he was in a state of comparative poverty; that he died in the year 1814, thirteen years after the conclusion of the treaty; and that he left in his treasury the enormous sum of fourteen *crores* of rupees (seven-teen millions sterling;) of which a considerable portion was advanced, by his successor the present King of Oude, for the service of the British Government.

These facts are irreconcilable with the supposition, that the treaty of 1801 had not been advantageous to Saadut Ali.

At the close of the year 1809, the Marquess Wellesley (being Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Mirza Aboul Hassan arrived in London as Ambassador to his Majesty George the Third from Fateh Ali Shah King of Persia. Sir Gore Ouseley's conduct at Lucnow, and his intimate acquaintance with the Persian language, and with the manners and customs of that nation, induced Lord Wellesley to select him for the office of Mehmandar to the Persian Ambassador, as being the person in England best qualified for that situation. The ability, discretion, and zeal with which Sir Gore Ouseley discharged the duties of that station, again induced Lord Wellesley to recommend him to his Majesty for the office of British Ambassador to the King of Persia, upon the return of Mirza Aboul Hassan from his mission to this country.

In Persia, Sir Gore Ouseley's conduct (as it had in India) obtained Lord Wellesley's entire approbation, until the period of Lord Wellesley's resignation.

Sir Gore Ouseley's situation in Persia was extremely difficult, and his duties were of a most complicated and embarrassing nature.

After having successfully negotiated a treaty between England and Persia, whilst Russia was in alliance with France; under a happy change of circumstances, he effected a pacification between Persia and Russia; and throughout these transactions, preserved the good opinion and confidence of both parties. The Emperor of Russia manifested his favour by a most gracious reception of Sir Gore Ouseley at St. Petersburg, and conferred on him the order of St. Alexander Newski. His Imperial Majesty also recommended him in the strongest terms to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent for the honour of a British peerage; stating, that by Sir Gore Ouseley's timely aid in mediating a treaty of peace between Russia and Persia, Russia obtained the advantage of a large disposable force in the rear of Bonaparte's army; which enabled the Emperor to drive the invader from his dominions.

The sentiments of the King of Persia respecting Sir Gore Ouseley's services are fully detailed in the following extract of a letter from his Majesty to the Prince Regent of England.

WELLESLEY.

Extract from a Translation of a Letter to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of England from his Majesty the King of Persia, Fateh Ali Shah.

(After Compliments,)

We next represent to our August Brother, the Prince Regent of England, that at the time of the departure of the high and dignified Ambassador, his Excellency Sir Gore Ouseley, Bart. we wrote a letter containing some account of the zeal and wisdom which he displayed, and of the high services which he performed to both states whilst here, by his strenuous exertions in cementing their union.

As he himself was the bearer of that letter, we forebore expatiating in it on his merits and praises out of respect for his feelings; but we have always had an intention of representing in a proper manner to your Royal Highness his loyalty and affection to both our high states, our gratitude for his eminent services and the perfect confidence we have in his wisdom. We cannot choose a more proper time for shewing the sincerity of our gratitude towards him than by expressing now, that he is no longer with us, our highest satisfaction at all his acts and services. Indeed his services towards us have acquired for him our highest esteem and regard, and had it not been for his ill health we could never have consented to part with him. The request which we have to make to our affectionate brother is this, that in return for the splendid services which your Ambassador has performed, your Royal Highness will please to distinguish him constantly with marks of your favour, and raise him in rank, so that acquiring high dignities he become the envy of his equals. As we, in compliance with your Royal Highness's recommendation and wishes, bestowed marks of our highest favour upon the exalted Mirza Abul Hassan Khan, raised him to the dignity of Khan, and placed him amongst the nobles of our empire, so we therefore trust that your Royal Highness in compliance with our earnest request, will bestow marks of your regard upon your above-mentioned representative, and so exalt his rank, that when it becomes known far and near it may be manifest, that in return for his

eminent services to this state, you have thus distinguished and exalted him, and that thus the friendship of the two states may become more than ever evident to the world.

To conclude, may the days of friendship be eternal.

(Sealed) FATEH ALI SHAH.

A true translation.

J. D. CAMPBELL.

APPENDIX T.

Extract from the Calcutta Gazette, 2d March, 1804.

Reply from his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General and Captain-General of India, to the Inhabitants of Calcutta, on the occasion of their presenting to him their Vote for erecting a Marble Statue to him, which is now at Calcutta.

GENTLEMEN,

After an administration of nearly six years, marked by a rapid succession of events, which have exercised every branch of this service, and have tried the public spirit of every description of the British inhabitants of these provinces, I am enabled to form a competent judgment of the character and disposition of this settlement. Justice and gratitude require, that I should acknowledge the sincere conviction of my mind; and I rejoice in an occasion, which demands the public declaration of my sentiments upon a subject, intimately connected with the warmest emotions of my heart.

In the course of my administration, you have been pleased to afford to the world, repeated demonstrations of your personal regard and esteem for me, founded upon the public benefits enjoyed under this government. The value of such distinctions cannot be appreciated without reference to the source from which they are derived: no honours can ever be received by me with equal satisfaction, or with an equal sense of just pride. Highly as I tender the reputation of our country, it is my duty to declare, that no part of the British Empire surpasses this settlement in the abundance of zeal for the public service, of ability in the discharge of official functions, of useful knowledge, of exemplary diligence, and of approved integrity; nor are the loyalty, public spirit, and liberal disposition, which prevail among you, exceeded in any quarter of the globe. The fixed esteem of such a community, established upon mature experience of long public service, is the most grateful distinction to which honourable ambition can aspire.

I therefore accept the high and extraordinary testimony of approbation, which you have been pleased to confer upon me, with the deepest sense of its value.

The just object of public honours is not to adorn a favoured character, nor to extol individual reputation, nor to transmit an esteemed name with lustre to posterity; but to commemorate public services, and to perpetuate public principles.

The conscious sense of the motives, objects, and result of my endeavours, to serve my country in this arduous station, inspires me with an unfeigned solicitude, that the principles which I revere, should be preserved, for the security of the interests, now entrusted to my charge, and destined hereafter to engage my lasting and affectionate attachment.

May then the memorial, by which you are pleased to distinguish my services, remind you of the source from which they proceeded, and of the ends to which they were directed; and confirm, in this flourishing and prosperous settlement, the principles of public virtue, the maxims of public order, and a due respect for just and honest government.

WELLESLEY.

END OF VOLUME IV.

CRITIQUES.

"This is a publication of extraordinary interest in many points of view. The whole of the brilliant policy which ended in crushing the great enemy of our Indian Empire among the native powers, in restoring our political influence with the other courts, and in extinguishing that of France in the East, is here laid before our eyes in every part of its progress: we have the whole history of the events given with a degree of authority and particularity of which there is no other example. We have access to the plan in its first conception; we see it struggle with various difficulties previous to the execution; we can trace its progress to maturity; and have the means of ascertaining how those difficulties were overcome, and lesser minds were made to yield a compliance, sometimes reluctant—more frequently cheerful, while the instruments were always able as well as hearty, because they were the selection of the framer of the design, who hardly ever was disappointed in any one chosen by him for civil or military service. In short the whole springs and wheels of the machine are exposed to our view; and we doubt, if any continuous history could arrest the attention, or occupy the mind of any discerning reader more entirely than this more series of state papers and demi-official letters is calculated to do. The consummate ability—the truly statesman-like views—the admirable combination of temper and firmness—the rare union of patience with despatch, of vigour with perseverance, by which the formation of Lord Wellesley's plans were characterized, and by which their uniform and complete success was secured have never been questioned by any one at all acquainted with the subject. His confidence in his own resources, and his determination to carry through his own measures were tempered on all occasions by the greatest urbanity and kindness, and the best and most appropriate monument of his Lordship's fame, and the marvellous exhibition of capacity and vigour which we have been surveying, is the record which this volume contains of his actions."—[*Edinburgh Review*, No. 128, July 1836.]

"The Despatches may truly be called national records of which England may justly be proud; they are the very best materials for history, if not history itself. Not only do they almost in every page throw new lights upon imperfectly known subjects, but they give us fresh facts with all the multiplicity of their remote causes. Moreover, they tend to uphold the English character, while they do infinite honour to the noble Marquess whose wise government they so well illustrate. The name of Mr. Martin is a guarantee that what he undertakes will be well done, and the work will not only give satisfaction, but just pride to the British public."—[*Metropolitan Magazine*, No. 61.]

"A work which displays the comprehensive mind and high statesman-like qualifications of the noble Marquess in a remarkable manner. The greatness of his general policy—the profoundness of his views, and the skill with which he conducted every affair of difficulty and peril, with powerful and threatening opposing interests are here demonstrated throughout. The Work possesses that high standard value which must make it the inmate of every public and private library."—[*Literary Gazette*, of 2d and 9th April 1836.]

"The Despatches of the Marquess Wellesley embrace the most important period in the history of British India. His Lordship had to encounter difficulties which would have baffled a less able statesman; but the Despatches shew us the sound judgment with which his Lordship directed the combined movements of the British powers."—[*Athenæum*, No. 442, April 6th 1836.]

"This Work cannot fail to command attention. The space which the noble Marquess long filled in the political world, the prominent positions he maintained—the great objects he achieved—the wisdom and foresight which he displayed for so many years, in the most important and varied characters all give weight to this publication, in the pages of which will be traced the workings of a master mind, through a period of the greatest interest to the British nation."—[*John Bull*, April 10th, 1836.]

"It is now generally admitted, that had not the splendid talents of the Marquess Wellesley been called into active exercise at the critical conjuncture of his Lordship's assuming the government, the necessity for discussing Indian affairs would long since have ceased. The issue of the contest with Tippoo Sultan was a triumphant proof of the political sagacity, energy, and above all, the moral courage (his peculiar characteristic) of Lord Wellesley's highly gifted mind."—[*Asiatic Journal for June*, 1837.]

"The despatches of the Marquess Wellesley are a fine course of political science, detailed in the language of an orator. The letters and papers of the Marquess are of the Wellesleyan stamp; they are masterly."—[*New Monthly Magazine for June*, 1837.]